Office of Strategic Services KtstAJtcii and Analysis Branch
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Government. The radical clique, thea, has steadilyolicy of belligerent and anti-Western imperialism involving decisive military action.14 the Kodc-ha was able to enlist the cooperation of the more conservative Totei-ha.
Internally the Kodc-ha advocated army ruleorporative state with nationalization of the major Industries. Its members believed that the accumulation of private capital can be useful only when applied directly to the aggrandisement of Japanese military strength. When1 the group came into dominant power with General Tojo'sto the premiership. It attempted to enforce virtual state control of Industry, and lt eliminated bureaucrats and more conservativefrom the Government. Tojo attempted to strengthen the one-party system by establishing the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Societyf Tojo allied himself with any group outside the Army it was with the "new bureaucrats" and "modern" industrialists who alsoorporative reorganization of Japans governmental and economic structure.
The zenith of Kodo-ha power was reached in4 when Influential but moderate General Sugiyama lost the Important post of Army Chief of Staff. Tojo personally assumed the Job. Sugiyama had served under both Army factions In the past, but had never espoused the Ideas of the young officers and had often been under attack by Kodo-ha sympathizers. Nevertheless Sugiyama had powerful connections within the Army, and he reappeared In the new Kolso Government as Minister of War.
The Rotso Coalition Regime
Inlmost Immediately after the Allied conquest of Salpan. Premier Tojo was replaced by General Kunlaki Kolso. whobelonged to neither Army clique. Under the new Premier the most uncompromising militarists were supplanted by members of the leas extreme Armytrong coalition Cabinet was formed, ably representing the chief political elements within Japan and including nonmilitury political careerists and industrialists. Admiral Yonal and General Sugiyama, both political moderates, were given the keyof Navy and War, with Yonal serving as Deputy Premier as well.
Kolso came into officeave of adverse public opinionthe Ineffectual Internal policies and the deterioration of Japan's military situation under Tojo. In no sense did the Cabinet changeeakening of Japan's support for theilitary careerist of considerable distinction, Kolso had been Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army at the time of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria. Later, while Governor-General of Korea, heeputation for efficiency in applying Japanese repressive techniques.
The Tosei-ha ls as strong an advocate of Japanese territorialabroad as the Kodo-ha, but lt is more willing to work through
and with other poUtlcal forces like the finance-capitalists and influential statesmen to achieve its endB. The Kodo-ha, at the peak of its power, was not strong enough to effect tho nationalization of the greathouses (collectively termed theith the advent of the Kolso regime, powerful moneyed interests were reinstated in the Government.
After assuming office In July, Kolsoumber ofchanges in an attempt to coordinate military strategy and war production. Unlike Tojo, who had concentrated increasing power and responsibility in the handsew individuals. Kolso tried to divide responsibility for the conduct of the warumber of groups and individuals, and also restored the traditional separation of the Army and Navy commands from the War and Navy Departments.
While all groups emphasized the pressing need for theof war production controls to meet Japan's critical war situation, sharp disagreement existed over the method. Some of Japan's leading industrialists ascribed the unsatisfactory progress of the war to lack of speed in munitions manufacture resulting from undue Government interference. This group, Including the present Munitions Minister Toyoda, demanded that the responsibility and Initiative for production be left to the industrialists themselves. Other factions advocated the placing of such industries under much closer Government supervision, if not directly under the Army.
Koiso's policy reflected the influence of those who demanded control by the Industrialists rather than by the Government or the military. His Munitions Minister Yoahlda pointed out that private enterprise should be given full play and that Government operation of civilian factories was no simple task. In merchant shipping, the one sphere where Koiso's regimeajor reorganization, the result was to increase the powers of the Shipping Management Association dominated by the big Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo firms The appointmentarch of seven leading representatives of the Zalbatiu as advisors to theMinistry bore out other Indications that Government supervision of industry under Kolso amounted to supervision by industrialists in Government positions.
During his last two months In office, when his regime was already seriously weakened by unallayed military adversity, Koiso made several attempts to consolidate the Empire behind the war effort. Notable among these were theebruary Cabinet shift designed to meet persistent criticism of the manpower program, the formationew political party in March, and the granting of Diet representation to Korea and Formosapril.
Since the pattern of Japanese war mobilization had already been set, the Cabinet changes had little opportunity to alter lt decisively. The new political party (Greater Japan Politicalhich isto assure "certain victory" and enlist "spontaneous popular
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support for thears not likely to be more effective than its predecessor, the LRAA Furthermore. Japanese efforts to integrate outlying regions into the political structure of Japan proper entail no genuine political concessions, and certainly in the case of Korea will have little effect on local aspirations for independence
The Suzuki Cabinet
The composition of the new Suzuki Cabinet belies Tokyo insistence that Kolso has made waytronger Government. Although almost all political element* in Japan (the military, the industrialists, the bureaucrats, the old political parties, and the Imperial court) areonly six have held Cabinet posts in the past as compared with eleven in the case of the original Kolso Government Most of the new Cabinet members are older.mire tired public servants resurrected to serve In positions which they failed to achieve in their earlier careers. Suzuki himself Isears old and was serving as President of thePrivy Council until his appointment to the premiership. He has never been identified with the extreme military cliques and. In fact,arget for assassination In the radical young officers uprising ofis close association9 with the usuallycircle of Imperial advisors undoubtedly lends prestige lo his premiership at this critical time.
The new Government contain* only two members of the Army, the most Important of which is War Minister General An ami Anamlhas never been associated with either the radical or theArmy cliques. General Yasul. the second Army man. Is said to have been selected by Anaml to maintain "liaison between the Army and the cabinet"
Although the Navy Is represented In the new Cabinet by fourtwo of these, Premier Suzuki and Munitions Minister Toyoda, were undoubtedly selected primarily for special administrative andcompetence. Toyoda, like Suzuki, isighting admiral. Hepecialist In ordnance production, president of the Japan Steel Works, and married into the powerful Mitsui Industrial family. Together with the new Transportation and Communications Minister Kohlyama,of the South Manchuria Railway. Toyoda now represents In the Government those Japanese Interests which strongly oppose military control of mdustry.
Justice Minister Matsuzaka, Agriculture and Commerce Minister Ishlguro, Finance Minister Hlroee, and Home Affairs Minister Abe are all career bureaucrats, the first two having served In previous cabinets. Welfare Minister Okada and Minister Without Portfolio Sakural were leaders of the two most important prewar political parties.
The new Foreign Minister Togo has probably been chosen for his experience in foreign relations, particularly with the USSR. However, as Foreign Minister in the opening months of the Tojo Cabinet, Togo
was responsible for the sustaining of diplomatic negotiations inuntil the Japanese were ready to strike at Pear) Harbor.
Upon assuming office. Premier Suzuki warned Japan that an Allied invasion of the homeland was imminent and pledged his Government to "achieve final victory over theut the relatively weak composition of the new Cabinet appears to reflect the presentof the Japanese power groups as to whether to continue the war on an all-out basis, or attempt to save what Is left of the Empireegotiated peace. Although the Kodo-ha has been temporarily submerged, It can be expected to disapprove any limitation on an all-out war policy. Whatever course It follows, Suzuki's government must operate under the threat that the bitter clique rivalry within the Army may resultritical lack of internal unity.
Original document.
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