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CONFIDENTIAL
THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA
SUMMARY
Because of South Africa's strategic position, its membership in the Britishand the world-wide sensitiveness to the racial Issues which dominate its domestic scene, the partisan politics of the Union's small white electorate take on an international significance.
The coalition Government headed by Dr. Malan. which replaced the Smutsin an electoral upset last May, holds powerarrow parliamentary margin. Primarily it represents the Afrikaans-speakingroup in which Isolatkirilsm and anti-BrlUsh feelings arc still very strong; but it must attract some support from the English-speaking element to retain power. Malan hasolution for this difficulty in two major unifying policies: (a) stricter segregation of the various dod-European racesrogram summed up in the wordndelligerent South African nationalism displayed chiefly in the forum provided by the UN. In spitehreatened split with Finance Minister llavenga and the Afrikaner Party over the constitutional means of implementing the Government racial policy, Malan has found both these issues politically popular and has forced Smuts' Opposition to yield some ground on both.
The issues which unite white South Africans are among those which divide the world. Racial tensions, already on the rise throughout Africa, have been further heightened by Malan'i repressive policy. Local Communists have begun to exploit this, and although their threat to the Union is not immediate, it is potentially serious, for the tensions are real, and the whites are outnumbered four to one.
In the wider field of international affairs South African intransigence on the racial issue and on the control of colonial areas has provoked criticism from non-Soviet as well as from Soviet sources, and has made the country somethingropaganda liability lo lhe US and the Western bloc.
^ lh, Alr Force
The Informationy'
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THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE UNION OP SOUTH AFRICA
1. Tm Importance or South AraiCA to tms United States.
Thc Importance of the Union of South Africa lo the United States is In the firstonsequence ot its geographical position. It is the only independent state of European traditions and of substantial power and stability on the African continent; south of thc Equator It is the only African state of consequence. It Is therefore capable of exertingery large and important area an influence greater than the Intrinsic power of the nation would otherwise Justify. Tlic Union can contribute to order and stability ln the whole of Africa, or It can follow poUcIes which will tend to upset the precarious social balance of the continent.
Strategically, the Union is ln thc broadestajor stronghold ln thc southern hemisphere, but Its most useful functions areaval baseay-station on the line of communications to the East. World War II showed how important the Cape route could be; It likewise showed the industrial potential of the Union, which In large part furnished the equipment for0 South Africans who fought abroad. South Africa currently produces twelve of the twenty-three strategic minerals listed by the National Security Resources Board as so critical that stock-piling is deemed essential; it also possesses uranium deposits.
Politically, tho Union's orientation is unquestionably toward the West. More immediately significant is South Africa's Influence on the position of Qrcat Britain, tho principal ally of the United States. The power with which the UK can speak In Europe and In the world has been for generationsesult ln part of its relationship to the Dominions and overseas dependencies. Insofar as Southember of the Commonwealth, strengthens that relationship, the position of the United States is also strengthened; conversely. South African tendencies to weaken Commonwealth ties also tend to weaken the position of both the UK and the US.
2. Dominant Factoes ik South Ajuican Politics.
The primary political fact about South Africa is the existenceocial structure In which twohird million Europeans make up the effective cttltenry of the country, and nine million non-Europeans provide the semi-skilled and unskilled labor. These non-Europeans are of various races and cultural levels, ranging from that of primitive tribal societiesuch highor standard. They include Bushman,various mixed breeds, Indians, Malays, and Bantu tribesmen, the so-called Kaffirs. That all real power should be retained ln white handsrinciple on which virtuallythe European Inhabitants agree, but they differ on the method of doing sowith the requirements of industrialization, and on the concessions which should be granted non-Europeans on humanitarian grounds.
Within the European community the usual forces and conventions of Western democracy operate. The distribution of political power is, however, complicated by the
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white population's division into an Afrikaans speakingf mainly Dutchwhich makes up aboutercent of the Europeans, and an English-speaking group which makes up thearge part of this Afrikaner population is rural, much under the influence of thc intensely conservative Dutch Reformed Church, and prone to look back nostalgically to the pioneering days ot its Boer ancestors. Much of the British element stems from people attracted to South Africa by theh century gold mining boom, and it is still concentrated in industry and commerce. The Afrikaners' rankling sense oflo some extent,is well illustrated In theemi-secret societyuarterentury ago to establish the supremacy of Afrikaner culture, and now an important political force.
Despite these divisive tendencies the two linguistic groups are held together in one polity by the theory or equal status for the two cultures and their mutually tolerated separate development, by the common interest in white supremacy, androwing feeling of South African nationalism. On such an Issue as the Union's title to the former German territory of South West Africa, for example, people respond as South Africans, not as Afrikaners or Britishers. Differences on economic questions do not deeply divide the white community, which has inomparatively high standard of living. The importance for the whole country's economy of the largely British-controlled gold mining industry is recognized by all responsible political leaders; conversely, much of the industrial community is, for the sake of while supremacy, willing to subsidize forms of agricultural life and certain labor monopolies which are economically Inefficient. Even in the labor movement there is no strong pressure for socialism as such. And despite thc preeminence of historic loyallles in the Union's political life, thegroupings of Government and Opposition have never quite followed simple linguistic lines. As In most political democracies, there has been in theersistent tendency for parlies having acquired power (usually through coalition) to forget the more violent passages in their campaign oratory, and lo governoderation which respects both thc existing institutions of the country and lhe rights of opposing parties.
3. The Ppesknt Pasty Situatiok ik South AraicA.
The reins of government are al present held by an uneasy coalition of theParty, led by Prime Minister D. K. Malan, and the Afrikaner Party, led by Finance Minister N. C. Havenga. This situation derives from the general election ofn which, to outside observers' and their own surprise, the alliancearrow victory over General Smuts' United Party and the labour Parly. General Smuts had been Prime Minister9 (since3 electionarge majority)eneral dissatisfaction of the electorate with the continuation of wartime shortages
"Afrikaans" Is the language developed from seventeenth century Dutch; "Afrikaners- (some-limcs writtenre while South Africans having Afrikaans as iheir primary tongue, though many of Uicm also speak English. The lerm "Afrikaner" also applies to the political parly led by N. C. Havenea.
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uidlne ulcreasinK administrative laxness of his Government is consideredc had much to do with his defeat. The United Party actually received more popular voles than the Nationalist and Afrikaner Parties combined, but since ruralin South Africa normally contain fewer voters than urban ones, this was liuuAV cJent for parliamentary control. Dr. Malan took office witheats In the House of Assembly held by his own Nationalist Partyy the Afrikaner Party; the United Party opposing him heldeats and its ally, the labour Party.ut Malans working majority was cut down lo the narrow marginy various Inescapable technicalities. These figures did not change during the special session of Parliament, which ran from early August to thc beginning of October, and still obtained on the eve of the regular session scheduled to openanuary.
The Nationalist Party has been for years past the main political expression ofwho resent the British and the Commonwealth connection, lookingto thc eventual goal of an Afrikaans-speaking republicinimum of tiesoutside world. Some of the "wild men" in the presentsuchinister of Lands, and C. P. Swart, Minister oftopoint of view openly; but Prime Minister Malan. whose own political past Istheirs, has In the last year or two been acting on the assumption thatmust attract some English-speaking voters in order to achieve andHe has accordingly been muffling the anti-British note and trying, in eflect,thc context of the Party's title from Afrikaner Nationalist to SouthA more potent aspect of his electoralbothcampaign andln rousing antagonisms against the ., .
The Afrikaner Party, though possessingeats, holds the balance of power in the present House of Assembly. Formed0pbt from the Nationalist Parly, itrouping explicable more on lustorlcal than on logical grounds. Its leader and only Cabinet member, Finance Minister Havenga. is widely respected for integrity and competence, andeliever In the Hertzog concept of "parallelor the co-existence of the British and Afrikaner elements in thc community with their differences unresolved but mutually tolerated. ense, the Afrikaner Parly has been put together on the same principle, for It contains within it bothformer adherents of Smuts' United Parlyarge group of the most extreme and Nazi-like Afrikaner nationalists The lalter are to be found mainly ln the Ossewa Brandwag, an organization on paramilitary linesecade ago in connection with the centenary celebrations of thc Great Trek and now estimated to0 members under its. F. J. van Rensburg. Malan has icfused lo let. become affiliated with the Nationalist Party, partly on the ground that there is no proper placearliamentary state for an organization of its totalitarian tendencies, partly because of personal antagonism between him and van Rensburg. Though thc Afrikaner Party is jealous of its separate organization, its acceptance of the Nationalists' racial policy makesatural ally of that party at present.
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The United Party, led by thc internationally famous Field Marshalmuts, is thc second large party on the political scene, currently holdingeats in the Assembly to thet represents, though not always wholeheartedly, the liberal tradition in South Africanbetween British and Afrikaner elementsasis of equality, maintenance of Commonwealth ties (butealous regard for South Africanaintly progressive policy of gradual Improvement in the status of the non-European races. Al present, however, it is troubled by Internal dissension, particularly on thc racial issue, belwccn an avowedly liberal minority, Icadcrlcss since the sudden death of J. H. Hofmeyr inonservative majority which holds many of the same views as the moderate elements In the Nationalist and Afrikaner Parties The personal prestige ofyear-old Smuts has so far prevented an open split but has notidespread conviction on the part of the electorate that the Party currentlyositive program. Thc UP Is also deficient in capable secondary leadership and,arty claiming toeconciling instrument between British and Afrikaner elements. Is surprisingly lacking in speakers able to address the electorate In both languages, lessifth of lis present House of Assembly membership being reckoned fully bilingual.
The Labour Partymall and not very homogeneous group representingthe interests of urban middle-class intellectuals and English-speaking workers in the mining and industrial districts of lhe Transvaal. Though formally committedrogram of state socialism. It is interested primarily in maintaining high standards of pay and working conditions for skilledmeans, in effect, restricting the desirable Jobs to whitein various social welfare measures. Its natural alliance Is In most respects with the more progressive wing of the United Party, but there is an element which sympathizes somewhat with the Nationalists' racial policy.
The Communist Party for the nrst time in South African history sent lo the House of Assembly inepresentative lor one of lhe Ihree nativeThe Party's effective political Influence, however. Is still negligible. In part because of the racial situation, all European groups represented in Parliament arc hostile to Communism, domestically and internationally. White Communists are to be numbered in hundreds only, and few of these have any influence in the laboror in any other politically significant spot Communist efforts lo organize the natives and mixed breeds have so far had little apparent success, despite thc Party's recent electoralIndeed,eflection of rising racial tensionsand to some extent of local conditions, rather lhan of solid organization and indoctrination.uarter of thc politically conscious Indians are said lo be under Communist influence; but the Durban riots of9 forciblythe bad blood existing between the Indian and native communities.
During his first six monlhs of office. Prime Minister Malan pursued with someasic tactic of appeasing his own extremists without disturbing moderate opinion sufficiently to rally it lo the Opposition. He immediately lifted thc ban on civil servants belonging to the Broederbond and Ossewa Brandwag, which lhe Smuts
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governmental assistance to immigration from the UK. which dashed the hopes of moderate South Africans that such immigration would in time redress the electoral balance between themselves and the extremist Afrikaners. On the other hand, most of his Cabinet appointees were able men and some were, for Nationalists, men of moderate political views; his initial radio address to the nationeassuring tone; and the tax cuts provided In Havenga's first budget were distributed without apparent attempt to favor one element of the white community over another. But these were relatively minor questions. Two Important issues were with some skill given major emphasis by Malan: the first was racial policy, the second International affairs.
4. The Racial Issue.
The racial situation In South Africa is dominated by two basic factors: the small number of the Europeans (outnumbered four to one) and the diversity of the non-Europeans. The eight million natives spring from many different tribes; some live in the native reserves almost as primitively as their ancestors, others live In modern slums on the fringes of the Industrial towns, and still others leave their families on the reserves and live in huge compounds attached to theuarterillion Indians, mainly in Natal, cling to their own culture but demand equal political and economic status with the whites.illion mixedapeainly in the Cape Province, aspire to the standards of European civilization.ociety having little common denominator but geography, and recently plagued by the dislocations ot rapid industrialization and wartime shortages, the racial question inevitably bulks large and rouses strong emotions.
The present Government's answer Is known aserm for which no precise and generally accepted definition exists. Thc Afrikaans wordut all important political groups advocate an extent of racial segregation greater than that obtaining anywhere In thc US. Minister of Native Affairs Jansen, who Is one of the moderates of the Nationalist Party, has since the8 election defined apartheid as meaning thc retention of the natives as much as possibleribalized state on the native reserves, allowing outside the reserves only those necessary to white economic Ufe, and strictly controlling the conditions under which these natives may enter urban areas to accept employment. He denies that it means complete separation of the black and white communities, Before the election, however, the campaign oratory of the Nationalist Party extremists lentcredence to the United Parly charge that apartheid meant not merely the removal of certain political and economic privileges from the natives and other non-Europeans, but the wholesale return of the former to the already crowded native reserves. The United Party's own racial policy calledecognition of the fact that over half of the natives already live outside the reserves and are necessary to the nation's economy, and insisted that thc natives could not make their full contribution to the Union's economic life under an unsatisfactory system of migrant labor whereby Ihey moved back and forth between the reserves and lhe farms, mines, and factories depend-
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Ing on their labor. The United Party called Instead (or maintenance of the present limited rights of the non-European races and (or certain welfare measures to Integrate them more effectively ln thendustrialization program.
Thc policy of apartheid, In the general sense of stricter segregation for all non-European races, has so far had for theocusositive appeal entirely lacking in the United Party racial program. The Government has Implemented it chiefly by closing the gap between existing regulations and actual administrative practice. Pass laws restricting the movement of natives have been tightened, native employment has been more strictly controlled, and the Government offices concerned have tended totough" attitude toward individual cases. The status of the "Cape coloured" has been attackedew ordinance forbidding them tor the first time to ride in the "European" coaches In the commuting trains In the Cape Town8 actimited franchise for the Indians was repealed by the August session of Parliamenthrewd tactical move to embarrass the United Parly representatives from Natal, where the Indians are concentrated and particularlyAll of these moves seemed to strengthen the Government's political position.
In announcing an intention to deprive the natives of their few representatives in Parliament and to remove the "Cape coloured" from the common electoral rolls. Malaneeper constitutional question. The voting rights of persons of color in Cape Province were specifically protected, by one of the "entrenched clauses" of the British South Africa Actrom alteration by lesswo-thirds vote; and when Malan, referring to South Africa's complete legislative autonomy under the subsequent Statute of Westminster, spoke of altering these voting rights by simple majority vote, he caused widespread concern for the permanence and stability of South Africa's political Institutions. The Opposition immediately gave expression to this concern; and. more seriously for Malan. his colleague Havengaimilarew months later, thusatal break in the Government coalition. Attack was trained, however, on the method rather than the substance of the proposition; and the more extreme Nationalist Party leaders seem confident that the racial issue will bo popular enough to override the constitutional oneeneral election Is held on the subject.
5. South African External Relations.
On many aspects of South African external relations all politically important South Africans agree, All are Insistent that thc Union's independent status be maintained beyond question. All desire friendly relations with the US. All are hostile to the USSR. Nearly all recognize that history and economics have irrevocablypecial relationship between the Union and the UK.
Where they differ is on the degree of South African participation in international affairs and the nature of the special relationship to the UK. Isolationism andthough currently played down for political reasons, are still very strong. The most antl-Sovtet of Afrikaners do not necessarily favor an active role for South Africa in the eventar between the Soviet Union and the West; friendliness toward the
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US docs not always Imply willingness to follow US leadership or advice on accepting UN commitments; recognition of the Inevitability of some UK connection does not mean genuine acceptance of the present one. Starting with Malan himself, most of the present Cabinet members are men whose aim, to judge from their past records, Is an Afrikaner-directed republic with only such ties to the UK as are minimally necessary and obviously in South Africa's self-Interest. They are most of them aware, however, that Genera! Smuts has an appeal to part of the electorate when he stresses the advantagestrong British Commonwealth, and that many South Africans loss pro-British than Smuts still look with favor on the maintenance of something like the present relationship, either from sentiment or from their own appraisal of South Africa's long-term interests. It Is this Intermediate body of opinion that Malan seems variously trying to conciliate, confuseover.
In this endeavor Malan has been astute enough, with some exceptions, to choose hu specific moves so that It Is hard for the United Party to oppose them without also appearing to oppose the national self-interest. The general tactic seems to be to combine expressions of friendliness toward the UK with indirect suggestions that South Africa's relations with the UK are essentially the same as with any other state, and that South Africa recognizes no obligations deriving purely from membership in the Commonwealth. Al the London Conference ot Commonwealth Prime Ministers, for example, thc Union's representative surprised British public opinion by the generally cooperative nature of his public utterances. He was, however, careful to add that he was there only in the cause of South African se It-interest, heactless reminder that thc UK now needs friends and should act accordingly; and he Is reported to have taken the line In conference that South Africa was willing to participate only in such consultations as directly Involved its own interests. The last point ratified Malan's slated preference, expressed on assuming office, for handling Commonwealth relations through "separate contacts between the individual members of the Commonwealth, rather lhan through discussions at Joint and inclusive conferences."
In the area of defense cooperation with the UK. the Malan Government hasa similar course, though not so successfully. In its early weeks of office the Government announced that the traditional reliance on UK assistance for much of the higher training of the armed forces had not been in South Africa's best interests and proceeded loumber of these arrangements (decreeing even that training manuals must be written inimultaneouslyurge of pro-British senior orTiceis from their key positions. By October, however, the Government had evidently found that these moves both hatmed military efficiency and gave theolitical issue lo exploit in Parliament Some of the canceled training arrangements were then restored and Malan made the gesture ofew airmen lo lhe UK to assist in the Berlin air lift.
The other important area of South Africa's present external relations lies In tbe UN. On two questions in particular the Union has been under attack thereis treatment of the Indian minority in South Africa, and its refusal to submit aagreement to cover its administration of the former German colony of South West
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Africa, which was handed over to the Unioneague of Nations mandate after Worldn both these issues South African nationalism has permitted no realof policy between the Malan Government and its predecessor. But Smuts was sensitive lo world opinion and anxious to conciliate it by making occasional gestures toward negotiating with the Indian Government over the status of Indians In lhe Union as requestedeneral Assembly motion, and by quietly submitting lo the UN Secretariat factual reports on South West Africa like those which would have been requiredrusteeship agreement. The present Government, on the other hand, hasoint of publicly defending thc Union againstouth African Delegate Louw's refractory attitude at8 Paris General Assembly seems to havetrong appeal to national feeling at home.
On the Natal Indians Malan has simply announced that the Government policy Is repatriation and that he would insist on this being the primary topic of any discussion with the Indian Government on the matter. On South West Africa he submitted in early June the long report prepared under the Smuts Government in reply to UN's questionnaire, but ir. mid-November stated bluntly that South Africa would rather leave UN than submit the territory to trusteeship, adding that the people of South West Africa had apparently no desire to be ruled "by the United Nations with its Communistn the meantime Malan has gone ahead with measures originally initiated by Smuts to give South West Africa representation In thc Union Parliament. Since the new representatives would mostly be Nationalist Party members, such awould also have the result of increasinglim parliamentary majority. In its political effects at home, therefore,andling of UN disputes has so far been conspicuously successful.
In world opinion, however, and particularly ln the General Assembly, thc Union has put itself in an unfavorable light on Iwodiscrimination and lhe exploitation of colonialthe Soviet bloc has been assiduous In exploiting for propaganda purposes, and on which many non-Sovietin Asia and Latindeeply. Some of this unfavorable light, furthermore, is likely to be reflected on the US because of its close alignment with South Africa In various other respects.
6. Pa on able Developments.
The elements of strength in the Malan Government's present position consist partly in the strong popular appeal of its racial policy and its foreign policy, partly In the disorganized state of the Opposition. Smuts has implicitly recognized the Nationalists' advantage on the two political issues by attempting since the May election to make the United Party seem somewhat more nationalistic and somewhat less liberal on racial questions. He has also been attempting lo revitalize thc organization of the United Party and has succeeded In checking ils tendency to split into liberal and conservative factions; but the improvement In the party machinery slillong way lo go before the UP can rival the Nationalist Party In this respect. In the one by-election held somid-November contestafe NationalistNationalists even Increased the large majority wonopular candidate at the general election.
The main element ol weakness In the Government's position Is the fact that Itoalition government and that one part of thesmall but essential Afrikanershowing signs of parting company with tho rest on theissue of native representation and on the distribution of power within theA minor element of weakness Is the increasing payments deficit with dollar areas, which forced the imposition in early November of limited Import controls and naturally caused some shortages, price increases, and patches of unemployment. The inevitability of such controls had for some time been recognized by responsible opinion and the Opposition did notolitical issue of their imposition; but the depletion of the Union's reserves of gold and hard currency continues, and Smuts has already started trying to pin the label ofepression Government" on the Cabinet Should serious economic difficulties ensue, the Opposition might then effectively exploit the situation with the argument that the Government's political behavior had shaken the confidence of businessmen at home and abroad.
The growing rift between Malan and Havcnga is, however, the more Immediate threat. With the known antagonism between Malan and the Afrikaner Party's second most powerful figure, van Rensburg, the alliance has always been an uneasy one. From the very beginning of the Government Ilavenga consistently refused overtures for closer relations between his party and the Nationalists; and in early December he indicated publicly that the two parties were unable to reach agreement on theof seats for contesting the provincial elections Inew days earlier Havcnga had announcedajor speech that he would oppose any Government effort to reduce the political status of "coloureds" and nativesimple majority vote in the Union Parliament, rather than by the two-thirds vote required by the South Africa Act for the alteration of its "entrenched clauses."
Havenga's political bargaining position is attrong one.in South Africaan of prime-ministerial calibre, and holding withnine votes the balance of power in the present Parliament, he is now onfavoring In general the Nationalists' popular racial policy but opposing theof it which has roused the fears of the British element that theirmight be altered by mere majority vote. His stand on this importantwas taken only after some months of consideration, is reported already tohim support in Natal, where much of the British element favors apolicy because of the Indians. His chances of reaching an accord withParty were, moreover, fortuitously Increased by the deathecemberC. Hof meyr. thc Party's liberal leader -who most obviously stood in -the way of, . "
As Parliament gathered for the session opening onanuary, politicalseemed destined to take one of the three following lines:
con
ppeasement of Havcnga byat the price of greaterwithin the Government for the Afrikaner Party -at least until the provincial elections in Marchest of public sentiment. This would presumably meanof the Government's present program except for the particular imple-
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nearly as slim as mo-
lutnly prevent byeneral election Instead of resigning.
alling or another general election, to take place after certain essential mailers Huch as appropriation, have been attended to by Parliament. Since Malan wasted toeneral election in any case, if the Nationalist candidates did well in Lhe March provincial elections, and since many Nationalists feel confident ot winninglear majority on their popular racial policy of apartheid, there win be strong pressure within the Party to folio* this course. Noting that the United Party is still Ln aslate, tho pro-election Nationalists can plausibly argue that an election now might give them undisputed power for five years, and at worst would merely replace Ihelr Governmentmuls-Havenga coalition possessing even more elements of Instability than the present one.
Exact prediction la Impossible; but the fact that the pre-sesslon cabinet meeting scheduled foronuury passed without an open spilt In the Government makes the Hist line ofseem the most likely. Whatever Government emerges in the next few months, however, will probable be more inclinedepressive racial policyhometrident nationalism abroad than was the Smuts Government which foil In Smuts himself has since that election shown some tendency to adopt the political coloring of bis opponents on these issues, and with Hotoeyr dead the liberal wing of thc United Party will be much less able to maie Its Influence felt inconclaves, fn owlltlon with the Afrikaner Party and thus with the ultra-,vntlonaiist OisetM Uraudioag. the United Party would be even less Inclinediberal program.
7. Implicationstms U&
The implications fur the US International position of the South Africanlie less inuccess or failure of the Malanof amainlining ltscl1he means currently beingthat Government lo do so. In its short-term electoral results the generalof apartheid ttew* quite likely toonspicuous success; but the Issuewhite South Afrlc;uw Is also one that divides thc world As the Gold Coastlast winter demooslmted. black-white antagonisms are on the rise not only Jnbut In colonial Africa generally, and the problem is one which affects thewell as the UK. *w* "Ss extensive political and economic responsibibilesa slake in stability almost everywhere in the world. Furthermore, as is seen inand prlsMcr* Indian Government has concerned itself
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with the status of the Indian minority in the Union, South African racial policy takes symbolic vahie* for cKurd peoples in other continents as well. This situation has been reflected in *lM<wnls at UN and was again illustrated in connection with the prions rioting animd Durban in9 when smouldering native resent-
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menls broke out In moo violence directed against thc Indians, who arearge extent the retail traders of the area, but not against the whites. The Initial reaction of the Indian Government, however, was to blame thc racial policy of the Malan Government.
The danger of the Communists' exploiting apartheid within South Africa may be still more serious, though less immediate. There is no reason to suspect anyhandiwork in the Durban outbreaks; but the mere fact that the outbreaksis only thc most recent exampleeterioration in racial relations which has been taking place for the past decade, has been accentuated under the Malanand seems destined to continue under apartheid. Thc genuineness of many of the native grievances provides an excellent opportunity for Communist agitation, as was demonstrated In8 by thc Communists' success In winningarge majority one of the three native constituencies of thc Cape Province. Since thata further increase of Communist influence among thc natives has been reported. Though the failure of the natives up to now lo develop any effective indigenousor to come together In trade unions Indicates that the political danger point is still some distance off, continued Communist failure to acquire significant influence can by no means be assumed.
Finally, the effects of the chauvinistic nationalism fostered by the Malanmay be Indirectly fell by the US in two ways One is through its possibleof the British Commonwealthtabilizing force in lhe world. The other Is through the effects In the UN of South African intransigence on the Issues of raceand colonialism. Because of the association of the Union with the US and the "Westernoviet propaganda can the more effectively use these Issues in its attacks on the Western Powers; and Asian or Latin American resentment at the Union on these counts may on occasion make more difficult the task of organizing common action for US objectives.
South Africans' pride in their new nationhood is such as to make them unusually sensitive and obstinate when confronted with direct criticism of their domesticsuch as has recently appeared in various American periodicals. They do.possess an acute sense of immediate national self-intcrrst and are thereforeto indirect governmental pressure, particularly in the economic sphere. The Malan Government, for example, soon shifted its ground on defense cooperation with lhe UK when ll found that military self-sufficiency was more difficult than anticipated and thai the US seemed lo receive more pressing demands than South Africa's forThe US opportunity for indirect pressure is. of course, the wider because of the Union's complete lack of any international alternative to alignment with the US and the UK
Original document.
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