CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS RESULTING FROM THE GRANTING OF AMNESTY TO ACCUSED COLLABORATORS IN THE PHILIPPINES
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POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS RESULTING FROM THE GRANTING OF AMNESTY TO ACCUSED COLLABORATORS IN THE PHILIPPINES
SUMMARY
President Roxas" proclamation ofanuary, granting amnesty to Filipinosof political and economic collaboration with thc Japanese has, in eflect.ogical course of postwar justice: those who actively aided the Japanese occupation ore now not only free but may well beosition to regain control of the government; many of those who opposed the Japanese and aided the US in recovery of the Philippines are in effect subject to persecution despiteor evenesult olthese endeavors.
Several hundred Filipino guerrillas, who opposed the occupation under their own or US leadership, are now in custody and subject to prosecution in the Philippine courts for alleged acts ol violence committed during thc war as part ol their anli-Japanese and anti-collaborationist activities. With the declaration ot amnesty and thus the strengthening of power of the very elements against which most ol these acts were perpetrated, it is obvious that Filipino testimony in behalf of accused guerrillas will be difficult to obtain. Testimony of US personnel who participated in Philippineactivities would require both thc consent of US citizens to appear in the Philippines and Philippine Government acquiescence in their appearance
The ultimate eflect of thc amnesty, therefore, may well be detrimental to USin the Philippines In that (s) elements suffering from its effects will believe themselves betrayed by the US and thus may reverse their previous loyalty to It; and (b) former collaborationists who play on extreme Philippine nationalism and aresecretly or avowedly anti-US are likely to achieve political and economic control.
Note The Information In this report Is as ofarch 1SHS.
The intelligence organizations of the Departments ol Stale, lhe Army. Navy, and Air Force have concurred in In la report.
POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS RESULTING PROM THE GRANTING OK AMNESTY TO ACCUSED COLLABORATORS IN THE PHILIPPINES
Concurrence by the Philippine Congress in President Roxrs'anuarywhich grants amnesty to those accused of political and economicwith the Japanese, has provided thc meansegal settlement of one oi the Philippine Republic's most critical issues. President Hoxas' decision to signroclamation was apparently madeautious assessment of its probable effect in both the United States and the Philippines. Although direct US intervention in thc settlement of this Issue had long been ruled out by events in the Philippines, it has been apparent for some time that President Roxas' real concern and the primaryweighing against an earlier amnesty proclamation has been the fear that unfavorable reaction in the United States might adversely affect thc extension ofUS financial assistance to the Philippines. President Roxas, by issuing hisanuary proclamation, took thc calculated risk that his action would not seriously Jeopardize or embarrass his administration and that it would be followed by the minimum of unfavorable reaction in the US. Thc amnesty proclamation may beby two major developments adverse to USealization by many Filipinos, who made significant contributions to US mtlilary success in the Pacific and who arc currently being prosecuted in Philippine courts, that the US probably will be unable to facilitate testimony on their behalf;trengthening of extremely nationalistic and avowedly anti-American elements which may achieve political and economic control ol the Philippines.
The grant of amnesty goes contrary lo the position of the United States as established in President4 statement thatwho have collaborated with Uie enemy must be removed from authority and influence over the political and economic life of theoreover, the Philippine Government has subsequently established no principles or Judgments which would help to distinguish patriotism from treason. In any event, the effect ol thc amnesty will be to weaken US ability to protect those Filipinos who arc being subjected lo persecutionesult of the amnesty.
The US decision to refrain from participation in the collaboration issue alienuled groups of Filipinos that might otherwise have been friendlythe US. Aside from thc antlgovernment llukbatanap, whose anti-US bias will be Intensified by what will appear to them exceptional injustice, there are several hundred Filipinos who have been imprisoned on charges arising from specific acts committed under orders of US and Filipino guerrilla commanders during the war. Failure to include Ihem in amnesty lias left these Filipinos subject lo prosecution under Philippine penal laws and unless some remedy is found for them, they will ultimately hold the US responsibleiscarriage of justice. Their cases have not been handled expeditiously. With the consolidation of political strength in thc hands of former collaborators, their position will be further weakened in that neither Philippine noi US personnel can safely or effectively testify In their behalf.
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Meanwhile, those persons who served in key positions in thc occupationor who assisted the Japanese economically will benefit Irom the amnesty proclamation. Complete reentry of these persons, including Jose P. Laurel who was President of the Japanese-sponsorednto thc political life of the Philippines willolitical struggle which will culminate ln9 presidentialWinle Roxas may be able to absorb many of these persons into histheretrong possibility that Laurel in particular Is determined to vindicate his record by exploiting the easily aroused expressions of extreme Filipino nationalism and that he will be able to consolidate enough strength to challenge Roxasevelopment would complicate US-Phllipplne relations: an openlyand nationalistic group with strong political influence would beosition lo undermine Philippine support of US policy in the United Nations and, by Intensifying their attack on US policies and programs in the Philippines, would thereby discredit the US In other Far Eastern countries.
An account of the events leading up to thc amnesty proclamation Is set forth in Enclosurehe proclamation itself in Enclosure
ENCLOSURE A
COLLABORATION IN THE PHILIPPINES
for Charges of Collaboration.
The loyalty of the great majority of the Filipino people was thoroughlyduring theidespread and active resistance movement developed in the Philippines and became the basis for an organized intelligence network which greatly facilitated thc return of American forces and aided immeasurably in theof the Japanese.
However, thc Japanese secured effective support from small but important groups of Filipinos, Politically, the governmental Instruments of collaboration were well defined. From2 untilhilippine Executive Commission under chairmanship of Jorge B. Vargas paralleled the organization of the Japanese Military Administration. Otters from Japan of "Independence" were accepted and formalized. Inhilippine Republic was Inaugurated, with Jose P. Laurel as President. With few exceptions the leading political figures in theaccepted and vied for positions of responsibility in the Philippine Executiveand thc "Philippinene of the last acts of this Philippinewas to declare war against the United States and Great Britain. In thesphere, many leading businessmen assisted thc Japanese by making materiel and supplies available to the Japanese Army and Navy. Inew Filipinos acted as Japanese agents or servedapanese-sponsored military organization known as the MakapUL
The motives of these individuals and groups and the extent to which they assisted the Japanese were questioned by both Filipinos and Americans. Public opinion in the United States and the Philippines demanded some means for establishing the guilt of those charged with collaboration.
Status Policy.
It was not until4ublic declaration of policy was madecollaboration in the Philippines. On that date, President Roosevelttatement in which he declared that "those who have collaborated with the enemy must be removed from authority and influence over the political and economic life of thehis statement of policy was not further defined, nor were the methods designated by which It was to be carried out. However, it became thcpolicy of the United States Government and was transmitted in directives from the Joint Chiefs ol Staff lo General MacArthur's headquarters in Australia before the landings in the Philippines.
General MacArthur's headquarters was prepared to carry out this general policy by taking into custody and turning over to the Commonwealth Government individu-
al
als who were accused ol collaboration.le In lateie-liminaiy attempt at prosecution by thc Comrnonwealth Government. General Mac-Arthur assumed control of those who had been Interned. At the same time hethat the Counter Intelligence Corps would continue to take into custody individuals cliarged with collaboration, but that they would be held by the United States Army until the defeat of Japan and then be turned over to the Commonwealth Government fur prosecution. Tills action In effectolicy of leaving thc prosecution of those charged with collaboration entirely to the Philippine
Subsequently, intervention by the United States apparently was considered. Onhortlyigh Commissioner to the Philippines was appointed. President Tiumanirective to the US Attorney General requestingtudy be made of the status of those who collaborated wllh the enemy in theHowever, onft, after receiving reports from the Attorney General, from the Secretary of War. and from High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt. President Truman announced that there was "no necessity for any change in our established policy of leaving thc disposition of civil collaborationists in thc Philippines lo thc civil authorities there."
The decision of the US to refrain from participation in thc collaboration issue has alienated two groups of Filipinos which might otherwise have been friendly to thc US The first is theeftist organisation that effectively fought the Japanese and collaborationist groups. It has now emerged as both anti administration and anti-American. Another group which has been alienated is composed of several hundred Filipinos who have been imprisoned on charges that specific acts committed under orders of US and Filipino guerrilla commanders during the war are subject to Philippine penal laws. The larger number of this group were in the Northern Luzon guerrilla force under the commandS Army officer. Although an effort was made loamnesty for this grouproclamation Issued by President Roxasheir cases have not been handled expeditiously. In addition, the burden of proof under this proclamation rested with the accused and it has been impossible, because of thc strong Influence exerted by collaborationist elements, to arriveatisfactory basis for obtaining the testimony of US officers In behalf of these gurr rillas They have continued to hold thc L'S responsible for their predicament and nave clearly indicated that the US policy toward collaboration would lead to aof Justice in their particular cases
3 Developments in the Philipi'Ikes duiii.no Tim Osmxna Administhation.
During the war the Philippine Government-in-exile in Washington refrained from making any policy statements on the subject of collaboration. After the return uf President Sergio Osmeiia to the Philippines, the action of General Mac Arthur- in Leyle relieved the Commonwealth Government of any immediate responsibility for the piose-cutton of those charged with collaboration The political implications of thcIssue were recognized by President Oamena. and he was reluctant to establish
any clear policy. lie was endeavoring to secure specific guidunce from Washington when an event in the Philippines irrevocably relegated the issue of collaboration to the Judgment of Philippine politics.
Manueleading figureormer Secretary of Finance in the prewar Philippine Oovcrnmenl. had participated In the government of Uie puppet Philippine Republic and was subject lo internment. In company with other leading figures of the puppet regime he had left Manila and was in the Baguio area when contact wasith American troops. Roxas was brought to Manila, where it was announced from General MacArlliur's headquarters that he had been "liberated" and Uie othersRoxas assumed his prewar rank of Brigadier General, was later relieved from active duly, returned to the political scene as President of Uie Senate, and thenthat he would be candidate for President In the forthcoming elections.
With political control of the Philippines at stake and with thc groups whichconsiderable political strength in thc Philippinesublic accounting of the issue, the Osmcfia Administration sponsored the establishmenteople's Court ino try all cases of offenses against Philippine national security during thc war with Japan. Byhich was the deadline for rilingases had been filed before the court. By6 decisions had been rendered in only forty cases; twenty-eight of these were convlcUons. The outstanding trial during this period in terms of the basic issue was that of Tcofllo Sison, puppet Minister of Home Affairs, whose trial began on5 and was concludedhe verdict was strong and clear. Sison was found guilty of treason, and he was ordered to be cornrniited lo life imprisonment,nd deprived of his civil rights. In the decision he was found guilty of treason on counts which were common to nearly all of the cases filed in Uie People's Court. His case was immediately appealed to the Supreme Court.
However, the election of Roxas to the Presidency in6 strengthened the hands of those charged with collaboration and cleared thc way for more determined efforts to effect abolishment of the People's Court or to secure general amnesty for those charged with collaboration.
4. Developments in tub Philippines during thk Roxas Auministhation.
In his inaugural speech onresident Roxas stated: "Violations of the basic law will be tested and punished by Law. Traitors will not escape their just deserts, but among the people, there must be no recriminations orrors of mind rather than of heart must behis was interpreted as meaningeneral amnesty might soon follow. However, the issue was not yet to be
Just after thc proclamation of Philippine independence, an attempt was made to dismiss chargesumber of cases before the People's Court on Uie ground that the Philippine Republic had no jurisdlcUon over alleged treasonous crimes against the Commonwealth Government and thc United States The proponents of thiscontendedhe sovereignty of the legitimalr government in the Philip-
SEfKET
pines (and consequently the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens) was suspended during the Japanese occupation;hat therehange of sovereignty in the Philippines upon the proclamation of the Philippinehis contention which became known as the "suspended sovereignty" theory was not upheld In thc People's Court and was the subject of an appeal to the Supreme Court.
In6 four leading figures of the puppet Republic who were subject to trial in thc People's Court were returned to thc Philippines from Japan where they had been held in custody. They were Jose P. Laurel, puppet President, Jorge B. Vargas, puppet Ambassador to Japan, Benigno Aquino, Speaker ot the puppet Assembly, and Camilo Osias, puppet Minister of Education. In an interview early inresident Roxas stated that he was being urged by Filipinos as well as Americans to grant amnesty to these four and to others, but that he had decided against it. He is quoted as saying:ind most ot thc persons under charges of collaboration wish to have the opportunity to attempt to clear themselves before the People's andCourts."
The appeal to thc Philippine Supreme Court testing the theory of "suspended sovereignty" which, if upheld, would have resulted in the dismissal of all indictments, was rejected on7otend gave the People'semporary lease on life. However,7 the People's Court had disposed ofases ofere convictions and was facing even greater difficulties in prosecuting its cases. With the exception of the early conviction of Sison, which remained on appeal to the Supreme Court, no prominent persons were among those convicted. Beginning with thc acquittal in7 of Rafael Alunan,Minister of Agriculture, and In7 of Emiliano Tlrona, Occupation Minister of Health, Labor and Public Welfare, it became clear that none would be convicted. Complicated legal maneuvering7 repeatedly delayed the trials of Vargas, Laurel, Osias, and others. The resignation ot Lorenzo Tanada. Cliief Prosecutor of the People's Court, in order to run for Senator on President Roxas* Liberal Party ticket in the7 elections reduced the possibility that convictions would be secured. The election of Tanada and Osias. who was the only Senator clcctpd from the opposition ticket, as well as the death of Benigno Aquino undoubtedly speeded the8 Supreme Court decision which held that the mere holding ol aposition during the Japanese occupation was not in itself evidence of treason. This decisiontronger legal basis for President Roxas'anuary amnesty proclamation.
The Philippine Senateebruary votedn favor of thc proclamation.tormy debate thc Philippine House of Representatives approved itote ofon the House there were two abstentions andbsentees. Steps were taken for the immediate clearance of the more prominent indictees.
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ENCLOSURE B
PROCLAMATION NO.ROCI.AMATION GRANTING AMNESTY
WHEREAS, the occupation of the Philippines by thc Japanese armed forces during thc last war and the organization by themovernment administered by citizens of the Philippines but subject to their direction and control have given rise to charges of collaboration with the enemy against such citizens of the Philippines who occupied positions In that government, as well as against those who traded with the enemy;
WHEREAS,esult of those charges, indictments have been filedarge number of Filipino citizens for alleged treasonable collaboration with the enemy before the People's Court, which was established especially to hear and try these cases;
WHEREAS, these trials have been held for more than two years now but no final judgments convicting any one of thc accused have been rendered;
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court has declared that the mere holdingosition in the government established by the enemy does not per se constitute the crime of treason under the laws of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, with respect to those who are at present indicted for alleged trading with the enemy, It appears that because aside from the requirements of thc two-witness rule in treason trials. It has been declared necessary to prove specifically that the materials involved In thc trading were essential to the prosecution of the war. no final Judgments of conviction have been entered so far In such cases and. on theseveral verdicts of acquittal have been rendered and orders of dismissal issued;
WHEREAS, the majority of the Filipino people now realize that thc alleged acts attributed to political collaborators either were not voluntary on their part or, in effect, were performed by Ihem in the sincere belief that it was their patriotic duty to execute them In the interest of the safely and well-being of their countrymen who were then at the mercy of thc enemy;
WHEREAS, with the lapse of time there hasetter understanding on the part of the Filipino people of the motives which actuated the persons who held positions under the occupation government, and there is evidenceajority of the people have fully vindicatod the accused, convinced that in the discharge of their functions as public officials they did everything in their power to minimize theol the enemy and lo prevent the carrying out ol his purpose to induce or compel the Filipino people to arm themselves against the Allied nations;
WHEREAS, under the laws of the Philippines and the doctrines laid down by our courts, the prosecution of the cases now pending appears unjustified with regard to alleged political collaborators and futile as to those charged with economic
WHEREAS, the question of collaboration has divided the people ol the Philippines since liberationanner which threatens thc unity of the nationime when
SEKET
unfair
the public welfare requires that said unity be safeguarded and preserved;
WHEREAS, the question of collaboration Is essentially political In nature and should be settled in accordance with the conscience of the majority of the people.
WHEREAS, it appears that the overwhelming sentiment of the people of tills republic is now in favor of resolving this question as speedily as possible by the grant of amnesty to all persons who have been accused or may hereafter be accused of treason* through alleged collaboration with the enemy;
WHEREAS, this public sentiment does not extend to persons who voluntarily took up arms against the allied nations or the members of the resistance forces, or acted as spies or informers of thc enemy, or committed murder, arson, coercion, robbery, physical injuries or any other crime defined and punished in our penal laws, for the purpose of aiding and abetting the enemy in the war against the Allied nations, or In the suppression of the resistance movement in the Philippines;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Manuel Roxas, President of the Philippines, by virtue of thc power in me vested by Article VII, Sectionf the Constitution, do hereby proclaim and grant full and complete amnesty to all persons accused of any offense against the national security for acts allegedly committed lo give aid and comfort to thc enemy during the last war;
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that this amnesty shall not extend to persons who are now. or may hereafter be accused of treason for having taken up arms against thc Allied nations or thc members of the resistance movement, for having voluntarily acted as spies or informers of the enemy, or for having committed murder, arson, coercion, robbery, physical injuries, or any other crime against person or properly, for the purpose of aiding and abetting the enemy in the war against thc Allied nations or in theof the resistance movement in the Philippines.
All cases now pending before the courts for alleged offenses coming within the terms of the amnesty herein granted shall be dismissed by the respective courts on their own motion or upon petition by the prosecution or the accused.
This proclamation shall take effect upon the concurrence therewith by the
In witnessave hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of thc Philippines lo be affixed.
Done at the city of Manila,h day of January, in the year of ournd of the independence of the Philippines, the second.
ANUEL ROXAS President of the Philippines
By the President:
. ROXAS Acting Executive Secretary
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DISTRIBUTION
TIlO President
Secretary of state
Chief ofo Commoner! lo Chief
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of the Amy
Secretary of the Nary
Secretary of Uw Air Force
Executive Secretary. MaUooal Security Council Chairman. National Security Resources Board Chief of siaJT. us Army Chief of Naval Operation* Chief of Staff. US Air Force
Director of Plana and Operations, General SlatT. U8 Anny
Deputyf Naval Operations (Operation*)
Director of Plana and Operations. US Air Force
Special AxiUtant to the Secretary of Stale. lU'varcli mid Intelligence
Director of Intelligence. General Staff. US Army
Cblef of Naval Intelligence
Director of intelligence, US Air Force
Secretary. Joint Chiefs ot Staff
Secretary. Join; Intelligence Ore op
Secretary. SUie-Army-Navy-Alr Force Coordlnfltins Committee
Executive Secxelary, MOlUry lislsoa Committee to the Atomic Energy CommUHon
Director of Security and Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission
Chief. Acquisition and DUUlbuoon, OJCD, Department of State
Original document.
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