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PROBABLE EFFECTS ON ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATESN ARMS EMBARGO
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PROBABLE EFFECTS ON ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATESN ARMS EMBARGO
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Current
ImplicationsN Arms Embargo against Jews and
ImplicationsN Arms Embargo against One Bfijjgerent
a. Agnlnst the
b Against lhe
or UN Failure to Take Positive
MilitaryJune 1MB
APPENDIXMILITARY SITUATION
Tactical
Strength or Forces
APPENDIXARMS SUPPLY
Present
Infantry Weapons and
Industry before and during World War
Munitions Industry after World War
e. Jewish Munitions Industry after the UN Partition
Raw Material
Possible Outside Sources or
USSR and its
sWret
sec^t
US and Latin
appendixarea supply
Present
Saudi Arabia, and
and
and Saudi
Raw Material
Possible Outside Soudces or
APPENDIXAND AIR DEFENSE SUPPLY
Toe Arab
APPENDIXSTRENGTH AND SUPPLY
PROBABLE EFFECTS ON ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATESN ARMS EMBARGO
SUMMARY
Neither Israel nor the Arab stales now have sufficient stocks of arms andlo carry out prolonged, full-scale hostilities following the end of the four-week truce which began lt June. Israel is weak In heavy equipment, although it hasstocks of small arms and ammunition, and Is believed capable of supporting guerrilla warfare operations with its own armament industry. The Arab states,superior In artillery, armored vehicles, and aircraft, have only limited stocks of ammunition and replacement equipment and possess insufficient facilities forarmament.
Both sides are negotiating to obtain materiel from outside sources. Zionist agents abroad have been able to stockpile light weapons and ammunition fromand other Eastern European countries for eventual shipment to Palestine, and lhe Jews undoubtedly hope to acquire additional heavy equipment from the US. The Arabs look, as in the past, lo the UKrincipal source of arms but are exploring additional sources. Arab financial resources for such transactions, however, are not extensive.
Thc application of an effective. UN arms embargo against both Israel and the Arab states would limit the scale of the fighting and would probably result in astalemate, leading eventuallyompromise. The Arabs would find themselves Incapable ofarge-scale offensive. The Jews would also be unable lo wage offensive war, but would probably be able to maintain their present positions along the coast and possibly In Galilee. Jewish extremists would resist any attempts at compromise, and the Provisional Government of Israel itself would probably make every effort to have thc embargo modified before entering into negotiations with the Arabs. Thc Arabs would also be loath to make concessions. In the end, however, both Israel and the Arab stales (or at least Transjordan) might feel constrained toewish state exclusive of the Negeb.
i. Inadequate enforcement of the embargo could also be expected toirtual stalemate. Israel, possessing better facilities for obtaining illegal arms than the Arabs, would be able to defend more territory than under an effective embargo but could notecisive victory. The Arabs would probably obtain measured assistance from the UK. whichtalemate. Since some support for Israel would come from the US, anti-US feeling in the Arab states would rise following any Jewish successes. The USSR would probably supply arms lo both belligerents In
hc Information In this report Is as
The Intelligence organizations of the Departments of State. Army, Navy, and the Air Force have concurred In this report- This report was prepared In collaboration with theol the Army. Navy, and the AJr Force, and al the request of the State Department.
SEC
an effort to promote continued unrest In the Middle East. (Seeor an evaluation of Soviet Policy In the Middle East)
N embargothe Jews alone would lead to eventual Arab victory, and would Increase US prestige with the Arabs. Intruggle for power between pro-Soviet, extremist groups And the moderates would ensue, with the moderates probably attempting toodus vti'indi with the Arabs. The amount of support provided by the Soviet bloc, on one hand, and the nature of the terms provided by the Arabs, on the other, would determine the outcome.
A UN embargo against the Arab states alone would permit the Jews to obtain sufficient military supplies to take the offensive and force Arab acceptanceewish stale and the withdrawal of Arab armed forces from Palestine. Under suchthe Arab states would probably see no significant loss Involved in leaving the UN and severing relations with the nations responsible for the embargo. They might also be willing to risk thc economic dislocation entailed in cancellation of economic concessions; these concessions might eventually be reassigned to more friendly powers. Political upheavals would probably ensue In the Arab stales, facilitating Soviet
If the UN takes no positive action following the end of the truce, militarywill in large measure depend on thc great powers. If the present US and UK embargoes are maintained, fighting would continuereater scale but neither side would obtain decisive victory. The UK would probably attempt to redress the balance If Soviet aid or other factors appeared to make Jewish success imminent. The Zionists would then Increase the pressure on the US to end Its embargo. Ii the US did so. thc Palestine battle would become bloodier, and US-UK relations wouldessation of British aid to the Arabs at this point, in order toreak with the US. would result in significant Soviet military aid to the Arabs,by intensified efforts to extend Soviet Influence Into the Arab countries.
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probable effects on israel and the arab statesn arms embargo
1. Cuiwint Situation.
he United Nations Palestine truce became effective onune, the fighting between the Arabs and the Jews was tendingtalemate. In which both sides were experiencing difficulties in marshalling effective military strength.neither Israel nor thc Arab League bloc was willing lo retreat publicly from its basic position. The Zionists insisted on thc maintenanceully independent state within the territories allocated them under the UN partition plan. The Arabs, although they showed some signs of willingness to compromise, were committed to opposing both sovereignty for Israel and unlimited Jewish immigration into it
At present under the truce, Arab regular and irregular forces within Palestine or near its borders total0 of whom have been actually committed inside Palestine. The strength of the Israeli forces totals0 of the Israeli troops have been used for active operations, half ot this figure being employedtriking force, and half for local, mobile defense.
The Arabs haveight aircraft and transports, while Israelan estimatedight aircraft, an unknown number of transports, and possibly several heavy bombers. Thc sea power of both Arabs and Jews is relatively light The Arab Armieside variety of small arms and are stronger than Israel In artillery and tanks. However, their stocks of ammunition and replacement materiel areand the Arab states have insufficient facilities and raw materials for theof armament. Present Israeli stocks of small arms are adequate to arm allmembers of the Israel forces. Israel's Industrial capacity is restricted by the shortage of raw materials but is believed capable of keeping present weapons and equipment In condition and of supplying replacements and ammunition for guerrilla warfare.
Thc arms and equipment of neither Jews nor Arabs are sufficient for prolonged, full-scale hostilities, and both sides are Involved in negotiations for obtaining materiel from various outside sources. The Jews have managed in various ways surreptitiously to acquire large amounts of arms and equipment from British Army stocks InThe efforts of Zionist agents abroad have resulted in the stockpiling of quantities of small arms, automatic weapons, and aimnunltlon in various eastern European countries for eventual shipment to Palestine Most of these stocks come fromYugoslavia, and possibly from Poland and the USSR. Jewishom the US consist mainly of machinery, motor vehicles, and air transport The Israeli forces are much more concerned with obtaining such heavier equipment lhan insmall arms.
The Arab states look lo the UK (subject lo its UN commitments) as their principal source of arms supply and will continue lo do so. However, such alternate sources as
SEOJIET
France, Belgium, Switzerland. Sweden, and Czechoslovakia are now being explored, and Spain and Argentina arc also possibilities It Is expected, however, that financial limitations will prevent large purchases from these sources
There is no evidence that either Arabs or Jews have smuggled any substantial sup-plies of arms into Palestine since the truce went into effect.
2. ImplicationsN Arms Embargo against Jtws and Arabs
If the effort* of the UN Mediator fail and hostilities are resumed, it is possible that the UN will impose an arms embargo on Israel and the Arab slates. Iftepeny arms to both sides, and thus keep the warmall scale andore or less localake It difficult for the belligerents to negotiate blackmarket arms purchases and even more difficult to effect delivery,robablyilitary stalemate leading eventuallyoliticalbetween the Jews and Arabs.
if thc Provisional Government of Israel (PGI) Is unable to obtain lhe heavywhich it needs touccessful campaign against thc Arab states, it will be forced to reappraise its position in the light of these changed conditions. Policy hilhcrto has been based on Ihc assumption that the Zionist organization throughout the world, and particularly in the US. would be successful in enlisting sufficient great-power support to assure the establishment and continued existence of thc Jewish state. Faced with the realization that their present military resources would not be sufficient toolution to the Palestine problem in accordance with the terms of the General Assembly partition plan. It scenu Inevitable that the more moderate Jewish elements would be obliged to consider some relrcal from their present attitude.
Wlille Arab outside sources of supply would also be cut off, this loss would befor by the shutting off of Jewish supplies.talemate would ensue. Tlic Jewish forces, though Incapable of waging offensive war. could probably maintain their present positions along thc coast and possibly In Galilee. Under theseboth lhe PGI and the Arab states, or at least Transjordan. might be willing toewish state exclusive of thc Negeb (assigned by the UN plan to the Jews bul now cut off by Arab forces).
No such willingness to consider compromise could be expected from the Jewish extremists. Both the Stern Gang and thc Irgun Zval Leumi have already rejected the authority of the PGI, and they have been working with the government only for reasons of expediency. Both groups would reaffirm their claim to all ot Palestine anddisassociate themselves from the decisions of thc PGI. and resume their terrorist activities. This schism would further weaken the Jewish political position, and produce Increased dissension in Jewish ranks. Attempts by the Irgun to import arms during thc truce have already resultedloody engagement with the Israeli Army.
Beforeompromise with the Arabs, the Jews would make every effort to bring about modifications in thc embargo. To this end, they would probably be willing toolitical alignment with any country whichisposition to consider their picas.
if lhe embargo were Inadequatelyilitary stalemate wouldeventuate. Jewish facilities for obtaining illicit arms would be greater than those of the Arabs, although the Arabs could probably obtain sufficient quantities to prevent an Arab defeat but not loecisive victory. The Jews could consolidate the areas of Palestine which they now hold and perhaps also force the Arabs lo relinquish the Negeb.
An active, well financed Zionist organization throughout Europe and the US would be able to run arms ships as formerly it ran ships of Illegal immigrants, Principal sources for small arms, automatic and semiautomatic weapons, ammunition, explosives, mortars, and light artillery would continue to be Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, with delivery accomplished by transshipment through Albania. Bulgaria, and Italy. This arrangement would entail minimum jeopardy to the UN status of the countries of origin. Any air or ground transport, self-propelled units, or heavy ordnance supplied by these countries would probably be of German or US manufacture, thereby making determination of the immediate source more difficult.
The British apparently favor the developmentilitary stalemate, which wouldompromise solution. For this reason, it Is likely that British arms In sufficient quantity to bring aboutituation and to prevent an Arab defeat would find their way into Arab hands. Czechoslovakia would accept arms-purchase contractsollar basis, and private sources in Italy could furnish arms on the same basis. The dollar shortage of thc Arab slates, however, would limit the quantities thus procuredery small percentage of what the Jewish forces could obtain.
Thc US would probably be deeply Involved In the illicit Jewish arms traffic.support would certainly stem mainly from this country,onsiderable portion of the actual war materiel would likely originate here. Consequently, violent antl-US reaction could be expected throughout the Arab world In the wake of any Jewishsuccesses. There Is also the probability lhat under such circumstances similar resentment would be directed against the UN and against those nations voting for the embargo. Meanwhile, thc USSR could be expected to exploit the Inadequacies of the embargo in order to play both ends against the middle.
3, ImplicationsN Aiims Embabgo against One Belligerent. a. Against Ihe Jews.
An effective UN arms embargo against the Jews alone would obviously mean military victory for the Arab forces.elatively short time lhe Arabs would beosition to establish some form of unitary state In Palestine, wherein the present Arab majority would be able lo control the Jewish minority. US prestige in the Middle East would be improved since Arab leaders would probably credit the US with having permitted this pro-Arab measure.
Thc repercussions in Israel of an embargo against thc Jews would be violent. The Jews would look on thc embargoetrayal by the West, and thc Stem Gang
control from the pro-West or moderate elements. To circumvent the schemes of the
5
SKC/fcT
extremists, lhe moderate elements might try to bargain with the Arab leaders in the hope otoodur vivendi for the Jews under some form of confederationfactors in the extremist-moderate struggle for power would be the amount o( support given by the USSR to thc extremists and the nature of the political terms the Arabs would be willing to grant lhe moderates
b. Against the Arabs.
An effective UN arms embargo against the Arabs alone would mean military victory for thc Jews. WhUe the Arabs would be denied outside help, the Jews would be able to buy arms In various parts of thc world, and to effect relatively easy delivery. They could thus assume the offensive and force Arab acceptanceewish state. Other nations could be expected to grant diplomatic recognition, which would add to the prestige of Israel and its government and help to ease current economic difficulties
The Arab states would, of course, look upon such an embargoostile act intended to defeat their claims In Palestine and to guarantee Israel's independence. Arab leaders have already declared that, If increasing aid Ls given the Jews by other powers, thc Arab states will leave the UN, break off diplomatic relations with those nations most directly concerned, and cancel the concessions held by the same powers in Arab countries. These concessions might eventually be transferred to more friendly powers.
In terms of self-interest, the Arab slates would lose Utile by severing diplomatic relations with the SC members responsible for the embargo or even by withdrawing from the UN. The imposition of economic sanctions by the Arab states on the powers which had voted for the embargo would cause serious dislocations In the Arab countries and would delay development programs indefinitely Nonetheless, the Arabs might well be willing to sacrifice economic benefits In order to punish the oflending natrons.would likely Include the canceUaUon of oil and air concessions or the sequestration of foreign Installations. Moreover, the Arab masses would probably turn against their own governments, holding them responsible for the defeat. Thc violence and unrest accompanying these political upheavals would create the chaotic conditions most favorable to Soviet exploitation.
4. plications of UN Failure to Take Pcsmvr. Actio-*.
In the event that thc UN truceh the UN having taken no positive action, the development of the military situation in Palestine will depend largely on the policies pursued by lhe US and UK regarding arms shipments to the Middle East. If the US and the UK should maintain embargoes, the Jews could obtain more arms andfrom other sources than the Arabs This advantage, however, would not bedecisive; fighting would continuereater scale but would not brin* oul-rlghl victory to either side.
Thc USSR probably would not support either side exclusively. If it should attempt to increase Its influence In Israel by making lorge shipments of materiel lo the Jews or If for anyewish victory appeared Imminent, the UK would almost certainly
SEJWtET
seek to redress the balance by resuming arms shipments to thc Arabs. Thus thedeadlock would hold.
The UK's action would cause the Zionists lo increase their pressure on the US lo lift ils embargo If their efforts were successful, the result would be an Increasingly bloody struggle in Palestine for an indefinite period of lime, coupledatastrophic deterioration In already strained US-UK relations. Should the UK subsequently stop its shipment of arms to the Arab states in order toomplete break with the US. the Arabs would beesperate situation At this stage, the USSR would almost certainly give support to the Arab Armies considerably beyond the small amount of materiel aid already reaching them through the Soviet satellites and would take ad-vantage of the Isolation of the Arab world from thc West to extend its control into the Arab countries.
APPENDIX A
PRESENT MILITARY SITUATION
I. Tactical Situation. {See attached map.)
When the Arab and Jewish truce began on8 the Jews controlled loosely almost all of Galilee, roughly the area northine running from HabTa through Jenin to Bclsan. The Arabs had made three small penetrations Into thisixed force of Syrian regulars and Arab Irregulars had established itself south of the Lebanese border atecond force of regular Syrian troops had penetrated from Syria as far as Mishmar hay Yarden. and was ln position to threaten the main road running from Tiberias to the settlements north of Lakehird Syrian force is reported lo have penetrated to, and occupied, the city of Nazareth,
In addition to the Galilee arei, the Jews remained in possession of the coastal belt, roughly ten miles in width, from the Lebanese border on the north to Isdud on the south. Tlic Jews also maintained small forces in aboutsolated settlements in the Ncgeb, and continued to hold the western portions of Jerusalem.
The three-pronged attack of thc Arabs In the vicinity of Tel Aviv had stalled, at least temporarily, byune. The Egyptian column, about one brigade In strength, had moved north along the Palestinian coast, and was in control of the coastal area from the Egyptian border to the general vicinity of Isdud. with some units deployed along the road leading cast from El Majdal. Strong Jewish counterattacks hadnear Isdud beforeune. Iraqi troops were In possession of Ras elumping station for Jerusalem's water supply, locatediles northeast of Tel Aviv. Arab Legion units controlled Lydda and Ramie, ten to fifteen miles southeast of Tel Aviv. The truce apparently interrupted Jewish operations designed to seize those two points.
In thc Jerusalem area, Arab Legion units continued to control the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv road at Latrun by covering it with artillery Ore. although the Arabs did not physically occupy thc road at any point. The Jews, however, had opened an emergency by-pass route on the Jerusalem highway. In the city of Jerusalem, Arab Legion units occupied the Old City and the northern and northeastern suburbs. Other Arab Legion troops supported by Arab Irregulars were attempting to force their way into Jerusalem through Jewish-held positions south of theecond Egyptian column, which had moved north from Beersheba. was last reported to be located between Bethlehem and Jerusalem.
2. Strswcth or Forces Involved.
As ofune, It is estimated that the Jewish military and quashrrulitary forces totaled0 men and women. Hagana, which has become the official Israeli Army, consiststriking force of0 organized into approximately
six brigades; local mobile defense units, totalingnd0 militia used for the static defense of both urban and rural areas. While present estimates put the strength of Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stem Gang, respectively, there is reason to believe that both organizations may be considerably larger.
At the beginning of the truce period, Arab regular and Irregular forces operating within or near the border of Palestine totaledf0 regulars and an undetermined number of irregulars were actually within Palestine. The above totals are broken down by countries in the accompanying table.
ARAB LEAGUE MILITARY FORCES PERSONNEL STRENGTHS
In
Near
Army
Palestine
Arabia
undetermined)
Plus at least some ot the Arab lircgoiaii, originally estimatedn wnote present location exact Information Is lacking.
J .
SRAELI ARMS SUPPLY
1. GtNKHAL.
Trcscnt slocks ol small arms (Including rifles, submachine guns, and pistols) are considered adequate for arming all combatant members of thc Israeli forces withweapons. It is also believed that present stocks of small-arms ammunition are large and that the Jews can produce more. The Israeli forces are generally deficient In heavier equipment but have an ample supply of mortars, most of which, along with mortar ammunition, are locally made. Allhough there were no indications of any appreciable quantity of artillery in the possession of Israel, the Zionists now claim to be well equipped ln this line. The Zionists are supplementing their small stock of armored cars and captured tanks with scout cars and armored personnel carriers converted from trucks. Israeli forces are equipped with grenades and appear to be well supplied with various types of exploslves.
It is estimated that present stocks of arms and ammunition in Israel would not suffice for moreomparatively short period of heavy fighting.
lan for establishing an armament industry In Palestine, submitted lo thc British High Commissioner, was flatly rejected, and an order forbidding munitions production was Issued. Nonetheless, there Is evidence that even before theof thc Independent state ofonsiderable capacity for the illegalof weapons and ammunition had been developed within the present boundaries of thc new Jewish state. Materiel so manufactured has been uncovered by numerous British police and military raids on various Installations. Following the UN partition recommendation, when It became clearajor conflict would develop between Jew and Arab, Jewish leaders prepared for the complete conversion of Palestine's small but efficient Industry, which bad been built up earlier by Jewish colonists, lo military needs.
The materiel now produced by Jewish industry includes small arms and small aims ammunition, mortars, and various explosive devices. While the shortage ot rawrestricts the munitions industry. It Is believed that current production is adequate to keep present stocks of arms In condition and to supply replacements and ammunition for guerrilla warfare.
Zionist agents have for many months been actively engaged throughout Europe and thc US formulating plans toteady and adequate Sow of arms to thc Jews In Palestine. Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia are probably the chief European sources for such arms. Because under the Mandate the importation of arms into Palestine was Illegal, the materiel acquired was stockpiled both in these countries and In Bulgaria, Albania, and Italy for subsequent shipment to Palestine. The stocks are believed to consist of small arms, automatic weapons, and ammunition; they are for the most part of Czech manufacture, the only notable exception being quantities of Mauser rifles from
10
SEflfflET
ircraft and other heavy materiel have been acquired in the US, much of this equipment Is shipped to PalesUne via Latin American countries
2. PRESENT Stocks.
Infantry Weapons and Ammunition.
Israeli stocks of rifles, submachine guns, and pistols are of various origins, mostly British, and are adequate to arm all members of Irgun Zvai Leumi, the Stem Gang, the Israeli Police, and all combatant membersf Hagana with personal weapons. It Is alleged that in northeast Palestineercent of the Jewish men are armed. According to one source,ettlements in the Tiberias-Safad regionotal populationewsotaliflesutomatic weapons. The high percentage of arms per capita in this particular region may be accounted for by thc fact that the Zionists considerritical area. On the coast and in the cities wlilch have greater protection in depth, the percentage is probably much lower. The ratio of pistols and submachine guns to rifles Is greater in the larger towns and cities than In the settlements. The main weapons In this category are the British,evolver, and the US-made Smith Ac Wessonevolvers in use by the British Array. Other small arms possessed by the Zionists are British Bren machine guns. Stcn and Thompson submachine guns. Browning machine guns. British and German-type rifles. Vlckers and Spandau light machine guns, and medium and heavy machine guns, Boys antitank rifles, PIATS, and bayonets and commando knives. Some Sten guns of superior quality, possibly the major portion possessed by the Zionists, are manufactured In Tel Aviv or Galilee.
Present stocks of ammunition for small arms are believed to be large, and the Israeli are reported able to produce more. Although before the present truce some of thc stocks of ammunition were expended In operations, the Zionists allegedly bought large quantities of British storesons of ammunition They also are reported to have salvaged unknown quantities of ammunition and weapons jettisoned by thc British at the time of the British withdrawal. Ammunition for the relatively small number of heavy machine guns Is in short supply.
The Israeli have an ample supply of mortars, most of which are locally made. It is alleged that In January thereortars of unnamed caliber inettlements In thc Safad-Tibcrias area.nehnch mortars stolen from the British Army have been used by Israeli forces, but the number thus acquired by thc Zionists is not known. The Israeli are also manufacturing mortars of these calibers, and their use of such weapons has generally been increasing. In one Jewish settlement cache.f these locally manufactured mortars were discovered by the British inalmach. the full-time combat unit of Hagana. is reported tonch mortars and to have fired at least six such projectiles during the Haifa engagement Mortar ammunition Is produced In Israel.
11
SECRET
Artillery.
Although the exact number of licit! artillery pieces possessed by Israel is not known, the Jews claim now to be well equipped. Twenty-flvc-pounder field guns (at leastndave been reported in the possession of Hagana. as well asnch pack howitzers. There is nothing to Indicate, however, that the Israeli forces are in possession of any self-propelled artillery. It has been reported thatntiaircraft guns were installed for the defense ol Tel Aviv following thc first air raids
Vehicles.
Although the Zionists apparently had no tanks or other tracked offensiveat first, they reportedly seized two Sherman tanks from the Arab Legion in the middle of May and two Cromwell tanks from the British at the end of June. During World War II the British are believed to have supplied the Zionistsmall number of armored cars so that they might protect their road convoys against Arab attack. The Zionists hove supplemented this materielumber of trucks to which protective boiler plate has beenarge number of trucks have thus been converted into Improvised types of scout cars and armored personnel carriers.
The Israeli forces arc equipped with standard British hand and rifle grenades stolen from the British Army and with some improvised grenades. Some of their hand and rifle grenades appear to have been made In the USut they are not US service types. Israeli forces are also reported lo havepound 'rocket shell. They appear lo be well supplied with various types of explosives, as mine warfare has been conductedelatively large scale, both with road mines and with demolition charges. The Zionists claim to have both antitank and antipersonnel mines. Most of lhe mines are improvised from explosives stolen from the British. Standard British mines are also used.
3. Production Capacity.
a. Jewish Industry be/ore ond during World
Jewish colonials before the war hadmall but efficient and well diversified manufacturing industryotalactories and workshops This includedetal-workuig shops which employedorkers and possessedower presses,lUlng machines, andhapers and planers. The abundance of experienced workers, many of whom were driven out of Europe by Axis persecution, provided the counlryoundation for development of an Industry based on skills and craftsmanship. Of particular Importance among metal manufactures were such specialized products as precision optical apparatus,and medical equipment, tools and dies, and electrical Instruments.
The establishment and development of thc Near Easttrategic center and the demand for war supplies by the Allied armies in thai area ledonsiderable
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exparuion ol lhe productive capacity of thc Palestinian industry.ewish Industry includedndustrial establishments0 wot ken The me Uil-working industry in particular was expanded to meet war needs,etal worksorkersachinery works. Chemical production was also developed as an Important branch oflants employingorkers. The British operated aAiling factory during the war at Warti Sarar. using mine casings and components furnished by metal works In Tel Aviv. Haifa, and elsewhere. Peak production of the plantines dally. Explosive charges for thc mines were not manufactured In Palrstine, however, but were Imported from Great Britain.
b Jewish Munitions Industry after World War II.
One of the principal sources of information as to the postwar development of an illegal Jewish munitions industry has been raids conducted by British police and military on installations suspected of furnishing demolition materials to Jewish extremist forces. Even prior to VE-Day, Jewish efforts turned from the accumulation of considerable stocks of hidden weapons, acquired by smuggling, illegal purchases, and thefts from military personnel, to the domestic manufacture of spare parts and ammunition for weapons and even lo fabrication of complete weapons. Among the latter were crude rocket projectiles which were fired from mortars ln an attackritish police barracks inhe projectiles wereeet long, anduel tank. Jet. and explosive charge of gelignite, and showed evidences of workmanship of persons familiar with the manufacture of rocket weapons. Aboutere found, used and unused.'and It Is estimated lhatay have beenA Tel Aviv workshop raided shortly thereafter contained evidence of the manufacture of such projectiles and morlar parts. Olher workshops for manufacture of crude bombs and electrical detonators were also found
A major haul was madeaid in6 on the Jewish settlement of Meshekew miles east of Haifa,mall underground arsenal yielded thousands of grenades, mortar shells, and. among other'weapons.nch mortars of undetermined origin.
Further raids by British military and police in0 revealed large caches of arms and explosives, Including thousands of homemade mines and bombs, in Tel Aviv churches, schools, and houses, establishing almost to the point of certainty that Tel Aviv is the main supply base of the Jewish forces in Paleit-iw.
Evidence of Jewish Ingenuity in fabrication of munitions was displayedin terrorist raidsrude but effective flame-throwers were used by Irgun in raids on police barracks. New and powerful types of road mines were developed by thc extremists for attacks on British truck convoys. Homemade mortars, constructed of pipe, were used more frequently.
British military patrolsomplete arms-manufacturing and spare-parts workshop in7loorsuilding opposite Britishin Tel Aviv. The shop was filled with lathes and other power tools, and stocks of homemade rifles and spare parts for rifles and automatic weapons were
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In thcaid on one of thc larger Tel Aviv metal works In July brought to light Slen gun components and blueprints for Slen guns, and one worker was caught at his latheap for Slen barrel extensions It was considered probable thai this plant was merely one linkhain of Slen gun partsof which the previously raided shop wasink-
C. Jewish Munitions Industry after the VN Partition Recommendation.
Under lhe provisions for the partition of Palestine, the major parts and most of the industry of Palestine were centered In the Jewish state of Israel. It Is estimated that five-sixths or Uie Industrial workers In Palestine work for Jewish enterprises which are concentrated In the cities ot Haifa and Tel Aviv. Palestine's maindiamond-polishing, textiles, chemicals, food-packing, metal works, and electrical goods-are all in the Jewish state. As the scale of Jewish-Arab conflict within Palestineand as Arab league forces made threatening moves toward Palestine's borders, preparations were made by Jewish leaders for the maximum conversion of this small but efficient Industry to military needs In the emergency. Among the preparations taken as open warfare became more Imminent wa; the armoring of commercial trucks and buses with armor plate or (In its absence) with ordinary steel plate.
All available Information pointsonsiderable Increase In production iollegal arms factories, located In Tel Aviv and Galilee, werecomplete Stcn guns in considerable numbers. Cost of the finished weapons to the Jewish forces is reported to be aboutpiece. Mortarsnch caliber are also being manufactured and used in Increasing numbers.nch mortars of varied origin arc csUmated to be in the hands of Haganaortar ammunition for both types is also being made. British officers have stated that the Sten gunsnch mortars made by the Jews are In many cases superior to those made in England. The Jews are also reported to have facilities for the manufacture of considerable quantities of small-arms ammunition in various arms factories. Among the items produced In other factories are explosive devices such as mines, grenades, and demolition charges, smoke, pyrotechnics, detonators, and (uses, bayonets and knives, barbed wire, concrete emplacements, sandbags, first aid supplies, and other defense products.
4. Raw Matkhiax. Situation.
Palestine suffers from an almost complete lack of mineral resources, especially iron ore and nonferrous metals. The Important potash and bromine deposits In the Dead Sea and various sulphur and gypsum deposits are the only exploitable mineral wealth. Coal and petroleum are completely lacking. In addition, the country Is deficient In raw material for Its food-processing and textile Industries. Raw material for the Iron and nonferrous metal foundries is scrap metal, of which plentiful supplies have been brought from the North African battlefields.esult of short supplies of most raw materials, the Jewish colonists before the war concentrated on thcof industries in which the finished product depends for its value upon theskill of management and workers, while raw materialselatively minor part.
SEtfRET
estimated annual requirements of Palestine's industry0 for rawif ils total productive capacity were devoted to the war effort, were as follows:
Iron and steel
metals
and cork
and oils
and leather
products
raw materials
raw materials
materials
Possible Outside Sources or Supply. (Countries from which Israel Is receiving materiel.)
USSR and its Satellites.
No reliable evidence exists of purchases of arms from the USSR, although it Is known that Jewish Agency representatives In Prague have negotiated with the Soviet Purchasing Commission there. The Governments of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, as well as those of Bulgaria and Albania, have cooperated In the transfer of arms to the Jewish forces by providing facilities, applying security measures, and maintaining the utmost secrecy concerning movements of arms. In Czechoslovakia, the transfer of arms Is apparently being effected by Hagana andzech Government export-Import agency. While some shipments have been made from Czechoslovakia by air (from Zatec and Ruzyne airfields, nearost shipments appear to have been made by sea from ports located mainly in Italy, Bulgaria, and Albania. Bulgaria and Albania have no resources for making actual contributions of arms of any significance. There are indications of some purchases of arms from Polandesult of negotiations between representatives of Hagana and the Polish Central Jewish Committee. Shipments thus made entered Palestine under the guise of pipe and plumbing supplies.
Europe.
Apparently the only Western European country in which lhe Jews have met with success in their efforts to purchase materiel is Belgium. Sale was made by the Office of Mutual Aid to the National Hebrew Government, and the materiel consisted of tenting and individual equipment of US manufacture rather than weapons.Italy, because of Zionist pressure, has taken no effective action against the
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transshipment of aims, there Is no evidence that Italy has actually supplied any arms to the Jews Italy has adopted an altitude ol "benevolentt is believed that no arms have been shipped from any of the Scandinavian countries Swedish munition manufacturers would probably be willing to sell arms to both Jews and Arabs; no direct purchases can be made at this time, however, inasmuch as lhe Swedish Government will not grant export licenses for shipment lo Israel or the Arab states.
c. The UK.
The Jews have acquired large amounts of arms and military materiel from British Army stocks in Palestine. These acquisitions were accomplished not with the cooperation of the British Government, which has been reluctant to sell arms to the Jews, but through purchases from Individual members of thc British Army, and by bribery, theft, re purchase from Arabs, and through open raids on British supplyThe British Army supplies now in the hands of the Israeli forces Include rifles, pistols. Bren guns. Sten guns, explosives,neh morlars.erynch howitzers.
d. The US and Latin America.
Thc bulk of Jewish acquisitions from the US has consisted of machinery and motor vehicle and air transport, much of which was purchased on the open market In the US for allegedly peaceful purposes. Both corporations and private individuals are engaged in this illicit traffic. One man Is reported to be engaged in theof small arms for Hagana in the Dominican Republic. The shipment of much of the raalenel acquired In the US has been via Latin American countries.
An American organization. Service Airways, with headquarters In New York and Burbank. California, is exporting surplus US aircraft to Palestine. Its Panamanian subsidiary. Lineas Aeras de Panama, SA (generally referred to as LAPSA)leet of Constellationss out of Panama ostensibly to Rome. These aircraft are reported to be carrying small planes, aircraft parts, and arms to the Jewish forces in Palestine.s bearing the Panamanian flag have recently been observed at the Zatecenter for clandestine arms operations near Prague.
RAB ARMS SUPPLY
1. GfNIKAL.
The armies of the Arab states (particularly the British-trained units of Trans-Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq) are organized along conventional lines, although they are much weaker than Western armies In supporting weapons, motor transport, andorganization. (At present, for example, they possess an aggregate strength ofieces of lightess thanight tanks, andrmored cars.)
The Arab armies do not possess sufficient stockpiles of arms, ammunition,and other essential war materiel loampaign against Israel to aconclusion; on the basis of present stocks, thc Arab stales would beifficult supply position and could not launch extended offensive operations. The armsmade to the Arabs by the UK prior to the truce probably served mainly to equip existing units or to replace obsolete equipment, and consequently would not be available for expansion of the armies in the field or for the replacements which, it is expected, would begin to be required soon after resumption of the fighting. At present deficiencies in ammunition reserves are particularly acute, although other supply difficulties are expected to arise.
The armament producing facilities and raw materials In the Arab states are too limited to affect materially the present supply situation. Under the circumstances, the Arabs undoubtedly hope for assistance from the UK. although limited additional materiel might be obtained from private sources In Czechoslovakia and other countries.
2. PaxsiNT Stocks. a. F'Oifpl.
Thc Egyptian Army's small arms, predominantly British, consist ofifles of Worldintage, Sten and Thompson submachine guns, and atren light machine guns, as well as Lewis light machine guns and Vickers and Holehklss heavy machine guns. It also has British hand and rifle grenades
Thc Egyptian Army employsnch,nch mortar, but stocks are nol known. It was to have received from thenchnch mortars, and an unknown numbernch mortars. Atmm. PIAT antitank weapons are known to have been delivered by the UK out of an allotment of more.
Early8 the Egyptian Army possessed approximatelyight artilleryt also had at the outset ot thc Palestine fighting aboutrmored cars, some of which have since been immobilized, and aboutight tanks. Egypt is short In motor transport, especially for battlefield use.
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Thc Transjordan Arab Legion is probably thc best equipped of the Arab forces. Its British Infantry equipment5 rifles and carbinesren light machine guns. It hasnch mortars.nchnch mortars, and aboutntitank guns.
Transjordan forces possesspoundcr light artillery pieces and had. in4 armoredritish deliveryounds sterling worth of trucks, tractors, armored cars, and miscellaneous equipment was held up onune because of the truce. Thc Arab Legion has adequate motor transport but would faceand replacement problems during extended operations.
Trans Jordan's chief difficulty is with ammunition reserves: shortagesnch mortar ammunition were developing at the time of the truce, and it is likely that additional shortages of arms and ammunition would developonth of hostilities if outside resupply was not made available.
The small arms of the Iraqi Army are practically all of British origin, although0 rifles and other Fiench equipment obtained1 are alsoThc basic infantry weapon Is the3 rifle. Iraq is amply supplied with infantryillion-pound sterling order for British arms, largely filled by the8 deadline,len submachineren light machine guns, and an unspecified number of rifles. Iraq is also believed to possess at leastewis or Bren light machine guns,ickers heavy machineotchklss heavy machine guns, andtalian machine guns.
Included ln the British shipment due In8 werench mortars,nch mortars, andnch mortars, as wellmm. PIAT antitank weapons.
Iraq haspoundcr artillery pieces,nch pack howitzers, and some additional light artillery and light AA weapons.rmored vehicles andon trucks were to have been furnished by the Britishraq previously had virtually no armored vehicles. Iraq's motor transport is stillalthough the government has requisitioned all trucks being privatelythrough Basra as well as other civilian trucks.
The bulk of the Syrian infantry forces arc equipped withifles purchased before World War n. althoughee-Enfield rifles andauser rifles purchased from Czechoslovakia arc on hand. Syria has receivedhompson submachine guns andubmachine guns of Czech origin as well asaliber pistols. The Syrian Army also hasm. lightguns (Chatelierault Modelndm. heavy machineodel). Thc amount and types of mortars available are not known.
Syria Is believed to haveight artillery pieces, probably obsolescent French models. Eleven oright tanks (nine of which were disabled before the truce) and
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rmored cars have been observed. The Gendarmerie hasritish-suppliedarmored cars. Syria has ample motor transport
Ammunitionritical Item of supply. It is reportedly adequate foronth of aggressive action.
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.
Lebanon's small army possesses old French equipment In unknown quantity, and hasittle equipmentontract with the French firm of Brandt Ammunition is extremely short, reportedly being sufficient forew days of
Saudi Arabiaiversified and mainly obsolete stock of Italian, British, German, and US lend-lease weapons,3 rifles.mm.mm mortars, machine guns, and automatic rifles. Saudi ArabiaS lend-lease trucks (about half of them jeeps)ritish trucks. Adequate fuel isbut motor maintenanceajor problem.
Yemen's small, heterogeneous arms stocks add nothing to the Arab war effort.
3. Production Capacity.
The Arab states In general lack even the limited industrial base which lends strength to the forces of Israel. This can hardly be attributed to lack of rawsince all are similarly deficient In this respect. The lack of efficientand skilled technicians in the Arab states Is an important factor bearing on their lack of industrial capacity.ore Important factor Is their position as small countries which have been up until recently, or still are. dominated by major powers whose policy was to supply them with their requirements for weapons and ammunition rather lhan to see their own small Industries built up, The result Is that the Arab states arc even more dependent than Israel upon foreign sources for their weapons and equipment
and Lebanon,
As far as is known, there is no production of finished munitions In theseother than limited production of homemade bombs and small arms ammunition in clandestine arms factories. The French Army formerlyunitions depot In Ha man a,mall village aboutilometers east of Beirut, but this wastorage depot for munitions imported from abroad, mostly from France. Small-arms cartridges may have been filled at this depot but primary manufacture was not undertaken.
Homemade bombs of unknown origin have occasionally been used in pastA clandestine small-arms ammunition factory is reported In operation at Gharifeh. an isolated Druse village In the Baakllne district of Lebanon. Establishedhe plantaily capacity ofounds of small-arms ammunition0 percussion caps. Imported tin, brass, lead, powder, and other supplies are
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furnished by Darwiche Tabbara and Sons, pyrotechnics and fireworks manufacturers in Beirut.
Both Syria and Lebanon are encouraging the development of private munitions industries. The Beirut firm of Muhammad Farhat and Abd-al-Razzak Habib, aand general repairs shop, recentlyicense from the LebaneseTor the manufacture of munitions. Initial production was to consist of mines and grenades. Machines for manufacture of percussion caps and detonators for these were reportedly still on order inhe firm Is also reported to be trying to purchase equipment lo produce more complicated weapons, including riflesmm mortars. Syrian military leaders reportedly were negotiating In8 with lhe owner of the Italian Zorzoti firm, manufacturers of an efficient machine pistol (modelo move his plant and workers from Turinew location near Damascus.
Little information is available regarding the productive capacity of Iraq of arms and ammunition. The Iraqi Army is known to maintain, probably in thc Baghdadifle factory which is capable of producing British-designed3 rules of the short Enfieldmall arms ammunition factory Is also available for production of various types of small-arms ammunition, mainly3 caliber round for the Enfield rifle. Production of these plants was stopped during the war owing to shortages of raw materials, and it Is not believed to have started again owing to lack of demand. (The Iraqi Army can supply itself more cheaply from British surplus stocks than it can from its own factories, since aU raw materials for munitionsmust ben artillery shell case factory was also purchased from the UK but has never been placed inecent report indicates that Iraq is Interested In selling this plant to Egypt. It Is authoritatively reported that the Iraqi General Staff does not intend to establish any more munitions plants.
Inh century, Egypt was self-sufficient in the production of small-arms and ammunition. However, the developmentodern army made the native munitions industry completely Inadequate, with thc result that the industry was allowed to languish in favor of almost complete dependence on imported weapons and Production is for all practical purposes nonexistent at present.
Egypt is anxious tounitions industry, and has entertainedof US and Citech firms interested in establishing plants for the EgyptianHowever, such munitions plants would be dependent on imports for raw and semi-finished material requirements.
The Arab section of Palestineew textileoapatch factory, some plants for processing olive oil,ew metal and chemical works. However, five-sixths of Palestine industry was included in the new Jewish slate.
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Arab Industry, which0mall mclal worksersons andhemical worksorkers, has also been curtailed by the loss ot JafTa. in which several metal shops were engaging in the armor plating ol trucks and some mortars were made.
and Saudi Arabia.
There is no evidence of any manufacture of weapons or ammunition inor Saudi Arabia.
The Yemen Armyew field pieces which areertain amount of rifle ammunition Is made in Sana'aachine shop operatedussian Jewew native assistants. ItmaU and primitive establishment, with an estimated capacityounds of small-arms ammunition daily, provided raw ma-terials ar available. Although black powder is produced In some quantity, brass is extremely scarce and cartridges are necessarily very expensive.
Material Situation.
All the Arab states lack significant quantities of iron, steel, coal, nonferrous metals, and chemical requirementsunitions industry. There is no prospect in the near future that any of the Arab states can overcome these basic hindrances to establishmentelf-sustained munitions industry.
Outsdje Sources of Supply.
Although the materiel now possessed by the Arab states Is of mixed foreignthe bulk of the serviceable and efficient military equipment available to them is of British origin, and thc only logical standardization would be along British lines. It Is further difficult to foresee any source but the UK which would provide anything like an adequate supply of arms to the Arabs. UK delivery of equipment to the Arab states was haltedune, two days before the truce became effective, but the treaties remain in effect. The Arabs will undoubtedly look first to thc UK in attempting to obtain additional materiel.
The Arabs have also been approaching other sources of supply, however, including those in France, Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden, and Czechoslovakia; Czcchoslovakian and Belgian arms representatives have recently conducted arms demonstrations in Cairo. Syria and Lebanon, which feel less need to standardize on British lines, have been particularly active in seeking supplies from other sources. Syria has still to receive delivery on the bulkkoda {Czechoslovakia) order for0ubmachineachine guns,0 rounds of ammunition due inebanon has outstanding orders for machinemm. guns, light mortars, antitank guns, and ammunition with thc Parisian firm of Edgar Brandt, but this source Is unable to supply amounts adequate for more than day-to-dayneeds. In general. Arab lack of dollar credits will restrict purchases outside the
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although the USSR and its satellites might provide some materiel under special circumstances.
' Another source of arms still capable of exploitation is the reservoir of British,and US equipment abandoned during the North African campaign. This equip-ment, consisting mainly of small arms, automatic weapons, and ammunition, has come largely Into the hands of private individuals and small concerns andrincipal source of the arms acquired by Arab Irregulars. The traffic has been particularly active In Egypt, but there are no Indications that the Egyptian Government has officially sanctioned It or has acquired such materiel itself.
Acquisition of arms from the US for Arab use in Palestine Is not likely,onsiderable number of vehicles, not subject to the current embargo, have beenrecently from the US.
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AIRCRAFT AND AIR DEFENSE SUPPLY
At present the Arab stales are markedly superior to Israel in the number of military aircraft of all types available. However, on the ba*is of present stocks of planes and replacement parts. It Is estimated that future deterioration of Arab air strength would be rapid, while Israel would be able lo continue to provide effective airhortage of trained Arab pilots Is another critical factor; even if an arms embargo were nomlnnlly In effect against Israel alone, the Jews might be able to outstrip the Arabs In operational effectiveness. Neither side has local sources of aircraft. The Jews have been obtaining aircraft from Czechoslovakia and (through clandestine sources) from the US. The Arabs were not receiving aircraft at the time of the truce onune but presumably might obtain additional materiel from the UK under the appropriate circumstances
The Arab slates are superior to Israel In antiaircraft weapons, having guns of Ughl through heavy calibers asimited number of Ught weapons installed by the Jews at Tel Aviv. However, neither side has enough equipment for adequate defense against sustained attack. Ammunition stocks are limited. Israel has been buying AA equipment from Czechslovakia and has approached Oeriikon. The Arabs haveAA equipment from the UK and have approached Czechoslovakia and Oeriikon. The Arabs haveew radar sets, while Israel Is not known to possessumber of sources of radar equipment are available to both sides, neither thc Jews nor the Arabs arc believed capable of making efficient use of radar.
stimated that Israel has the following operational aircraft. In addition to an unknown numberss and possibly two ors:
Hl An0 Austersiscellaneous light types
Up lo the lime of the truce Israel was receiving aircraft from Czech firms and through clandestine sources in the US. It Is estimated Ihat at leasts would beto Israel from Czechoslovakia and an unknown number of fighters. Ught bombers, and transports from clandestine US sources.
Forty light AA guns, are reported In position around Tel Aviv. The Jews have
obtained AA equipment from Czechoslovakia and have negotiated with Oer
Switzerlandmm. guns. Additional weapons might be available from the Soviet bloc.
Radar equipment, not known to be in the possession or Israel at present, might be obtained from British. US, and German World War II stocks now In private hands and from electronics dims In the Netherlands. Sweden, and other countries.
3. Tur Arab States.
It is estimated that the Arab states have the following aircraft:
pitfire V's and6
In addition. Egypt maintains, at approximatelyercent operational efficiency.bsolete aircraft, asoulton Paul Deflants.'s,urricanes. Egypt alsos donated by the US for mechanical Instruction only and not to be flown; of these.re believed to have been put Into operation.
Iraq nsons
ladiators (condition very poor)ea Furies
iscellaneous light training and liaison types Syria
iscellaneous light training and liaison types Lebanon and Transjordan nil
No aircraft were being received by thc Arabs at'the time of the truceune.
Arab antiaircraft artillery ranging In caliber fromm. upnch isat Alexandria, Cairo, and Baghdad. Ammunition stocks are low. Fire control radar Is not used with thc heavy AA guns. The Arabs have been receiving AA weapons from the UK and were expectingram. Bofors guns at the time of thc truce.weapons might be available from Czechoslovakia, with which the Arabs con-traded for the purchase of arms prior to the Communist coup, and from the Oerlikon firm, which had been approached prior to the truce.
Egypt apparentlyew British radar sets (including early warning as well as lighter equipment) but Is not believed to have spare parts and qualified maintenance personnel. Except for some indicationsadar station (possibly supplied by Egypt) has been installed along the Jcrusalem-Latrun road, there is no olher evidence that the Arabs possess radar. The Arab slates might be able to obtain radar equipment from the UK. as well as from the private sources also available to Israel.
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APPENDIX E
STRENOTlt AND SUPPLY
Egypt is the only nation under consideration which possesses more than token naval forces. Israel reportedly has several corvettes and might be able lo employ light defensive armament on merchant vessels chartered by its representatives for bringing in immigrants and supplies; conceivably It might also be able to obtain naval assistance from the Soviet bloc
The Royal Egyptian Navy consists entirely of sloops or small, slow, escort vessels It has sufficient (although inadequately trained and experienced) personnel to man these vessels and Is believed to be able to provide logistical support for the force In the Southeastern Mediterranean. Replacement parts and ammunition are limited. Ad-ditional equipment might be available from the UK, which has supplied most of Egypt's equipment with the exception of some recently acquired US surplus motor minesweepers.
/Vo. Displacement Speed (knots)
(tons)
Type
Sloop (PC) Sloop (PG) Motor Minesweepers (YMS)
Landing Ship Tank
) Small Transport
IAPC) Motor Patrol Boats
<YP)
Current Egyptian fleet strength may be summarized as follows:
0
Armament
eported Disarmed
ual0 MM AA
)
2-Depth Charge0 MM0 MMdr,
M AA
or more miscellaneous vessels of negligible fighting value areT is badly in needefit.
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Original document.
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