EFFECTS OF A US FOREIGN MILITARY AID PROGRAM

Created: 5/10/1949

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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S ^oroign Military /id Program

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9099o be euhlisbed9. in preparation

1. Wo have boon requested to reviewn the light subsequent developments ainoe its preparation. Thopertinent major dcvelopaento since the date of that estimate have oeeni

g. Tho actual signing of th3 Tferth Atlantic Treaty.Soviet initiative towird reconvening the Council of Foreign Ministers to consider tho German proislem.

signingtorth Atlantic Treaty was assumed in

. The actual event does not affoot the eonolusions of tftat paper. The Immediate psychological response in Western Europe haa been favorable, but, as is mere fully set forth in9he maintenance of thia initial effect Is dependent uponelated US military aid program. The conclusion ia otdll validS failure to afford expected militaryld tend to undo the good effeot of Uie Treaty.

Soviet initiative toward reconvening the CFH mustnot only to the Atlantic Treaty and military aid progran,the total situation in which those developments are Ifaro immediate considerations are the failure ofee euro of coeraZon, progress toward tbe organization of

a West Gorman state, and general deterioration of the Soviet position in

Notet Thia memorandum has not been coordinated with thscrganizatic-nB. eferred to within,coordinated with

Dooiuoent Bo.

Gernany, all callinghift in Soviot taetioa. This subject will be sore fully discussed in9 snd. both eohsduled for early publication. It say be noted hare* however, that thia spadllo development falls within the general terras of the oonolusions reaohod In. The USSH continues to employ 'politico! rather tlian rxUltory moans to accomplish ita own purposes and to frustrate thoai; of the United States. The Soviet initiative touard reconvening the CFM is an Intensification of the "peace offensive. * It has notcontinuing propaganda attack on the Atlantic Treaty and military aid pro gram or continuing pressure on such peripheral states asuccessful outcome of CFM negotiations ia by no moono assured. moot on Germany ooald leade-tep$e> but it could also lealenewal of the struggle for control of Geranny under the new oiroupuitanoes. The presumption still is that the USSR Is not seeking an equitable

Ao Conolpfflom Developments sinoe its publication do not require revision of the conclusions reached in.

Original document.

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