luLlllUu.
CEJ7TRAL Hn-IXICnCE AGEXY
9
umLinnicE lEMosArirAiM
SUBJECT i CIA Evaluation of the Znpotooky Remarks Concerning Soviot Plana for Enst-Ueat Conflict
REFERBEEi
Tho authenticity of thla report lo highly questionable for several roaeonat first, bocauoe of the circuitous route by vhioh It raaohod the USurportedly froa tho Krealln to Zapotooky,
lj second, boonuso tna report lfl nilea lata third, bocauoe of the possibility that this reportumber of reports cirJlar in no tore have been die-credited aa being plants.
Tho following considerations aleo cast doubt on tho authenticity of tho report i
(a) It la possible that Zepotocky cay not havo oada the state-nonta credited to bin in thla report; (b) even If Zapotooky did anke tho statements, they nay represent ideas other then thooo he claim to have acquired in Hoooow; and (o) the information, purportedly fron Ifeooow, nay have boon purposely colored.
Even grantinc that tho document is authentic, it contains little that has not been available in newspapers end other overt sourcea, toyond the statement that tha USSR desires and will be ready toa oonflict. Even this is weakened by Zepotocky'a
Hotel This ncDorandum has been concurred in by the intelligence
organisations of Departments of State, Amy, and Havy. The navy would add another point to second paragraph above; namely that It la considered unlikely that authentic Kremlin strategy would have been givenzech official, oven one as highly tdacod
mmmt
tuWrTOnr
aftiisflion ln the report that he ia unaware of Soviet military plana end by his reference to the Hronlin'e ability to eomplote consolidation ond preparetton fir war at an earlier onto,in fron IS toonths from,
Elsewhere lnreport the unqualified statement that "tirxi works for tho Soviet 'Onion" would obviate the necessity of seeking armed conflict in Generally, the report merely reiterates fanilinr Soviet promgaica thenos in use since the end of World Uar II,
net impress ion left by the report in tltst (a) tho USSR is complete master of tha eitue.tion end, given twenty-four monthsntilill bo ccjjpletely prepsrod for war, ll factors in the cold uar operate to Soviet advantage, and (c) Western noe euros ore costly and have little or no effect on Soviet plans or oapabilitioe. This injirossion io boiled by the known political and economic problems of ths Soviet orbit, and the vehemence with which tho DTSR opposes such measures es ERP and tho Atlontio Pact,
ore detailed ovaluai-ion eee Enolosur*
-2-
t iOlOSUHS "A"
Tills report, riiila of cor ilderable interest,nnlyaia of the Sovietis tha West, enphasisingtrength and ignoring Soviet *lyiloassses. While tho data containedhare been given tohe Kremlin, it nay have been preeentvd vlthInt-aution of reeilite-.Ing and justifying further anptlifca'sV efforts toaards consolidation of the Soviet orbit. Zapoteeky, regard- Iocs of his persona! convictions, say have dissesdnated this report withino "prova"the inviaoibillty ef tie Soviet bloc and too folly of tbe opposition to Soviet measures.
Factually, the report prolate little that has not been availabl* ia newspapers and other overt sources. Generally it Barely reittrati**'. fosdliar Soviet propaganda thersas which have been expounded since the conclusion of Kerld War IX. The bread generalizations of this report are subject te various and possibly dangerous specific interpretations.
The Zapotecky Report comas toarthron Zepeteeky
the report
genuine,flbant lcl.tr esoatt be voachvd for bv CIA. Sloes Berne is the greatest ruawr factory in Kurepe, lt io resaisle that thic report isplant" by iho KreoUn, by theGevern-
P-SSufti? -
Specific Co&nerits follows
"We uill receive fromrodlt in both ourronclei and In gold, naturally,won't be completely onoueb to cover our increased needs for imports, given tho new tacks which were assigned to us. It uill be, therefore, noceo-eary to inereace experts regardless of the dcaestlo narbet. Besides that, ue will use our gold reserve regardless of tho Czech ourrency fund* In order to do so withoutnotiotnc it, ue idll publicly etreos the crodlt in gold, but this will bo only for public consumption. You een be sure that ue will havo enough bard currency and gold to allow us to import whet the heavy and machine tool industries will need."
fovlgnt*
Tlie critical foreign oxchingo position of Czechoslovakia, reported by CIA inos bsen publicly known for cone time. The nnoignoont of "new teaks" to Csoonoslovelda can bo implied from the text of tho Czechoslovak-Soviet eoonomio agreeneht, which uao announcedecember. It ia logical to deduce that the'-fluggoBted ourrency and gold ranipulation will be resorted to in order to provide sufficient foreign exchange for essential' Imports* j ? '
"Yes, there willar, but only, when we want it. In Masoou they reached the conclusion that it is not enough to usIt until tho eoonomla crisis by Itself causes the craBh of oapltaliso and of tbe bourgeoisie, but they don't think that the economic crisis is imminent. In Moscow, in their hearts they admit that Verga is right, but passive waiting is not enough and it ia necessary to givo theblow to. tho West. Hie whole, probloo _lo_ that, the conflict must not come at the moment when they (the West) would like it. taturelly, wo have to proceed carefully. For tho tim
being ue ore neither strong nor consolidated for an open - conflict, but it Isuestion ofr ZA months. It uill bo, therefore, necessary to do everything in order toonflict You knou well that at present there is not full confidence, in tfasoov, in us, in the Poles, not to speak of thu R'saanlane, and Bulgarians. on't neon in this connection tho governments but It ie moinly tho probleo of tho armies. The Russiens havoifferent probleo. Tne old generation disappeared and the young one was educated by then, tut even the Russians had to and vjill have to rrake irony changes in thoir army. Vie must also pake decisive changes in our officers corpsnd that without record to persons and their The same thing in industry,. It uill bo not enough to ellninnto only certain persons, but it will be necessary to oUnJnate whole groups. Ve were alsoforoed about the unreliability of transport personnel. . This uill explain to you tho changes-in personnel that;we:VvinUl have to make. Wo can'tonflict beforewhich would be from our point of view the best rxmwnta; Agreement? Cortainly yes, butemporarye must not be deceived by that and we have to prepare everything for tho final ccofliot. In the next yoarany doubt there will be some agreements vhloh vill be eurprining for both tho West and our people. In that con-ection you vill have on especially importantXbu ust" deal with the west, oonolnde new commarcial treatieey- ven lon^termoomoerciol treaties, and you must show,them- :. (tho West) prospects for goodhey aro solooking for profit;'that they
. the commsrcial/stendpointa1*. '
he 8tatoaont that fosoow considers that the economic-crista]of capitali'im is not Imminent appears less significant when ithe possible purpoao of ita transmission to Zapotoeky is concid.ered. The Kremlin may have given Zapotoeky this Information in order to 'justify theeconoraio and rolitical sacrificoe nhich tho Soviet union in apparently demanding from Czechoslovakia to counter the threattrong West. It uould be difficult to justify such measures if the
-RSr-
Kremlinonviction that the crisis of capitalism was Imminent. Ihe reference to Soviet economist Targa appears to be Zapotooky'a personalsed cc lnf Croatian received fron the Kremlin concerning tho temporary economic stability of tho West.
Consolidation, particularly in the field of economicend planning, in connootico with the governments ss vail asla of utmost importance to the Kraal in in vien of theand unity of the Best. This is apparent inpurges within both tho governments and Communist Partiessatellite states. Such consolidation will eventually increaseSoviet control in tho event cf war, but at the same tinenecessary under present conditions simply to hold the satellites Soviet efforts to consolidate the Soviet orbit are alsobe reflectedthe USSH Itself.
Eventhe.Soviot viewpoint, eighteen to twenty-four noaths appears overly; optimistic for completion of Soviet war preparations, particularly: if-the* purges "of [industry and the armed forcoe'y Zapotooky ere carried out. Thla section of tbe reporteadinesa for, and desirability cf, open conflict, while laterapotooky
confesses a. lack of Rnmiledge of Soviot military piano. Furthermore, tlie unqualified etctenent (para.hatworks for tlie Soviet Woo is in apparent contradiction to the desirability of war at.
"It is not necessary to bo afraid that those agreements will undermine the CKtrale of tho proletariat of the wholeOur final aim ie the liquidation of the roirrgeolalo andand the dictatorship of the proletariat. Therefore, as far as our propaganda for horns consumption goes, it is not necessary to put on any brakes. Ke uill apeak tho truth to tho people, but lt is not necessary to say the sane thing when dcellng with the capitalists.He have an enoraouii advantagen dealing with them. We have an :uncbangoable finalnifying idea, and unified coraiand, and therefore, also, total frooaon in tlx) choice of tootles uid;Beans. He do not need to worry about concents in the press and In the Parliaments Both are fully and reliably on tho side of the government
This statement is typical of Soviet propaganda regarding the In-
vincibility of the Soviet Union, labile tho Kremlin oan probably control
PRrogravb 5-
"Ofoexiotenco of twoI don't Been ideologiesbut of two totally different pqlitioal, e'oonaodd,.and-social systems which exclude one another is- in tho presont world excluded. Wo know thorn bat they don't knew" our^world, and therefore they evaluate everything according to their standards,
GftB
and that la mother advartage for ue. Ho havo fought In tho pact already for our principles and therefore ue know that ue have to fight them until their final destruction. But: they aro trying to avoid this clash at any price, or at least postpone It ever if thay ore aware that tlrje uorka for us. They are too degenerate end accustomedcn-fortahle life. Time worts for
Cowaos^ t
Una la noi necessarily lorldng for tho Soviet .bloo, particularly if tho Heat continues along the pattern of econcolo rehabilitation pud unity of purpose as currently exooplified by ER? and the Atlantio Pact. Tain nny not, however, bo apparent to tho Kremlin in view of the probability that rcporta revic/ed by It ara tailored to fit tho dogmatic analysis of Western capitalism.
OOP BBOBU
"Their cold war is, on tho whole, convenient for ao. It costsremendous mount of money and that Td.ll load to dissatisfaction on the part of their taxpayers, on the votes of whom their politicians are dependent. Fear of losing votes will load in tho United States to new compromises and finally to isolationism. At the earn tirae, this cold war of itself can not achieve any victory which would bo visible to their broad nasses. On the contrary, the masses will not understand why this cold war ia being waged when on tha other hand their capitalists arc doing business with us.
"This will, undoubtedly, lead to internal political corapli-cations. Yes, it la admitted that the cold war causos sose difficulties to us too, butifferent way. It nesns only that the middle classes will have less food and clothing and that the prices of strategic materials will be increased. As you know, we import by subterfugo even what the United States doesn't allow us to import. It isuestion of price. Ie, even during this cold war, can and have aont our parachutists wherever we want. They need pianos| we don't."
1.
The cold war has so far resulted in continuing progressive stops
toward "estomevelopment most inimical to Sovlot plana.
Tho vehemence pf -the Soviet attack .oh ERP: end the Atlantic Pact'-i
bclieved! ,to;,rtflect; the grave] cone em with which the Kremlin
views these developT-its. Tthile internal political complications in
the nest have developed and will undoubtedly develop in the future,
the understanding of the cold war by the peoples of the TJest, particularly
as already been clomnstrated and will probably continue
to grow. Also, the cold war in retarding industrialization of the
Soviet orbit and creating new iroblems of control by reviving the
hope of liberation In the population of the Satellites. This analysis,
therefore, appears as wishful Ilinking on ths Soviet aide.
Paragraph 3.
ere afraid at first of the preventive war which would have undoubtedly found ua unpi spared and in an unfavorable position. This also will explain to you the importance of February events, few, after careful analysis of tho situation, we are convinced thatost will notreventive war. The re -election of Trunan was convenient to us. Heypical loprescntativo of the degenerate businees-iiunded Best. He believes only in busineso and compromise, and he will do everything in order toecision which involve employing force. He fears what he sees approaching and he is satisfied if he can postponeit, even if he is hound to lose by that anyo not deny that the situation was critical this) and tocv crisis by next year in May. The ia portent task iao diaperse the strength of the United States and Great Britain by local crises. For tills purpose, and also for propaganda, the united Nations is
Policies pursued by both before and after the re-election
of lir. Truman do not support this analysis. Zapotooky'a/rooarksreventive war appear moreeans to Justify the Csech coup thanrue reflection of Soviet concern.
Pnrnj-rnnh 9.
"In one sense, our rood io parallel to that of tho United States. It is tho liberation of tho colonial nations. Of course, even here tho United States havo purely selfish aims. They don't have any colonios and they try to alienate
then fron their present holders, and they hope that they will bo able to rule than and oxploit thenommercial basis. Te help them beeaoM wo know that they will never achieve this aim,t they will at the sans tine seriously weaken their cm allies. They overlook completely tho historic and political evolution in colonies. The bourgeoisio phase has not even started yet. If independent states are established there will he nothing but the ruling group and the proletarir.t. Therefore, those states will be ready to accept our socialist political system, and tho people themselves will take the government and power in thoir hands. This will bo the most serious blow against the capitalist syrrtem because it will oliminato them from. Asia and then from Africa, This is precisely the genius of the Politburo because it knows how to use even the help of the capitalists in order to achieve its aims. Don't forget that without the treaty with ilitler int would have boon difficult for Stalin to defeat him."
Comment:
avorable Interpretation of the colonial problem,with regard to the problems policy, night oonocd.vr.bly have boc given to Zapotooky by the Kremlin. This analysis presupposes Conraunist domination of practically all colonial independence moveinents. Thla supposition is perhaps best refuted by the case of Pakistan and India, which, since achieving independence, have been capable of controlling Communist minorities. In spite of tho friendly attitude toward tho USSR which existed in these countries prior to becoming independent, tho governments have shown increasing tendenaies to align themselves with the Western Powers. Since the date of this report, tho recent Asian Conference ln New Delhi, with numerous representatives of
* "SECRET
AsU.ticas condemned by ths USSff as an effort to oatabMsh an Asiatic anti-Soviet bloc. There is also evidence that tho USSR hM boooDe seriously concerned over the icplications of Pbint Four of President Trunan's inaugural edeross.
"For the time being, wa have to concentrate our attention to Europe.ill make new attacks in France and in Italy during the spring. Also Holland and tolgiun are on tne schedule. As far as we (Csechs) aro concerned, we areey territory. Our task will be to produce and repair weapons. Today there la no more danger of foreign intervention. They proved to bo unprepared and they don'tow to deal with our tactics. Also, the Gorman problem will bo solvedimilar way* Every conproraiseain for usoss for then. They have always toart of what they had before while we are always gaining completely now ground, and so we march on their ground to our goal."
Co'renti
This analysis is believed over-optinlstic with regard to Communist capabllltlea in TTestern Europersony. Aa far ascompletely news concerned, ths Soviet bloc has not gained any, ground beyond the "iron curtain" in Europe since the end of tho war.
Paragraph H.
don't know naturally, their (Russian) military plana but Judging from what tasks we were assigned and fron what vq were told, it is clear that our area Is considered by tliem (Russians) as very important since its fall wouldotal change in their strategic position and inuld uncover Hungary, foitrri, Yugoslavia and even Bulgaria. It would be equal to the loss of their continental position."
purported
oiuTo.inion ot ignorance regarding Soviet military plans reflects adverselye authenticity of statements tin-oughoir; the report concerning Snviot *ar intentions- Furthermore, tho defensive tone of thiss in contrsdiction to thoffensive tenor of the entire report.
"Berlin isroblem for us but for Uia TJest. ould at any tine make their stay in Berlin and their airlift impossible with relatively very small risk of an open conflict, but this is net necessary. They exhaustfinancially and they use up thoir air material, and at the end this celebrated airlift will disappoint the Germans becauno it can only give basic food to the Berlin,-but willove sufficient in maintaining their industry. In the caseonflict it will ba forriceless first triumph sines we will capture tho whole western colony in Berlin including their material."
Coraenti
It is not believed that the airlift could have been mado impossible at any time without serious risk of open conflict. If this were true, it would probably have been done long ago, as the airlift constitutes, from the Sovietramatic and damaging example of TJestem, particularly I'S determination. The psychological impact of thealone, both within Uernany and tho satellite orbit, laatter of considerable coio'rn to the Kremlin.
"If theyat) would try te make use of the Germans they would undoubtedly alienate oven those who otherwise, in our country or elsewhere, would bo willing to go along with then, and what lo important they would unifythe Soviet Union. Our task in propaganda will be to strengthen and help tho antiwar elomonts ln tho nest, and at the sane time show up their compromisesign of their knowledge of their orm weakness. Our people have to bo accustomed to the ideaHoot is pov/erless and so lose their fear of its technical superiority,"
>
- 13
In the event of war, successful exploitation of the foar of Gernany in the Soviet orbit would probably enhance popular support of the Soviet war effort. The ability of Soviet propapandn to achieve
CU COKBKJ OHFCRCS
The Air Forceirttcularly those contained ir, "Annex A" of the Air Studyepresent en apparentf the Report rather than an evaluation.
. There ia an Inclination to overlook the questionable character cf the source of the document aa well as the fact that the subjectontained therein represents raw information ond as such should beto considerabia examination prior to acceptance, particularly in the light of events which have transpired since its receipt.
The Air Force takes the stand that the Report is basically true -and will continue to bend then seta out to support its position primarily by means offerences to Leninist-Stalinist doctrine. This approach is somewhat naive, since for almost any given Ccosunist polemic one can cite chapter and verse. Further tho Air Force comments are characterised (air Study, Annex.osty certain unjustified generalizations such as "at tbe moment the balance /of power/ in favor of the West is maintained solely by cur exclusive possession of an atomic capability." Also, "It is believed that if and when ths Soviets achieve even one atom bomb, the balance uill immediately shift in their favor." Such statements, which completely overlook the tremendous economic and industrial edge of theontributing factor to balance ef poser are unacceptable to CIA,
After much favorable eodoryeaieiit of Soviet capabilities, tha Air Force suddenly moderates its stand and concludesaragraph (Air Study, Annex.ortion of which CIA is in general accord since it represents in the oain our version of as muchss the original Report warrantsi
"The Zapotooky report io valuable in emphasizing theof Soviet long-range thinking, and their devious course tcward their fixed objective of undermining, weakening, and finally overtbrcering ell opposition to world-wido Camaunlst dictatorship. Italuable because it checks with other reliable material pointing to tha same conclusions. It cost be read in proper perspective, boaring In mind that tbe original report Itself includes ouch that is for effect, nuch that is wishful thinking, and that there Is no suro evidence that it might not havelant."
InfKorea Studyho statement la irade that "CIA rutcd the content of the report aa probably true,- This statement la Incorrect. CIA has previously node no official evaluation of the content and while certain portlcaa of the report are in fact probably tree, CIA very definitely does nA consider the over-all report worthy ofigh rating. The gogce rates tha content astrue*."
CIA's detailed comenta on the original report ore contained in
eP-SSGRfiS-
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: