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THE CURRENT SITUATION
IN IRAN
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THE CURRENT SITUATION IN IRAN
SUMMARY
stability of government ln Iran has Increased markedly during the springnternal security has been maintainedelatively high level, Soviet threats andhave been firmly resisted, and Important steps have been taken to improve thc national economy and increase thc operationalof the government. The fight for supremacy between conflicting groups,remainshreat to Internal stability. This threat may become aggravated If the Shah and the army seek to Increase their authority further.
Before the attempt on the Shah's life In February, there hadrendesult of irresponsibility on the part of thc country's legislators. Tlicassassination, however, had aeffect on the government, and the Majlis registered some notable accomplishmentsthe approval of measures curbing its hitherto unchecked authority and granting greater powers to the Shah. Thetook the occasion to outlaw theTudeh Partyotentially dangerous Soviet tool) allhough no evidence wasthat the attack on the Shahudeh plot, and martial law was gradually extended throughout the country.
In thc economic field, the government has made unexpected progress Ineven-year plan for large-scale economic and social improvement. Nevertheless, serious economic ills remain to encourage popular discontent, and there arc certain to be delays and obstructions In the Implementation of the Seven Year Plan.
The Iranian military high command has continued its policy of integrating thc tribes
Into Iran's defense scheme and has made plans to incorporate the gendarmerie Into thehe army hasumber of attacks by Soviet frontier forces but would be unable to offer effective resistance to an actual Soviet invasion. The Shah and thc Chief of Stall are eager to increase the size of the army, claiming that such an increase would permit Iron's forces to lake effective delaying action In the event of an Invasion by the USSR. The army is able to maintain Internal security, and its capabilities in this respect are being considerably increased by the arrival of US military supplies.
Iran's positionis the USSR continues precarious, although the Iranian Oovemmenl has not been Intimidated by vitriolicrepeated border violations, andprotests and threats. The curbing of thc Tudeh Party undoubtedly hampered Soviet political activities in Iran, and efforts willbe made to resuscitate thc party. The USSR is very resentful of US activr.es in Iran and has endeavored toase forArticle VI of1 Irano-Soviet Treaty, which permits the entry of Soviet troops into Iran under certain conditions if it appears that lhe latter is being usedhird parlyase from which to attack the USSR. It Is considered unlikely, however, that the USSR would be willing lo resort to direct intervention at this time Thewill, however, continue to apply strong political and psychological pressures in an effort to force Iran Into submission
information has Just been received thatplans were put Into effect onay. The merger isix-moo th trial period and must beby the Majlis before It takes permanent eflect
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Iran Ls expected to maintain itsto Soviet pressures and to strengthen Its Western alignment, It will remain Insistent on more aid from the OS. If, however, lt loses
confidence in US and UK support, lt mayolicy of neutrality or even feel compelled to enterisadvantageous arrangement with the USSR
THE CURRENT SITUATION IN IRAN
Political Situation.
Iran's political stability Increasedduring thc spring Up throughhe disunity and Inactivity which had long hampered governmental processes continued in eflect Theof any checks on its authority, beset with Intrigue, and devoted to the self-interest of itsdeaf to pleas that It pass needed legislation and continued to snipe at thc governments it had put In office.ew government under Mohammad Saed took office Int required moreonth to obtainare vote of confidence from the Majlis and appeared doomed to even quicker frustration than Its predecessor, thc Abdol Hosseln Hajirwliich liad been able to accomplishnothing during Its five months In offlce.
During the next few weeks Saed was able to line up thc support of most of the groups in the Ma] its. Including thc largest faction, that of former Prime Minister Qavam es Sultan eh. and he succeeded In getting thc Ma] Us totbe government's budget for thefour months of the fiscalno other government had made in years. Before Sacd could make further progress,Ids coalition became embrwled In abetween the forces of the court and those of Qavam, who was attempting to winfrom charges of malfeasance. (The Shah, ambitious for himself and for Iran,more Impatient than ever over the short-coinings of constitutional eanwhile, the continuing stagnation ofwas partly responsible for the resur-genco of the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party, which had been rapidly gaining strength
These tendencies toward disintegration were abruptly checked by thc attemptedof the Shahlthough it has been established that the would-be assassin was an adherent of the Tu-
deh Party as welleporter foranatical Moslem society, theItself, while probably Inspired by Tudeh propaganda, appears to have been an act of individual terrorism rather than portidespread plot. In any event, It provoked no outbreaks on the part of dissident groups In the population. The attack, nevertheless,rofound effect on the political community and provided the regime with an opportunity for strengthening Its position. Thetook thc occasion to crack down on ttseats and gradually extended martial law throughout most of Iran. The Tudeh Party, charged with responsibility for the attempt on the Shah, was immediately outlawed, and several hundred of its key members werealthough about twenty of tbe party's top men escaped, some reportedly to theof tho Soviet Embassy. Thealso moved to deport its principalopponent, the fanatical Mullah Kas-hani, and to apprehend other non-leftistof the regime. Qavam, the onlyfigure capable of rivaling the Shah In political power, found it expedient to depart for Paris,
Other changes In Iranian political life took place in the wake of the assassinationthc friction between thc Shah and the Majlis (which had often left the primein the middle) was eased; theframework for effective government was strengthened; and Uie stalled legislativewas set in motion. It was at first feared that the Shah, who had at various times during the previous year tried unsuccessfully lo obtain greater powers, would take advantage of the situation to seek dictatorial authority. Instead, however, he shrewdly called In agroup of elder statesmen andtheir support and guidance for aconstitutional reform program, wliich would be effected by an elective constituent assembly to be called for the second time In
TUP ft
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forty-three years of the constitution's
urst of energy which would have seemed Impossible six months previous, thcxtended Prime Ministerearly unanimous vote of confidence (thus strengthening the government's hand In the difficult negotiations with the Anglo-IraiJan Oil Company about to takethe long-discussed Scven-Year Plan bill for economicuthorized convocation of the Constituent Assembly asked for by the Shah;, as final proof of its changed attitude, approved the bill asby the Shah forenate. (When thc Majlis opposed an Ill-advisedbill drastically curbing freedom of the press, however, it Indicated that Its cooperation did not extend toapproval of greater powers for thehc trend toward cooperation was continued when the Constituent Assembly, made up largely of members of the Majlis and of other notables backed by thc court-army group,its task in less than three weeks after its convocation onpril.
The principal result of these events hashift In the balance of power from the Majlis to the Shah. Under the more Important of the two constitutional amendments adopted by the Assembly (thc otheregular procedure for making futurehc Shah ls authorized to dissolvenot more than once on the same issue and new elections must be colled promptly.esult, he nowonstitutional weapon against dilatoryThe establishment of thc Senate, half of whose members are to be named by the Shah, will also increase the influence of thc court and willounterweight against factional irresponsibility.thc new strength of tho court-army group will undoubtedly be reflected in the elections for thc XVI Majlis scheduled tolate inarmythat martial law will be lifted during the balloting period.
Prime Minister Saed's position has alsoin the last few months. Despite his apparent lack of full support from the Shah,
thc smallncss of his personal following,eputation for limited executive ability, Sacd has exhibited great skill and acumen Inthe support of the factions in the Majlis while cooperating with theiolent attack in the Majlis in April against Chief of Staff Razmara raised doubts as to the durability of political harmony In Iran, Saed emergedtrong vote oflie ls currently faced with growing criticism over Iran's failure to obtain US aid comparable to that furnished Turkey, but this Issue is unlikely to have any significant effect on the current domestic political situation, and Saed will probably retain office until after the elections because of his proved political skill and the belief of many deputies that their best chance of re-election lies in continuing to support him, Whether he stays on after the new Majlis meets will depend for the most part on thc Shah.
The Shah is expected to take anactive part In thc direction of his country's affairs. He will support measures for social and economic improvement and will continue totiff policy toward the USSR, In line with the attitude he has consistently held In the past. The Increased influence of the Shall may alienate ambitious political leaders anxious to dominate the Iranian political scene; at the same time, lt may encourage strong army personalities to press for adictatorship.
2. Economic Situotion.
Iran's economic situation continuesin certain important respects. Croparc generally good; governmentcontrary to budget estimates, exceed expenditures; and the considerable revenues from Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC)arc expected to be doubled in the near future.
Serious economic problems,arvest8 which was considered sufficient to meet the country's grain needs, severe local bread shortagesapparently as thc result of hoarding, smuggling, and malaeurnhistration. Thewas compelled to deplete lis stocks In an effort to maintain supplies of low-cos*.
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and was also forced to Importquantities of grain. Other economic ills include constant exploitation of thc peasants byeneral low standard ofhigh commodity prices, low industrial wages, and chronic unemployment. Theof serious unrest in the countrythat thus far labor has accepted these conditions with stoicism; nevertheless, theis sufficiently dangerous for theto feel that, by way of appeasing labor. It must keep great numbers of workers nominally employed in the governmentan Important factor In unprofitable operations. While the outlawing of theParty has driven Its labor union activities underground, the Tudeh platformstill appeals to the workers of Iran, and the party will continue toorce in tbe ranks of labor. Thc synthetic government-sponsored labor unions are vociferously antl-Tudeh bul have developed no positive program designed to appeal to thc workers.
Recently there has been unexpectedtoward setting inomprehensive economic-development program. During the winter, an association of US engineers.Consultants Inc.ade surveys of the country nnd reportedirge-scale development program, properly administered, was practical in Iran. Onebruary the MajUs approved the Sevcn-Ycar Plan bill for economic and social improvement. TheIs tentatively authorized to proceed withrogram Involving6he program will be financed partly through current revenues and partly through loans. The bill provides for thc government to divert all of Its oilto tho program; under terms now being oilcrcd by AlOC, these would
"The program Includes housing snd municipal Improvements, public health measures, expanded educational faculties, and the construction of CO*-emraent buildings, agricultural projects, and the Importation ofultural machinery and feru-oters. expansion and Improvement of railroads, roads, porta, and airports: Improvement andof Industry and mlormaUonov-crnmenl petroleum company to develop thc oUIn areas outside the AIOC concession: and the reequlpmciit of the post and telegraph systems.
million annually. The bill alsooan equalling0 million from theBank of Iran (Bank Melil) andthc executors of the program toa loan ranging up0 million from thc International Bunk for Reconstruction and Developmentubject to thcof the Ma Jus. While IBRD has shown some Interest in the program. It has refused to commit Itselfoan and hasthat Iran must make specific requests on the basis of projects fully blueprinted.
Actual work under thc program can begin once the Majlis Program Commission hasthe recommendations of the Planning Organization, and once the functionalhas been established. Delays willand the Shah, while expressing ato carry out thc plan, may In some degree subordinate thc Interests of theto those of thc army.
While the program appears sound. Itsexecution vrtll require close foreign supervision, both technical and financial, in view of local inexperience and inefficiency and the prevalence of graft. Failure of theor protracted delays would result Inand dissatisfaction, which would seriously affect the stability of thcand would benefit the Tudeh Party in ils attempts to orient the Iranian people toward the Soviet Union.
3. Military Situation.
Iran's armedhe army and the gendarmerie,ajor Influence on the life and stability of the country. Not only are they responsible for internal security and thc protection of the frontiers, bul they also
* Iran's regular armed forces totalfficers and men: of these. Includingavalir personnel, are ln tbe army and0 In the gendarmerie. Into these forces the army baa trained andumber of tribesmen as auxiliaries. As part of Its efforts to gain tribal coopcraUon. the anuy commandribal leadersencs of conferences, demonstrauona, and eaeecLics held In Tehran during September IMS The eOecUTCiiess o( thisevealed by the unusual degree of tranqalUty pre tall ine In tribal areas and the assistance icndercd the army by tribesmen along the Soviet border.
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an Important role In the political life of the nation. Over wide areas, especially In the tribal districts, thc armyIn thc absence of martialto civil authorities, and exerts strongInfluence by Interfering In elections. The gendarmerie, which ls at present under the Ministry of Interior and isivilimilar influence through Its Intimate contact with thethroughout the country.
The army, with the possible exception of minor elements, Is loyal to the Shah, itsandajor part In maintaining his policies. Thc recentlyconciliatory policy toward the tribes has not only enhanced the army's ability toInternal order and to resist Soviet efforts at penetration but has also secured additional support for the Shah and the government
Thc principal weakness of the armed forces Is widespread corruption, especially among the officers (attributable in part to their lowlair for Intrigue among higher officers who are rivals for power. The bitter feudthe Chief of Staff, General Razmara. and thc Minister of War, General Ahmadi,onspicuous example of this rivalry,Ahmadi's efforts to unseat Razmara, who Is considered lo be Iran's most able officer with Influence second only to that of the Shah, lt Ls likely that Razmara will continue for some time in his present capacity.
The Shah and the Chief of Staff areIn their desire to Increase thc size of thc army, having named figures ranging. They claim that alarger army couldelaying action against armed aggression which would, provide time for assistance to reach Iran from outside. This year's Increased army6 million as opposed lo lastsuggests that an expansion of the army is definitely contemplated or possibly already under way.
Thc armed forces will be appreciably strengthened by US military equipment and supplies which commenced arriving in Iran In February. The material falls short of Iran's original request, however, and consid-
erable additional equipment would be required if the army were increased evenen.
The Shah and the Chief of Stall arc also considering merging thc hulk of thewith thef this merger Isthe army's Influence in civil affairs will be considerably Increased. While the merger could conceivably strengthen the security of Iran by giving more unified direction to the armed forces, the proposal has beenby liberal opposition elementstep toward autocratic control, and (as such it could arouse considerable animosity against thc Shah and thc Chief of Staff. This move would, moreover, readily lend itself toexploitation by the USSR. It might also prejudice the continued existence of the US Military Mission to the gendarmerie, thereby reducing US contacts and influence In Iran.
Iran's armed forces are adequate forinternal order, controlling theand suppressing any dissidents whoSoviet Inspiration might seek to enter Iran by force in order to overthrow the centralor to detach the province offromlong, that is, as these dissident elements are not provided with strong armed support by the USSR. Although the Shah Insists that the army wouldoviet invasion, it Is unlikely that the present Iranian forces could offer more than token resistance If Iran's army were better trained and equipped. It might offer limited delaying action against such an Invasion.if properly trained, organized, and equipped, selected army units could inwith the tribes carry on guerrillaIn areas suitable to this type ofThc scope and the effectiveness of such guerrilla activities would be dependent on the
' The merger was actually effected onay. Under tbe plan (which ls being carried outrial basis and must be authorized by tbe Majlis before It can take permanenthe army assumes command of tbe entire gendarmerie,embers are to be detailed back to thc civilian Ministry of Interior for Uie execution of clril functions.
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and direction supplied by the US or the UK.
4. Foreign Affairs.
a. Relations with the USSR and thc US. Tbe tactics employed by the Soviet Union against Iron during tbc past months have netted the Soviets no tangible benefitstaken by the Iranian Government, on the other hand, have appreciablyIran's ability (at least temporarily) to counter Soviet subversive activities and toSoviet pressures. Iran's continuedto counter these efforts of the USSK will depend. In the long run. on the steps thetakes to improve the lot of the masses and on tbe degree of support given Iran by the US and the UK.
While the USSR has made no furtheron Iran by way of official notes since the series delivered during thc first halft has maintained steady pressure by means of subversive activities and anwar of nerves. Thus the Soviets aided the resurgent Tudeh Party to such an extent that by the end8 It had developederious threat against Iranian stability, and early9 the government seized theprovided by the attack on the Shah to outlaw the party. Free Democratic Azerbaijan Government-Ln-Exile" was formed, according to the Soviet radio, by members of thc defunct autonomous regime ln Azerbaijan who had fled to the USSR. The radio claimed that thc government-in-exile would liberate Azerbaijan anddemocratic" government there. Also, Soviet agents among Kurdish tribes in northwestern Iran and In other areas of the Near andEast have been agitating forurdish national state. The Idea of Kurdish independence bos been played up by the Soviet radio and by clandestinely distributed literature; and it has beenthat thc Barzanl Kurds, who during the latter part7 fled from Iraq through Iran Into the USSR, would return forciblyropitious time. The USSR's war of nerves against Iran consistselentless radio and press campaign against the Shah, thcand US activities in Iran; armed
atlacksnion frontier posts; ostentatious military maneuvers near thc border; anddiplomatic maneuvers.
While the Soviet campaign has causedspeculation and worry, Iron has not been Intimidated by these tactics. Formerly wary of offending the Kremlin, the Iranian Government has not only repudiated with vigor the charges put forth by the Soviet radio and press but has even accused thc Sovietof suppressing Individual freedom within the USSR and has publicized the lna dents along the border. Seven such Incidents have been reported during the past nine months, and they appear to beorenature than previous ones. Ther. forces have resisted all these attacks, and the Iranian high command feels that thc army will continue capable of containing suchand of frustrating any Kurdishmovement.
On the diplomatic front, there Is little doubt that the Soviets have attempted to buildase for invoking Article VI of1 Irano-Sovict Treaty, which permits Soviet forces to enter Iran If It appears that the latter would be usedhird partyase of operations against the USSR- This third party has been Identified as thc US on varioustho scries of Soviet notes delivered to Ironn verbal statements by the Sovietin Tehran, and In newspaper articles and radio broadcasts. Although Iran has denied these allegations, the government lias been concerned over the action which thc USSR might take allegedly under the terms cf thc treaty. The Iranian Government has, however, been reluctant to file with,ecord of Soviet interferencehen the Security Council voted tothe Iranian case on Its agenda. Althoughove by Iran might acteterrent to possible overt action by the USSR andthe US and UK assured Iran of their support hi the Security Council, the Iranians consider that the step would be untimely and might even be provocative to the USSR.
A subsequent exchange of cobra denned th* thud party" aa partisan* of the former regimeoreign power seeldne restoration o! Hint leclme.
While Soviet pros* and radio allegationsUS activities in Iran suggest that the Soviet Union is still intent on establishing the applicability of1 treaty to the current situation, the treaty probably will not beal this lime. Reluctance to Invoke It may be attributed to the Soviet's concern over international reactions, and theirot the spuriousness of their claims. Nevertheless, the possibility of Soviet military Intervention can never be ruled out altogether.
There are several other developments whichearing on current relations between the two countries. The Iranian Government inotified the USSR that therepresentation of the two countries must be placedeciprocal basis. The USSRthe Iranian Government In March that, because of Iran's hostile attitude, lt wasall its consulates In Iran at once andthat Iran lake similar action. Soviet intentions are, however, obscured by the fact that thus far the USSR has proceeded to close but four of its eleven consulates and has given no indication that It will close the remainder. Iran has only one consulate In the USSR (athis it continues to maintain."
iew to eliminating one possible cause, or excuse, for Incidents along the Soviet-Iranian border, the Iranian Government In early April considered requesting that the two governments Jointly undertake to delimit those parts of the frontier wliich arc in dispute. No action has yet been taken In this matter.
The departure of the Soviet Ambassador for Moscow in April may be without specialbut it is considered likely that the Kremlin Is engaged in re-examining Soviet-Iranian relations for the purpose ofwhat tactics may be most effectively cm-ployed against Iran.
During recent months the Iranianhas looked more and more to others for support against possible Soviet action.spurred by the North Atlantic Treaty, it has consklcred strengthening the Saadabad Pact andore extensive regional
* The Iranian Foreign Minister hureaa conference ihat according to an agreement between Iran and the USSR. Uie re-specUve consulates of both rounlrici will be closed.
pact, increased US aid has been its chiefThe Shah, the Chief of Staff, and other leaders have again and again cited the strategic importance of Iran and. Its present vulnerability In an effort to obtain military aid from the US comparable to that given Turkey so that the strength and efficiency of thc army may be increased. Recently the Prime Minister personallyritten appeal to the US for various categories of aid aimed at Increasing the general welfare of the Iranian people. Thus the Iranianwhile expressing gratitude for USmentioning Iran specifically as aIn which the US Ls concerned, Ls constantly asking for more tangible evidence that US Interest In the security of Iran Ls sufficient touarantee against Soviet aggression.
with the UK.
British policy toward Iran continues to be generally in accord with that of the US, the UK strongly supporting US efforts to build up Iranian resistance to Soviet pressures.protracted negotiations between the UK and Iran concerning the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (the UK's primary Interest in Iran) have so far been Inconclusive, It Isthat agreement will eventually be reached greatly Increasing Iran's revenues from the company's operations. The British feared that their second most importantin the country, the Imperial Bank of Iran, might have to close its doors In view of stringent legislation proposed by the Governor of thc Bank Melli (thc National Bank ofn agreement has been reached with the Iranian Government, however, which will enable the bank to continue to function
with Other Middle
Iran's relations with its neighbors continue to be friendly. Agreement has now been reached on the employment of neutral experts to make recommendations for distributing the Helmand Riverroblem which has caused recurrent friction between Iran and Afghanistan.
The matter of sub-surface mineral rights in the Persian Gulf has still to be settled by the littoral countries. Thc possibility of a
violent icactlon In Iran. If the Saudi Arabian Government had issued without prior advice toroclamation on its claim, has been diminished by Iran's preparationimilar claim for its aide of the Gulf.
5. Probablo Future Developments
The relatively high degree of Interna]now prevailing in Iran is expected toGovernment stability will probably be maintained at Its present level, and greater administrative efficiency may result frommeasures aimed at speeding up theof the Majlis. While the government will continue In the hands of the presentgroups, the Shah Is expected to exert greater control than ln the past Somewill be made In enacting long-delayed social legislation and In blue-printing the seven-year economic Improvement program, but serious delays may well develop In tbe execution of new laws and in theof the seven-year program. Should these delays be protracted, the Tudeh movement, which remainsowerful force, and other subversive elements will gain ln strength. They vrlllertile field for their activities ln growing popular discontent,among thc unemployed ln Industrial areas and among the people of Azerbaijan, where dissatisfaction with thc centralhas long existed.
Recent Soviet actions have further obscured the USSR's Immediate intentions toward Iran-While thc USSR's Iranian policy Is probably undergoing review by the Kremlin with the aid o! Ambassador SadchJkov. any new tactics decided upon are not likely to be set lnuntil the outcome of the Conference of Foreign Ministers at Parts becomes manifest.
It may be expected, however, that the USSR will maintain its support of the Tudeh Party and other subversive elements and will carry on Its propaganda directed towardtbc Iranian Government It will continue to promote nationalism among the Kurds and secesslontsm among the Azcrbaljants. One of Its principal Immediate objectives willto be the elimination of US Influence In Iran and the re-establlshmcnt of Sovietln the northern part of theIt may Increase Its military attacks along the Iranian frontier and Its military operations In areas north of the border. The likelihood, however, of an armed Invasion and of theof Azerbaijan and other northern provinces still seems remote, although theof such drastic action cannot be ruled out altogether.
Iran will continue to resist Soviet pressure successfully, barring large-scale armedThc Iranian Government will strengthen Its alignment with the Western Powers, provided it Is sufficiently encouraged. Iran win, however, continue to be extremely sensitive to any fluctuations In US Interest and support. II will persist ln Its appeal foraid, especiallyilitary natureto that allotted Turkey. (It may also explore further the possibilities ofegionalacking sufficientfrom the US and UK, Iranolicy of neutrality or even feelto enterisadvantageouswith the USSR.
control of Azerbaijan, which contains one-fifth of Iran's population and Is Ita prtndpal food-producing area, would seriously endanger Iran's existence as an Independent state.
Original document.
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