CENTRAL CTELLICXE AG^EI
39
rjlTELUGEICE rEf-CRAIEuTl
SUBJECTt Foreign Reaction to tbe US Position on tba Stalin "Peace InteTTioel
fie actlone to dote are olnost ontlrely confined to official otatecents and to radio and press ooniaanta. The latter oonmonte, ex-oopt wben officially directed, aro prejudiced by the politioal positions of tho media ln chieb they appear. Significant analyaea of public opinion are not yet available.
rovideegional basis
positions mhore knotm
Press and radio reactions as available
Bstinatea of probable public rosponoe node on general
la considered that
A- Official responses in non^ocnunlot Western States tend to Bupport the preaentosition of asking for "doedo not words."
fe. Press and radio oamenta follow either the officialsupport the "peace offensive" itself. At tho pro cent nonont theylittle
e. Publlo opinion and popular judgasnt aro motivated, often onreelitrtically,idaspread desire for peace and roroooal security, androping for stability. Theae motivations aro subject to manipulation and exploitation. Conversely, they cannot be entirely frustrated if publlo opinion and popular judgments ore to be enlistn firm aupport3 line. Evidence la not yet in hand to indicate the oxtont to ubich those motivations havo been touched by the presentoffensive." Such evidence should be requested and eonaidered aa It becomes available.
G, "Foreign Radio Reactions to Stalin's RepliesSmith" mas prepared by the Foreign Broadcast Information
Branch expressly for this study.
__ j
NO CHANGE iillECLASSIFIED
Tho following questions have been considered with reference to foreign reactions to the recent Stalin propoeala for conversationsPresident Trureani
Will it cease the Government to change Its present policy in regard to the EaoWest struggle?
bill it cause tho people to bring pressure on theirto alter its policy in regard to tho Seat-Moot struggle?
If tho Government does not alter its policy, will it lose popular support?
evidence have you received to riato?
Uostern Europe estimates that the reaction will be aa folloost 1. Franos.
Mo, However, continued close cooperation of the Frenchwill be conditional open dose consultation among the toe tern allies on any Important actions or exchange of notes.
Ho, arge majority of the oopulation appears thoroughly cynical with respect to the Stalin proposal, Tbe Comounista and felloe travwUera will, of course, oontinue to exploit thla phase of the "peocend scree actively pacifist orgnolzationa euch as the Gary Dmvlo group may bring pressuro on the Government tooreattitude toward the USuR.
Not any appreciable portion of ita present support,
by Premier ^ueuilles tern apokeenan toon Stalin "peaceoreign Minister Schuman, andreaotion, reported in groator detail than usual by Paris Embassy.
1. although the Stalin interview had little or no effect upon the Lend govcrnmenta, the impact ce. the Geroan politiciana at the Donn rarlia-nor.Ury Council waa reported to be considerable. Tho President of the Council, Dr. Adenauer, is reported to haveeetlng of Minister
Presidents to discuss too effect of tho Stalin proposals on tho erectioneatern Gorman government. Itood bargaining point for the Germans, uho give credence to rumors of aagreement at their oxpenao.
German press reaction, except far Coiuaunistuniformly skeptical about sincerity of Stalin proposition,papers questioned the advisability of going ahead with plans forGerman government at this tine.
Public is apathetic, ond politicians aroia Uilitery Government.
T] oablosGorman press suranary,
on benn reaction.
Two 3. Italy.
Ho. The Government sill find It necessary, however, to make ole-rto the population that the Italian Government aelcomeseny positive step which would oaso the tension botueen East and West.
Tea, In addition to intensified opposition from the extreme left, snny of tbe moderate Socialists and certain Left-King Christian Democrats will feel Justified in continuing pressure on their Cabinet representatives to oppose military commitments to the Meet.
Mo. The Government will not necessarily lose popular support if if acts as inbove. Fopular support of the Government will
bo conditioned by many other factors besides foreign policy, most prominently by the Government's success in handling problosis of domestic oconceiio
foreign Officehe Mew larkndentsSareget; at recent moderate Socialist (FSLl) Congress,voted in favor of calling on the Government to lino up definitelyiloatj Left-wing Christian Democratic leader Giovanni Grcnchi.
L, Motherlands.
Ro.
Mo. Unless the Soviet "peace offensive" is continuedong period of time with concrete evidenceesire to reach agreement on outstanding Issues.
Mo. Except possibly under condition stated in 2.
Only evidence to date has been Dutch prone oaaaent. General tone of non-CoEounint preen is one of extromo skepticlara. Official Labor, Catholic and snail rightist pur ties' papers cite various probable Soviot motives, ell ulterior, for Stalin's statement, several asking for deods and not words.
Aostrlana have consistently pointed cot that Sovietcat an Austrian treaty uould best furnish concrete evidence ofto ease the Bast-hest tension.
No.
No.
A. No evidence received to date on tho recent proposals.
in.
No. Ihe Government sill continue its intense opposition to the USSR and tho expansion of Communism. Tho Coveriment believes that the menace of Communism should ce net with militant intransigence. The controlled press, therefore, probably will deplore any statements or acta which can be interpreted as "weakening" of the US attitude tonard the USSR or as an evidence of US gullibility, warning that trickery and deceit underlie any conciliatory gesture by the USSR, and will seek to Impress the Spanish people that for these reasons the prospect of an aeat-Reat war, in which Spain wouldrimary object of attack by the USSR, continues to be "inevitable.11
No. The Spanish people have no moans of bringing pressure on their Government.
Ho. The Government doos not depend for its strength on popular support. The majority of the oonservative elementa, particularly the Arny, on those supjort lt does depend, concur in this policy.
L, No evidence.
7. Belelum.
i
nless the Soviot "peeoe offensive* ia continuedong period of tine with concrete evidenceoslre to reach agreement on outstanding issues.
xcept possibly under condition stated in 2.
QwMflgT
'Wnnirr
A, Only evidence to out* has beer: Belgian press comment. Hon-CemiauniBt prase views Stalin proposal with skepticism, linking it with USSR attempt to "pre*sure" Norway and an "all oat" canpaign to prevent formation nf the Atlantic Pact and to block Seat Geman Govomnont.
Bo. The Government will continue its anti-Communist stand.
Mo. The people have no way of influencing the Government.
The Government ia not dependent on popular support,the support of the Army, which io strongly anti-Communist.
A. No reports have yet been received.
No.
No.
No.
U. Only evii!ance to date has been Swiss press comment, previous to Stalin's proposals, on possibility of "peace offensive." Skeptielan was expressed that there reallypeace offensive" on basis of statements of Italian and French Communists.
In conclusion. It should be noted that Kestem Europe and countries in general are torn between conflicting emotions springing frcei
The fear that they will become involvedar between the US and thebloh loada them to want peace bt almost any priee.
The fear that bilateral US-USSR negotiations will result in an International "deal* in which they will be victimised.
Tha fear that the US ie "gullible* and will allow itself to be cut-maneuveredo tho detriment of the foreign aup-porters of US policy.
British opinion on tho issues appears to correspond generally with that of thehoy havo cotjo to look on Stalinwith skepticism, and to demand actions Qs well as words in demonstration of good faith. Falling such actio no, the oracular expressions from the Kremlin are overwhelmingly considered to be propaganda.
No direct evidence yet available.
On the basis of Irish reaction to similar events of the past, it is believed that Irish public opinion, uhilo nreriouo for'aof Groat Power differences, uill approve the position taken by the US.
Of South AfJlPfl'
Ho direct evidence is yet amilable.
The Union of South Afrloa haa boon in continuous sympathy vith the US position regard the USSR, and South African reactions to the US response to the rtalln statements aro probably overuhemingly favorableo
Hb direot ovidonce available.
Swedish prees ooroante on Stalin's interview treeted it with skopticlen as another nove in the Soviet pceoo offonnlve donlrned to forestall an Atlantic Pact ond to confuseVet. It iounlikely that Swedish opinion will be otherwise than rdJdly favorable to tho US reaction.
No evidence avalLahlo
6.
Ho ovidonae available.
7,
Ho evidence available.
It Is not expected that the Canadian reaction will differ fron that of US public and official opinion. The following quotationpeech raede onanuary by L. B. Pearson, Secretory of State for External Affairs, ia appropriateI "let us not bo do-ooivod by phony olive branches, which now seen to be waving here and there In Europe rn orders fron Mdsocv."
APPSJOJIX C
EaSTERIJ EUROPE
Sffl-
The OoveranpnS will naturally back Stalin to tho hilt. The peonlc. who generally know nothing but Soviet propaganda, will be deeply disappointed by "US rojoctlon of Soviet peace overtureo."
atellites.
Thoill bock Stalin to the hilt, with the possible exception of Yugoslavia. Even tho Yugoslav CoveTToent will profess support for Stalin proposal. The majority of tvoole will beIn the "US rejection of Soviet peaceecause they believe that the chances for peaoo are being lessened. There are rjony people in the area, however, uho will ueloono tho US rejection bo cause they feel tho only chance of salvation Unaar between tho Soviet Union and tho US.
SgAft EAST/tfBffiA,
3. Knoyn reaction i Tho pro go lo akaptioal and unenthnsiastic, feeling positive acts arc neoded to prore that the Soviets aro notto defeat the Atlantic Pact and western union.
S- Probable reactioni Tbe press reactionractioally unlToraol Greek distruat of Soviet Intentions,eeling that tho first tokenoviet ohango of heart would have to be relaxation of Soviet-satellite pressure ln Greece. The Greeks regard too Stalin statements ln the sane light as the Sarkoe peace proposals, asaland at discrediting or weakening their opponents.
Editorials so far reported are varyone Iatanbul writer bolievea he poreoivea on oralfoe* of "Truman raallam."
reaction,! Tha Turkiafa Goverrnent and people, aalead the field In open skepticism. They are highly likely toae another Soviet propaganda noro released for tho usual Thay would advocate prompt, even contemptuous, rejection and
a demand for ooooiliatory Soviet deodo, not words. (Hotel There is likely also to be censure of the IBTIB) for ita possibly mla-ohievoua irresponsibility in prooonting Stalin with this opportunity.)
Stntma.
17. froboble reaction,! Probably too such concerned with Palestine and internal problems for any marked public reaction. Privately, most responsible Arab statesmen will probably bo skeptloal of Soviet good faith. They will probably also Interpret lturther attempt of the great ponora to Ignore and by-paaa the UN.
Ji- Tpfrtttit rTwrtJon1 Officially, Israel, which Is attempting toolioy of friendship tooard both East and Dost may be expected to greet the proposaltep towardviot understanding.umoroun political parties and factions will react according to their several orientationa.
*> gnom'roao^cni So far there io no notorial available ohioh conveys the reactions of tho govornoont, press, and other inportont eloraenta In Iran.
Probable ronotloni The Shah and the governmont, and nost ofpoUtloal leaders will probably viewuch the sane ekopticlom aa expressed in aking Its on* fron ffascon,
^^Jf? 0Be*Pt StaUn'a nropoaal. advocates of aoil! probably also support It. Extreme naUonolisto andof tbe prooont government nay book tho proposaleasurotnternal political
4- Inorm reaction! Price Ihmiator Ilcfaru haa Drlvately*exnres8od the hope thatould handle the Stalin statementsg ovoid giving large eoctlone of iaiatlo public opinion the iapresnionriendly gesture was boing rejected. Nehru said he couldn't judge chether stclin nanood faith in asking tho gesture but felt that theutrht
"iponsiWllty for any further rift squarely on the TSSR. Ho pointed out that tho Soviots manipulated tho situation last summer so as to give many Indians tho lasting impression that theas In the wrong.
Probableo press ccomont available, though it mill probably follow the lines suggested by Nehru, The Communists, of courne, oan be expected to follon their usual line.
*V lUfltt' There are as yet no knoun reaotlons of the Pakistan government, press, or other important elements in the country.
h. ftiajffl*i Bhile it is believed that the Pakistanbe ecemsdiat ocraparabla to that of India, It is anticipated thatbdao exhibited by Pakistan mill Induce tbe government onto approvection. It will be hoped that tho "poooe offer"to not give tho Anion countries tho impreoolon
that thoariendly Russian gesture. Leftist elements in tne press will, probably, seise upon the opportunity to ploy up tho "war nongoxing Americano* and point out that the tension betooon the OS and USSR Is the fault of the US.
8. Afgh^fll^-ffl
fl. Kflwn reaction! There are as yet no known reactions of tho Afghan government, proas, or other elements.
SUeilET
b. Probable, ronotloni In line uith fifoallBticof USSR tecbniquoo and probable intentions, it nay bo anticipated that Afghanistan will on tho oholo approve tho direct ond blunt official position taken by tho US on Stalin's "peace interview." Tho entire natter idll
probably be givenfficial, and very little unofficial recognition In Afghanistan.
a. Known reaction^ Hone.
Jit. rrobuble reaction; Will follon US reaction If any.
ifcaifl.
sjrnw
APPENDIX E
m past
Op to tho proaont thoro has boon practically no reaction either official or unofficial to the present Sovlot peace offensive and the United States reaction thereto. Far Eastern governments and peoples aro ao rrncrouo and their problnao so complex tbat the reactions TOold vary ln aaoh country or area, doponding upon the presentof too governments and pooploa. In general, however, it is the opinion of this Branch that except for aome Communist exploitation of tho propaganda value of thoee current ovents, tho Far Eaat is so preoccupied in ita own immediate problema that no strong rose tion one way or tho other is to bo expected.
hFXSMDIX F
LaTIK aliHtlCA
haa reported no radio cocoon to in LA onto tho Kingsbury Smith cueetions, nor hove any cablesin our area given any conn ento.
expect no deoided reaction in oar area except fromand other pro-Soviet sources, who rdll play up Sovietand condemn the US for not accepting Immediately,the rulo book. There will bo general comment to the effect that
it would be desirable if tiie US and the USSR could come to terns, with acme mention of tho danger of grasping apparent Soviet olive branched. Stalin's admitted poor health will cause speculation.
AFTETillX OTE
The political leanings and connections of the Journals quoted in thie report ere not given, but they are of Blgnifioanoe ln evaluating tho etatenocts attributed to then.
Pageeginning "DEIZ4ahould reed as followsi
zone German prose service, quotes the liunich SUEDDEUTSCHE 2EITUHG as assorting "Stalin'sreveals gonuine anxiety about the rallying of theaden-Baden conusntator, Fred Simson,tha interview was givenpaychologieally favorable" tine, for itwith Russian censure of the Atlantio Pact,
t
FOREIGN RADIO REACTTOKS TO STALIN'S REPLIES TO KINGSBURY SMITH
SOVIST RADIO.
GERMAN AND SATELLITE
"Voice of
Rejecting Stalin's Offer Will Reveal...
RADIOS OUTSIDE THE SOVIET ORBIT
aution.o Exaggerated
b. "Deeds Rather Than
e. Unequivocal
Should Be
. Official
59
C2KTF.AI. GEHCK AGKSCY
Tho Soviet Radio: To dote. Radio Moacow haa notingle monitored content about Stalln'a roplloa to Klngabury Smith. Verbatim reports of tho initial reply, however, have been broadcast repeatedly ln practically all languages used by tho Sovietecord surpassing Moeccv'o coverage of any other single event since ot least. And preliminary monitoring reports Indicate that Moscow la giving widespread publicity toebruary reply to Smith's telegram.
Soviet-Controlled German and Satellite Rsdloa: Tho Soviet-controlled German radio end press havo given overwhelming attention to Stalln'a initial reply, tho Satellite radlca considerably looo. Two najor themoe ore atroeaod, with lnaletent repetition, to the exclusion of practically all-others: (l) the "freeh ovidence of the Soviet Union's (allegedly historic) willingness to remove all obstacles to buildingastingho final proof of American "warmongering" that will be revealed if Stalinegatlvo reply. Disproportionate emphaais appears to have been placed on driving homo the latter point: "thoee who reject (Stalin's) fair offer will revealaa warmongore"; if. refuses to accept Stalln'a propoeals, "thon the whole world will know who laeacenyone who oells Stalin's statement "propaganda" la "quite obviously an enemy of peoce and oppoeodeaceful settlement of poatwar problems."
This report covere all monitored foreign radio broadenote received In Weehington up. Aa of this time, no monitored reaotlona toebruary reply to Smlth'a telegram have been received.
RfflrflffTTtr?)
Hadlog Outside tho Soviet Orbit; Here, en equivalent volume of monitored attention to tho Stalin statement baa been reoolved, most of lt frcm countries* In western Europe. The comment la subjectolar variations; from the Interpretation that Stalin ia bocomlng milder to the statement that the Soviet attitude ia stiffening; from Communist press laudations to unqualified negativism; from proposalsruman-Stalin mooting to outright rejections of auch an idea,
Tho great built of the ccnacont, however, takes no catogorlcol position. Qualified skepticism, qualified hope, and caution about both tho algnlflcanoe and elncerltj of Stalin's eto tone nt are the rule. Considerable concern ia erprossod or impllod about tho possible impact of the statement on the Atlantic Pact and the Wootorn Union, which are almost uniformly defended (again either lmplloitly or explicitly).
Among tho various monitored suggestions aa to tho course of action that should be pursued In response to Stalin'o statement there ore fow that reoommonc outright rejection. That Stalin's statement be given seme form of seriousand response is the attitude of moat; and several fool that thla pooaible chance of pence (oven though perhape an outeide ore) should be given ooco sortrial.
To date, few monitored reactions to the officially. attitude about the Stalin statements havo boon rocoived.
THE SOVIET RADIO'
The response of tha Soviet radio to tho initial Smith-Stalin interview haa conaiated of voluminous reporting of the Interview itself. It has beer, given verbatim in practically all of Moscow's foreign-language beans, end on eomo boame (including Soviet Home Service broadcasts) ot least throe timeoew hours. It has also appeared, in record time, inebruary lesue of the Comlnform publication,ASTING PEACE,EOPLE'S DEMOCRACY. In sheor number of repetitions, no other single equivalent event since April(whon FBIB began concentrated study of Soviet radio broadcasts) has received an equal smount of publicity inhort time.
Aa often happens, however, Moscow has as yet refrained from comment, leaving this to Soviet-sympathizing sources. Some of these ore quoted by the Soviot radio. And at loaet one Soviet Hose Service broadcast hoe also reported the qualifledly favorable reactions from other sources in. (such as Senator Connolly's) and has noted that, sccording to UP, "the White House and Stateeceived cooly the statement of...
SOVIET-COhTROLIED GERMAN AND SATELLITE RADIOS
The volume of Soviet-controlled German radio and pross attention to Stalin'a reply to the four questions has been overwhelming. In contrast, few Satellite broadcasts on the subject have been monitored to date. (Among them, it is of interest that TANYUG, ths official Yugoslav press service, dispatches an account of Wollsoo'a interpretation that Stalin's statementign of hope for the whole
a> The "Voice of Peace"1 Together with tho Ccamuniet proos in western Europe, the Soviet-controlled German and Satellite radios hail and describe Stalin's reply in terms such oa the following: ray ofwide door tola releasedeeds offresh evidenoo of tho Soviet Onion's willingness to remove all obstacles to the building upastingho re, Berlin conzcentator Michael Storm dramatizes the reply as "one of tho moot important statements pronouncod since the end of tho war":
"Itong time einco we havo been able to observe scenes like these of this morning in Berlin. Newspapers were virtually torn out of the hands of the news vendors. Groups of people oooombled around thekiooks. In the trams, in the factories, everywhere there were lively discussions. To Judge by the reports of the news agencies, aimllar scenes occurred In Parle and Rome, New York and London. There is no doubt that even the politically indifforont people have for sone time beon subject to growing concern end tension: 'How are things to go on? Whet will happen?'"
And TAEOLICHE RUNDSCHAU (SKA organ in Berlin) notes that the world public has received Stalin's "positive replies" with "deep satisfaction. Those who aro endeavoring to preserve peace and to maintain international harmony will welcome Stalin'e statement."
In support of tho contention that Stalin's reply is further evidence of tho Soviet "peace" policy, frequent roforoncos are made to previous Stalinabout "peaceful coexistence" of differing economic and ideological aystemo.
Two itema are of particularfor no other roason than their uniqueness. Onoontrast drawn by Micheol Storm between the "sharpnosa of tho note of the Soviet Foreign Office In outlining tho policy of the Western Powera ard the readiness oxpresaed in Stalln'a interview to'coco to an undo ro tend log." Storm la the only monitored Soviet-controlled coxmentotor to diacuse thla contrast, and oven be explains it away. "Ino soya, "theae are merely two sidoB of ono and the same fundamental problem. The note of the Soviet Foreign Office clearly outlined tho problem of recent times, while tho replies of Stalinay out of thia dangerous atmosphere." (later Storm also spools of "the Sovlot note to Norway (wbloh) had proved that the time had passed once and for all when lt was possible toordon eonltalre around tho USSR.")
Tho othor Itom of Interestroad coot statement by Dr. Schvarte, Vice President of the Sexony-Anhalt Diot and center of the Saxony-Anha lt'n LDP Executive. Emphasizing tho Importance of direct cooperation between the heads, of the USSR end. Goverumonte, Dr. Schwarxo la reported by Soviet-controlled Berlin to have "declared that this could leadreater euccoaa for the prooorvatlon of peace than month's-long dlacusalonsoweraa tho inf luonoe of warmongora would be felt there in the' case of the Wee tern Powera." (Though not explioltly declaring thatTruman la nothla would appear to be impliod by tho form of the statement.)
b. Thono Rejecting Stalln'a Offer Will Reveal- Thogaolves as Warnonfierahe content of Soviet-controlled Gorton and Satellite radio coccentarles la not limited to mere accentuation of the Soviet "peace" policy as indicated by thia "freah evidence of Soviet willingness to renofO all obstaclesasting peace." In fact, in terms of volume of broadcaat attention, they appear more concerned with spoilingropaganda baeo for subsequent attacks. policy in tho ovont of negative reaction totatemente For oxamplo:
These who reject hie (Stalin's) fair offer will reveal themeelvea aa They will, however, notice that the authority of the Soviet Union and of Stalin ln particular, as principal dofondor of world peace, will have joined even noro respect." (from tho Dutch CoBmuniet IS KAARHKID aa reported by the Dutch radio at Hllveraum)
Tho answers have put before the Western Powers either the decision to show by deeds and facte their willingness to come to an understanding vith tho Sovlot Union ond thus to put an end to the international tension which they novo created, or again to demonetroto to tho whole world their determination to continue in tho policy of preparingfrom Prague's Communiat RUDE PRAVO ae reported by CT1C, the official Czechoslovak press eervlce)
U.S. will have to reply to Stalin's declaretiona. And from thla reply, it uill be poasible to Judge whether the predominant oirclea of that country lntond to atick to their plana for world conquest or whether they are ready to come to an understanding whioh would be welcomed aleo by the American people," (Michael Storm over Soviet-controlled Berlin)
Ifrofusos to accept Stalin's proposals, "then the whole world will know who iseace oettlement." (SMA's TAEGLICHE RUNISCBAU as reported by Soviet-controlled Berlin)
"Up tooviet concession had always been called the onlyfor the settlement of all differences between. and the IESR. The Russians must make the first move.' This haa now been done. And the whole world now calls on tho Western Powers to play the gome. , The people want to know for certain whether their suspicion was Justified that certain war profiteers were out for profitB end had entrusted' 'certain governments' with the task of creating tho (RATIONAL ZEITUNG, as reportod by Soviet -controlled Berlin)
Nor do these commentarieshance to attack "the enomies of pooce, tho propagandists and incendiariesew war (who) are trying to minimize ite (Stalin's etatomont) significance" (TATGLICBB RUNDSCHAU), While. statements, have not yot boon noted in monitored brcadcasta from Soviet-controlled Gernany and the Satellites, "the orpreased readiness of the Soviet Government to arriveomprehensive settlement" io said to have "obviously been 'very embarrassing' to those who wanted toew world war, especially ae war preparations had started oo promisingly. Hence, it wao necessary for them to besmirch Stalin's offer" (BERLINER ZS1TUTJG as reported by Soviet-controlled Berlin). And TAEGIICHE RUNDSCHAU offers the idea that as for thceo who speak of Soviet propaganda, "tho simplest way of refuting Soviot propaganda is to accept Stalin's proposals and to. pence declaration, to postpone the formationest-Gerran Government, to call the Foreign Ministers Council, and to agreerucan-Stalin meeting."
RADIOS .OUTSIDE TBE SOVIET ORBIT
Considered together, the radio and proso outsido the Soviot orbit, especially those ln western Europe, appear to have given almost as much publicity to the initial Stalin statements ad did tho Soviet radio. In contrast to the letter, however, they are rife with speculation and conaeont. uhlle most of this can be grouped into tbe pattern Indicated by the following sub-hesdlnge, there is occasional wldo diversity: from the Turkish TANIH'e observation that 'Stalinradually be coming milder in the face of tbe realioticor example, to Pertinox' Interpretation inR that Stalin's statementtiffening of the Soviet attitude. Aleo, for oxonplo, while most comment avoids any prediction of the American response, Rome's MESSAGGERO comes out flatly, according to the Rome radio, with the "certainty that President Truman will do nothing which could be interpretedefusal of tho offer."
HiDUThirTgn
rudoncorr,o Exaggerated Hopes. rt ": SkoptleoJ acceptance of tho conciliatory tone of Stalin'e reply to Smith's four quootlono characterizes the overwhelming rajorlty of monitored ueotorn Europe broedcaat referoncea to tho Stalin-Smith exchange. Soys Race, for oxacplo: "first roe ctere roe aired and cautiously expectant. Ho exaggerated hopoa are placed, on practical developments." Such reservations nark monitored broadcasts free London, Parle, Rome, Madrid, Berne, Melbourne, Stockholm, Ankara, and radios in tho western zones of Germany. Stalin's reply la frequently termed such thingsdiplomatica rhetorical ppeal," 'a spectacularacophonous iistrunontatlon. "
Many of the broadcast statonenta examine the reply int of tho Soviet noto to Horvaj regarding tho North Atlantic Pact, or ln the light of Soviot policy on Berlin, Tho two sidoo of Soviet policy are said to beonly ot first glance; in reality, It Is claimed, they aro "parts"holo, "cooplcmontary." Commontotoro ond broadcast editorials rooort to varied aimlleo and metaphors in thoir attempts to characterize the 'maneuver" precisely. Parle quotoo CE MATIN Uf PAYS which characterizes tho reply ag "en excellentf tho diplomat's art which consists In altortctirg tho dagger withESa said to have compared the "new coup"moveame of choes." London quotes the DAILY MAIL aa bellovlng the reply to be another Iratanco of ;talln'e familiar reoort to "words,while "hie emissaries throw monkoy wrenches Intoerne roporta. that Swiss pepors describe the nonouvor ln reteorologlcel. or musical to rmo: the Berne DBB BUHD le said to refer to Soviet eanouvora as "political April weather" In which "sunshine follovehilo DEC TAT claim that Stalin playa "softly on tbe flute while using his feet on tho drum." Berne also interprets the move aa part of Moecov'a "ahock eystom" for the treatment of tho weatern powers: "cold ahowore are followed by warm ones at lorn intervals."
Monitored broadcasts "explain" tho seeming divergencies in Soviot policies on grounds ranging from "tension" in the Kremlinesireull during whloh Soviet gains in Kuropo and Asia may be consolidated. In on early analyaio, the London commentator Cordon Waterfield,hooretiool explanation:
"Mr. Stalin conducts two diplomacies. One io based on tho Marx-Lonln-Stalin theory of history end revolution, tha endurlry* and fundamental policy. The other diplomacy for the market places of the world la propaganda dlplocacy carried on through intorviewe with Joumsllots and through speeches dollvored by the Soviet delegation at the United Nations."
Other monitored brosdeaata oxplaln Stalin's otatoment on the basis of specific, current developments.
1. The Atlantic Pact and/or Western Union: umber of prooa and radio ccmentators adduce that Stalin woe motivatedesire "to hamper the offort toostern union" (LEr to "present the Atlontlo Pactne thing which la unneoeaoary. " (SVENSKA DAGBLADET) Slniler exproaalona an found In BBC's quotations fromyj^ and DAILY TELEGRAPH, In Ernest
Watklns' ccnmentary, ondtatement by Berlin's LDP chairman SchueraiiGe. Paris quotesJOURNAL D3 GSHEVE,'AURGRE, L'DffHAHSIGEAOT, and FRANCE SOIR, BUMAKETE, however, ia quotod ae specifically denying any connection between western cooperation and tho Stalin ox change. zone German preee service, quotes the Munich SUEDDEUTSCBE ZEITUKG as asserting "Stalin's interview reveals genu!no anxiety about the rallying of the west"psychologically favorable" tlme-for it "coincides" with Russian censure of the Atlantio Pact. Radio Melbourne quotes Robert Menzlea and Anglo-Anorlcan diplomats as believing tho coveeflection of Soviet dietruet of western unity. Ankara cites TASVIS as noting the coincidence of thewith the Soviet "warning" to anoll nations about the Atlantic Pact; while CTOHUEIYBT interprets the move to mean that Stalin wants to "slow down measures of defense."
2. Heat Cerman State; The alleged connection between Stalln'a reply to Smith and tiie impending stabilization of the German situation le pointed out by Baden Baden; by Madrid quoting "Londony Helsinki, alao quoting "London diplomaticy London, quoting tbe YCSISHIRE POST; by Paris, uoting "diplomatic oiroloo" and Ernst Router; by tSJHA, quoting'
NAGnTuXHTEN, and by Masico In an "editorial note" analyzing Stalin's replies, r
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'3. Tension" in the Kremlin: Opinions vary over the possibilityinterview might have been occasioned by "nervousness in thequotes the BIRMINGHAM POST aa declaring "it would bo foolish toMr. Stalln'a answers evidence of nervousness in tho Kremlin." Onhand, the British-zone German progo service reports that according toBER TAG, "Moscow had certain reasons really toay cut ofgrowingnd according to AFP, the Baslethat 'Stalin's gesture is thought toymptom of internal tension-Russia." Tho Parle radio cites IA 7XE FINANCIERS to tho effectln replacing worn-out equipment in eastern Germany and in meeting.oontracta for the delivery of Russian wheat, olnco the."wheat crop ie*;endangered by atmosphericro among -tne: causesSoviet
K elaying Tactic: AFP reports that tE JOURNAL BE GENEVE noted that"the USSR wishes to gainhile IE POPUIAIBE thinks the interview "probably means that the USSR la thinking of consolidating itshe Havana radio declares that the Soviet Union 'will dedicate itself to the digestion of the advantages achieved in Aala, and afterwards will return more energetically to the original objective of the domination of Europe."
b. "Deeds Rather than Wards": The majority of the west-European radios and
press oppoar united In their belief that the Soviet Union ehould demonstrate ita peaceful intentions by "deeds rather than words." Brazzaville quotes .the London Foreign Office ao holding this point cf view and similar expressions aro attributed to spokesman or Journal in Isrie, Borne, the Netherlands, and Vienna. WIENER KURIEH, London TIMES, and L'AUBE are alao quoted ee claiming Huasla will have an opportunity to prove its aincorlty when the Austrian treaty comes up for diacusBlon later thia month.
e. Unequivocal Rejection: Among monitored foreign radio broodoaoto to date, there have been ot least throe unequivocally negative etetononte abouteply to Smith's four questions. Onehen cones fron West Berlin's Oborburgermelater Router, who, according to tho British-zone German proas oervloe said that ho did not believeoviet poaco"for tactical reasons, the Soviets woro sure to prevaricate at tiroes in order to obtain influence onhare in thohe second appears in Madrid radio conmontary characterizing the reply asropagandist effort."he commentary further contonda "that behind tho Soviet propagandistic verbosity thereatentofar as soon aa Ruoois isosition to winnd the third io representedondon BALLY MAIL editorial identifying Stalin's tactics with those of Hitler's. As roported by the BBC, "the MAIL eoya Hitler deceived the denooratic nations unt* it woe too late to orffinize collective security; but the western nations havo learned thoir lesson ond are not to be taken in by Mr. Stalin."
d- Uhat Should Bo Done? Among various monitored auggeationo as to theaction that should be puraued in response to Stalin's statement, there arethat reoosmena outright rejection. That Stalin's statements beconsideration in tho chance that they might offer sons hops foris the gist of
According to the BBC, tho British DAILY EXPRESS "suggests that Mr. Stalin' should be taken at his word and Invited to meet Presidentnd Mr, Attleo in London. There will have toeeting somewhere, one day and Britain should novor atop trying for It."'
TheAURCRE -PRArxjE -LIBRE states that "whether Itrap or not the new attitude adoptod by the Kremlin should be taken intoeven Ifj(Moocow'a) Intentions are not aincere, tho fact that Moscow thinks It should resort to cunning proves that the tfeet is sufficiently strong to examine tbe Soviet demand. It should not run the danger of.hance, however uncertain it tay bo, of dispelling.the.un-.easiness which wolghs heavily on the ;civllized world."
The Stookholn radio reports that tbe Norwegian Premier expressed tho opinion that "ifooting (as referrod to by Stalin) was arranged, it couldroat deal to humanity vrdcb had had enough of war and Buffering."
According to the BBC, the British YORKSHIRE POST "welcomes Mr, Stalin's words as, at anyhow of conciliation and soys we shall examine them closely for any chance of cooperation. They nay be the laet opportunity torift toword-disaetrous conflict. Britain is on--her guard, but any roal*friendllnesa on Russia's part would be answered with friendliness by us. "
And in the same BBC broadcast, tho London NEWS CHRONICLE le roportedsaid that "despite the enormous (differences) between Mr.anddeeds of his lieutenants, Mr. Stalin'o ovortures to thebe laughed off or rejeotcdavalier fashion. They demandand the Weatern Powers have always declared thoir readineoowith Rusola to end tho civil war provided this io notduraaa.
There aro at least tvo Buggestlono implying that propacandaerations ahould be takon into account in answering Stalln'a advanooe,
Baolo'a HATIOHAIZKITUTfli, for oracple, "conaldero that the Uoatern Fcvora ought to anavor theade by Stalinre voy, whatever their doubta aa to the sincerity of hie declarationa. the Russian offera should bo taken at faco.value ao that they will not bo able to throw tho responsibility for tho continuation of conflict in tho eyea of tho Russians on tho Uoatern Fcvora,"
And, according to AFP, Carloa Ronulo of the Phlllppiroa "urged tbat Stalin's peaoo feelara 'should be given oarnoat The aeourity and well-being of the world dotrand that every avenue to peace be explored. If the Stalin statement ehould prove toalse lead,. will not be the loser for having pursued lt ln good faith and exposed lt for the deliberate decoptlon that woe intended to be."
The Par ia FRARC TIREUR considers that, "it la for the governmentoo ask questions in turn end to make' conoreton order to bring about soro specifaw era by Stalin aa well."
A general mooting, to include the heads of otote of other countries concerned, lo suggested by Istanbul's TASTIR. ootoncludes the paper, 'should be the oentoreneral peace conference." And the conservative FIGARO cautions'agalnat undertaking any talks with Moscow "without making tho Kremlin clearly understand tbat thia acceptance isanifestation of weakness end without stating ot tho ease time that there can be no quostlon of givingigorously dofonsivo policy which the Soviets themoolves Imposed
upon the The rightiet L'EPOQUE, going evon further in this direction,
thinks that although "Stalln'a appeal la of the type which will be difficult L* not toho besta to make tho Atlanticeality."
The only suggestionplague, oh -both your houses" oppoore in theOMBAT; (independent,hich does"/not know what will happen now that Stalin haa made an offer. But tho two big powers would do well to stop singing ln tho lobblaa. ime will come when rations will no longer lend them on ear," CCMBAT also oonsldors that "it Is no longer up to Stalin to mako the next gesture. Let ua hope that tho response will not disappoint tha son of good will.
0. Reactions to. Attitude: To date, among countries outalde the Soviet orbit, monitored foreign radio react lone to the American attitude toward Stalln'a atatonienfca have been reoeived from only the London and Paris radios. BC commentary, explaining the relationship of propaganda to dlplonaey and noting the coincidence of Stalln'a statementa vith the pending negotiations for conclusion of tho Atlantic Pact, obaorves that "Mr, Aoheson's comaente today mods it clear that he la not satisfied at all that Mr. Stalln'a answers to the questions put to him mark any significant change In the International aituation. hus, if Mr, Stalln'a statementsropaganda device, thoy have failed In their purpose eo for as. Administration Is concerned. If they wereere propaganda dorlca, lt la atlU open to Mr. Stalin to eupport hla vorde by deeds."
French reaction appearsaris press reviewebruary*
"CCMBAT writes that. keeps to her point of view which la that egotiations with the USSR will coke no difference to tho Atlantic Pact. The apparent stiffening of the State Departeent's attitude toward Russia should of course not be taken too literally. For tho time being, Dean Achoson is trying to reassure the western nations and toroof of tho continuity. policy.
CB KATIK IE PAYS considers tho "negative answer to Stalin" as athe Stato Department's belief "'that it will be tine to begin direot with tho Kremlin when tho European balance of power J
LIBEHATIOHn the other hand, "regrets that Britain and. have said *no.' 'Uet oaya, 'help being astounded on hearing that Stalin's conciliatory declaration, tho thirdpace of two years, has been brushed aside because it was not made in tho accepted way. Where do the Anglo-Saxons want to got? Do they prefer the Atlantic Pact which contains the germ of warreely discussed and loyally accepted peaceful agreement. Can't they visualise peace otherwise than as an atomic peace.'"
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