NEAR-EAST AFRICA; PALETINE - SOVIET POLICY; CHINA - SINO-SOVIET FRICTION; MAO I

Created: 12/9/1949

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

NEAR EAST-AFRICA

PALESTINE

Soviet Policy In openly supporting theof Jerusalem, the USSR has once again demonstrated its desire tooice in Near Eastern affairs and to foster dissension and unrest in the area and has highlighted the deterioration of Soviet-Israeli relations. The USSR probably supports Internationalization, not only for the opportunity it affordsirect Soviet voice in the administration of Jerusalem but in the hope that the plan will prove unworkable and thus give rise to irredentist agitation and political instability. Although the USSR has abandoned its support for Israel on this issue, basic Soviet objectives remain unchanged: namely, to reduce Anglo-American influence, promote disunity in the Near East, and foster political and economic instability. Thus, in pursuance of these aims, the USSR at first supported Israel. With the gradual strengthening of US-Israeli ties, the USSR hasIts support and is again laying emphasis on Itstl-Zionist policy. Similarly, Soviet supporteparate Arab stale In Palestine is designed primarily to weaken UK-supported Jordan and to Increase fragmentation in the Arab world.

-

FAR EAST

CHINA

Sino-Soviet Friction Resentment against Sovietand exploitation is apparently increasing in Communist China.strong in non-Communist circles, this anti-Soviet feeling is reportedly also spreading to members of the Chinese Communist Party. Principal reasons for growing friction between the USSR and the Chinese Communists include: rumors of large food shipments from China to the USS^R; Soviet refusal to return machinery to Manchuria; Soviet oppression of the Manchurian people; Sovietin trade relations; the interference of Soviet advisers in China; and the inadequacy of Soviet technicians. Non-Party circles are beginning to blame the USSR not only for genuine Soviet malpractices but for certainof the Chinese economy and mistakes of the Chinese Communists, Some circles of the Communist Party are reported to share in the anti-Soviet feeling, and the Party leadership may choose to change its tactics in presenting Sino-Soviet "friendship" to both the Party rank-and-file and the Chinese people generally. However, the Party leadership has probably not wavered in itsto maintain close relations with the Soviet Union. The anticipated Sino-Soviet treaty is likely to extend and formalize the very Soviet privileges which have occasioned resentment. Although the Partymay regret certain aspects of Sino-Soviet relations, there is no evidence that the "alliance" is insecure.

-

X iW?

FAR EAST

CHINA

Mao in Moscow One result of Mao Tse-Tung's visit to Moscow will probably bereaty of Mutual Assistance and Friendship between the USSR and the Chinese CommunistThis treaty, augmenting the Slno-Soviet Pact5 to which the Chinese Communists have already given their stamp of approval, will probably provide for:

economic and technical assistance by ihe USSR along lines already developing in China, as well as anof cultural relations;ecret militaryproviding for cooperation between the armed forces of the two countries and the joint use andof Chinese military facilities, particularly air bases. The presence of outstanding Politburo members Molotov, Malenkov, and Bulganin at the meeting between Stalin and Mao suggests that other important matters were discussed. In all likelihood, both Stalin and Mao saw in this visit an opportunity to re-examine questions likely to become increasingly urgent In the near future, such as: fl) Western diplomatic recognition and trade;

the Japanese peaceurther Communist penetration of Central and Southeast Asia;he extent of Soviet-Chinese cooperation in Manchuria, Stn-kiang, and possibly China proper.

ET

-

Original document.

---

---