CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL
CEhTRAL DtfELLIGSICE AGEMCX AuffUBt m8
Addendum to
PC6SIBLE DSVELOPICOTS FROM THE PALESTDE TRUCE
CIA ban be on roquoatod by the Office of tbe Secretary of DefoMo to review and bring up to dataeajblo Devolorjgmtn frostH! Tnv^l,. An analysis of rocent events in Paloctine flhowa little reason for changing substantially tbe cstlcates iaeon in that otudy.
Because tho support given tho Kediator baa not boon iruf fie lent for offoctivo enforoeEont of tho true*,fighting and)tho acquisition of arms and fighting psrsonnsl (ohiofly by Israel) have continued. Klnor violations have boss noithor Investigated nor checked; provocativehave conaoquontly bo coos moro and core frequent and norloua until the situation has deterioratedoint whore tho continuation of oven an uneasy truce appoexs highly problematical. The JeWhavo 'taken advantaire of the- inadequacies of the truce onforcennnt machinery and)hove heeomo increasingly belligerent and uncooperative. Recent Arab stoteKonto emphasise that unleaa the VS is prepared to deal promotly and firmly with these oon-tinued breeches of tho truce, the Arabs (rill havo no ehoico but to resume fluting.
b. It has cocoas even more apparont that tho Mediator cannot effect an acceptable permanent solution for the Palestine prohlea. Count Bernedotte himself is apparently corrrlnced of this. Hie tentative efforts towarda settlement have eucceodod only In exacerbating the feollnse of both Arabs and Jews, and be reportedlyhat the whole question will Inevitably cose up before tho General As.in ably odco egsin in Septosber.
c.. The CSSE continues toourse productive of instability and innecurity in the Middle East. Onugust tho Security Council, in responsearning that the situation was "gradually rjett'ng out ofrdered both Israeli and Arab forces to stop violations of the truce. The USSR votod for the gonoral resolution but abstained from voting on tho paragraphs domending punlehinont for truce violations and reiterating that neither Jews nor Arabs be permitted toilitary or political advantage during tho period of tho truce. (Reports indicate that sons materiel is moving fron the Soviet bloc to Israel and tho Arab states, the greater part going to Israeli the volume may be expected to Increase If hostilities aronvisaged the possibility of tho Arab states seeking SovietIf they believed their cause to bo In Jeonardy. An increase Inactivity between Syria end tho USSR has recently boon reported. One account (transmitted as "possiblytates that the Syrian Ulslster in Moscow has been instructed to obtain froa theefinite statementhat the USSR would do for Syria, or for alL,the Arab
states, If* Syria should Too instruEental ln bringing the Arab statesSoviet sphere;hat guarantees tha USSt could give that,had entorod the Soviet nphere, Soviet influence would stopHalts. Another report Indies too tne possibility thatconsidering wanting nilitary bases to the USSR In exchange* for aid These and similar reports have not boon confirmed jpoasibiiityvrouger as
Arab discouragement increases.
jj. ontinuing throat to peace in Palostlno Is tbe posslbl' lty of indopendont action by extremist groups on both nldec, particularly tho Jewish Ir gun Zral Lausd. (EL) and Stern Gang. Persistent Jewish violations In the Jerusalem area are apparently designed to brlnf* the city (or at least tho major portion of It) within the Jenlsh atete by establishing It asJewish-hold area. Such action ia almost certainly promoted in part by the fear of tho Provisional Gorcrnrwnt of lerool (PGI) that fitiluro to act in Jerusalem might provoke such extra re stops by the EL and Stern Gang as toefinite break between these croups and the PGI. thus splitting the Jewish coBoajnity and weakening the whole Jewish position In Palootlne. Tho Arab gorornrMinta hove been reasonably successful inorder in their countries through the imposition of martial *aw. when, however, the local populations become whollyof tho true eerioua-ness of the Arab position and have had tine to suffer the full economic and enotional impact of the refugee DTOblea, deaonstrotions may heeone so violent as to defy control.
RKCEJff VtVmjJ?iEitTii IM THE PALESTINE SITUATIOS (Since inauguration of second truce onuly)
1. Arab PafUi^oo^
Tho most sorlous population upheaval sinco tbo termination of Torldas been the exodus of Palestinian Arabs froa Israeli-held arena. Tbe Arab refugees, oooserratlTely est Ian ted, exceed ln minber tbe Jewish DP's in Europe. The Arab countries have neither tbo ocGnomic resources nor the. political stability to absorb such large numbers of destitute refugees. Israel's decision not to allow the refugees toto their hones baa greatly exacerbated Arabinat the Jew*.
DeTelopasnts in tho past few weeks hare resultedrowing feeling of self-sufficiency and confidence on tbo part of the Israeli whichwillingness to take eattiro Into their own hands without being bound by the UN.
a,. The fact that the Israeli forces increased their holdingsbetween the first sod rw*cond truoer and have steadily lnrroved their military potential hoc resulted In the feeling arcnr; the Jews that they hare tbe power to expel tbe combined irabfron FalestlDS and that consequently the UH, for froa protecting tbe Israeli cause, is actually deterring Israel froa extendinc.
b. Since the British Ksjxlate endod onay* an cat0 Jewish DP's hare been admitted te Israel. By the end8 Israel hopes to here. itration policy hasbeen responsible in largo part for Israel's refusal to readmit Arab refugees, and is encouraging Israeli demands for Incrossod territory over that allotted by the General Assembly partition plan.
o. During the past weeke It has bson evident that white Israel has been euceessful in withstanding Arab nllltary attacks, the continuod state of mobilization haserious drain on its oconom'e resources. Israeli officials hare consequcortly hlntod that ancontinuation of the truco would be an intolerable burden. Accordingly, the confident Israelis indicate thateace sottla-Bsnt is not soon forthcoming,ou'denovcl of the conflict since they believe they can now force the Arabs out of Palestine.
TThllo some truce violations on the part of the Arab* have beenthe Areb states appear to have beenonscientious In cooperating with the aviator and the UH.
The naSn recent concern of thesv? countries has been to compose thoir differences and to strengthen theirioness so as toommon front. Israeli expansionist sentiment, which sn>ht be ioiolntod by either diplomatic or military methods. Is being viewed with increasing misgivings. Some positive countermeasures havo boon token, Iraqi and Trans Jordanian leaders net at Amman onugust for tho purpose of placing the eraieB of these two countriesnified cosiand in the event that hostilitiesopcred. ProeMem Qtf-iatli of Syria, has urged: (o) tho oooroV.natScr'b diplomatic effortsi (b) the placing of the Arab countriesrtilaa footing with provision for mituol aid if necessary; and (c) the ooordlnetlonrogreis for obtaining arms and materiel from abroad.
There are definite indications that thereb Liberation Amy is being reorganised at its base in Damascus. 2voniplomatic settlement is reached, it soy bo expected thet puerri^ls warfare will con-tlnuo for coma tirao to BOsst,
Ho Arab roverone nt is yet prepared to recognize the existenceewish state or to negotiate directly with representatives of Israel. Popular Arab dislllusioroent withnd the TTostern Powers is almost oonplete. tfeanwhi'e, unconflrwod but pars latent reports suggest that Iraq and 3yrie are considering tho possibility of sooking ouooort from tho USSR.
Conclusions.
Although the current truce has been noro successful than its four-woex pre.de ceot has not been strongly baokod or efficiently enforced' hereeen no thorough Investigation ofho destruction of tbe Letrun punning station and other alleged Arab vie' atnd Israel has not been cited before the OH for its reported broaches of tho truce. Moreover, do effective steps have been taken to restrain Israeli oxpansloniat tendencies. Thus the Arabs have lost roopoct for and faith in tho UH, and tho Jews feel strong enough to disregard it) cousoquontly, both tho truco and thff chanees for an eventual settle front ore jeopardized.
Fear of popular reaction will still prevent any Arab iroverncBnt from recognising or negotiatingewish state, but determined Bi action would probably enable the Arab Governments tola the existonce tn-Ot Israel and to novo face with their pooplo by yteldin^Cpn'y^to tho dictates af an international body/becked by obviously superioruch determined UN action would Involve the definitionrontier and its delineation oa the spot as an Imposed boundary, with adherence tooundary by both sides ^emended end guaranteed by the Security Council.
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: