SOVIET ROLLING STOCK AND MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRIES
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SOVIET ROLLING STOCK AND MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRIES
SUMMARY
Stock Industry.
Industrial facilities for the production of railroad rolling stock in the USSR are located primarily In the Central Industrial Region and the Ukraine, althoughplants have also been established In the Urals and East Siberia. Data on the production of rolling slock since the end of the war have been virtually Indeterminate;7 output may haveocomotives0 freight cars (In termsxle units; actual production of freight cars, however, wasreat extentxlc cars Seet the close7 the park of rolling stock, perhaps amounting0 steam locomotivesreight cars (in termsxleas less than one-half of the United States ln motive power and less than one-fourth in carrying capacity.
5 thc annual output of rolling stock in thc Soviet Union may amountteam locomotivesreight cars (in termsxlehis wouldocomotive park approaching in motive power the present inventory of locomotives In the United Slates, but the Soviet freight car park would still bebelow that of the United States In aggregate capacity.
Vehicle Industry.
The Soviet automotive industry at present is concentrated in the CentralRegion Thc bulk ot thc output is manufactured at two large plants, one located at Gorki and the other at Moscow.7 production of motor vehicles In the USSR probably amounted boehicles, over nine-tenths of which were trucks At the closehc Soviet truck park probably was In the neighborhoodehicles, of which perhapsercent were actually in operable condition.
5 thc USSR may have increased thc annual output of motor vehiclesnits, which wouldark ofillion trucks. Because of anticipated technical improvements in Soviet vehicles and other factors, theof the truck park In operable condition should be increased materially by that year.
Note: The information tn lha report is as of SO June
Thc Intelligence organizaUoru of the Department* of State, Army. Navy, and the Air force have concurred In this report.
Both production and parlt of freight can In the USSRmeasured In termsxle unlta.nit Is an artificial measure based on number o! axles rather than carrying capacity, hence,xle car produced, or In the freight car park, representsxle units.xle unit In terms of carryingariable measure, depending In different circumstances on the proportion ol various size can included In the preparation of Uils study data were not available whereby the carrying capacity ofxle unit could be calculated with reasonable accuracy in all contexts Wherever pou.Me, ho**rer. the capacity ofxle unit Is Indicated In thc text.
SOVIET ROLLING STOCK AND MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRIES ROLLING STOCK INDUSTRY
The great bulk of goods are transported within tho USSR by railroad facilities;7 Soviet railroads carried approximatelyercent of the total traffic within the country. Consequently, the plants manufacturing rolling stock rank as the most Important of those producing Inland transportation equipment.
The highcsL prewar output of rolling stock in the USSR amounted to0 freight cars (In termsxleassengeruring the immediate prewar years, however, production was substantially lower than the record levels, amounting in most of those yearsreight cars,assenger cars.
During the war Soviet output of rolling stock was negligible. Many plants,locomotive factories, were in occupied areas and consequently damaged or destroyed; some railroad-equipment works were converted to thc production of warand others were evacuated to the east, thereby disrupting output of rolling stock. NotG was the production of rolling stock once again of consequence. Since the end of thc war actual data on Soviet output of locomotives and freight cars have been virtually ^determinate. Output of steam locomotives may have amounted roughlynits6nitslthough small numbers of electric and Diesel locomotives also were produced, most of the output since thc end of World War II have been steam locomotives. The principal models of steamnow in production are rated In tractive effort at00 pounds compared to thc average0 pounds for steam locomotives in use by United States railroads. Production of freight cars, in termsxle units, may have been0607xle unit is believed toarrying capacity in the neighborhood ofons Much of thc output in those years, however, werexle cars, having cargo capacities approximatingons and about equal in size la those in thc United States.
At the close7 the park of rolling stock in the USSR was in general still slightly belowevels. In7 thc inventory of rolling stock in the Soviet Union included0 steam locomotivesreight cars (in termsxle units of aboutn terms of motive power, the Soviet park at present is less than one-half that of the United States and, in terms of carrying capacity, less lhan one-fourth.
In prewar years the rolling stock industry in the USSR was centered in the Central Industrial Region and the Ukraine. Among the major plants were those located at
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Kolomna, Gorki, Bryansk, Beztutsa, and Kalinin In the Central Industrial Region and at Kharkov, Voroshilovgrad, and Dneprodzerzhlnsk in the Ukraine. Beginning with the Third Five-Yearumber of plants were established eastward of the original centers, predom'nanlly in the Urals and East Siberia; major plants are those at Nizhni-Tagil, Ulan Ude, and Krasnoyarsk. Nevertheless, thc main centers ofat present, particularly for locomotives, arc In general still west of thc Urals; morehird of the planned output of rolling stock0 Is expected to beIn the plants of the Ukraine alone.
3. Future Prospects, with Special Rkftrencx
Under the Fourth Kive-Year Plan, the USSR expects0 to produce rolling stock at the annual rateteamiesellectricreight cars (in termsxlcassenger cars. On the basis of available Information, it appears that thc planned output of steamfreight cars, and passenger cars should be approximately achieved.of Diesel and electric locomotives, however, probably will not materially exceed one-half of the planned output.
Assuming an increase in output, except for Diesel and electricroughly equivalent to one-half that between average prewarnd expected outputhe production of rolling stock5 will amountteam locomotivesreight cars (In termsxleisregarding possible Imports and exports, this rale of production would permit an equipment inventory of0 steam locomotivesillion freight cars (In termsxlelthough thc Sov et locomotive park5 would thus approach the present United States park In motive power, the Soviet freight car park, in terms of aggregate capacity, would still be substantially below thc present freight car park in the United States. Thc production of Diesel and electric locomotives5 should be at least at the planned ratet this rate, the total number of these two typeshe USSR5 would still amount to lessenth of the total locomotive park.
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motor vehicle industry
1. Production.
In comparison with the United States, the USSR at present produces relatively few motor vehicles. In the immediate prewar period, the output of the Soviet automotive industry amounted to only about one-twentieth that of the United States. In that period the USSR ranked aboutar with France and Canada in terms of the total number of vehicles produced. Because of the heavy emphasis g'.ven to the production of trucks, however, the USSR ranked second in the worldroducer of trucks, exceeded only by the United States.
Average Annual Output of Motor Vehicles' By Major Worldin thousands oj vehicles)
States
Kingdom
thc immediate prewar. output of motor vehicles in the USSR averagednits annually, of which approximatelyercent, ornits, were trucks. During thc war, Soviet production decreased markedly largely because of the partial conversion of the automotive industry to the production of military materiel. Other deterrent factors, allhough probably less Important,the evacuation of equipment to thc Urals and the wartime destruction offacilities. Output3 appears to have been substantiallyehicles. The reduced wartime output, however, was offset by Imports of lend-lease vehicles; during the period1 to0 Jeepsrucks were received in the USSR from the United States. Since the termination of hostilities in Europe, production of motor vehicles in the USSR has gradually increased, probably amounting0 unitsG,n those years production of trucks accounted for materially more than nine-tenths of the total output.
' Insofar as possible, the data represent production plus exports ot parts and componentsabroad: contrariwise, vehicle assembled from imported parts have been excluded, as Tar as possible, Irom thc production data of the importing countries.
' Usually includes buses and special vehicles
Information on the total park of motor vehicles In the Soviet Union is far less satisfactory than for other factors relating to the automotive industry. The total number of trucks at the closeowever, probably approximated the prewarevel, or In thc neighborhoodehicles, assuming relatively high rates of retirement since the war.
Of more Importance, the usable park of motor vehicles in the USSR has been markedly less than the total number of trucks and passenger cars In thc countryof the small capacity and low productivity of repair establishments as well as the frequent necessity for repairs.t was reported that onlyoercent of the vehicles In the USSR were actually in operable condition. This situation seems to have been prevalent throughout the prewar years Probably but littlehas been made to dale.
For an adequate understanding of Soviet capabil'tles, certain specialof the Soviet automotive industry and of Soviet vehicles must be briefly indicated. Thc first has been previously mentioned: lhe extreme emphasis on the production of trucks, which since the end of the war have accounted for materially more than nlnc-lenths of the total output of motor vehicles.
A second characteristic Is the increasing obsolescence of the vehicles produced in the USSR relative to the motor vehicles manufactured In other major producingBecause of the overwhelming dependence to date of the Soviet automotive industry on foreign prototypes, particularly United States models, the degree of obsolescence may be roughly gauged by the average time lag between Soviet designs in production and the date of initial manufacture of similar designs In other countries.0 the average time lag amounted toears, the obsolescence of Soviet designs was not decreased, of course, during thc war.
A third characteristic is the relatively low quality of production primarily due to inferior plant equipment and Inferior mechanical skills of labor
A fourth characteristic of Soviet vehicles, and perhaps the most significant, has been the short vehicle life between major repairs. This factor has been influenced pr'ncipally by difficult operating conditions -the rigorous climate, inferior gasoline and lubricants, poor roads, and inadequate maintenance and repair facilities- -and by the lack of technical adaptation of motor vehicles to those conditions, rather than by poor quality and Inferior performance standards of Soviet vehicles. Hence, short life of molor vehicles between major repairs in the USSRharacteristic not only of Soviet vehicles but also of Imported passenger cars and trucks. In prewar years. It appears that the mileage between major repairs for Soviet vehicles0 miles; moreover, reports on lend-lease vehicles Imported from the United Slates and the United Kingdom indicate that major repairs were needed al the endiles. Repairs are not only frequently required, but also apparently are oflen greatly delayed because of the inadequacy of repair establishments. As indicated above, before lhe war as much asercent of the total number of molor vehicles in the USSR have been inoperable at one time Only recently, and for the newest models,
have technical improvements been adopted by the Soviet industry to lengthen repair Intervals and facilitate qu'ck major overhauls.
The production of motor vehicles Is concentrated largely in the Central Industrial Region. The two major automotive works are the Molotov plant (GAZ) at Gorki and the Stalin plant (ZIS) at Moscow. At the present time, virtually thc entire output of motor vehicles in the USSR Is produced at these plants. Two smaller motor vehicle factories are also located ln the Central Industrialtruck plant (YaAZ) at Yaroslavlassenger car factory In Moscow. These four plants, along with component and accessory plants which were also concentrated in the Central Industrial Region and assembly plants at Omsk in West Siberia and Rostov-on-Don, formed the prewar motor-vehicle Industry In thc USSR.
During the war and under thc present five-year plan, there hasarked attempt to disperse the automotive industry moreumber of new plants have been at least partially established; in general, however, such plants appear to have produced only negligible numbers of motor vehiclesuring the war the Ural Motor Works, centered at Miass near Chelyabinsk in the Urals, was established, in part with equipment evacuated from thc "ZIS" plant in Moscow. Other motor vehicle plants under construction, all of which apparently are to produce trucks, are located at Minsk in Byelorussia, Kutaisi in Georgia, Ulyanovsk on the Volga River in Kuibishev Province. Dnepropetrovsk In the Ukraine, and Novosibirsk In West Siberia. Most, if not all, of these plants probably will be in partial operation
Prospects, with Special Reference
Under the present five-year plan, the USSR expects0 to produce motor vehicles at the annual ratenits, of, or aboutercent, are to be0 passenger cars,uses. Aboutercent of the output is scheduled to be manufactured at the two largest plants located at Gorki and Moscow. On the basis of available information and in view of thc many difficulties involved, it seems probable that the USSR will not achieve more than aboutercent of the projected goal, or an output ofehicles
Assuming an increase in output of motor vehiclesoughly equivalent to that which Is expected to take place, production5 will amountehicles, of which perhaps about four-fifths,ehicles, will be trucks. At this rate of production and disregarding possible imports andof motor vehicles, the Soviet truck park at thc beginning5 would be in the neighborhoodillion vehicles.
Thc Soviet automotive industry no doubt will continue to rely heavily on foreign prototypes for design. There seems to be no indication at present that the time lag between Initial productionodel in foreign countries and production in the USSR will shorten, and it may possibly become longer. 5 thc newer Soviet vehicles
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may approximate present United States models In design and performance.
More Important than comparability In specifications between Soviet and foreign vehicles will be the degree to which trucks and passenger cars are adapted to Soviet conditions and the extent to which the rigors of automotive operation In the USSR axe overcome. In general, considerable improvements In Soviet vehicles maylthough the factors cannot be safely predicted, technicaldesigned to lengthen the life of Soviet vehicles in thc face of difficult operating conditions should be widely adopted by that time. Moreover, any substantialIn roads. In gasoline and lubricants, and in maintenance and repair facilities will. In turn. Improve the operating efficiency of the average vehicles in the USSR. Hence,5 the proportion of the motor vehicles park which is actually in operableshould be increased materially over prewar levels.
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Original document.
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