CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CONSEQUENCES OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED STATES FORCES FROM TSINGTAO
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CONSEQUENCES OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED STATES FORCES
FROM TSINGTAO
SUMMARY
1. Communist forces in Shantung Province are presently capable of seizing Tsing-
expulsion from Tsingtao by Communist force of arms would most severely damage USoluntary US withdrawal would obviously avoid this extreme contingency.
If the US forces remain, it is highly improbable that the Chinese Communists would assault Tsingtao, at least within the next six months, although the possibility of local raids cannot be dismissed.
Although voluntary US withdrawal from Tsingtao would avoid the extremely damaging consequences of expulsion by Communist force of arms,ithdrawal would certainly incur grave damage to lhe US position in the Far East and throughout thc world. Whatever explanation was given for the withdrawal. Soviet and Communist propaganda would herald itS strategic retreat reflecting US judgment that the force of Communist expansion in Asia was irresistible, and popular opinion through-out the Far East and the world would accept this interpretation. In particular:
a. The Chinese National Government would be incensed and the Chinesegreatly encouraged by the withdrawal, which would be universally accepted as reflecting no confidence in the survival of the National Government and aof moral support. The psychological impact of the event would prejudicemeasures intended to aid the National Government, hasten ils disintegration, and
o. Thc withdrawal would also contribute toward Soviet domination of all Korea by weakening confidence in US support of resistance to Communism and assist inonvietion that Communism must eventually prevail throughout that country.
c. Native elements in Southeast Asia (Burma, Indochina, and Indonesia) already susceptible to Soviet propaganda against Western imperialism, would accept US withdrawal from Tsingtao as evidence of weakness, and would be encouraged toward alignment with the USSR as thc best means of promoting and protecting local Interests.
Note: Thc Information In this report Is as
The intelligence conizations of the Departments of State. Army, and the Wavy have con currcd in this rcpoit; lhe AirDivision, Air Intelligence Directorate.ol the Ait Force, had no comment.
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CONSEQUENCES OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED STATES FORCES
FROM TSINGTAO
I. e or Tsingtao.
the Sat tonal Government
Tsingtao is the best port in North China and tlic Chinese National Government's most important naval station. It Is valuablease for Nationalist operations In the Shantung Peninsula. In addition, it is acquiring increasing importance as aechelon supply base for Nationalist forces in Jehol and Manchuria andase for amphibious operations in support of such supply movements. Tsingtao is the last open hrrbfi with adequate facilities which the National Government can use toils position farther north and as long as Tsingtao remains in Nationalist hands, thereossibility of maintaining the Government troops still left in Manchuria. This city Is also the site of the US Naval Advisory Group's school which has alreadyted that it can increase the effectiveness of the Chinese Navy and thus permit that service to play an increasingly important role in the civil conflict.
Of less importance to the Nationalists than thc port facilities of Tsingtao. but of cons4derable value nevertheless, is the industrial plan: of that city. Although the civil conflict and the inflation have sharply curtailed industrial activity in this area, production of many desperately needed commodities could be undertaken if fuel and raw materials were made available.
the US.
As noted above, Tsingtao is the base of the US Naval Forces Western Pacific and the headquarters of the US Naval Advisory Group. There are more0 marine and naval personnel new on shore duty in this city. Although there is no other suitable port on the China mainland to which the fleet base and Naval Advisory Group's school could be transferred, it may be possible to move these operations lo Taiwan. Tsingtao Is lhe most suitable base from which Americans In North China and Manchuria could be quickly evacuated by either air or sea in case of emergency.
In addition to its direct importanceS naval base. Tsingtao has broader strategic interest to thc US: Byoothold in North China, the US could maintain contact and give support to non-Communist de facto Independent regimes which might emerge in North China as the power of the National Government declines. Furthermore, the US base in Tsingtao serves, in some measure, to offset the advantages accruing to the USSResult of that power's occupation of Dairen and Port Arthur.
the Chinese Communists.
Tsingtao would offer the Chinese Communists few positive advantages. The Communists have no navy and but few merchant ships so that the port facilities would be of little direct use. The USSR, of course, would be able to exploit the port; trade opportunities would expand between Tsingtao. Dairen, and thc ports of North Korea
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a consequent strengthening of the economies (and military potential) of both the Chinese Communists and the Noith Koreans. On the other hand, the Communists already have ports In Shantung, and it may be to their advantage to continue using Tsingtaoeans of trading through the Nationalists with non-Communist areas.
2.
The most important strategic advantage that the possession of Tsingtao would provide the Chinese Communists, however, would be Its denial to the Nationalists.
The Possibility of Communist Attack on Tsingtao.
The Chinese Communists are believed capable ofuccessful assault on Tsingtao if they choose to do so. They are capable of taking Tsingtao even if the US forces now present in that area join the Chinese Nationalist Army in theof the city, but would probably be unable to do so If the US forces were materially reinforced. It is unlikely that the Chinese Communists will attempt to assaultin the course of the next six months, although raids with limited objectives are possible.
Capabilities.
Chinese Communist troops outnumber the Nationalist troops in Shantung Province (the Communists have anroops, the) and could provide more troops in an assault on Tsingtao than the Nationalists now have defending that city. The Communists are reported to be considerably superior to the Nationalists in morale and combat efficiency. The Communists have conslder-aDlc mobility, while thc Nationalists are pir.ned down in the cities and the possibility of reinforcing one garrison with units from another must be discounted. The acute replacement problem facing the National Government would render readyof troops to Tsingtao difficult. There is little question but that the Nationalists have sacrificed the military security of Tsingtao in terms of both the quantity and quality of troops allocated to Its defense In the expectation that the presence of US forces will deter the Communists from attempting to take the city
Intentions
There oppears to be little probability that the Communists will choose toTsingtao within the next six months. The advantages which the Communists feel they can now derive from Tsingtao probably will not justify thc pricerontal attack, although it Is not improbable that tho Communists will conduct raiding
Although Chinese Communist propaganda is strongly anti-American, thethus far have shown little inclination to risk direct conflict with the US. in part at least, because of the possibility that this would be disadvantageous to ade facto regime seeking International recognition. However, this is nothat they would not assumeisk if it were fell that the benefits accruing to them (and perhaps to the USSR) would so justify. At this time ll appears that thc presence of US forces in Tsingtao willommunist assault. However, themay attempt, in the next six months, lo control trade bclween the city and
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its hinterland and to exploit civil disorders resultingarge refugee population, widespread unemployment, and general war weariness. Such civil disorders, of course, would be an excellent mask for Communists' raiding operations. The effectiveness of such measures to bring about the reduction of the city would be very questionable, inasmuch as the Communists' capability to blockade the port from the sea will probably remain nil.
3. Consequences or US Withdrawal.
Unless the deteriorating military and political trends throughout China areor materially retarded, there is an Increasing possibilityhineseattack on Tsingtao will occur eventually, even with US forces in existing strength present In the area Therefore the US may be confrontedituation in which it may be forced to withdraw in order to avoid Involvement in the Chinese civil hostilities. However,ithdrawal would probably become imperative onlyime when thc situation ol the National Government would have so deteriorated that it would be but one of many necessary decisionse-examination of the entire US position in China and the Far East.
o. Faiorable Factors.
Withdrawal of US forces from Tsingtao might somewhat offset the virulent anti-US sentiment currently rife among many groups in Nationalist China.ithdrawal could be presented as evidence of themperialist" policy of the US. However. In view of the strong position of the Chinese Communists in Shantung, it would be difficult to convince Chinese opin;on that the sole or primary reason for the evacuation of US personnelesture of good will.
Withdrawal would avert the possibility of direct Involvement of the US in the Chinese civil conflict The consequences of direct involvement in the war areserious because of the political, economic, and nulitary weakness ol theGovernment To make direct US participation in the civil warfare effective Inonclusive victory for Ihe National Government wouldub* stanlial outlay of US resources. US involvement would probably occur when the National Government was on the verge of complete disintegration, and in suchit would be very' questionable whether the US, at that time, could change the tide of military events In China.esult, the United States wouldery serious loss in prestige and gain little but the hostility of the Chinese people
Immediate withdrawal from Tsingtao would also avoid the grave, albeitrisk of conflict with the USSR. If the US found Itself actively engaged in the Chinese war on the side of the Nationalists, It is possible that the USSR would counter such aid with similar assistance to the Chinese Communists. It is estimated, however, that while the USSR will exploit every opportunity to hinder or embarrass US efforts on behalf of Nationalist China or in the protection of US Interests in the Far East, the Kremlin will, for the time being, avoid an armed clash between US forces and Soviet-dominated forces.
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Withdrawal now wouldossible hurried and embarrassing withdrawal later. Immediate withdrawal wouldrave loss of US prestige, buloss uf "face" would certainly be less than if the withdrawal were carried out hurriedly and under lhe very obvious pressure of the Communist Army If US forces were toin the initial defense of the city, it would be difficult to extricate them and, even If that could be done, it would involve an irretrievable loss ofhe Chinese Communists would undoubtedlyajor military victory over the US. Finally, withdrawal now would eliminate the danger that US forces might findon Chinese soil at the time of the downfall of the National Government b. Unfavorable Factors.
(I) Adverse Effects on US Interests in China
The evacuation of US forces fromno matter how or when it wasbe regarded by thc Chineseithdrawal of US support from the National Government. (Chinese Communists and USSR propaganda would certainly emphasize to the Chinese and to the world that the US had forsakenhis might sethain of events which would seriously undermine and probably accelerate the disintegration of the already weakenedGovernment.
Many Chinese who have tolerated the National Government primarily because of the prestige and material benefit resulting from support by the US may become disaffected if there were evidence that (for whatever reason) the Un.ted States was withdrawing its support The evacuation ot Tsingtao would, in effect, jeopardize the psychological benefits that have accrued to the Chinese Government and Ihe United States Governmentesult of thc US aid progi ams The position and the influence of Chiang Kai-shek would be weakenedonsequent acceleration of trends toward disintegration of the Government
The alarm which lhe Chinese Government expressed at the proposed US warning to American nationals to evacuate the Tientsin*Peiping area is an indicationrobably more viulrnt reaction in any move involving thc evacuation of US forces from Tsingtao. The grave concern with which the Chinese Nationalists regard the Governments situation in North China and Manchuria might degenerate Into utter hopelessnessonsequent snowballing of sentimentompromise peace with the Communists.
To thc extent that the Communists have been holdingirect attack on Tsingtao because of their reluctance to stir up additional US support to the National Government, the removal of US forces from that city would increase the probability of an early assault. If such an assault were to be undertaken and were to prove successful, lhe National Government would very probably blame the US, thusSlnoUS relations.
ilhdrawal from TWnetao. at the present time, would in elect write off the poss.bihty that the National Government, through itsh
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foreign aid, might in thc immediate future salvage the situation in North. China, or reverse present trends of Chinese Communist military and political successes. Ifhange occurs, the US probably would not be confronted by the necessity offrom Tsingtao under Communist pressure. It is likely that in the foreseeable future thc war will continue favorably for the Communists.
(2) Adverse Effects on US Interests in the Far East and Elsewhere Throughout the World.
A withdrawal of US military forces from Tsinglao at this time would serve to increase political instability In the Far East. Regardless of any rationalization made by the US for the evacuation,ove would be interpreted by the "face-conscious" people of the Far East as evidence of US weakness and an indication that this country has discounted the possibility that the Chinese Communist farces could be defeated. In addition, the US wouldoss of prestige throughout thc world with again in the political influence of the USSR Furthermore, thc USSR, itself, would interpretithdrawalign of weakness on the part of the US and would be encouraged toore aggressive course in Far Eastern affairs.
The downfall of an anti-Communist central government in China would accelerate thc trendSSR-oriented Far East. Although the Chinesehas been steadily declining in power boihonsequence of its ownand the growing strength of the Chinese Communists, thc continued existenceational Government provides some check to the Communist of USSR-oricnled movements In the rest of the Far East. To the extent that US evacuation of Tsingtao at this time will accelerale the disintegration of the National Government, it would jeopardize an opportunity for coping with the spreading USSR influence in the Far East.
In Korea lhe US position would be adversely affected. The Southand their newly elected leaders could easiiy be convinced by Soviet-inspired propaganda that the withdrawal of US forces from Tsingtaoictory for the Chinese Communists and the USSR. Resulting uncertainty regarding US intentions and capabilities would probably weaken the determination of South Koreans to resist Communist pressure to accept the Soviet-sponsored regime established at Pyongyang Even though US forces continued lo occupy South Koreaeasonably adequate native security force wasrevious us withdrawal from Tsingtao might slill have unfortunate consequences. North Korean authorities might reason that they could force the withdrawal from South Korea of any US military or diplomatic missions merely byetermined offensive action against the South Korean Army. Consequently the new South Korean Government's very existence might be seriously threatenedime when the regime was in its formative stages and least able to cope with external aggression without US assistance.
In the Asiatic countries the creation of independent nationaland the formulation of international policy within these governments are being undertaken. In Burma, Frcnch-Indo China, and Indonesia, the issue of political oiien-
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ta .on toward the Western Powers or the USSR is uppermost in the minds of native rxmtlca. leaders. Ithiy questionable whether the United States could hese people that the evacuate of American forces from Tsingtao at this time is any tlunglctory for the Communist elements throughout the Far East.
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DISTRIBUTION
The President Socrclary of Blato
Chic! ofoQUDUdct In Chief Secretary of Defense Secretary of ths Army Secretary of the Navy Secretary of th* Air Force
ExeenUra Secretary, National Security Council Chairman, NaUooal Security Resources Board Chi of of Btaff, US Army Chief of Naval Operation* Chief of Staff, UB Air Force
Director of Flaw and Operations, General Stan, US Army
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operation!)
Director of Flans ands Air Force
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. Research and IaleUlg enee
Director of latelugeiice. General Staff.rmy
Chief of Naval Intelligence
Director of Intelligence. US Air Force
Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Secretary. Joint IntelUgeEce Group
Secretary, Bute-Army-Nary-Air Force Coordinating Committee
EaecuUvo Secretary, Military Liaison ConunllMe to the Atomic Kncrgy Commission
Director of Security and Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission
Chief. Acquisition and Distribution, OICD, Department of Stat*.'
am.
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Original document.
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