corr so.03
FOR
POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS FROM THE PALESTINE TRUCE
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MILITARY88
(At beginning of second U. N. Truce)
POSSIBLE DEVEI.OPMENTS PROM THE PALESTINE TRUCE
n responseequest from the Office of the Secretary of Defense regarding the probable duration of theuly truce in Palestine and developments that may ariseesult of it. CIA presents the following estimates:
current continuation of the truce is for the most part nominal,fighting continues. Israel benefited greatly from the previous truceimproving its militaryontinuation of the truce on the conditionsprevious one would be to Israels advantage, and the Arabs probably wouldrespect lt. On thc othereally effective and adequatelyeasonable chance of being prolonged. Therefore, the Mediator'sprolonging the truce is In direct proportion to the support he is given Inmeans of enforcement.
is unlikely that the Mediator himself will be able toettlementbasic controversy. Provided, however, that effective means of observation andare made available and utilized, it is probable than an unstable truce canuntil the problem can be referred back to the United NationsIn September or to thc International Court of Justice.
present Intentions of the USSR are to promote instability andthroughout the Middle East and to undermine the positions of the USUK therein To do so the USSR has given, and presumably will continue toIn varying degrees to both Israel and the Arab countries. Thc collapsetruce and the intensification of hostilities would afford the USSR increasedto pursue lis alms. Conversely, any measures which might prolongwould ho detrimental to Soviet alms.
ritical factor in the continuance of the truce will be the ability of thc Israeli government to control the activities of Its extremist elements (Irgun Zvai Leumi and thc Sicrn Gang) and of the Arab governments to control popular outbreaks directed against the maintenance of the truce. It is not believed that complete control by their governments of either Jewish or Arab extremists will be possible, but thefor such control will be much more favorableair truce, rigorously enforced, lhan under an Inadequate truce, half-heartedly supported.
urther discussion concerning the possible outcome of the truce Is inA; of the current military situation In Palestine in Enclosure B; of Sovietin the area in Enclosure C.
Note. The inloimaiion in this report Is as of Julyuly.
The intelligence organizations oi thc Department* of Stale. Army. Navy, and tin- Ai- Force have concurred in this report.
SrTCTTTT
enclosure a
possible developments from the palestine truce
The UN Mediator has two objectives: an effective truce of indefinite duration;inal compromise solution, between Jews and Arabs, of the Palestine problem. The present truce was agreed to onuly and has been violated repeatedly by both Arabs and Jews. The violations have resulted from the absence in Palestine of UN observers and machinery for preventing infractions, and from the determination of various Arab and Jewish groups to gain last-minute advantages which they feel to be of vital importance. The Mediator's success in establishing an effective truce will depend on thc effectiveness of thc machinery which is given him, thc ability of Israel to control its extremist groups (thc Irgun Zvat LeunU and the Sternnd the reaction of the Arab peoples against the acceptance of the truce by their leaders.
of an Effective Tkuck.
Teams.
Current efforts lo organize UN observer teams include plansthree times as many as were sent to Palestine during the previous truce. Thcof the current truce will depend largely on the Incisiveness with which these observers carry out their duties and the forcefulness with which the Mediator deals with violations. If violations arc Ignored to thc same extent as during the previous truce, the success of the current truce will be doubtful. The Jews will, as before, bring in men, aircraft, and heavy military equipment; present Arab opposition to the truce will then become intensified, and thc Arabs will probably reopen hostilities.
Extremists.
It is probable that any concessions that the PGI might make to obtain Arab agreement Lo permanent peace would be met by open and violent action by theextremists if, however, the Mediator attempts topecial UN regime over Jerusaleminal settlement is achieved or to revise the territorial boundaries to what they consider detrimental to Israel, thc extremist groups will almost certainly resume fighting. At the present time it is believed that the PGI can control extremist elements within the partition boundaries, but It may not be able to control them in other parts of Palestine, especially in Jerusalem.
of Arab Peoples.
The Arab people were confident of victory and were assured by their leaders that the truce would not be extended. Their bitterness may well erupt into violence against their governments or the Western powers or both. If their wrath Is turned against their leaders, some of the Arab governments in an attempt to survive may
2
ftSKKSOfl
well resume lhe Palestine war. Arab leaders, however, will first make every effort lo turn the anger of their people against the UN, the US, and lhe UK, or even against
one another.
Thc timing of such developments cannot be predicted because they depend partly on spontaneous eruptions of popular feelings, which are subject to violent change, and partly on organized agitation. Rioting, however, has already developed In Cairo Serious Jewish violations of the truce (particularly the bombing of Arab cities) would further inflame Arab public opinion and would make it more difficult for the Arab governments to continue the truce. Communist agents in the Arab countries will probably exert themselves to stir up the people against their governments in order to bring aboul the downfall of thc present regime as well as lo destroy the truce. The rapidity with which thc observer teams are mobilized and their effectiveness willhave great bearing on this problem
3, OMI'HOMISE SOLUTIONhaHS AND JEWS.
It is extremely unlikely that the Mediator himself will be able lo persuade Arabs and Jews to agreeompromise solution for Palestine. The Jews,e Jaeto government and because of their military strength and the political support of the US und the USSR, are in an extremely strong position. The provisions of the UNscheme constitute for the moment their minimum demands. The Arabs. In spite of their weakness, have given no official indication that they arc prepared to recognize Israel as defined in the UN partition plan. At the present time no Arabfeels it could survive if it consented to negotiate with Israeli representatives. Israel and the Arab governments might accept some sort of International status for Jerusalem or its de-mil Ha r( ration, butevelopment might well be resisted by the Israeli extremist groups.
If, after repealed attempts, the Mediator Is unable to make any progressolution, he may recommend some further course of action to thc Security Council Should thc truce prove reasonably effective, he might as an alternate movethe advisability of securing an advisory opinion from the International Court ot Justice. If, on the other hand, tho truce collapses, he undoubtedly will recommend sanctions against Arabs, or Jews, or both. One difficulty in the way of gettingstarted is the firm statement of the Arabs, frequently repealed, that under no circumstances will they recognize an Israeli state, which they would appear to do If they satouncil tabic with Israeli delegates. KncouragemenL must therefore be given to the present Arab governments as well as an excuse furnished to ihem to give to their own people. This might well be secured through an advisory opinion of the International Court of. as toovernment of Israel exists with which the Arabs can negotiate.
4. Conclusions.
Unless strongly backed by the Security Council and efficiently enforced it isthai the truce will be effective. Even with an effective truce it is unlikely that
SHCRET
a compromise agreement will be reached between Arabs and Jewsonsiderable period of time. Judging from present events in Palestine and should thc effectiveness of the observer machinery be no better than during the first truce, it is probable that sporadic fighting will continue and that the Jews will greatly increase their military potential under the cloak of the truce. Thus the state of Israel would be Jjcfurther consolidated, and the Arabs would be further weakened and isolated. If. however, the truce Is effectively enforced and the present comparatively moderate Arab governments can slay in power, the truce may be prolonged by the Arabs in the hopeevision of the UN partition resolution may be secured at the September meeting of theAssembly or that the issue will be submitted to thc International Court of Justice. If, on the other hand, these governments are overthrown, the Arabs will resume the fight, be seriously defeated, break all contact with the US and the UK, and almost(In one way or another) eventually find themselves open to Soviet
ENCLOSURE U
THE MILITARY SITUATION IN PALESTINE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SECONDJULY IMI
The military situation onuly, thc beginning of the second truce in Palestine, shows that thc Jews have made substantia) gains during the nine-day perioduly anduly. (See map) During that period the Jews captured Lydda, Ramie, and Has el Zin. thereby removing the danger of an Arab thrust on Tel-Aviv. In the north they took the strategic Arab-Christian town of Nazareth and consolidated their positions along the lebanesc border into which units had been moved during the truce. In the south the Jews thrust southeast into the Egyptian-occupied area near Isdud and widened and strengthened the strip of Jewish-controlled territory along the roads between Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv. Thc only successful Arab action during that period, the Iraqi advance north from Jenin toward Afule, was hailed by the truce before any significant gain was made.
During the period of tlie truce the Jews gained considerablyilitary point of view. They strengthened and improved their existing fortifications and built new ones in the areas recently taken over from the Arabs They improved the by-pass road lo Jerusalem, which skirts Arab-held Latrun and Bab el Wad on thc main road from Jerusalem to Tel-Aviv. They recruited and trained troops both abroad and in Palestine, and reinforcements were flown in from abroad. They increased their supply of tanks, aeroplanes, and artillery. The Jews brought heavy artillery into thearea and are reported to have acquired al leaslermanighterwhich can be converted intos (They are now reported tootal ofE-lufl's, of whichrehe food situation in Jerusalem was greatly improved during the truce.
The Arabs made certain gains during the truce, but these were insignificantto the Jewish gains. The Arabs received some Italian and Belgian arms and brought more arms and ammunition to the front.
The truce resulted in so great an improvement In the Jewish capabilities that the Jews may now be strong enough loull-scale offensive and drive the Arab forces out ol Palestine. Events during lhe truce, and the enormous increase in Jewish strength resulting from them, considerably change the previously held estimate of the probable course of the war in Palestine. Thc Arabs' logistical position generally is very bad and their ammunition supply Is exceedingly low. It Is estimated that they coutd not continue lo fight, even on the previous moderate scale, for more than two to three months
5
Military Forces involved are estimated
Arab Forces in or near Palestine
Transjordan Iraq
Egypt
Syria
Lebanon
Saudi Arabia
Irregulars
Totals
IN PALESTINE
NEAR PALESTINE
Forces
0
llaganah
Mobile Striking Force Semi-Mobile (Local operation) Garrison or Defense (settlers-urban milllla) Irgun Zvai Leumi
The Irgun has gradually increased0 during theonths
Stern Gang
A similar rise in Stern Gang numbersas been recently confirmed.
Tola!
ENCI/JSURE C
SOVIET POUCY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1. Soviet Oujecuvks.
ultimate objective of Soviet policy vis avis the Middle East is theof thc dominant role in the area.
implement this main objective. Soviet policy is directed toward theof four secondary objectives:
Instability in the Arab world.
A complete break between the US and the Arab states.
Strained relations between the US and the UK concerning Middle East
policy.
complete break between the UK and the Arnb stales
? ArruCATiox and Risults or Soviet7.
With the above objectives in mind, the USSR voted for thc UN partition of Palestine. From November to May lt consistently supported partition but took no initiative In urging effective action to implement partition. Officially the Soviet position wasunofficially, the Kremlin was content to sit bark and watch matters go from bad lo worse in Palestine. The Soviet delegation loudly denounced and obstructed the US proposalsemporary trusteeship over Palestine, the one possibility which might have prevented an Arab-Jewish war afteray Sinceay the delegation has been lukewarm on truce attempts and has obstructed mediation efforts.uly it abstained in the Security Council from voting on the resolution to extend the four weeks" truce. Although It voted for the resolution onuly ordering thetu cease hostilities, it abstained from voting on the proposal to give the UN Mediator authority toettlement between Jews and Arabs.
By pursuing the tactics outlined in the preceding paragraph, the USSR hasits prestige among Zionist groups throughout the world. Moreover, itsof partition has done little to impair Soviet-Arab relations, which could hardly have been made worse in any case. (The retaliatory outlawing of the Communist parties in Syria and Lebanon merely sent the Communists underground and, in view of lhe ineffectiveness of Arab police and security measures, did not greatly impair the capabilities of the Communists in theseoviet tactics in the UN have also contributed directly io instability in the Middle East, the first secondary objective of Soviet policy.
The inability of Lhe UN toompromise solution of the Palestine problem has contributed directly to the other three Soviet secondary objectives US support of partition immediatelyedge into US-Arab relations. This breach in relulions could never be mendedompromise was reached between Arabs
and Jews. Byompromise solution, the USSR contributed directly to Increasingly strained relations between Arabs and the US, its second objective. As the UK was compelled lor strategic and economic reasons to support the Arabs, strained relations between the US and the UK. the third Soviet objective. Inevitably followed. Thc Kremlin doubtless reasoned that UK dependence on ERP would compel the UK lo bow to US pressure. This would in turn lead to the fourth Soviet objective, the rupture ot UK-Arab relations. While the USSR was doubtless prepared to take positive steps toward the attainment of its objectives, it has been unnecessary for It to do anything beyond obstructing the possibilityompromise solution between Arabs and Jews. US support of partition. UK support of lhe Arabs, and UK economic dependence on the US have combined toituation favorable to the USSR and one which they can be expected to exploit in the future.
3 Future Pomcy (after.
The future policy of the USSRis Palestine will aim al consolidating lhe objectives already partially attained. It will continue to be the Soviet plan toine of opportunism and readiness to exploit what the USSR considers US and UK mistakes. While continuing to support thc partition scheme, lhe USSR may beto abstain on or to block any UN action which is likely to bring Jewish-Arab hostilitiesermanent end. This trend is forecast by the USSR abstention onuly Security Council resolution calling on both parties to agree to an extension of the four weeks* truce, and subsequently on the question of granting Bernadotte powers to mediate.
4.
It may come 2boui thai the UK.esult of US and UN pressure, would find it difficult to maintain all its tics with the Arab stales, which would contribute to the fourth major objective of the USSR. In such an event it may be expected that the USSR will shift lhe emphasis of its progaganda from "Jewish Independence" to "US Imperialism in Israel" and under the latter slogan will woo the Arab governments with promises ol military advisers and supplies. It can be expected to "encourage" its own candidates in the political turmoil which wU follow Arab military defeats. By such methods II will continue its drive toward the attainment of its basic objective, lhe assumption ol the dominant role In the Middle East
Soviet Arms Policy on Palestine Issue.
Therearge body of evidence which indicates that arms shipments from lhe Communist-dominated countries have been made both to the Arab states and to Israel. Thc Israeli have received the bulk of these arms, which have includedsmall arms, automatic weapons, artillery and military planes.*
The major source of arms supply for Israel has been Czechoslovakia. Other countries which have supplied arms are Yugoslavia and Poland, and possibly the USSR. The govirmnents of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia have activelyhere ti iw indication thai9 type aircraft are being used by cither Arabs or Je*i.
in these shipments by furnishing protection, maintaining secrecy, or supplyingfacilities, including airfields In the case of Czechoslovakia Ports in Albania and Italy have been utilized for transshipment purposes to provide additional secrecy as to thc countries of origin of these military supplies.
Some of the Arab League countries have purchased arms from Czechoslovakia; the largest shipments to the Arabs from that country have gone to Syria and Lebanon. Small shipments from the USSR or Balkan ports are also reported to have been landed on the Syrian and Lebanese coasts; also, petroleum products are now being shipped to Lebanon by Rumania.
Original document.
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