THE BERLIN DISPUTE

Created: 10/15/1948

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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Thfr 3cr?.in oyC'Sljoa cootinuec. ioe SecuriS?rin& tne past weefcj trtto ihe ac-caSied ceutrai(Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, and Syria) attempting toompromise formula whichimultaneous lifting of the blockade and reference of the entireroblem to toe Council of foreignThis attempt by tbe SC "neutrals" has thus far had little success. The Soviet proposal for resumption of direct ncgo-tlatfOTiP on the basin of tbeoreent wocM merely return theto their status prior to UM considera'uon of the matter. Tliia Soviet proposal ciso emphasir-es thethat Uje USSR, in return for lifting toe blockade, willtoore substantial concession than western agreement to "re-opeu" the German problem. The minimum Soviet demands will probably be either temporary suspension of plans forGerman government or westernto toff Kremlin terms for the use of Soviet currency in all sectors of Berlin. Meanwhile, the USSR may reasoa following SC action on the Berlin question, discussion in the Assembly Trtll be prolonged.elay would enable the USSRbserve the effect of winter upon toe westernand upon the resistance of the Berlin people toeigh the effects o* its attacks on the European recovery program;onfuse further the Berlin issue by additional 'conciliatory' proposals designed primarily for tactical or propaganda value.

Soviet delaying tactics on toe Berlin question may also be prompted by the bleak industrial outlook ior western Berlin, which is not likely to improve until the blockade Is lifted and normal transportation restored. The food processing industry has been closed by military government order to conserve coal and power, and the major industries (chemicals, textiles, machines and machine tools) continue to operate atf the pre-blockade level. The continued depletion of fuel and raw material

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FRANCE

Thengpirfed striker ir. rrnrcc preprimarily nfindlh which to further the Kremlinprimary goal ol Cc-icatinj the European recovery program. ConM.'O.ue.ftly, the fate which befalls the French Communist Parcyesult of the strikesa secondary consideration to Uie USSR. The current Communist attack in Trance reflects the Soviet belief that such action, If taken before resterr. aid restores French political and economic stability, rould seriously dislocate thfc French economy andhe beneiicial effects o* the European recovery progr^P; throughout western Europe.n choosing France as the first major br-ltlegrounc* In ite light against. European rehabilitation, the Kremlin has run the risk ofDe Gaulle's return to power and of possible outlawing of the Communist Party. Regardless of the outcome ol the strike offensive in France, the Communists can be expected to resort to similar direct tactics in other ECA countrios.

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