prospectsegotiated peace in china
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advantageseacefully cornmunized China, and the propaganda value accruing from apparent advocacy of world peace.
A negotiated peace would have real advantages tor the Communis is. but since they hold the military Initiative and feel sure of final victory, they would probably Insist on terms that woud ensure their ultimate control of China.
PROSPECTSEGOTIATED PEACE IN CHINA
in Nationalist Cbzha.
Large numbers of people throughout Nationalist China blame the civil conflict for their present misfortunes. The Internal struggle has already dashed the hope of peace and stability which the end of the war with Japan held out The apparent hopelessness of ultimate victory for the Nationalists contributes heavily to the tow morale of the common soldier, the civil servant, and the peasantry; and makesmilitary operations against the Communists seem pointless. (See ORE)
The bulk of the common people In Nationalist areas have become apathetic; their aspirations and hopesrighter future underationalist orregime have been dissipated. The peasants are told that the Government is In favor of agrarian reform, but except in certain Communist areas little substantial reform has been carried out. The students and intellectual groups have beenby the Inflation, and this has intensified their bitterness, frustration, andSome students. In the face of severe and arbitrary police measures, arethe Communist cause In Nationalist universities Even many businessmen ofChina are resigned to the prospects of living under Communist domination if lhat Is prerequisite to the restoration of peace. Inflation, the complex andGovernment controls, and the feeling of uncertainty have brought much of China's private enterprisetandstill. It is significant to note that many foreign businessmen. Including Americans, are reported to favor peace now under theCommunists rather than continued and inconclusive fighting. These groups would probably support any program holding out hope for their continued existence and economic betterment, and they would be ^different as to whetherrogram would be to the advantage ot the National Governmentolitical entity.
This widespread feeling of war-weariness has also penetrated the ranks ofcivil and militaryumber of whom are believed to favor ansettlement with the Communists. This desire, however. Is and will continue to be largely ineffectual until it finds expressiontrong politicalwith effective military support.
Government Attitude toward Chiang Kai-thek's Opposition to Negotiations.
Chiang Kai-shek and his closest personal adherents in the inner circle of powerful military and political figures are the key to the Nationalist position, and they remain adamant In their oppositionompromise peace. The conservative CC Clique and the Whampoa Military Clique, In particular, so long as they sec any hope in the continuation of the military struggle, will give the Generalissimo staunch support In his refusal toolitical accommodation with the Communists.
The National Government under Chiang has reasons for holding out as long as possible. The US aid program alonetrong Inducement and there Is further hopeew administration may increase the program. Since it may well be years before the Communists can achieve total military victory, the Nationalmay be able to maintain Itselfignificant political entity longer by continu-
ln{ lis present course than by ecgagir.f. in peace negotiations with them. The long-rtnre hopes of many Nationalist officials, furthermore, hinge upon their expectation of an inevitable war between the US and the USSR, in which the US would be an active war ally of the National Governmenttruggleinternational
In order that the National Government may continue to exist as nowIt might withdraw to South China where its prospects for continued resistance, however, are not bright (see
b. forces Working for Chtang't Removal.
Defeatism has to some extent penetrated those groups close to the General Issimo. and, while this may not result ln peace overtures to the Communists, It may provide tacit approval, ln high circles, ofove. Even certain high military figures feel that the Nationalist military position is almost hopeless.
There has not yet emerged any leader capable of directly challenging Chiang as head of the state but there are some who are working for his removal. Ii Tsung-Jen. the new Vice-President,otential threat to Chiang and reportedly hopes tohim toar-reaching reform program, failing which Li might try to force Chiang Into the background and assume the presidential powers. Since his election in April, however, Ll has had little opportunity to influence the political scene In assessing the elements relating to Ll which will influence the prospects for peace, It Is Important to note that he may be as unacceptable to the Communists as Chiang, Inasmuch as their propaganda has recently classed him with theas an enemy of the Chinese peopleool of US Imperialism. In addition Ll hai publicly professed his opposition to peace talks with the Communists.
Ll Chl-shen and his Kuomlntang Revolutionary Committee in Hong Kong are openly attempting to displace Chiang, and plan to establishrobably somewhere In Southwest China In addition to the fact that he believes peace Is necessarytable National Government. Li Chl-shen feels that the faction which brings peace to China will gain immense popular support. He has been cooperating with Communists in Hong Kong with the hope that such cooperation will place himey position for any future peace negotiations and the establishmentoalition government At the same time, however, he maintains that he Is anti-Communist and that he Intends to retain the upper hand over the Communists inovernment Ll Chi then Is essentially an opportunist and will probably accept any offer from any source that would assist him inosition of power.ay have considerable popular support, lhe extent ol his organized political and military backing Is probably small.
3. . i POSITIOK.
The Communists, since the collapse of negotiations Inave reiterated their refusal to deal with the Generalissimo and his followers. Any discussion of peace on the part of the Communists, therefore, presupposes the removal of Chiang They continue to stress In their propaganda that they favor the establishmentoalition government of all democratic elements, under firm Communist leadership.
Despite Uieir favorable military position, the object of the Chinese Communists, which Is the control of all China, could probably be achieved sooner and more easily through peaceful channels than by continuance of the war. The Communists could demand that they be given legal status In the government of China, and such status would probably facilitate the extension of their control over all China. By taxing over the remainder ot the country before it is further disorganized or damaged by fighting, they would have fewer problems intable China.
Position
The USSR Is the most likely external medium through which the two sides can be brought together because It Is In the unique position of maintaining treatywith the National Government while giving Ideological, if not materialto the Chinese Communists.
Roshchin. Soviet Military Attache, gave added impetus to the movementompromise peace by his unofficial overture to certain National Government officials several months ago. He was subsequently recalled to Moscow (Innd was appointed In late8 as Soviet Ambassador to China In mid-July Roshchin reopened the discussion when he approached another Nationalist official. This has added strength to the opinion that the USSR maypecific mediation proposalime judged propitious by Moscow.
A peace settlement mediated by the Soviets would be advantageous to them since it would present an opportunity to counteract US influence In Nationalist China. In addition, by shifting the Communist revoltilitaryolitical sphere, the USSR could vitiate the Influence of the present Chinese Communist leadership which the USSR mayommunist China would be an immense advantage to the USSR and would be important in spreading Soviel Influence over the entire Far East. Even if Soviet efforts to bring about an end to the war were unsuccessful, the USSR would gain prestige, and the propaganda value of having attempted to bring peace to China. The USSR has already exploited and aggravated the currentIn the National Government by bringing up the question of mediation.
ior Peace.
eace negotiations between the Kuomintang and the ChineseParty were broken off because of failure to reach agreementheand disposition of the armedocal government andepresentationoalition government,roblems relating to the callingational Assembly for the adoptiononstitution. These questions would necessarily constitute the basis for any future negotiations.
Because the Communists are nowosition to resume the military offensive at any time, they can insist on much more extreme terms. These demands, which would undoubtedly include the removal of Chiang, would be In excess of the maximum concessions that the Nationalists would be prepared to make at this time.
In the event of Chiang's fall, there may be no single leader in Nationalist China, with the possible exception of LI Tsung-jen. with sufficient support to form an effective successor Government. If no qualified successor to Chiang should emerge, several
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more or less Independent regional regimes would come Into existence. Thecould enter Into separate negotiations with the leaders of these local regimes who would be forced to deal with them ln order to preserve, if only temporarily, some vestige of their personal power.
If, upon the removal ofeader or group should emerge with sufficient political and military backing to unite the diverse elements of the Kuomintang Into an effective successor Government, negotiations for peace might follow. Suchwould be colored by the fact that the new National Government would probably be In an even weaker bargaining position than the present Government under Chiang. In the negotiations, the Communists might satisfy themselves Initially witherritorial settlementontrolling positioncoallton" government. Although the former type of settlement would afford the Communists legal recognition of the areas they now occupy and permit them to consolidate their administration andthese areas, it would by no means satisfy the ultimate aspirations of the Chinese Communisterritorial settlement would, therefore, be honored by the Communists only so long as it was to their advantage.
The ultimate goal of the Communists would be better served through the inclusion of that Partyliberal front" coalition government Inovernment the Communists would obviouslyowerful. Ifominating, voice They could forceew Nationalew or revised Constitutionew election, all of which would aid them in selling virtual control of China
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