WEEKLY SUMMARY - EASTERB EYRIOE: COMMUNIST PENETRATION; SOVIET UNION; SOVIET

Created: 1/14/1949

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WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

EUROPE

enetration Soviet t'etermmaiionse the

World Federation of Democrat* Youthnd its component national youth move-ncets asents for ibe ponotrat.cn of wolem Europeanorces is suggestedeport that wkdxecentlyecret Paris conference held for this he WF'DY has become at! ir;feffec ivef Co:nn:ar lat propaganda 0 million -v | uiounTriCHi. tt has ostensiMy ief. penetral^aa worSr.imunlst Party cadres The Soviet delegate ai (he Paris Conference, however, reportedly dlsu-ussedwork and The 'ruining ofitingactivity iathe Preach Army aaexample for British antf US.ns for torucripimuia! -viep inork. Plans farntrcaseJCttvttylM indicatedje Kremlin'sf an important Soviet Vouvh official to art end the Partsn appeal byoarmyd (S) tJt H'-eeleraiedme west 'o bdatcw European *nd La*.in American svjtnori for the Soviet drive m .of'

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SOVIET UNION

Soviet Intentions Recent Soviet and Satellite propaganda

indicates that the Kremlin may nowthe early formation of an east Gorman state to offer several advantages. Rather than attempt to cast the blameplit Germany upon the western powers by waiting until the establishmentest German provisional government, the USSR may now "'Justify" formation of an east German staie which claims sovereignty over all of Germany on the grounds that current plansest German state are

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SOVIET UNION

virtually completed. Such propaganda claims, however, would have little effect within Germany. Although actual Soviet troop withdrawals following establishment of the new statu would depend upon bow quickly the USSR could safely transfer authority to the German puppet regime, the USSR could easily recognise the new German state and then accede to its request for the continued presence of Soviet soldiers. The Kremlin would probably estimate that such an arrangement, If accompanied by partial withdrawal and implying later complete withdrawal, would have aappeal throughout Germany and could result indemands for withdrawal of the western powers. In addition to these advantages for die USSR, some measure of Soviet prestige within Germany might be salvaged and general attention would be temporarily diverted from the Berlin blockade. Moreover, the USSR could avoid at least partial responsibility for the continuation of the blockade by insisting that the Communist rump government had control overny event, such an action would have the effect of interjecting an allegedly legal government for all Germany into the Berlin conflict.

KOREA

Increased Sovtettaatfon increased miliiary and economic

cooperation between Korea and tbe USSR pointsrendoviet satellite system In the Far East comparable to tbat already established In eastern

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Europe.ecent poet, the (North) ICoreaa People'3 Republic reportedly Granted navaJ banes to the Soviet Pacific Fleet and agreed to develop several port facilities under the direction ot Soviet engineers. The Soviet pattern Is also apparent la North Korean economic developments. Joint stock companies tore bean act up in which the USSRhare as it? price for laving eliminated the Japanese. Other reported agroGrneiua regulate ths supply of Korean tabor for work hi tha USSR aad theof major industries aad nationaloviet system of agricultural collectlvbatIon may emerge slowly.

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Original document.

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