CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
EFFECT OF SOVIET RESTRICTIONS ON THE US POSITION IN BERLIN
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW8 RELEASE IN FULL
COPY NO.67
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EFFECT OF SOVIET RESTRICTIONS ON THE US POSITION IN BERLIN
SUMMARY
Contrary to many published reports, thc chief detrimental effect on the US of the Soviet restrictive measures imposed in Berlin, since thc walkout of the USSR from the Allied Control Council, has not been interference with transportation and supply but curtailment of certain US activities having to do for the most part with intelligence, propaganda, and operations of the quadripartite KoDimandatura.
Concurrently with attempted Inspection of US military rail traffic, the Soviets both tightened their "security" measures and manifested greater intransigence In all city affairs.esult: (a) the general usefulness of Berlin as center of an intelligence network has been impaired, while in particular, access to Soviet deserters and anti-Communist Germans has been made more difficult; (b) since friendly Germans cannot move freely to and from the Soviet Zone or within the city, the US cannot as before, support anti-Communism within the Soviet Zone; (c) US propaganda cannot be freely disseminated except by radio; (d) commodities manufactured in Berlin cannot be shipped to thc Western zones; and (e) the ACC and thehave, at least temporarily, lost their usefulness in keeping up German hope of unity, revealing coming Soviet moves, and easing US-Soviet tension below thelevel
Note: The information in this report is as
The IntelllGence organliaUons of the Departments of State. Army, and the Navy havein Uils report; Uie Air Intelligence Division. Air Intelligence Directorate,of thc Air Force, concurs with those portions which pertain to air Intelligence.
T^OrrrHrJ^rivttr
EFFECT OF SOVIET RESTRICTIONS ON TIIE US POSITION IN BERLIN
Imperative as It l| lor the US to remain in Berlin, its mere physical presence there does not Insurell the strategic benefits that might be derived therefrom, and tills strategic position has, ln fact, been undermined already by unpublicized Soviet action, taken for thc most part in general security and local political matters. The hindrances imposed by the USSR during the past several weeks onto and from "Berlin have not seriously Interfered with the logistic position of tbe US but rather with its strategic position.
Continued US occupation of Berlin requires supply from the west of food and such other necessities as coal for both the US personnel and the German population of the US sector of thc city. Incoming barge transport, carrying thc bulk of food for the western sectors of thc city, reportedly ts unchanged and continues adequate,stoppages of short duration on British transport through the Soviet Zone. Inbound military and civilian rail freight, hauling the necessary coal and other supplies, continues to move as before, except that the civilian freight routes have beenrestricted.
The present transport situation is the result of Soviet efforts to extend thc right of civilian rail traffic inspection, which the USSR has always exercised, to Western Power military traffic. Civilian passenger traffic apparently continues unchanged, but military passenger traffic docs not function because of Western Power refusal to accede to Soviet demands for the right of personal Inspection. Incoming roadcontinues normal except for slight difficulties In routing; as yet. thc USSR has not attempted seriously to restrict Western Power air transportation. Thesituation, as outlined above, indicates that the necessities lor the German population and for the US personnel in Berlin are still being supplied.
The US strategic position in Berlin, as contrasted with Iti logistic position, has been impaired both by the Soviet transportation restrictions and, more particularly, by other Soviet measures taken concurrently with Uic imposition of logistic hindrances. These comparatively unpublicized measures, which soon followed the walkout of the USSR from the Allied Control Council, have involved: general lightening of Soviet "security"hroughout the Soviet Zone; greatly increased police controls in and around Berlin, and Soviet efforts to block the operations of both the Allied Kommandatura and thc nor.-Communist city government.esult thc following material benefits to the US arising from the presence of USnd troops in Berlin have been reduced or eliminated'
Thc value of Berlinenter of an intelligence net covering the city itself, the Soviet Zone of Germany, thc eastern satellites, and thc USSR has been threatened
The value of Berlinanctuary and transfer point for anti-Communist refugees or Soviet Army deserters has been reduced, in that: (n) heightened Soviet security precautions make access lo thc western sectors of Berlin from the adjacent
Soviet Zone Increasingly difficult; (b) Soviet travel restrictions on westboundrail traffic have curtailed the means of evacuation of refugees and deserters, who must now be limited to relatively high-level personnel warranting air transport.
Except for the capacity of the Berlin radio of the US sector, the value of Berlin as point for the dissemination of Western propaganda through the Soviet Zone has been, and despite new Soviet assurances is expected to be, curtailed by Soviet Interference with the dissemination of Western* pubheations and impediments to the Issuance of any German pro-Western material in the Soviet Zone.
The security and transport regulations have limited tne value of Berlinase from which the US can support anil-Communism in the Soviet Zone. Writ-em Zone Germans can no longer easily enter or leave the Soviet Zone, while tightened police controls have reduced the capabilities and the freedom of movement of anti-Communist elements already within the Zone.
The Soviet-Imposed demands for inspection of ail westbound freight have prevented the shipment of Berlin manufactures that contribute to the finishedof the Western Zones and eliminated almost all commerce between Berlin and thc west.
Although the Allied Control Council remains in the city to embarrass the USSKymbol of quadripartite agreement In Germany, its functional impotence and failure to meet since the USSR abruptly terminated thearch session has: (a) diminished remaining German hope of implementing Uie Potsdam method of unifying Germany politically and economically; (b)ounding board for the rcvcla tion of future Soviet moves; and (c)seful safety valve for casing US-USSR tension below the governmental level.
The USSR still has at Its disposal further means for harassing the US and making the latlei's position in Berlin more difficult. These means include: imposition oftraffic regulations on inbound food and freight shipments, attemptedof unilateral regulations on thc flight of Western Power aircraft over the Soviet Zone, complete repudiation of quadripartite Kommandatura jurisdiction over thesector of the city and thc Incorporation of that sector Into the Soviet Zone, and, finally, increased efforts to create unrest among the civil population of the Western sectors of the city.
Strategic losses such as thc damage to US propaganda machinery, to Intelligence operations and to the use of the US sectoranctuary for refugees from the Soviet system, cannot be completely retrieved except by the removal of all the Soviet-imposed restrictions and impediments referred to above Though the US couldegree of the strategic initiative by intensified clandestine intelligence operations, such action could do nothing to remedy the unfortunate situation in which recent Soviet hindrances have placed the an tl-Communist Berlin city government or lo relieve the tension brought by increased Soviet intransigence in the quadripartite Kommandatura.
Original document.
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