SECURE'
O b
THE CFM MEETING
The recent meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which made substantial progress on the Austrian treaty and agreed In principleodus vlvondl for Germany, clearly revealed that the Kremlin does not yet believe that theof Germany would contribute to eventual Soviet control over Germany. The Kremlin Is not ready to relax Its grip on Berlin and east Germany and apparently believes that ultimate Soviet objectives can best be obtainedlight relaxation In cold war tension and continuation of the partition of Germany.
The failure of Vlshlnsky to buildonsistentpattern at Paris, as well as his defensive attitude and apparent Improvisation, suggests that some basic change took place In the Soviet attitude not long before the meeting. The rude jolt to the USSR from the May elections In the Soviet Zone Germany and continuing difficulties ln maintaining Soviet control over the Satellites may have contributed to the Soviet decision to mark Ume on the German question. More fundamentally, however, the USSR may have estimatedestern economic recession is now approaching more rapidly than was previously believed and consequently that the future will provide more favorable opportunities for the attainment of Soviet objectives In Germany and Western Europe.
The Kremlin probably reasons that the western powers, particularly the US, will beeaker position tn the eventepression to oppose the USSRn economy-minded US would be more reluctant to give adequate support to the European recovery program and the Military Aidconomicwould weaken US-British-Frenchestern Europe would be Increasingly reluctant to maintain tradeagainst Eastern Europe;conomic distress would make western Germany more receptive to Soviet overtures. With this Ln mind, tbe USSR apparently felt It necessary to preserve the status quo while making certain that the door remained open for future negotiations through the machinery of theore truculent Soviet attitude at Parts might have Increased western determination to re-arm and Impelled western legislatures to continue their financial support of the "cold war' despite economic troubles at home.
EASTERN EUROPE
By means of purging "nationalists" In tha Satellite Communistore aggressive campaign against the Catholic Church, and an Intensification of Its attacks upon Tito, the Kremlin is continuing its attempts to consolidate its position and control in the Satellite countries. The vigor and Intensity cf Soviet activity In the Satellite area reflects continuing Soviet concern over tne ability of the localregimes to serve Soviet Interests. Confronted with growing economic recovery In Western Europe In comparison with economic hardship tn theore aggressively hostile Catholic Church, the Kremlin has apparently decided to take prompt and drastic steps toward eliminating the last vestiges of opposition in its uneasy Satellites.
Party Purges The vigorous efforts being made in Hungary
and Bulgaria to eradicate "nationalist" deviation is ts Indicate that the Kremlin has not yet solved the problem of "home-grown" Communism. In both countries, the ruling group of Moscow adherents is attacking anationalist Communist leader in order to make an example of him. Former Bulgarian economic czar Traicho Rostov and ex-Hungarian Foreign Minister Lasxlo Rajk have already been expelled from the Comnmalst Party. Tberegime now seeks to destroy Rajk totally by levelling at him the sensational charge of espionage for the US, while the propaganda assault on Rostov, in which oven the Com-Inform Journal is being utilised, continues unabated. Both Rostov and Rajkubstantial party following and had risen to power locally without direct Kremlin support Their destruction will demoralise anti-Moscow Bulgarian and Hungarian Communists and forestall the rise of any
Communists who might consider the national interest before that of the USSR.
AntI-Catholic Drive The Soviet Union's continuing drive against the Catholic Church isbeing focused on Czechoslovakia, where the probable Imminent arrest of Archbishop Be ran may follow the pattern established In the recent Mlndszenty trial in Hungary. (In Poland the Communist Government Is preparing cases against certain Catholic bishops for collaboration with thehe Czechoslovak Government Is publicly accusing Beran of political activity against the state and will probably arrest him soon on trumped-up charges of treason based upon evidence aUegedly found in the Archbishop's personal flies. Benin's arrest will Immobilize the last effective anti-Communist force In Czechoslovakia. MeanwhUe, Sovietto eradicate Catholic power and Influence in the Satellites has been matched by the increasingly aggressive anti-Communist stand of the Vatican. Communist plans to establish national or Communist-manipulated churches have apparently caused the Vatican to abandon all hope ofa modus Vivendi In the Satellites and Instead to embarkigorous campaign to resist Communist anU-Catholic pressure. In addition to stepping up lis radio propaganda designed to stiffen Catholic resistance In the Satellites, the Vatican has already meted out severe penalties ofand suspension to Catholics In Hungary and Czechoslovakia who participate ln the anti-Church campaign. In addition, the Church may soonundamentalwarning all Catholics In the Soviet orbit against cooperating with the Communists and appealing to theworld for aid and Intervention. Despite these Vatican moves, however, the Communistsefinite advantage In the struggle. Basing their strategy on cutting the ties
binding local Catholic cbirches with Rome, oa separating the Church hierarchy from the pariah priests and the people, and oa abolishing Catholic control over education, the Communist regimes have the means and determination eventually toall effective Catholic resistance in the Satellites.
Polish Changes In tightening their grip on Poland, the pro-Moscow Communists have continued their slander campaign against the Catholic Church and are groom -ing Aleksanderaithful Moscow follower, for titular leadership In the Party. Since Gomulka was read out of the Party leadershipear ago, Zawadakl's ascent has been steady and rapid until now he appears to be the Number One prospect to serve as theront man. Service with the Red army andolitical commissar In the Soviet-sponsored Polish Army corps, plus eleven years of political Imprisonment, have madeonvinced and ruthless Communistogical Kremlin choice to head the Polish Communist Party and perhaps eventually the Polish Government.
Albanian Weakness The Sovietho
have assumed direct control of the Rozha administration In Albania, are concentrating their main efforts toward stabilizing the regime on alleviating the nation's transportation difficulties.oviettechnicians helpedailroad running between the capitol at Tirana and the principal supply port at Durazzo. Despite the presence and activities of the Soviet representatives in Albania and other Soviet efforts to maintain this weak and distant Satellite outpost, Hcotha remains pessimistic about tbe future of both himself and his country. His pessimism is basedlbania's basic poverty and lackhe current hostility of the people toward his pro-Soviet regime;he Isolation of Albania from tho rest of the Soviet bloc.
YUGOSLAVIA
Tito-fltalln RUt The year old Tito-Stalin rift has widened
perceptibly In the pant few weeks. The struggle between Yugoslavia and Its former partners to the East has apparently now passed the stage of propagandaon predominantly Ideological themes and entered the realm of concrete diplomatic and economic action. ThisSoviet effort against Yugoslavia is In part necessary In order to buttress the current Kremlin campaign against "nationalist" deviation In the Satellites. More fundamentally, the Kremlin must feel compelled to lake more drastic action against Tito because Tito's continued defiance strikes at tho very core of the Stalinist concept of Communist expansion and actstrong magnet to other Communists with nationalist leanings.
Pressure on Tito The Intensification of the Yugoslav-Soviet
struggle haa been manifested on several fronts. Sparked by an exchange of sharp diplomatic notes belween the USSR and Yugoslavia, the Soviet attack has been
carried on by Hungary and Albania and strongly supported
by Bulgaria. Hungarian-Yugoslav relations have been severely strained by recurring border Incidents, the mutual ouster of diplomatic representatives,ugoslav charge ofespionage activity. Border Incidents have also Increased on the Yugoslav-Albanian frontier, and Bulgaria has not only Intensified the anti-Yugoslav war of nerves by concentrating troops on the Yugoslav border but hat" expressed an Intention to encourage subversive activities within Yugoslavia. Of more far reaching significance, however, has been tho tightening of the economic blockade against Tito. Althoughlockade would deprive the Satellites of vitally needed Yugoslav non-ferrous metals, Czechoslovakia and Hungary have already
YUGOSLAVIA
reportedly broken off all trade relations wtth Yugoslavia and similar action by the olher Satellites may be planned tn the near future. In view of Tito's increasing trade relations with the West, the Kremlin may ln fact beimilar action by Yugoslavia.
Ability to Resist Barring an extremely unlikely Soviet decision to overthrow Tito by forceful invasion, the Tito regime will continue to defy the Kremlin and successfully maintain Its Independence of action at leastugoslav officials are apparentlyof their ability to maintain control In the face of the Soviet-Satellite war of nerves and the more acerbated the conflict becomes, the less likely it Is that either Tito or Stalin can find an acceptable basis for the return ofInto the Soviet orbit. Even the application by the Soviet orbit of total economic sanctions against Yugoslavia would not result in the collapse of the Yugoslav economy. Tito will undoubtedly be able to survive until substantial imports from the West begin to arrive and any reduction In Yugoslav-Satellite trade would actually place Yugoslaviaorrespondingly more favorable position to fulfill Its export commitments to the West,
Relations with Groece Meanwhile, the deterioration in Yugoslav-Cominform relations has Improved the prospects for an amicable settlement of outstanding Greek-Yugoslav Issues. Yugoslavtoettlement may have Increasedesult of: (t) the belief that the USSR, as Indicated by its failure to support Yugoslav claims against Austria at the CFM meeting, will no longer support Yugoslav foreign policy
SECRET
SESRET
YUGOSLAVIA
In otherhe realization that establishment of trade with tbe West will be facilitated by the cessation of Yugoslav support for the Greek guerrillas;esire to make its own terms with Greece now In the event that the recent Greek guerrilla "peace offensive" by the Comlnformists should resultrior accord. The Greek Government also has strong reasons forettlement withAlthough such an agreement would not diminish to any marked degree the immediate ability of the guerrillas to continue their fight in Greece, iteaken the morale of the Greek guerrillas and bolster the morale of the Greekocus the guilt for aid to the Greek Communists primarily on Albania;ccentuate aSoviet desire to remove the present struggle In Greece from the military to the political sphere.
Original document.
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