o. <
Office MefTzorandufuunited states-government
ilrootor of Central intelHsoneo ifflW9
from': st ant Direotor, 2eports and Estimates
overage of International J -
Interim Report, of tbo Interdepartmental Ad Boo Committee "Jigsaw" Pro jeotV ;
3U There is transmitted herewith the interim report of theAd fioo Committee, set up on ORB initiative to maketbe intelligence ooverage of the International ConuBunistreport states inter alia that (a) there Is not at present oompleteooverage of tbe international Ccoaaunlst noveaent la. anyb) there ia no cloer-out delineation of responsibility for theof intelligence on International Ccamunism among the severale.geaoiear, and (o) there is lnsuffiolent coordinationon the working level between Government IntelligenceCosamunisa,.. The roport requests that the various agencies oonour inand reocosaondatlons and reoormaends that the intelligencea coordinated programntelligence research on the
movement, and that,eoessary preliminary, the agenoios coma to
agreement as to the apeoifio fields of intelligence oonoerning the Coaaunlflt movement in which they ore rilling to assusie primary responsibility, '
In order to meet the responsibilities of CIA, ORB has planned''j-establish an International Comaunlsa Group end has allocated six professional positions In the gradesn the Eastern Burope/OSSR Branch andone profesBional position in eaohof the other regional branohes to coordinate the study of the International Communist movement. Three persons suitable for this activity are on duty at present in the Snetern Burope/oSgR Brenoh and two others have been seleoted and are awaiting security olearanoe*'
It is planned that- tha' ORB 'intelligence Production Boardrepresentatives of-OK,* end the International Coianiuniam Croup,andgenoius whenever matters pertaining to their Intorests under consideration) #iU function In an advisory capacity to the ' Direotor, ORB* *. j
JL oopy of the detailed plan for the International Cats.'sunism
' .
It Is planned that ORB will act, as coordinator for the reoorasnded research program on the subject of international Conaaunlaa. ORB will assume
APPROVED FOR RlIEBSE DflTL2
mini
j-'p'rliaai
responsibility for the produotiejajaf ell nationnlthis oategory overlnpo
with th*oolologloiil, and oultored aspeots of thait will coordinate Its produotioarwith that ofla ordar to uvold duplloation/ It is presumed that thawill desiro to retain primary responsibility for th*intelligence relating to oertain uapeots of Communism, but it lalikely that there will be any serious olash of interests^
B. In order that the questionetailed delineation offor researoh on specific aapeote of international Cowniaa may be settled, it la roooanended that (a) the Directoroint nesting of the IAC Standing Committee aad the aJigsaw" Cotaalttee toelineation egreeusnt for oooslderatloa by the IAC* raftroposed letter to the IAC agencies isb) the ORB plan for handling the CIA respooslbilities concerning International CobbvaIsb be approved! (o) th* Direotoretter to the Director of the federal Bureau of Invest!gation, substantially in accordance with the attaohod draft* It is believed that FBI advloe andia the study of Communism will be of considerable assistance toesearch program*
r>
9 (d)
InteMeparmnental Ad Hoc Committee "Jigsaw" Projeot Interim Report. Flan for Intelligence Treatment of International Cosnunism by CIA. Memorandum for Members of the IAC.
Letter to Direotor. Federal Bureau of loveafcigation.
*6fht
OPTICS OP RSrCRTO APD EGTIliATES
78
IRTBRDEPARTlJEHTAL AD HOC COM^TTBB,ROJECT INTERIM REPORT
I PROSLSia
1. By directive of the Assistant Direetor, ORE, datedhe Committee us eiUbllnhod and assigned the foiiowinjT nlseionsi
To aaoertaln what coverage should be glvsn hy the governmental intelligence orgnnleations to Communist activities Jn various areas of hhe world)
To translate the coverage deoldod uponofinlto repertinr, progran3
To drawriority Hating of desired reports!
To nake appropriate rscopesodatlona to the AssistantEstimates Group) for scheduling reportsbove, talcing into consideration the capaolty of departmental intellirence organliationa and ORE to produce Ihe requisite reports,
2* The Committee first devoted Its attention) above and0 after exploring thia aubjoct at acne lengthy concluded that it .would be impractical to)) without some clarification of the responsibilities as between the various agencies represented*
S. In view of this, the Ccaraitteo has decided to propare this interim report in order to present its corclueione and recosoendations regarding) above, and to request oUrifioatien of the responsibilities of the various amsnciea before turno the problems in)
aicLusims
The Cotanittee'b lnvestlEotion of the problems set out In) haa led te the following oonolueionss
1* Adequate lntelligenoe treatment requires that Conrauiion be bandiedhreo-fold besisi
- SECRET
tssedalletaployin*
as an lnterootlonal('poHtlca do fined dootrlno wlffisTSabT
a variety of toohnieues and, psychological; eeonoaic, ar.cQubmrelTa var against theorid in general and tho United States in particular.
ital factor in the ^oeol polltloaljsoene in varloua countries and ret
dequate intolllnotaco Governor requires that the subject of Coanunien bo treated under the* followinc hoadlnns-
Doctrine
OrgulsntlcB o) Strategy
Operetleml Kathode
Personalities
jjomplete Intelligence coverage does not nunany U. S. Government age-ioy.
4* There lc at present no clear-out delineation offor the production of intelligence on International (kSBBBSSlSBI acoag the several Gotcrecent intelligence agencies.
is insufficlint ooordiaetlcn end contact onleval betweon Goveruaect intelligence agenciesCommunism.
agenciescBprehsr.sive and Intelligence rososrcfiT desired to provide the
Ill RECOJtTKDATIWS In view of the "oregolng, itcouDw.dedeneies sur.ds rtelte a
>rog
alanced analysis cf the major featurec of
International Conntunisn< nc outlined in Part II, parncraph za above, and (b) edvonee vornlng ofsnds and developments in Communist oport-tlcaa.
r a
Tha next task of thisimilar Ir/Mr'le portion tal caralttee deBlInG with this problem should bc the precise delineation of tie esponsibilities for tha production of intellijenoe on Intornstionclnong tho several Governxeiit intelligence agencies. Since the primary interests of the dsfonso agencios aro generally lloitod to the military ospact of the Communist novgmsntt it is outlastedths responsibilities of the defense agencies be established firsthat after this Ss done0 QJRoordinated program for the production ofca inategories of intollipnoe conoeming the Communist movemento
After tho steps outlii-ad in paragraphbove, have been con-pletedo this Cctxnittesinilar interdepartmental coriuittee procDodp p. definite reporting program and undertake the assigvnsnt of prioritiss for vr-rious iM?orts Li accordance with the original directive referred to in ?artaragraph
A psiryfiamfc liaisonbo set up for tho purposeroving;contacthe several agencies.
opies of this report be formrded to thef tho several intelligence agencies, end that they be requested to (a) concur in the report, tnd (b) instruct their representatives tn tho Comittee as to tho specific fields of intslli-enca.inncies aro vnMling to assume prireryina! the fields to riiich their agencies desire to obtain finished intelligence fron other agencies.
Carroll JoFeniraore
Dopartncnt of StetoDepartGwnt ttoprcsentetive
handler.eibert,F
2epartaont of tho Any Reprorentitivr L'eparteKont of theForee
!iepr3oontativo.
17 DJSOTSSICM The discussion is contained in the Armec:*
DISCOSSICK
dfElLlOHICE COrSRAffi OP RTERjrATICNAI, COBOTISH CALLED FOB. IK THE IWT3BISTXED STATES SBCOTU5T
nternational Aopoctt of CcraaunlBm
In Its drive toeards world domination, the International Coamunlst movemont directly threatens tha security of the United Statea, American policy makers require adiqiate and continued Information and analysis to ba able to deal effectively wife this challenge. The intellirenoe njenciea must undertake,oraproheojiTe ind intersive pro;raa of litelllg-enoe ad research deeljpod to answered byalr.noed usderrtandiar, of the major foarures of the Coramur.let strategy, tactics, and capabilities on tho inta;*nt tional and nationaln analysis of &io vulnerability of the Comnunist system of operotiOT and organisationshe anticipation of trends and doTalo-aients In the operations of the Ccscomlst aoveaent.
In accompli siting thoso tasks* the intelligence agenciesnique problem Inherent in the nature of tho Connuniot movement. Comivjniem io an orr,onlr.odolitical force, baaedell defined doctrine with spociKc"enildoriag variety of techniques to achieve its ends. Inseparably connected le tho central role played by the Soviet Union and its fore!pa policy In pursuit of Its orm national Interests. In addition-re tho regional and national Cctanunist orpuiiy.atioaa nhioh, within their own areas, tuny be capable* of focisxvoly influencing" the social, politioal and economic organisations of society and in sono canon capable of holding ortete pocer. Theee tlurcc institutions of iDtercatioaal Cocmunlaa have specific features unlquo to themselves which mutually influence and support cao another, novwverp thoy any at tines havo conflicting interests which require con-OMtlou rithin the framework of the era-.on organisation and objectives, Inoaeos, these differences cannot bo reconcilei and they lead to splits and ruptures. It Is precisely this interrelated end complex character of the Conaa-lst oovenent whloh imposes upon the American intelllganoe agencies the formulationrogram of study from anand national point of vlen directed towards consideration of CoDEwnist doctrine, crgAnlintions,pereticnal methodse eapnbllitJ.es and vulnerabilities*
(1) Doe trineInternational Coeeunism hasoil-de fined series of conoepts to serve as an Integrated oentral hypotheslc'by which the movement lives. Theso all^embraoing conoeptsheory of history besod on the existence of class struggle and leadin- toelacries of denoted stages; and speolfic analyses of tho social, political and eooaomlo 1nstIgnitions of society..
eieerly enunciated doctrine has been evolved on euoh vital mo/ctsri; as national and oolmial questions, religion, the role of nansn, agriculture and tho peaeantry* relations between Comruniet and ncu= Cattnuniattc This doctrineourea of both strength endof the Communist movementi strong in that It hae' managed to capture tho emotional and ideological adherence of millions of devoted partisans mho feel that itolution to the ills of tho world; weak In that it commits the floveaent to adherence to concepts which by virtue of tholr inflexible character rosy lead to schisms, setbacks0 reversals and defeat* The study of dootrlno end its evolution Is vital to successfully combatingCommunism in the field of ideas, to chart the course of the movement itself, tc wooaaiae fee possible rifte and divergenclee0 and to anticipate its major stmtogic movos.
(2) he IntcraaticrAl Communist moveme't has developedumber o? ormwilfaticnohich it seeks toits influence and achieve power * Iheae cr^snl actionsighly devoloped and syotexatisad machinery for coordinating the multifarious activities of international Ccnmmiso8 They include oentral bodies such ai the Cerainforn vi ich plans etretogy, issues instructions and directives? provides ewehanisns for handling financial matters0 intelligence exchange and relations between partleeo They nunber audi bodioa as the Korld Fodoration of DoiaoosMtlo Youth, the World federatloa of Trade Onions, the TCorld Congress of Intellectuals for Defense of Peace0 woaons* and students1 organisations, etc..
These organisations oust be madeudy of dotailod aad systematic intelli(,ence ressarch and tho relationstho Communist parties explored to reveal the operational framework and to expose the vulnerable contact points*. In addition, the direct connections of the Communist network with the Soviet Union and ito diplomatic services must be carefully charted sinoe they may rerraeJ. the objectives and policies of the Soviet Union in itc search for world power-
eecurity of the Unftedecause it is at thia level that the most effective oojr.ter-aotivitias mist be corvootly dcTolopod, Ccnfmnlst objectives and pollcios such as the weaken in r. of the industrialf Hesters Europe; the retarding of eooacaie recovery of capita Mst nations, the proration of oolenial revoltrust be closely observed* In ediitlon, specific problena arising in ennnociico with natters such aa atoato oaer^y, the Palestine situation, Trieste, etc, saist be examined toheii- connooticaa with the overall strategio deolslcas endsince tiiey may provide valuable clues to the Soviet Union's plans and policies as well as to tho possibility of diversenoofl existingscow and looal Communist partloe.
r.
hcsoThseans aaploysd by the Jiitr/aatlonjl-CcawnHilEt MOfeiaenturther field for latelHg-eoee opQi-etlooo^ balli pence agencies should provide ths data necessary for ths ccaprehenaica of Co&auaist mafecdor revolutionary charaeter0 Cesomiat ogitaticafiltrattea sndica of "front"to. Sheao activities have bo ocas highlyod and formalised in the davelopaent of tho Cessnunist uoveeusnto As tuch they my psrnit the dots ot ionomplete operation to be embarked on is connection, with ohangess, at en early stage*
(6) Personalitiesho highly centralised character of ths Ccanuniat novomoulT his ledorresponding atseea oale of leadarebipa The Coatmvaiet leaders achieve their positions follow*ighly selective process of training and experienceo art of the apparatus to fulfill specialized functions and to develop particular policies.. Study of tha seleotlca,emotion and movements of fee leaderehip oftan provides an Indoi: to the operations being conducted by fee CcM&mleta0 The intslligenco agencies musteveloped syatsa end organisation of materials relating to this iaiportoat aapsot of International Communist functioning.
(8) CapabllltieeThe eaergenos of the Soviet Onionajor world pcaer in con junction wife the forces of the Inter-national Ccsiuniet aoraasnt directly affects the well-being and cecurity of fee Unitsd States* The ability of tha regional and local organisations of the world Cooauaist movement to hinder and obstruot fee United 5tatse In its oenduet of international affairsatter of direct end primary concern. American policy makers must have, against the ba ok ground of Caiciimist short tern plans aad long termetailed evaluation of Communist capabilities to aeise power In etrategio areaa, to deny tho United States access to tarld areas, end to pander aid to ths Soviet Uhtca*
(?) VulnerabilitiesDespite Its persuasive ideology, ito highly disoTpiined-pareoanel end its carefully developsd orgenisa-tica. International Ccssuniam is almoet continuously beset by differenoes of interpretstiea. on matters of doctrine* by rlvalriea eaoag key personnel end by embarrassing discrepancies betas en theory and praotlcsa Purfeermoro, the international "party line" often runs counter to fee line Ufhlch* for local reasons; various national parties are sometimes forced to pursue. Pop the very reason that Communist doctrine and disoipline ere so rigid, those contradict lens are particularly troublesome aad embarrassing, and thusotentially fertile field for exploitation by the democratic nations throughropaganda end psychological Such exploitation, however, ealla for intelligence support considerably beyond the present capabilities of aaygency*
SECRET
Sftfctioaal fispa cto of ConaamlaB
Tas ipfsaaut prograa3 United Svitss intelligence agencies. latSng vO the regional aadtsiaualut partita aaet ba Thedosel3 isaat be synchron-listf tnVa. tea intelligence gsegcea dealing witt, 1flie SntornatlonaJl cupaefcsauBiBHo The seas generalf the world Ccanauaiet aovaaoat daearw conelderet&oa on the notional lovelpoctrine, opganisafciea, strategy, operational naetoiodB, gai-aonaJlties, and Ia every country or vegica of eigaifioanos to the Onltad States policy,cranunist Bowsnent eslsts0 careful attentica to theso factorseouls'ement of edequato Intoilirence coverage, with spooial eaphesla as Indlcatod*.
he spaolflo application of Cco&aniist doctrino to the naHonai"-scene must be studied and evaluated in tho light Of possible deviations fron established patterns* She national Ccsmunist moveejents afford many instances in which differences of e, theoretical nature have resulted in schismubsequent de* eline in influence end organ! itatica, ifO^ the roquii-emonts of Soviet policy towards the major powers has provided the grounds for doctrinal dispute tho colonial areas over the principle of colonial indopsndenoa=
(2) OrganisationA continuing survey of the organlEotlou of &aoh peTte^Bhcuid be" undertaken to provide detailed and current knowledge of (a) national bodies such as national ooiigveseeathe csntoel executive eonraittee, the foHtburo* tho political secretariat* the control and auditing ocHnisslons* psrscnnel assigned to direct end control front te-ganinations end spaolai systems Including party trainlag schools* party ocaarunioatieas, and illegal apparatus (b) regional level organisations* their rospsctive juriodiction* and methoda of operation, (a) the local level orgaalsationc
(8) he gcals and tasks set forth for the national Communist aowsDent within the framework of international Ccomaiiat Qtr&tegy and the requlrassots of Soviet foreign policy must bo established. The specific objectivesolitioal* eeencnio or ailitary nature prase? ibooT^br' HAS tuitions! party swat also be sought out as an Index to tha iuipevtunoo of tho area to tha CodDaunlst planners as wallndieatlon of the strength of tha organizations Involved*
(d) Operational IfethodaClose attention to the tactios ofcal' Conasun 1st movements must be made with an eye to de* tanninad anticipating poesible changes in tho rorld Communist line, by noting new departures la -activity.,
- te
The leadership of the localaut
ssessed" and evaluated la tones of their devotion to fee intsr-Batloaal MVfjjHl cad their yubeerviancs to Soviet policy,. The possible ajaerganoe of "netlcaalietioolly" inolined leadership la the Cc*nunlet parties must be constantly sought
(fl) CspabUltteeSpeoifao estimates of the ability'of the local cttir3mtst"parxfes to affect the Internal life of th* country In which thoy operate oust be prepared with particular emphasis ca ability to seise powr, loner the military and eocacaiond sabotage Ihe defease efforts.
(7) ational Cemnunlstlike the international orgsnliatTon, are subject to numerous internaland contradictionso These may spring from the personal rivalries of individual leaders? from tlie conflicting interests of particular groups (such as rural and urban) or from the fact that the officially dictatedoo times runs head on into deep^eeated looalrajudlces and aspirations.. The effective exploitation of these potential weaknesses calla for considerably improved Intelligence coverage. agencies,,
Part 2PRS3CTT COVERAGE OFNITED STATES
1NTBLUG21CE AX"CIE3
In the past, intelligence ocverega of CoBnauniefc activities has ouffered severely from tho lack of any dear dellaoatioa of responsibility as between tha various agencies* Each agency has been forced to give soiae attention to the subject, and especially those aspects of it which haveirect bearing ca the primary interests of the agency* however, there has been no oomprehenalve analysis of all relevant material at any one place within the Caverniaoot, nor have any of the intelligencesearch agencies been ablo to render extensive service to other agencies, since the Dfoilities of each are taxed to the limit In seating the raw* quirenenta of their onn departments * The result has been extensive duplication In superficial ooverage, but nowhere has the coverage bsen sufficiently comprehensive to meet ihe needs of national, as opposed to departmental intelligence requirements*
The Conmittoo haseneral review of the scope and quality of studies on Communism ^hieh havo boon prepared by the various agendas since the nar. Vfoile the number of euoh studies has beenthe great majority have been oonoemed with current and local questions. Many have been in response to specific requests, and coat of tbe pemsisder havo been focusedpecific developmentarticular Communist capabilityertain country or area. *ery fewn sufficiently comprehensive or definitive to meet fee needs of national intelligsuca.
mm
eneral review of the produotlea of the various egenoies covering Ccanuniim in allhe Ccaniittoe rrocoododlect cue CfBo.etailed study.. The Hear East no agreed upoauitahle cample for thla purpose, end Hear Eastern ops delists frca the various agencies were invited to participate. froa tho discussions ahioh followed, lt appeared that tho Hear Eastern experts from the se-seereh agencies, especially CAE and CSS, were of the opinion that tbo Material Ttiich they uare presently receiving was not adequate in quality to support any ooaprehenalvs estimate of Cotsaonlat cnpabilltles in that ersac This phase of the discussion pointed to trie oonolualon that,with regard -to-thaJToar -est, aad probably In owner areas asent ^Jeldot adequate for tho needsecurity. Tho rio"cessary Xiaprovsraent oen not be achieved, however, until thegendas areetter position to furnish the collection agencies with more detailed guidance as to their requirements and more authoritative evaluations of row reports.
a further problem results from the present confusion in the process*-lag and filing of incoming notarial. In Gome agendas reports cn local Co&aunist activities aro processed end filed by the appropriate regional branches, while reports on international aspectsommissi are handled by the branch covering the IESR. Innternational Conruniem and those Communist activitios vhlch present eecurity problems are handled by functional branchoc or groups. This results In extensive duplication in &ene oases, and in inadequate coverage in others.esearches seeking all of the materialertain CcsBunist problem night have to explore the filesozen different branches throughout the various agencies. Furthermore, he oould not rely on the research agencies elone, ilnce oca* sidereble valuable waterpparently is held by tho security agencies.
In view of tho foregoing consideraticaa, the Conmlttee has agiaed to the conclusions and recommendations set forth in parts IX and III of thla
interim report.
2.
.
International Ccssnnlsariaary, current, and long-range threat to US national security.
That the alms and objectlvae of international Coearanian arearge degree indistinguishable froa those of the USSR.
That US policy and operational agendasreater volume of batter intelligence than baa been produced on this subject in order to uage effective political, economic, psychological and other kinda of vrarfars against the USSR and the international Communist fcevemant.
That adequate Intelligence treatment of international Co-main lam requires coverage of tbe subjecthreefold basisi namely, (a) froa the vieupolnt of tha USSR, (b) as it relates to thecouatry concerned, and (c) its total International effect on US security.
ull scale analysis of the organisation, doctrine, functions and methods of operations, personalities, objectives and capabilities of the International Communist aoiementontinuing bonis, country by oountxy, and uorld^vride, la eseentlal to US security. It ia not suffiolent from an intelligence viewpoint merely to "Cover" trends and developments as they emerge.
sol actional Plan
The proposed plan provides for three elements to be established within ORB for the intelligence treatment of International Coa-auniea aa followst
ORE Intelligence Production Board, under thethe Assistant Director, CM, and augsrsnted by selectedin the study of the Communist movement will giveand direction to the production effort, and willapprove drafta of reports produced prior to publication.
International Cempuuniem Group,ranch, underro ctlonfo^UBsTBraoch, "willproduction responsibilities for intelligence ooverageCoasnmlamorld-wide basis.
III. ffiBsion
1. under tha overall guidance of tile IPS* (augaented) the operational dlreotion of tile Chief, SS/OSSR Branch, and in collaboration with the other ORE producing components, the International Co&nunist Group, EB/cSSB Branoh will produce national intelllgenoe onCommunismlli
the dootrine* orgaol nation, techniques,nativities of the international Ceemunlst movement asof Soviet foreign policy andhreat to
its immediate end long-range aims and objectivesareas. Individuallyountry by countryorld-wide basis.
o. appraise its capabilities in neetiug such objectives, interpret the signifioanoe of its activities In terns of US seourity and forecast and interpret its probable future activities and their consequences.
c
W&mimVIL FOBi Members of the IAC
Delineation of Responsibility for Research into
the International Conoaunist Movement
inter-departmental Ad Hoc Committee studyingthe ohairmanship of the Deputy Chief of the EE/OSSR Branch
of the Office of Reports and Eatimates of the CIA. haa reported that the planningoordinated program for research into theCoraaunist movement cannot proceed until there Is adelineation of responsibility for suoh research among tho various intelligence research organisations*
provisions ofre not intended to betolear-cut division of effort on thaat the working level. eeting of theof the IAC agsnoies will be called to determine whatof the Communist movement should be covered by eaohthe inter-departmental Ad Hoc Ccmoaitteo has already examined
the problems of research into the international Coram unlet oove&ent at some length, it would appear advisable to include its members In joint session with the Standing Committee for the purpose of drafting an appropriate delineation of responsibilities for processing by tbe IAC.
Standing Comaittee will convene in joint session withCommittee on
73
Ittftltb, MSicfiaaicector ofeoaay. riAch gUX EoSxto o. spoafiol yrcjjfwa o? InooJlif^acofcst*
iaficTaafilccoi tex -ante* Kswraot. 2fc3 iionra sillw-to-aporta intotfya ell foreign epcoo ttffott^oat GEO rapid* .
i
-To oreer to cabl*va atsi^lota ooa?6iafltion of effort*fintfcauJ4 lies tocjT.aa of Jnra^gatAeB' to deeieaoto a>n the oSvUoryb of the oRperiasen tfffl ^ralnlcs of year etaff in tbo etoflysuayoiot (iotoisitloo In fcto orcaa uxCnt yeareQt4cn. JbaXlcrofreuu vtadd to beixe^ieielotal US in^niccr.oo efforto field.
DiKaeraXy joura.
Original document.
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