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BACKGROUND PAPER IRAQ: SADDAM'S POLITICAL OPTIONS
Although Saddam Husayn is resolved to maintain his hold on Kuwait, his options are becoming increasingly complicated as US Iroops deploy in force to Saudi Arabia, UN economic sanctions begin to be implemented, and other Arab states become more resolute in their opposition to tne takeover.
o Baghdad's vehement anti-Saudi and anti-US rhetoric of the past fewy)
replaced previous assurances that Iraq has no hostile intentions against >
Arabia and indicates that Baghdad is faying the propaganda groundworkfurther military action.
o Saddam's inflammatory speeches and proposed "solutions" in the last few days echo bis anti-Kuwaiti propaganda and extreme demands prior to the invasion. Onugust he called on allMuslims tooly war against US forces in Saudi Arabia and Western interests everywhere.
o The "initiative" Saddam proposed onugustpokesman demanded the withdrawal of all Israeli forces from the occupied territories, Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, the removal of US and Western forces from Saudi Arabia and their replaceraent by Arab forces, the reversal of UN sanctions, the return of worldwide trade with Iraq to the status quo ante, and negotiations with Saudi Arabia to determine the future of Kuwait. Israeli, US, and Syrian withdrawals mustolution to the Kuwaiti crisis. Saddam threatened "if America and its allies will not accept this initiative, we will resist by force."
believe Saddam is assessing three options:
o His preferred option at present apparently is to sit light in hopes that poor
enforcement and lack of resolve within the international community will cause UN sanctions to unravel.
o If Saddam chooses toettlement, we believe he would seek an Arab-mediated formula that grants Iraq significant financial and territorial concessions.
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o If no solution can be reached that allows Saddam to maintain de facto control of Kuwait, or if he believes that thc US will use its growing military presence in Saudi Arabia to force bim out of Kuwaitjje is likely to conclude that he has nothing to lose by lashing out militarily.
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ightly controlled police state and Saddam, with the aid of hismachine and pervasive security services, probably could deal withof public support His only real internal threat is from assassination, (f
Hoping to Wait It Out
as a
Saddam probably calculates that if UN sanctions are not backed up with force-such naval blockade-he can outlast the resolve of the international community to isolate him and reject Arab mediation efforts. He is determined not to return Kuwait to its pre-tnvastoo status or give up its oil wealth and he hopes the world will come to accept his annexation of Kuwaitait accompli.
o Saddam hopes that as the crisis drags on economic and oil market pressuressome countries to stop adhering to the UN sanctions. He isabout maintaining food imports.peech onugust, hewomen to begin to conserve food. We estimate Iraq requires atood imports annually to avoid widespread.,
o Baghdad isi likely to continue to reject Arab mediation efforts while it gauges the resolve and ability of the international community to enforce sanctions.
o Saddam can indefinitely keep the US and other Westerners caught in Iraq to play on Western popular concerns about theirandful could be released periodically to maintain the appearance that these Westerners are not hostages.
-le probably believes that
pis propaganda machine can maintain popular support for an extended period even il sanctions begin to deplete supplies of food and raw materials for industry and agriculture. If supplies run short, he could starve the Kurdish minority first, saving key supplies for the military and his Arab constituency.
o In an effort to broaden Arab support at the mass level and deflect criticism of the invasion, the regime on Friday appealed to pan-Arab sentiments against foreign intervention and called on all Arabs to revolt against US presence in Saudi Arabia Saddarri^yrjhatly called on the Arab "have-nots" to rise up against the oil rich Gulf
iplomatic Solution
If Saddam chooses torokered solution to the Kuwait crisis, we believe he wouldace-saving. Arab-mediated formula that grants Iraq significant financial and territorial concessions, and continued de facto control of Kuwait
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o Saddam probably would accede to an Arab-brokered compromise only if he is facedaval blockade or military intervention that cripples Iraq's economy, significantly increases discontent within the military, and threatens to destabilize his regime.
o He almost certainly would press for financial concessions that include debt
forgiveness and especially large amounts of cash,order settlement that gave Iran possession of warbah and Bubiyan Islands, as well as major adjustments along the land border. His financial demands would be in the tens of billions of dollars.
almost certainly would not return control of Kuwait to!
pa,probably would agree to elections in Kuwait if he is
le can manipulate the outcome in Iraq's favor, possibly by demand!
chisement for Kuwait's Palestinian and non-Kuwaiti Arab populations.
Saddam's harsh rhetoric swift annexation of Kuwait, threats to retaliate for foreign military intervention, and massive propaganda effort make it extremely difficult for him to back down. To avoid the appearance of having gained nothing from the invasion, the regime's propaganda apparatus would try to deflect blame for the setback onto other Arabs who caved in" to US manipulation, while hailing Saddam as the only Arab leader brave
enough to stand up to Western imperialism.
Saddam's greatest concern in conceding to any mediated solution probably would be to contain coup plotting within Iraq's military establishment.
o He especially fears antagonizing his elite Republican Guard Forces, who carried out the conquest of Kuwait,ritical role in preserving his hold on power, and who probably wouldithdrawalisgraceful capirulation to the US.
o Given Saddam's record of ruthlessly suppressing suspected opponents, he is probably confident his security services caryrrush any civil unrest arising from public angererceived surrender. "
Would He Rather Fight Than Switch?
If no solution can be reached that allows Saddam to claim
o He could with little or no warningull-scale atuck against Saudi Arabia,against oil tankers servicing Saudi Arabia, or US navalforces in the
o Given the rapid deterioration of US-Iraqi ties and Iraq's deepening isolation in the Arab and international communities. Saddam is likely to resort to any means available, including the taking of US citizens as hostages, to forestall US retaliation
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against Iraq. Baghdad almost certainly intends its refusal to allow US citizens to leave Iraq or Kuwaitignal.
o Saddam could use his formidable terrorist capability over the long-term againstand Israeli targets to weaken popular supoort for sanctions orin Saudi Arabia or
SADDAMS FIGHTING WORDS
Saddam's call-"Save Mecca and the tomb of the Prophet fromougust for Arabs to rise up against the US and Saudi Arabia:
he imperialists, the deviationists, the traders and brokers of politics, and the lackeys of the foreigners have joined ranks against
he US forces came, and the doors of Saudi Arabia were opened to themalse and lying claim that toe army of Iraq wiU continue the militant struggle toward them. Neither denial nor explanation has worked. This meaos that there are deliberate arrangements to commit aggression against
urn the ground beneath the feet of the aggressive invaders who harbor evil against your peopiein Iraq, and who have set out to spread their evil throughout the Arab homeland to stifle the voice of justice in the Arab
trike their interests wherever they are, and save Mecca and tbe tomb of the MessengerU)
SADDAM'S PAST RECORD ON COMPROMISE
Notwithstanding his belligerent stance. Saddam has in the pastillingness to compromise to ensure the security of his regime.
o Saddam5 signed the Algiers Accord with Iran and made border
o9 he retreated from his aggressive efforts to supply Lebanon's Christians with heavy weapons, when confrontedyrian naval blockade of Lebanon.
In none of these situations were the political or military stakes as high or as dangerous for Saddam.F^
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