THE RYUKYU ISLANDS AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE

Created: 8/6/1948

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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1SZ ItYUKYU ISLANDS AND THEIH SOMIFICANCX

of tha KjtUryu islands may become one of the mostm am; settlement of Star Taatara problem* Posasaskm or control ofparticularly Okinawa, wta firm the occapytaf country: (a) an advantagedefsnstvs or offensive operations laatch post lo guard tbato Central tod north China aaa Sorb; mdun loz airi wide ana, taktof Cttmava aa the center

cca'.rol of the Rjuhjaould: (a) grra theosition fromoperzte in defense of an unamed post-treaty Japan and OSheother Pacific Islands; (b) obviate the poaaflflltj of tha Itytfajrua fallingotential enemy; (e) neutralise, to aome extant, Soviet poatttone taKorea, and Manchuria; and (d) grro tbeosition hum which toicrtval of nmitary aggression on the part of the Japanese.

oth China and Japan win advance territorial claims to the Islands; tbe TJX and PnmtfL'nai may support, while the rjBSS win rigorously protest, TJS control.

arla this raport Is ssugust IMS.

Ttr lauuhasaee onjaiunttoM ot tht DtpaitnumU of Stats, Anny, Navy, and tho Air force Lavs eoneurrsd to ihli rspart.

THE RYUKYU ISLANDS AND THEB BTONIFICANCE

1. or va Rrvvna.

The Naoshel Shoto,umber,ile-long chain from tha so nth cm tip of theo Formosa. In thla archipelago the term BynXyu applies to the islands comprising the Oainawfl.-gun.to and tha Amaml-gvuto, orislands which lie between the latitudes roughlyS0 N. Tha Ryuxyu Uands are important solely bacause of their strategic military position in tha Far East Economically the Islands are of no Tahw to anyone except thend the Internal political pictureelatively quiet one.

Tha value of Okinawa, centrally located trt tht RjuJcyu fhftp,demonstrated In World War LL In the Island group thenotal of tweniy-two airfields and

Kaplans bases. Pleven of irhich vpxp constructed on Oldnawe during thc woo- (six couldfaara are adjacant Islands which, if developed ha conjunction with Okinawa, would present an excellent base trom which heavy bombers could bring wrthfaa range the Interior ot Coins, any part of Japan and Borea, portions of eastern fflberta tocluding Vladivostok, the whole of lha Philippineuam and theand portions of Bouthaast Asia andther lanes East Indies.

Although the? ara not ideal, than an several ban and inlets (Nana Ko, Buckoer Bay, and Xarazsato) in the Ryukytu wmch provide natural harbors. Dae of then ittea for extended naval supply and taetleal operations is limited, however, since from three to six typhoons can bt expected annually to cross directly over tht Wanda and

easMtnandsoagt.

Withdrawal of USiareea from the Bynkyus following the eventual withdrawal from Japan and Eccea. would move the US line of detense In the Pacific bach to the Marianaa. Should an astatic conflict develop under these circumstances, the Ryukyus might cecometo control or powers whose Interests an antagonistic to thoae cf the TJB, Any power occupying the Ryukyua and possessing an adeqnato air potential could control an unarmed Japan. Furthermore, control of tha Ryukyua by powers unfriendly to the US would obviouslyhreat to US Pacific bases aa well as tend to circumscribe any future action of US forces operating In the western Pacific,

9. OOSBKDR 5TATDEL

The Ia'-nnda,art of the former Japanese Empire, hare been under CScontrol since the springeither the Cairo nor the Potsdam Declarations speclCcallT- denned the future status of the Ryukyua Wanda. Therefore, the way la dear to return the Islands to Japan, transfer them to aome other power, co-phue them under trusteeship. There axe indications thatukyuane would prefer to remain under us protection. Nevertheless, In anticipationutureht Fax East, China has already advanced territorial claims, and Japan has voiced pious hopes; but the major conflict over the dlrposltlon of the island* vnj involve the Ufi and the USSR.

3. Been or Japamxsb ajd> Osmu OUMii

Althougha tha flrtt contact with the Xynkyus end the latter sent "tribute" to China and received "presents" to return, tha procedure had the typically commercial aspect of the traditionalelationship obtaining between theKingdom" and the outlyingtates, Byh Century there paying tribute to both China end Japan.4 the Chinesein agreement with Japan In which the Ryufcynans were referred to as "subjects of3 Japan had assumed foil governmental responsibility for the Islands, and It eon-tinned to administer them as an integral part of Japan, Proper

4- Pwiunabd Pui low la'iaasciaii Powns

l Chinas cla!ma would Involve ft tremendous risk. Chlnase control might; use of the bases to the OT,ha mat of final subjugation of the Nationalist forces by the Commantats, might grre the Soviets easy aoeese to the Islands.evelopment would not only pose forerious threat of Soviet tnenratons bat wonltT, in effect, compromise the strategic position of thehe Pacific Area, The failure of (he CMasw Nationalists In Formosa since the end of the war Indicates the Impracticability of awarding the Byuhyus to the Rationalists wtth agreement that the USase on Okinawa. Under such an agreement, the resentment of thf Ryukyuans toward the Chinese, coupled wtth ftvof tho Chinese Qov.fnment, might seriously impede US efforts to maintain stability la tbe area. It may be, moreover, that China Is advancing claim to the islands more as as argument useful for Improving Its own bargaining positionar Easternis made, rathe* than with any real hope of seeing the claim satisfied. Even ta this ease, the pressure of Chinese public opinion may force China to press Its claimsointmbarrassing; to the US.

Even though the political, historical, and ethnical claims of the Japanese to thc Islands are substantial, Japan, under it* present circumstances, can advance no claim other than one sponsored by one of the Allied Powers. Hevsrtheleaa, it la to be expected that the Japanese will attempt to exploit the US-Soviet rivalry in order to regainof (he Islands and thus further Japanese ambitions In tha Far Bast. The us, however, Is caughtontradiction If It supports return of the Islands to Japan. Control of the Islandsilitarily weak Japan weald contribute to the ovar-eli inxtabulty of the Far East, whereas US commitments as well as US determination toecrudescence of Japanese aggressive power rules out giving the Islandsapan capable of maintaining Ryukyus' security. China, the USSR, tbe TOE, and the Dominions would strongly oppose retrocession to Japan because of fesr that such act'on would foster :he extension of Japanese power.

The uSSR hastern adherence to the poHCy that Japan be "limited to the four mainince the USSR win unquestionably oppose US control, the alternatives acceptable to the Soviets are ^dependence for the Ryukyus or transferhin* rapidly succumbing tolnatloa- The USSR will presumably prefer the latter.

Original document.

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