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(*) SoTtvt Palop. spa-ale of tha Soviet people woold aotecisive cowl de ration, to the Kremlin until Bach tiaeraatle deterioration of tbe Sotiet military position took place. Valla oertala eleacata of the Soviet population, particularly ethnic groups la flat Baltio states, Dnralm, tbe Caaaaaaa aad Central Asia, are dieeatlsfied with Soviet rale sad hostile to domination by the Great Rasa Iaaa, the Soviet Ocvernoent, through its effiolant security police network, soold be able to keep tha so groups under effective control ia the early stages of the war. Tbe acre protracted the war, the sare chance there would bo for these subversive influencee,prewent ia the Soviot Onion, to manifest themselves andore active part in interfering with the Soviet war offort. reel stance of uprisings could be expected to occur only when the Western Allies are able to giveupport and leadership, and assure the dissident eleejents early liberation from the Soviet yoke.
Soviet petriotisa, while lees ardent la supportoreign war than la defease of hose territory, would not ba greatly shaken as long aa military wioterles and war booty were forthcoming. Asprogressed, however, aad if Soviet military reverses become known within tbe EB3R, the Increased hardships and suffering woold magnify the already extensive papular dissatisfaction with the regime.
The one-time healthy res pact of the Soviet citiaen fortechnical and industrial ingenuity, however, would6 have beencounteracted by propaganda rVmlgnad to enlaglae Soviet technique.
The people of the OSSR are very susceptible to psyebolcgical warfare. The Soviet union's moat eignifleant weakness In this regard is its policy of keeping Its people la complete Ignorance of thend it ions both Inside and outside the OSSR.
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Psychological warfare, therefore, can be an extremelyweapon In promoting dissension and defection among ths Soviet people, undermining their sarala, and creating confusion andwithin the country. It eould be particularly effective Inoperaticne directed toward those ethnic groups which would welooaBiberation, aa well as toward the Soviet Army, especially those elements of it which weald be stationed outside the borders of tbe OSSR.
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The nt *ff*otive WWkt f*ra effort directed against th* Sorlet Onion woold be that the TToetera Power* are not fighting against th* people* ofR, but only against tb* Soviet regis* and It* pollcle* of enslavement and exploitation.
(b) fcttllltaj fftJt^n. Although th* aejority of tb* nativeIn tbe satellite oountries will still be Intensely nationalistic, resenting Moseew doennatlon and Ccawcmlst rule, tba oontlnuation of heavy Soviet and Oossnmtst propaganda will haveeasure of
at least upon the young people, apscifloaHy the generation which baa been under ideological pressor* for tea of their seat Important formative years. Rationalism will stilleuro, of great potential anelimes to the Soviet Onion, nevertheless, particularly so if shrewdly exploited by the feat) but It would not give rise to effective resistance oDvament* lammdlately upon the evtbreak of hostilities. Phil* It is possible that th* dosdnant attitude among tha satellite populations would be one of lessened cooperation and perhaps even of passivetoward their Coanunist mastera, actual Impediment of agricultural. Industrial, sal military contributions of th* satellites to the Soviets' war effort will be of miner significance since the Kremlin will have strvngtbensd Its control to the utmost degree. For ta* saa* reason, effective resistance In the form of orgenised ewaotag* end guerrilla activities woold ha unlikely unless guidance and support free the meet oeuld be made available and the Soviet armies had swffercd major reverses. The peoples of th* satellite areas will still remain susceptible to psychological appeals la support of their aspirations for national indenea-oence, however, particularly if evidence of aid fro* the seat is given.
With th* exception of scattered remnant* la th*tha Baltlohere woold be no subversive organisationsborders of tba uBSB. Tb* Dkranlan Partisan Amy (UFA) would haveand numbers considerably reduced by Soviet oouaten-vaesures.
I* the Initial stags* of hostilities these vestigial movements, or ether subversive organisations which sight spring up, would notaffect Soviet war capabilities. As to* war prosreseedfor the "astern Powers, however, and coordinated Allied material help and guidance were extended to thesehey might be expected to assume ear* active role* la sabotage, propaganda, and reolataaoe activities directed against the Soviet war effort.
There are, in moat of tba aetelllt* etagroups organised far tbe purpose of resisting Cosjeonist Tarns* group* bar* been th* object of relentless oaspalgns byCcaaBamlst securityad Itoubtful If they areof mors the* Isolated acta of sabotage and harassment. existence woold, in the event of mar, impose not-too-heavythe Cosmmmlst security machinery so long as teeters help is unavailable.
ad the power of tha security organisation* will ba snob ee to hold roalfltanoo activitiesdndmom.
(5) Coaolnalons af Strstsrla filimSMeanae- The significant political strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet orbit aro estimated to be sat follows I
I. The native courage, stamina, and patriotism of the Soviet people.
XI. Tba elaborate aad ruthless Dmohlnary by which the Kreelln exerciser, central isod political control throughout tba Soviet orbit empleying polios forces proregenda, and eecewsrio aad polltioal duress,
III. Tba ideolegloel appeal of theoretloal Coajronlsa.
If, Tha psychologies! effect on the Soviet oltlzen of the ooooept of Soviet superiority over tbe Vfest.
X, Popular dissillualoses nt snd enUttsrmeat among tb*throughout the Soviet orbit, resulting froa ruthless flovist snd CrwsniQjst opprsasloB and exploitation.
II, Tba Instinctive fear, pervading all aliments of Soviet end eatelUta society, wbloh tends to destroy Independentand paralyse initiative,
IXX, Tba res pact of aeay Soviet and satellite people foranhnlnnl progress, and the traditional sympathy of satellite peoples far western democracy.
If. Tba nationallaa of tba satellite populations ineludlag Cosnsaalst elsaauta, and of certain ethnio groups la tha USSR.
f Probable demoralisation which would result from foreign military and occupation duties.
It la estimated tbat the strengths noted above constitute an sotual aad present advantage toR, while the veekneasee, la most oases, are potential rather then actual. During the early stages of oonflict, the shove petitioned weaknesses wouldubstantial harden upoa tho Soviet Onion's machinery for political control, aad would also Impair tbe Kremlin's econc-io sad adsinistrati's oapabilltiee. These
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weaknesses, however, woulddaoieive effect upon
the outcomeoviet sdlrtary venture! mo-log the earlyf war, native Soviet morale eight tsprove scssswhat with reports of spectacular Victoria* and the prcepeets of booty free twatern Burope. It Is unlikely that tbe psychological weaknesses la tbe Soviet and Satellite structure would produce serious consequences unless the Soviet orbit were subjected to prolonged and effective aerial attack fron the West, sad the prospect for ultimate victory seriously diminished, or Invasion of the Soviet orbit by Western forces beeaao Imminent.
rartharnore. It la extremely doubtful that the fmreea of reels-tanoe within the Soviet orbit would effectively assert themselves unless they received guidance and enterial support from the meet, with tangible hope for early liberation by Western farose.
Original document.
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