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CKflEUL IBTELL30ENCE AOENCX
UJTELLIQSIJCE miORtSmi BO,
SOBlfiCTi Estimate of the Situation In the Event of Brer During2
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B. Intelligence Honorsndun, fcemorandua for tho aoet.irom the CIA Hep-.
The present nrooranduia is In response to Reference C,
raft ot aepumpticao pert in sot to an eotimste, such as ABAIf Soviet intentions and capabilities ln tho evcm of war during
e en estimate of political, psychological, ond eoonooio faotora pertinent to the problem lneUaated innd based on the assumptions stated therein,
A. For further discussion in scppnrt of the Enclosures eeei
,uly7 September4 February 49
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soviet iktebtions awd
estimate Soviet intentions aod cepebilitlea in thedaring
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The prohlea aascoes tie outbreakeneral war during2esult of Soviet aggression*
It is also assumed that, at tho outbreak of wari
The existing military oocurmtlon of Germany, Austria, and Japan will still be ln effect.
1, The European Recovery iTccram will have reeulted in greater eoonoalo and political stability in Reitern Europe. ..
orth atlantlo raot providingystem of collectiveembracing tbo United States, Canada, Great Brltsln, Iceland, Sorway, Dennark, the Baneltnr countries, France, Portugal, and Italy will have been adopted and implemented.
A. Substantial usola will have been provided to the participants ln the Horth Atlantlo Faot and alao to Austria. Greece, Turkey, Iran, Icrea, and the Philippines, but thia eld will not have been sufficient to permit any oontinental recipient to resist Soviet invasion suooeesfuUy without direct US military anpportt
a. The Situation In the Veer and middle East will be relativelydespite underlying tensions. In China tha Communists willthe rational government, bat their actnel local oontrol over extacslve areas and their relatione with Uoeoou will remain uncertain. The situation ln Southeast Asia will remain unstable.
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ENCLOSURE "B" Of THEHB EVENT OF fi*R
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POLITICAL muv KIChuLOGIC*L
vor sins. The rulers of the USSR have as theira Communist norld ordor under their own domination. Thethe USSR in the attainment of thla objective is to provide aand powerful support far the international Communistresort to war In the circumstances envisaged ln thea oonvlotion on the part of. the Kremlin that therecovery, political coalescence, and military rehabilitationEurope poee an intolerable threat to the security of theor at least such an obstacle to the attainment of itsas could be overcome only by military force, and that itimperative to act before the relative Strength of the Restfarther enhanced.
Tho immediate Soviet objeotive in resorting to war, then would be to smash the supposedly hostile alliance of the Vest and to subjoot Europe and tho Keer East to Soviet military dcrainfition. onsequent objective would bo to convert the resources of tho conquered area to Soviet use, greatly enhancing ths potential strength af the USSR In relation to that of the surviving capitalist states. It might also be hoped that tho strain of war and the shook of defeat would hasten the expected disintegration of oepitaliera throughout the world,
paToholcglcal readiness for war. The Russianon occasion rallied mgnifioantly to eacpal foreign invadershomeland, but have never successfullywarfareajor power, 45 theyforoard by the momentum of their pursuitefeatedcere powerfully aided by ftostem allies.)
The Russian people presently dread war, but could be driven to lt by the absolute power of their totalitarian state. Tbe war would, of oourss, be presented to them aa essential to their national survival, and few would beool tion to know better. Secure againstinvasion and ignorant of the potentialities of strategicthe vast majority could acquiesce in tho decision of the Kremlin, albeit without enthusiasm.
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The Imaediato psychological rcscUon cf the Russian people to praapt Allied strategic eir attack, including tbe use of atomic bombs, cannot be predicted. Tho. consequent cUiniption of national llfo would, b aver, oubjoct the police control apparatus to severe strain, ond sustained strstegio bombardment would have emulative psychological effeat. Soviet vulnerability to peychologioel aarfare would Increase as time passedavorable military decision andestern counter-offensive effort got underray. Disaffection in the USSR could not be expected to oxprooa Itself openly, however, until assured Hastorn support and protect ion was at hand. .
3, The elfruat.PB IB tho SaWUv. Stttfrff. rha popolationa of the Satellite States are thoroughly diBaffected toward the Soviet Union* They would welcome war in hope of liberation* The outbreak ofwould probablyave of anti-Soviet sabotage, per hops even scattered insurrections, which would be ruthlessly suppressed. Effective resistance movements could not be developed and maintained until Restem forces wereosition to render appreciable support and there wsb reasonable hope of eventual liberation*
4a Ymroslevja,. Jugoslaviapecial case. The outbreak of war would pose for Tito the ultimate dilemma. The primary requirement of his position would he to keep Soviot farces out of Yugoslavia, Active participation in the war, either as on ally of the DSSR or as an ally of the Best, would load directly to Soviet intervention in Jugoslavia end consequently to Tito's own destruction. Neutrality would result in isolation, merely postponing the day of reckoningate acre convenient for the USSR, among these bard choices, indecision and inertia would bo on the side of neutrality. Rhenever Soviot intrusion occurred, the bellicosity of the Jugoslavs wouldigorous guerrilla reslstanoe.
Communism in the West. Under the Asauaptions the political end economio pec or of the Communist Parties of Western Europe would beneutralisedut there would remain, especially in Italy and Inangerous fifth column of trained and reliable militants. Their efforts would facilitate the advance of the Soviet armies and contribute materially to the control of civil populations in their rear.
ComcunlPt China. Tho situation which will exist In China2 is still highly problematical. It has been assumed, with good reason, that tho Communists will then control tho national government, but that their actual local control over extensive areas and their
relatione with moscow will reon in uncertain. active chinese participation in the war on tha aide of the ussr iaoregone conclusion. bevar-thaleas, the presumption lo that coraunist china will cooperate aa required with the ussr,
7. coraunifto in southeast iiejfl. tho situation whioh will exist in southeast asia2 ia also probloaaticel. soviet-align ed nationalists will presumably still oontrol moat of indochina. tho existing altuetlona in burma and indonesia are particularly susceptible to communistend, unless radical aoldtlona are founds this condition willhave developed favorably for the ussr keetarn failure to solve these problems wouldcu unlet capabilities forin slam.
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industrie! ce reel iff. even if the planned development of soviet end satellite ind us trie! produoticn vero to beall ted, the industrial potential of the ussr2 would still be markedly inferior to that of the united states. soviet end satellite industrialis retarded tyi shortages of high-production ca chine tools,equipment, and preoision instruments, and of facilities far producing than; shortages of akilled personnel, both technical and manogorialj loo prcduotivity of labori rail transport stringencyj and ehartagoo of high-grade gasoline and lubricants, of oortala ferro-alloyo and non-fezTous metals, of oertain types of finished steel, and of industrial diamonds. while the outbreak of hostuitloa could find the soviet armed forooe generally sell provided with standard equipment, soviet and satellite industry could not moot the requirementsong ver of attrition.
tmtofa. the vast continentaln trolled by the ussr is relatively invulnerable to blockade, but is under rieoooalty to leport, not only oertain aonufaotured iteaa indicated above, but also natural rubber, industrial dicnonda, tungsten, tin, cobalt, oolybdoourj, and high-grade swedish iron ore, uoreover, it is dependent on iugoalavla fcr an adequate aupply of load, sine, and copper. these needs may be covered to acme extent by stockpiling (especially in the case of naturalut could make themselves felt in tbe eventong war.
transportation. oviet internal trancportatlon will still depend essentially on the railroads, which now carryf all inland freight traffic thair capacity is barely adaquato to meet present industrial noodo, ond is unlikely to increase at a
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greater rete than the expansion of Industry. At the outbreak of oar this lack of reserve capacity ncuid severely Unit the ability of the DSSR to support vast armies operating at extreme distances frcm tho centers of Soviet ear prod notion. The shift of Soviet industry east-sard for greater aeourily actually aggravates this problem end to that extent reduces Soviet offensive capabilities. There is also theof transshipment required by gauge differences between tho USSR and the Satellite Statea.
Because of limited Inland transportation facilities tho USSR must continue to relyonsiderable extent upon ooaetal shipping in the Block and Baltic Seas and in tho Far Bast.
eouoa.tipp. aftPvff. Soviettho industrial and scientific facilities of Western Europeenhance tbe Soviet oar potential. The industrial laborskilled, manpower (technical and oanfigerial) available to theeach be acre than doubled. Western European faolllties ferof precdaion instruments end machine tools wouldSoviet deficiencies. Soviet eteel oapacity would be shipbuilding capacity would be Increased five-fold. Ifwere enquired intact and their peaceful assimilationthe Joint econcalo power of the USSB and continentalprobably be made, ln the course of ten years, to equal thatUnited States.
Ho such gain could be realised, however, under conditions ofaggros8ion and oontlnuing war, including demolition, blockade, serial bombardment, and popular resistance. Deprived of fuel and raw materials which the USSR could not supply free tho roaourcos et its command, the Industrial plant of Western Europe could function at not cere thenercent of9 capacity, the effects of demolition, bombing, popular resistance, and general disorganisation ore lessto estimate, but might te severe.
It may be concluded that the occupation of hoctern Europe could significantly increase tho economic capability of the USSR toong war, the actual gain depending on the actual degree ofand popular resistance. In any caae, tho Soviet war me chine would remain primarily dependent on the war-industrial capabilities of the homeland,
Pf the qccucpUop, the,Bear East. The singleconsideration in this area is oil. Its acquisition by the USSR
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could bo important in terns of denial to the Seat, but of United direct benefit to tho Soviet Onion. Because of transportation difficulties, Rear Eastern oil could not be cade available for use in the USSR and Soviet Europe in any significant quantity, although it could bo used to support Soviet foroos in the Hear East. Tbe neat inportantfor tha USSR, would be the facilities et Abadan for the production of high-grade gasoline ond alkylate Mending agents. These faolllties, hoaever, would be subject to deaolltlon.
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POLITICAL ABD PSTCHCLOGICAL
*UUPUg fart* It is to be presumed that thecountries could loyally fulfill, their cccaitnants on thoof war. This would lacludek prosuot&bly, an attempt totbe line of the Rhine and Uie Alps pending the arrival ofThe quality of resistance would depend, however, upon tbothe defenders eo wall ae upon the quality, of theirand training. The morale factor is likely to berespect to the continental statesposod to SovietTbeir determination cannot be sustained by premises ofand ultimate victory, but will depend on oonfidecae inand decisive support. If tbe Idea, which thehat tbo United States will defend the Rhinelast Frenchman, ahould ever take holdj the morel effectollapse of reflietanee comparable to that Inwell ensue.
In this event the analogy to previous, might be carried further, with this difference, that European forces outside of Europe would be disposed to continue the fight against Communism without question. Underground resistance within Europe might be alow or inwithout the benefit of Communist loader ship and conspiratorial skill and under experienced ond ruthless Soviet polioe control, but would develop ob Kostornaction gsvo promise ofliberation,
aprl gwltSvTAfiB^ These countries would cling to aneutrality, but actually directed toward avoidance of Sovietany terms short of national surrender. If attacked, hewevar,resist to their utmost ability.
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rWflnflt Tao Irish would at leaet support the Heat by aoaauree shcvt of war, and eight wall bo persuaded to beaome co-belligerent.
StS&Jl* Baring no hope of eceoamedetion with the USSR. Spain would oelu tho opportunity to esoape froa isolation into aotivewith the Atlantic Powers and would offer fanatical resistance to Soviet invasion*
Ifllto. If not attacked; Turkey would probably seek to postpone involvement in the war, but not at the cost of isolattoi froa the West or of fatal concessions to the USSR. If attacked* the Turks fiould resist to their utmost ability*
OroefielU rontal resistance of these countries to Soviet invasion would be shortlived, bat guerrilla resistance wouldcontinue, ita effectiveness varying with the availablity of support.
Iraq.Ml* The poliUcel situation in these coon trios is extremely unstable. They would soak to Ovoid involvement in ths war, but would be psychologically aa well as militarily incapable of offering effective aid or resistance to either the Rest or the USSR.
20. JiBroel. Israel's position is Che of neutrality between the East and Sest. Western tieB aro predominant ao for, however, and, if Seat t0 Israelprobably align itself with tho
igQfo TrfMlBtopt mThese states would be effectively aligned vita the Rest, thoughassive role unless actually invaded, Egypt is vulnerable to subversion.
The African oontinentbo regarded as securelyby ths Kent, at leaet during the first phase of the war,existence of oertain potential .fool of disaffeotion. Southparticipate actively in defense of the oontinent,
InrtlflP BfagpJU Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India would to reaaln noutrel, but could resist ettaok. uldwith the Beat.
outheast Asia. Tho situation in thia area2 Is proble-natlcal, especially so with reapoot to Burma and Indonesia. Soviet-aligned native nationaliete are likely to control Indochina, excepting perhaps the environs of the principal cities, Siaa will probably remain
anti-Soviet, but officially neutral. British control of Ualaya la likely to bo secure. The Philippines will be aligned with the united States.
Auctrflljft czi Zeol'.ad,. These Dominions would take active part in the war in purport of Qroet Britain.
ftflrcs,. The reglno ln South Korea would bo US-aligned, but could offer no serious resistance to Soviet invasion.
Japan. The Japanese would support OS dofonse of Japan, not only by reaeon of traditional Russophobla and enti-Cciamunism, but also in hope of rehabilitation aa the premier military poser ln Eaat Asia.
Latin acerlea. The Latin American states would support the United States within the franco ark of the Rio Treaty, in various degrees of effective cooperation.
fl. Probable allieai tho participants ln the NorthIreland, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Iron, Egypt,Arabia, South Africa, Ceylon, Australia, lies Zealand,Korea, Japan, and latin
Jt. Uncertainutxsli Sweden, Switeerland, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indie, Burma, and Slam,
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The Allied economic capability to support ais greatly superior to that of tha USSR. Given effeotivoand advanced planning for tbe optimum utilisation ofno insuperable economic difficulties should limitcapabilities. The principal factore of strength in tbevouldarkedly superior Industrial potential andaccess te all the material resources of the world outside theactual Soviet oecupaticn. The principal seekness would be andependence on overseas shipments, often at long distances,loos of time and effort, limitation in terms ofahipplng, end exposure to Soviot submarine attack.
m, of Svropefl,p, Industry, The warof the Allies would be looated ln the United States, Canada,
end the United KingdCo. Lobs of continental Brxrepean Industrial potential (with simultaneous relief froa responsibility for sup-parting the civilian economy of that area) would not seriously affeot the war potential of the allies. The possible reduction of British production by heavy and persistent air end missile attack would be racre serious, but not fatal*
ffect of. the laaa.of seaf BiMt nil. Less of the oil production of tho Moor East ticuluevere blow to the Allied war effort, although ita effect would be cushionedeo extent if responsibility for supplying oil to Western Europe were eliminated at about the some time. The oil resources remaining available could be sufficient to meet Allied needs, but the Inconvenience snd risk involved in long overseaa shipments would hinder the conduct of ths war*
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adverse effect of tbe denial of these raoounces (principally natural rubber, tin,end oil) would' not be insuperable (they have been lostut the diveroico of effort that would be required to make up for ths lees would be hampering.
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