WESTERN EUROPE - GERMANY: SOVIET TACTICS; SATELLITE COMMUNIST PURGES

Created: 4/22/1949

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

WESTERN EUROPE

GERMANY

Soviet Tactics Soviet tactics in Germany continue to suggest

that although Soviet control ol all Germany undoubtedly remains the maxlmuri objective, the Kremlin has decidedneutral" Germany, prevented from making a

SECRET

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GERMANY

firm alignment with the West,ore feasible goal for tbe Immediate future. The Kremlin may reason thai the traditional tendency ol German commerce to look eastward for markets and raw materials will bring Germany under eventual Soviet domination.

Meanwhile, rumors have been active recently that the Soviet Union will soon lift the Berlin blockade. Although there has been little or no concrete evidence to support such rumors, it must seem self-evident to the Kremlin that if tbe USSR is to regain the Initiative and if the Sovintfor "German unity" ts to have any appreciable success among the1'German people, the Berlin blockade will have to be lifted. Any such Soviet offer, if made now, would certainly be part of an over-all "peacend probably would be made inay as to camouflage the Soviet defeat on the blockade. Therls "peace congress" would seem to provide an Ideal setting foroviet offer, bul there is no evidence that Soviet strategy has changed enough to permit an offer on Germany actually acceptable to the west-

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SATELLITE COMMUNIST PURGES

Tbe recent purges of high-level Communist officials in Bulgaria indicate that Kremlin eflorts to establish reliable Communist leadership in the Satellites are meeting withdifficulties. In attempting to eradicate Satellitehe Kremlin is confronted with two almost equally unpleasant alternatives, neither of which can bo wholly successful. If the USSR continues Its liquidation of old-line Satellite Communists, the morale and cohesion of the local Communist parties, as woll as their control over the Eastern European countries, may be jeopardized. If the Kremlin chooses the other alternative and relaxes its control over the Satellite governments and Party leaders. It runs the risk of further defections like Tito's. Neither course of action will make it any easier for Satellite Communists to perform the nearly Impossible task of justifying Moscow's ruthless exploitation of Eastern European resources or Increase Satellite dependability in the event of hostilities.

Since Tito's defection last summer, purges of high-level Communist personnel have occurred In Poland, Albania, guerrilla Greece, and, most recently, in Bulgaria. Meanwhile, recurring reports from practically all of the Satellites also indicate continued nationalist dissensions within the ranks of the various Communist parties, In many Instances, reports regarding as yet unpurged nationalist leaders within the Satellite parties reveal that the existence of these schisms Is common knowledge. The "deviatlonlsts" are usuallyconnected with economic planning who can see most clearly the pattern of Moscow's ruthless exploitation of the Satellites. In the face of resurgent nationalism among the Satellites and increasing prosperity In Western Europe, the

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Kremlin cannot afford the risk of relaxing its grip over the Communist parties in Eastern Europe. Thus, the Kremlin will probably be forced to use even more brutal state-police methods in retaining and consolidating Its control over the Satellites, even though such methods areasic core for nationalist deviation.

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Original document.

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