copr no. 3
CONSEQUENCESREAKDOWN IN FOUR-POWER NEGOTIATIONS ON GERMANY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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ORE b'Ma
CONSEQUENCESREAKDOWN IN FOUR-POWER NEGOTIATIONS ON GERMANY
SUMMARY
It is believed that thc Soviet objective, in entering into Four-Power discussions, was to exploit the precarious position of the Western Powers in Berlin in order to gain for the USSR certain concessions regarding Berlin and western Germany. Under thesereakdown of negotiations wouldoviet conviction that Western firmness had rendered this plan impracticable, and that the Kremlin must pursue its aims by other means. The USSR would therefore seek to obtain its goalsndermining thc Western position in Berlin to the end that thc Western powers would ultimatelyurther integrating Berlin and eastern Germany with the Sovietetard,ing the stabilization of western Germany, using Berlin when possibleressure point;bstructing Western European stabilization.
In the eventreakdown of the present East-West negotiations on Germany. Soviet aims as regards Berlin would beestern withdrawal,asten Soviet political and economic domination of the city. Thc Kremlin would attempt toestern withdrawal by unlimited pressure against the Western occupation authorities in Berlin as well as thc western sectorrogram of tlus kind would include Soviet interference with thc Western airlift, coupled with an attempt completely to disorganize normal life within the western sectors.
The USSR would take further steps to integrate the politics and economy ofGermany with those of the Soviet bloc. When thc Kremlin felt thattep was needed to advance Soviet policy in Germany, it might take measures tonational" government In eastern Germany and follow it up by Soviet and Satellite diplomatic recognition. To enhance the prestige of thc Soviet-sponsored regime throughout Germany thc Kremlin might back the creationoviet-controlledarmy, return additional German prisoners-of-war to eastern Germany, andimited extent Increase the availability of consumer goods in eastern Germany. When the Kremlin was assured of the reliability of lis German regime, it mighteparate peace treaty with the East German government and hint at the withdrawal of Soviet occupation troops. The latter move would beropaganda effort to bring pressure to bear on the Western Powers for the withdrawal of Western occupation troops.
In western Germany, the USSR would intensity attempts to disrupt stability, and thus reduce western Germany's important contribution to European recovery. Such attempts would include intensified support of industrial strife.
Note: The Intelligence organisations ot the Depaiunents or State. Array, and the Air Korce have concurred in this report. The Office ot Naval Intelligence dissents wiui the fourthonn thaielieves the following sentence should be added thereto: "However, consideration might well be given to the effectslanned evacuation on Western intUa-Uve instead of being subjected to the Ignominy of withdrawing from an untenable position.'" The information in this report is aseptember IMS.
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idespread propaganda campaign designed for western German consumption, the Kremlin would stress further the urgent need for social and economic reform in western Germany, and agitate In favor of German national unity.
Soviet tactics outside of Germany in the eventreakdown of East-West talks on Germany would consistombination of intensified antiwestern propaganda and pressure tactics. The USSR mightlockade of Vienna in addition to that already in effect inimultaneous blockade of the two capitals during the winter months would render effective airlifts to both capitals problematical. Regardless of developments in Berlin or Vienna, the Kremlin might Increase pressure on the Middle or Far East. The increased uncertainty raised In Europe by Western evacuation of either city, however, would influence the Kremlin to continue to focus its attention on Europearget of prime Importance.
Should Four-Power negotiations on Germany fait, thc following arc among the courses of action open to the Western Powersirect bearing on thc Berlinemain In Berlin and maintain the Western airliftefer the Berlin issue to the Unitedemain In Berlin and accept the Soviet offer of food and fuel for the entirevacuate Berlin by predetermined plan;ttempt lo break the Soviet blockade by means of armed convoys.
Any of the courses predicated on the Western Powers' remaining In Berlin Is likely in the long run lo prove ineffective. Thc Western position in the city would increasingly deteriorate, and ultimate Western withdrawal would probably become necessary. Regardless of the set of circumstances leading to It, Western withdrawal from Berlin would seriously damage Western, and especially US. prestige throughout the world. Such action could also bring about increased Soviet pressure In western Germany and elsewhere.
Whether or not the Western Powers can remain in Berlin, they could adoptmeasures designed lo stabilize further the western world and at the same time exert pressure upon the Soviet bloc. The US could augment its present efforts to strengthen and unify Western Europe politically, economically, and militarily.the Western Powers could attempt the stabilization of western Germany through the establishmentrovisional West German government Some economiccould be exerted on the Soviet bloc through continued blocking of reparations deliveries from western Germany to the East, by restrictions on Soviet transport through the western world, and possibly by curtailment of East-West trade. Thc Western Powers, however, would be reluctant to carry on economic warfare against the Soviet bloc because of the adverse effects of such action on the western economies Western Europe would support steps lo contain Communism Internally and would seek to weaken the Soviet bloc through Intensified anti-Communist propaganda and support of anti-Soviet elements within the USSR and its Satellites so long as these actions did not appear likely to provoke hostilities with the USSR-
CONSEQUENCESOUR-POWER NEGOTIATIONS ON GERMANY
1. Courses op Action Available to the USSR. a. Increased Soviet Pressure Tactics in Berlin.
The policy of thc USSR is directed toward: (I) undermining the Western Power position in Berlin leading to ultimate Western withdrawal from theurther integrating Berlin and eastern Germany with the Sovietetarding the stabilization of western Germany, using Berlin when possibleressure point;bstructing Western European stabilization.
The USSR would attempt to accomplish these objectives insofar as Berlin is concerned through the following means:
Interference with Western airlift operations and continuation of land blockade measures. The USSR would try to decrease thc effectiveness of thc Western airlift by interfering with flights and possibly attempting to reduce the number of air corridors available to the Western Powers.
Further strangulation of western sector economy by continued non-rccognition of western "B" marks. Increased currency manipulation, and an intensified economic blockade of the western sectors.
Formationeparate Berlin administration. After furtherthe legally elected Berlin Government. Soviet authorities would establish amunicipal government and declare it to be the only legal
(d> Organization and support of strikes, demonstrations, andirected against the Western Powers In Berlin. During thc winter months, with inadequate supplies and widespread unemployment in the western sectors, such tactics would rer.dcr the Western position extremely precarious.
(e) Increased terrorist activities against those segments of thc Berlinactively cooperating with the Western Powers. Berliners taking part in the western sector government would be under constant threat of seizure by SovietThc German police and security administration n! the western sectors would be marked for special attention by Communist "Actionuch terrorist activities might also be directed against Western Allied personnel in Berlin.
<f) Further Soviet offers of food and coal rations to the Berlin population. Such offers made during the winter months could have an increasing effect inGerman support of the Western Power? should lhe Western air supply prove inadequate.
(g) Increased interference with public utilities supplying the western sectors of Berlin.
(It) Interference with wire and radio communications between Berlin and the western zones.
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The reaction in western Germany and in Western Europe to the foregoing Soviet tactics would, except among Communist sympathizers, be highly unfavorable to the USSR and would tend to weld the Brussels Pact powers more closely. As the situation in Berlin deteriorates, Western Europe generally wouldirm stand against the USSR, but would continue efforts to prevent the situation fromasus belli.
b. Soviet Action AQecling the Soviet Zone of Germany.
With the failure of East-West negotiations on Germany, the USSR would probably consider that the division of Germany, and indirectly of Europehole, had become final. Consequently the USSR would undertake measures to integrate even more closely than at present the politics and economy of eastern Germany into the Soviet bloc.
The Kremlin could take steps leading to the establishment of an East German Government.overnment would rest exclusively in the hands ofleaders enjoying the confidence of the Kremlin, since the latter would wish to exploit German nationalism without permitting It to endanger Soviet objectives.trade agreements between the German state and thc various members of the Soviet bloc would be expanded, thus further cementing eastern Germany's economy to that of Eastern Europe
The effect on Western Europeefinitive split of Germany and of Europehole would be to retard economic recovery under ERP and toangerous and unwelcomed political cleavage which wouldenace to further peaceful developments. Thc immediate adverse effect on Western European morale could be partially countered by an intensification of US economic and military assistance.
When the Soviet Union had decided upon the formal establishment of an East German Government, Soviet and Satellite diplomatic recognition would follow, along with the declarationovernment was the only legal one for all otThe USSR would institute additional positive measures in an attempt to enhance the popularity of thc newly created East German Government, suchponsoring thc formationoviet-controlled Germanxpediting the return from the USSR of German prisoncrs-of-war, particularly those from easternncreasing consumer goods availabilily in eastern Germany;ncouraging German hopeseturn of territory given to Poland. Western Germans, resenting the splitting of their country, might become susceptible lo Soviet overtures ifseemed possible. Reaction in Western Europe lo thc split of Germany and creation of an East German stale would be divided between those countries whichtrong united Germany, and those desiroustrong united Germanyastion against Communist expansion.
urther effort to build up its prestige in eastern Germany, embarrass thc Western Powers, and facilitate the spread of Communism in western Germany, the Kremlin might decideeparate peace treaty with the East German governmentint at the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces from Germany.
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Such moves would be made only alter the Soviets had infiltrated all levels of thearmy, and party apparatus with loyal Communist leadership and reserved sufficient power toight behindcontrol and direction of the
new state
tthough the signingeparate peace treaty would not necessarily imply Soviet willingness to withdraw Its occupation forces,ove might be proposed by Lhe Kremlin in the nope that the resulting pressure would eventually induce the Western Powers to withdraw their occupation forces and thus facilitate Communist penetration into western Germany. This proposition would be generally supported in western Germany but would be rejected by Western Europe, which prefers to maintain the occupation of Germany until the perils of either Communist domination or of resurgent German nationalism have been averted.
c. Soviet Pressure on Western Germany
With the termination of East-West discussions on Germany the USSR would bend every effort to disrupt the political and economic stabilization of western Germany and thereby nullify the latter's increasingly important contribution torecovery. Prevented from accomplishing the foregoing aim overtly, thcwould intensify attempts lo attain the same end by subversion and propaganda. This lactic would Increase cooperation among the Western Powers against the Soviet threat and would precipitate strong counter-measures by the occupation authorities.
Leading the Soviet campaign of subversion and propaganda in western Germany wouldery small but militant German Communist Party. The western German Communists would, either directly or by the use of trade unionttempt to sabotage production in key industries by means of strikes and riots. The industrially important Ruhr wouldrime target in lhe Kremlin strategy.
Communist propaganda machine in western Germany wouldexploit every actual and imaginary grievance of thcrofitableCommunist propaganda exploitation would be that of championing populareconomic reforms.eak German economy, and with inflation, lackgoods, and unemployment existing as unpleasant realities inCommunist propaganda would have no scarcity of subject matter.
he uncertain popularity in western Germany of thc prcscnl Western plan to seteparate decentralized weslem government has been Indicated by its lack of strong support among German political leaders and thc population in general. Communist propaganda could be expected lo dwell on the theme that the Soviet Union had consistently championed establishment of apeace-lovingfor all Germany" only to have this plan blocked by the Western Powers. The Communists furthermore would hardly allow the German people to forgel that It was the Soviet Union which advocatedeace treaty with Germany lo be followedear by troop withdrawals. By declaring any government established inGermany to be the only legitimate government for all Germany, Soviet propaganda would hope to keep alive for German nationalism thc prospectevived "Greaterhe stress on centralization of economic und political control and conse-
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quent greater efficiencyoviet-sponsored East German Government wouldappeal to the orderly German mind.ove would be most unwelcome to Western Europe, and would result In strong counter-measures to check Soviet-inspired subversive forces and propaganda designed to revive nationalism.
d Sovtet Pressure outside of Germany.
he Kremlin would use any UK deliberations on Germany to Intensify the Soviet and Satellite propaganda attack against Western plans forest German Government and to carry on an all-out campaign in the UK. laying the blame for all phases of the present German crisis on thc Western Powers. Soviet propaganda wouldimited effect in Western Europe unless it coincidederiod of economic or political unrest
n an effort to disrupt Western plans for relieving the siege of Berlinthe Kremlin mightiversionary tactic bylockade of Vienna.aneuver would be designed to dissipate US moral and material support, and could disrupt thc effectiveness of the Western airliftuccessful Soviet effort of this kind resulting in the abandonment of Vienna as well as Berlin by the Western Powers would lead inevitably to the partitioning of Austria and Germany.
egardless of developments hi Berlin or Vienna, thc Kremlin might increase pressure on the Middle or Far East Soviet reasons foraneuver might be based on the following considerations: (I) temporary inability to make further inroads Into Western Europe by means short ofiversion of US attention fromproblems and dissipation of US aid effortsideroncern over the increased danger of war inherent in further Soviet efforts in Europe;aintenance of over-all pressure in order to promote world Communism. Western European reaction lo increased Soviet pressure outside of Europe would be one of temporary relief accompanied by concern for such steps as Ihc Western Allies might take lo check Soviet aggression elsewhere. The increased uncertainly raised in Europe by Western evacuation of either Berlin or Vienna, however, would influence lhe Kremlin to continue to forms its attention on Europearget of prime Importance.
2. Some Possiblr CounsKS or Action open to tio: Western Powkks. a. Directly Affecting the Situation in Berlin.
he US, the UK, and France could remain in Berlin temporarily and maintain their position by continuing the present airlift in order to supply food, as well as fuel for essential utilities and institutions This airlift could not. however, sustain Western Berlin industry. Provided substantial lncrca.se in the airlift is not required, the Western position could be maintained during the winter months. At the sametrong city administration for the western sectors with its ownwould have lo be established. In general, the immediate reaction to thceffort lo remain in Berlin would be good, not only in the western sectors of Berlin and the western rones of Germany, but also in all of the Western European countries. It could be construed by all as an indication of Western, and particularly US.to stop the lurther advance of Soviet power in Europe wllhoul resort to war.
Western Powers could refer the Berlin impasse to either the United Nations Security Council or Genera) Assembly. Recommendations lor settlement of the dispute in the Security Council could, however, be blocked by the USSR, and any positive action taken by thc Council would be subject to Soviet veto. In thc General Assembly, the Western Powers could count on considerable support and might be able toesolution recognizing the legality of their position in Berlin and their right of access to their sectors through the Soviet Zone. While reference to the United Nations would not settle the matter, it would al least impress upon thc world that all peaceful means of settlement had been exhausted and would tend to strengthen the Western Power legal and moral position. This step would be mildly popular in Western Europe as being unprovocative and unlikely to lead to war.
The Western Powers could remain in Berlin and accept the Soviet offer to supply the entire city with food and fuel, thereby in effect relinquishing political and economic control over the western sectors and thus abandoning to Soviet retaliation those Berliners who had supported the west. ,The ultimate reaction In Berlin,Germany, and Western Europe generally would be little better than that which would follow Western Power evacuation of thc city.
he Western Powers could carrylanned evacuation of Berlin. The evacuation of the city would probably lead to increased Soviet pressure in western Germany and elsewhere. Evacuation would also definitively split Germany between East and Wcsl and would lead to further Integration of the Soviet Zone into thc Soviet sphere. Because Berlin symbolizes an issue between the Western Powers and thc USSR far transcending the concrete value of the city to either side, the prestige of thc Western Powers and especially that of the US would be seriously damagedthe world, lite effect of this sharp defeat of thc West could be somewhatby strong US measures, suchreatly expanded armament program and military guarantees to the Brussels Pact powers which wouldreatly increased US military aid program.
he Western Powers could attempt to lift the blockade by forcing armed convoys of food, fuel, and raw materials into thc cily. Aside from the fact lhalourse of action involves the risk of immediate war. the procedure could not bein the face of Soviet counter-measures short of war, such as thc demolition of bridges, the destruction of road beds, and the mining of bottlenecks, road shoulders, and bridge approaches. It is extremely doubtful that the UK would agree Lo thc use of armed convoys, and it is almost certain that the French would not. In general. Western Europe is not likely to support this slep as an attempt to solve the Berlin impasse.
b. Indirectly Affecting the Situation in Berlin, but Directly Affecting other Areas.
he US could take further steps lo strengthen and unify the Western powers politically, economically, and militarily.ove would eventually improve the position of the Western blocis the Soviet bloc; it would also increase thc risk of war to the extent that the USSR consideredhreat to the security of the Soviet bloc. The move would be popular among the Western nations insofar as il
s
improved Iheir economy, political suability, and military force, although thc Increased danger of war would be apparent to them.
The Western Powers could cut off trade with the Soviet bloc. While this course of action would have an adverse effect on the economy of the USSR and Its Satellites, which need western manufactures. It would also have an adverse effect on Western European economy. It would be strenuously resisted by Western Europe evenemporary measure, since Western European economy and particularly thc success of the ERP dependsonsiderable extent on trade with thc East. Its permanent stoppage would have serious repercussions on the stability of alleverance of trade would be disapproved In the West also as Increasing the risk of war.
The US, the UK. and France could refuse to resume reparations shipments to the USSR from the western zones of Germany This step would have an adverse effect on the economy of thc eastern bloc. Western Germany would welcome such action as signifying the gradual termination of industrial dismantling.
Thc Western Powers could give the Germans in their zones increasedand freedom. Thc final establishmentrovisional government for westernwouldecidedly adverse effect on the USSR, regardless of the status of Berlin. It is unlikely, however, that the Soviet Union would immediately react by establishing an East German slate. Temporarily, the Kremlin would probably continue to press for German unityerman national government in the belief thai the Soviet position In eastern Germany Is essentially unshakable, and In the hope that western Germany could be penetrated and eventually controlled by Sovietof the powerful German urge for unity. Should these tactics indicate littleof success, the USSR would then probably form an East German state. In order to gain additional concessions from the West and in the hope ofnited Germany, the Germans would seek to play off thc East against the West This would furnish the USSR with increased opportunities lo influenre developments in western Germany. In Western Europe, the UK, Spain, and Italy would favorest German stateulwark against Communism; France and.esser degree, the Benelux countries, all of whichlrongly developed fear of the resurgencetrong Germany, would demand many concessions and guarantees before participating Inove.
he Western Powers could Intensify their nnti-Communist and anti-Soviet propaganda, at the same time curbing the activities of the indigenous Communist parties, and supporting clandestine anti-Communist and anti-Soviet groups in thcsphere These measures would tend lo drive the Communist parties underground in Western Europe. This would have important political repercussions in France and Italy where the Communist parties enjoy substantial political support, and wouldlead to outbreaks of violence In both countries.rogram would be widely applauded in Spain and western Germanyonstructive and important move.for the two latter countries and Portugal. Western Europe is likely to approve only such measures to combat Communism as represent firmness rather than provocation.
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Original document.
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