COPT BO.
FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR TOR REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
EFFECTS. FOREIGN MILITARY AID PROGRAM
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EFFECTS. FOREIGN MILITARY AID PROGRAM THE PROBLEM
the purposes of (his problem It is assumed that:
orth Atlantic Pact providingystem of collective security embracing the United States. Canada, and the Brussels Pact Powers, and perhaps also Norway, Denmark, Iceland. Ireland. Portugal, and Italy, will be consummated
uring0 limited US military aid will be provided to the Europeanof the Pact, and also to Austria. Greece, Turkey. Iran. Korea, and thethe amount and type of aid being governed, in each case, by limitations upon available US resources and the absorptive capacily of the recipient.
foreign military aid program thus Initiated could not be expected toWestern Europe, sufficient military strength to oppose and delay materially ainvasion until sometime during the.
ECA program will continue without serious interference by theprogram
direction, we estimate herein:
effect of the US foreign mibtary aid program assumed above on:
he will of the recipients to resist aggression by the USSR or itshc ability of theaintain their internal security and political Integrity.
he intentions and future action of the USSR.
the effectS failure to provide such aid during
DISCUSSION
considerations affecting the psychological response of the recipientsassumed military aid program are discussed in Appendixhe effect onrecipients in Appendixnd the probable Soviet reaction in Appendix
CONCLUSIONS
US military aid progrum and, more importantly, lhe Atlantic Pactresistance lo Soviet aggression insofar as they are recognizedasisfor the eventual achievement of real peace and security. Inasmuch as ihey
Note: This report has Ken concurred in by lhe InMUfccncB organlsuUoRs-of theIA
afford no immediate assurance of security, this effect will be in some degree offset by widespread popular apprehension that they involve grave risk ofar between the United States and the USSR. In any case, the will to resist is unlikely to outrun the visible means of resistance.
In general, the prospective recipients of US military aid are less interested in the amount of direct aid to themselves than in the over-all strength of thc combination achieved through the rearmament of its principal members and particularly inof prompt and effective U3 military intervention in their defense if need be.
If. however. US military aid were to be withheld, this default would be regardedreach of faith and would tend to undermine confidence In any assurances of US support explicit or implicit In the Pact. This disillusionment would affect adversely the will to resist Soviet aggression.
US military aid is essential to the maintenance of Internal security and politicalustria, Qreece. and Korea. Elsewhere it is not essential for that purpose although it would be of appreciable benefit in France, Italy, and Iran.
The Pact and military aid program will neither convince thc USSR of the futility or its present tactics nor provoke preventive war. The immediate Soviet reaction will probably be an intensification of Soviet and Communist effort in forms currently familiar with the purpose of preventing the accomplishment of their intended effect.
APPENDIX "A
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
The effect of the assumed military assistance program would be primarilyBy the terms of tne assumptions thc material effect would not be appreciable except with respect to internal security in some countries. Inasmuch as the program itself would not guarantee the security of the recipient states, the psychological effect would depend on whether it and the Atlantic Pact were regarded as an essential step toward the achievement ol peace and security or merely as preparationew war.
None ol the assumed recipients ol US military aid would willingly submit to Soviet domination and all realize that their existing individual and collective weakness invites Soviet political, and possibly military, aggression. On this account, all would have reason to welcome US aid In rearmament and, more importantly, the assurance of active US rrulilary support explicit and implicitollective security pact In thoughtful opinion it would be realized that, while the Pact and program afforded no Imrnediate guarantee against Invasion and hostile occupation, they would constitute an essential first step toward the development of an effective system ol collective defense which might deter Soviet aggression and that only by this means was there any apparent hope for thc ultimate achievement Of peace and security.
It would also be realized, however, that this Mist step could not lie lakeil without incurring Soviet dlsp:easure and the risk of Involvement in war.he interim before hopes and promises could be transformed into actual strength. Most of the countries concerned have had bitter experience of war and hostile occupation. The resultopular dread of involvement in war. This sense of insecurity cannoi be overcome by paper plans for future security or implicit promises ol eventualif war and hostile occupation should come first. This psychological obstacle inhibits response to anything lessonvincing guarantee ol immediate security.
One consequence of this psychosisisposition to "let George (totate such as Denmark or Iceland, helpless In any case, can avoid lhe risks ol participationcheme n! colleillve security and still receiveun da mental benefits insofar as the participation of others sieves to stabilize Ihc general situation In Greece iL can be felt that the struggle is essentially between the United Sates and the USSR, withystander caught in the crossfire In general application thii idea provides an excuse for apathy in the supposition that the United States, thc only possessor of real power in the non-Communist world, should bear the responsibility for curbing the USSR and Uie attendant risks.
Even wheie govcrr.nienis. more fanighted tn this matter, acrepl responsibility to contribute lo the common cause, ihey will do soigh sense o: hit nig accepted grave risks In consequence they will not regard US military aidiututty, but
rather as well deserved quid prohe aid received should full short of their cxpectatlons, there would be not only disappointment,endency to doubt the validity ot their reliance on US support and to consider whether Sweden had not chosen the better course.
rance, in particular, has peculiar psychological reasons, derivedense of former power and present helplessness, for demanding special consideration and deference and the reassurance of the actual po&seasior. of renewed military strength. But most of the European recipients are small states king accustomed to depending for security on the protection of greater powers or committed in principle to hope for the eventual achievement of an effective system of collective security. These states are less interested in direct military aid to themselves (given some token amount) than in the over-all strength o: the combination achieved through the rearmament of itsmembers. In particular, they would probably derive more reassurance from the existence of US military strength capable of prompt intervenUon In Europe than from military aid to themselves. They would be reassured by the existence of such strength, not merely In the expectation of Its Intervention In their defense If need be, but in the hope that Its existence would prevent the need for Its intervention from arising.
APPENDIX "B" EFFECTS ON PARTICULAR RECIPIENTS
United Kingdom.
A British determination to resist Soviet aggression already exists, but British thought on this subject assumes the support of the United Slates as well as that of the Commonwealth. British ability to resist ls dependent on US support; in particular, British resources cannot be further diverted to reannamcnt without prejudice to economic recovery. Moreover, the United Kingdom is concerned lo promote the defensive organization and rearmament of Western Europeeans of enhancing British security. For these reasons the United Kingdom, whatever its independent determination to resist, would be greatly encouraged by the consummation of an Atlantic Pact and the InitiationS foreign military aid program, noi only because of direct benefits, but also because of the general strengthening of Western Europe and above all because of implicit as well as explicit assurances of continuing US support.
Conversely, US failure tooreign military assistance program, for whatever reason, wouldiscouraging effect on the United Kingdom and might leadeconsideration of British poUcy.
The maintenance of British internal security and political integrity is not ln doubt.
The consummation of an Atlantic Part and the receipt of US military aid would encourage French resistance to Soviet aggression. The will to resist, however, would not outrun the visible means of resistance. The French would oppose political pressure, but would not accept serious risk of war while Incapable ol preventing the Invasion of France, whatever the assurance of eventual liberation.
The French armed forces are presently capable ofommunistbut only after considerable damage had been done. To the extent that US military aid made possible the prompter accomplishment of this task it would reduce the damage and perhaps prevent resort to violence. Accordingly the receipt of such aid would tend to render thc government's attitude more firm, to relieve popularand to stimulate economic recovery.
If US military aid were to be withheld or were lo fall short of expectations, the French would be disappointed and discouraged, and would become correspondingly reluctant to antagonize the USSR. The French would still resist actual attack on Western Union countries, but In these circumstances their resistance would be affected by low morale as well as material shortages.
l
These states are already disposed lo resist Soviet aggression, bul must depend on the support of greater powers. Insofar as the Atlantic Pact and US military aid prn-
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gram gave promise of an eventually effective system of collective security, they would be encouraged.
Thc Internal security and political integrity of these countries Is not seriously threatened- As in France, US military aid would serve to render the situation more secure, with beneficial effects.
These states are as much interested In US military aid to Great Britain and France as they are in direct aid to themselves. If such aid were to be withheld, they would be deeply discouraged, but would still tend to follow the British lead.
4. Mom way.
Norway is disposed to resist Soviet aggression in any case. Insofar as the Atlantic Pact and military aid program gave assurance of prompt and effective support, this disposition would be encouraged. Norway would be reluctant, however, to riskthe USSR without greater assurance In these respects than Is apparent in the assumptions
US mlllUry aid Is not required for the maintenance of Norwegian Internal security and political integrity, although such aid would, of course, render the situation more secure.
Norway would be little Influencedenial ot US aidonsequence of its own failure to adhere to the Atlantic Pact, but would be greatly discouragedenial of aid to the actual signatories- If. having signed the Pact at the risk of provoking the USSR. Norway were denied appreciable aid. the political repercussions within that country would be severe.
5 DlMMAIK.
Denmark's will to resist Soviet aggression is qualifiedense of the futility of armed resistance in the event of war. The Pact and program would encourageto the extent that thry served to stabUlte thc situation, but would not be likely to alter the Danish appreciation of the prospectsuccessful defense of Denmark in the event of attack.
US military aid is not required for the maintenance of Danish internal security and military integrity The Danes, however, expect it in return for then- complaisance respecting Greenland, regardless of their position with respect to the Atlantic Pact. They would be greatly discouraged by denial of aid to the major signatories of the Atlantic Pact
ICIXANll
fceland'a will to resist Soviet aggression is irrelevant in the total absence of any capability of doing so. Thc existence of an Atlantic Pact with Scandinavianhowever, would facilitate Icelandic cooperation with respect lo US determination lo resist Soviet aggression against Iceland
Iceland has no effective security forces There is no serious internal threat to Icelandic security and political Integrity, but the country is vulnerablelandestine
TOP^CRCT
Some military aid might Improve this situation, but not greatly in the absence of effective organisation for utilizing it Denial of aid would not alter the Status quo.
The Iruh will to resist Soviet aggression is beyond question and requires no encouragement The Inah position would be rendered more secure by the Fact and program, with or without Irish participation. No US military aid is required for the maintenance of Irish internal security and poliUcal integrity. Denial of such aid to Ireland would be without appreciable effect Denial of aid to the major signatories of the Atlantic Pact, however, would give Ireland reason for some concern.
8. PORTUUAL.
The Portuguese will to resist Soviet aggression and ability to maintain Internal security are not dependent on US military aid, but would be strengthened by lt. Denial of aid would not materially affect Uie situaUon in these respects.
will o! the Italian people to resist Soviet aggression is compromised by their fear of involvement in another war, particularly in the absence of effective means of self-derense The Pact and program would encourage Italian resistance lo Soviet political pressure and Communist subversion, but the Italians would remain unlikely lo Ughtill In any war unless rearmed, convincingly assured of prompt and decisive US support, and directly attacked
As in Prancehe Italian armed forces are capable of suppressing ainsurrection, but only after severe damage had been done To the extent that US military aid enhanced their capabilities in this respect, its results would be beneficial.
Denial of US military aid to Italy or to the major signatories of the Atlantic Pact would be extremely dwcouraging to non-Communist Italians and would influence them towardoncommittal attitude.
10 Austria
Austrian will to resist Soviet aggression is meaningless in the absence of effective means. Even for the maintenance of internal security and political Integrity Austria is dependent on the presence of Western occupation forces or on sufficient US military aid to permit the establishment of an effective security force. Denial of aid in one form or the other would probably result In the eventual Soviet domination of Austria despite the anti-Communism of the Austrian people.
11 GttFLct:
The Oreeks arc noworm of Soviet aggression Their morale is adversely affected by the absence of decisive Jesuits, but, with US support as at present, iheir
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resistance may be expected to continue. Any reduction of US aid might haveeffect. Some increase may be required to maintain the status quo.
The Turkish will to resist Soviet aggression and ability to maintain internalare not dependent on US military aid, but have been strengthened by it. The implications of the Atlantic Pact and the developmentystematic program ofaid would afford further encouragement to thc Turks provided they were assured that there would be no consequent diminution of US support for Turkey.eduction or denial of US aid would be discouraging in effect. If the entire aidwere rejected, or If essential aid were denied to Greece and Iran, so that Turkey became isolated, that country might be compelled eventually to submit to some form of accommodation with the USSR.
The will of Iran to resist Soviet aggression Is more dependent on confidence in US political and military support than on the receipt of any specific amount of military aid. Such aid would strengthen Iran's ability to maintain Internal security and tend to reassure Iran with respectontinuation of US support in the broader sense. Conversely, denial of aid would have adverse effect in both respects and. Insofar as it undermined Iranian confidence in US support, might cause Iran to hedge in itswith the United States and the USSR.
US military aid is essential to the maintenance of Internal security and political integrity In South Korea and the will to resist North Korean invasion or Infiltration. More than this is not to be expected. Denial ol such aid would probably result in eventual Soviet control of all Korea,
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Philippines.
The Philippines depend on the United States for protection from Soviet aggression. Some further military aid would facilitate the maintenance of internal security. Such aid is expected, and its denial would have unfavorable political repercussions.
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APPENDIX "C" SOVIET REACTION TO THE ASSUMED PROGRAM
The members of Ihehere at once the directors of an international revolutionary movement and Lhe rulers of the USSR. Their ultimate objectiveommunist world order under their own domination To achieve this goal they can employ with equal facility the apparatus of international Communism or the power of the Soviet state, whichever is better suited to the need of the moment, each with the implicit support of the other.
In Stalinist doctrine, the function of militant Conununism is toissolution of capitalist society expected, with "scientific" certitude, as the inevitable consequence of that society's inherent contradictions, and the role of the USSR is to provide, during theecure base and powerful support for international Communism. In this concept the Kremlin's primary instrument of aggression is the internationalmovement, to which the war-making power of the Soviet state is essentially auxiliary.
J The Kremlin, however, pursues its endsorld in which power politics it the prevailing mode of international relations It expects capitalistic states to resort to war raiher than submit lo subversion or dissolution Consequently, in Its conduct of political and subversive operations, the Kremlin must keep constantly in view the strategic position of Uie USSR In relationonstant possibility of armed attack and must view the conduct of non-Communist states in the same light.
t Is estimated that. In present circumstances, the Kremlin Is content to pursue its ends by normal Communist techniques and is unlikely to resort to open militaryIt has at present no compelling reason to resort to war. It has reason lo avoid war in the still vastly superior war-making potential of the non-Communist world and In exclusive US possession of the atomic bomb. The consideration most likely to cause the Kremlin deliberately to resort to war would be conviction that an attack on Die USSR was actually in preparation and Impossible to prevent by other means. The problem is whether consummation of an Atlantic Pact and adoptionelated US foreign military aid program on the scale envisaged would convince the Kremlin of the futility ol its present tactics, leadingetente In international relations, or convince the Kremlin that an attack on the USSR was actually in preparation, leadingreventive war on Soviet Initiative, or confirm the Kremlin's adherence to Itspolicy and cause an Inlenslflcalion of its current efforts.
5 In the eyes of the Kremlin the Pact and program would appear to confirm the validity of Communist doctrine regarding the conduct lo be expectedapitalistic society in its imperialistic stage The military aid program would be taken, like ERP.
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reflect lhe Imperative necessity ofociety (the United Stales) lo sustain its economy through exports. Regardless of the defensive terms employed, the Pact and program together would be interpreted as essentially hostile toward the USSR
Thc Kremlin would seriously consider whether the Pact and program constituted specific preparation lor eventual atlaek on lhe USSR. If their implementation were to include such specific actions as, for example, the construction of heavy bomber bases In Norway, the Kremlin might conceivably consider Its apprehensions confirmed and deem it vital to prevent such developments, by force if they could not be prevented by other means. If, however, no more definite threat developed, the Kremlin would probably regard the danger as still potential rather than Immediate In view of the time and effort required lo make the Atlantic Powers capableecisive attack on the Soviet Union, and the possibilities for counteraction during the interval. Soviet counteraction on the basis of this appreciation would be political, psychological, and subversive in character If (in Communlsl reckoning) this policy served only to delay, rather than to prevent. Inevitable conflict, the delay would be advantageous in permit ting the further development of Soviet power and lhe further undermining of that of the enemy. Except as attack may appear Imminent and unavoidable, the Kremlin haa no reason totrategy successful hitherto, and conceived to becertain of ultimate success, to accept the doubtful arbitrament of war.
Thc consummation of an Atlantic Pact and adoptionS foreign military aid program, then, will neither convince the USSR of the futility of its present tactics nor provoke it to Immediate preventive war. The immediate effect will be an intenslfl-ratlon of Communist effort in forms alreudy familiar wilh the purpose of nullifying and defeating the Pact and program. These efforts would Include:
of theiew to exploiting thefor peace and confusing Western opinion by identifying the USSR as anation and the United States aa an "imperialistic warmonger" Thisalso seek to iindermine support for the program in the United States andappropriations.
attack on the Pact in landedsuade Europeanevice of US imperialism designed to impair their national sovereigntyinvolve themew war for US benefit.
e. Pressure on peripheral statesorway, Italy. Iran) to prevent thento the Pact or acceptance of US aid (The pressure might involve risk of war if the USSR were to miscalculate Western determination lo resist.)
Intended lo arouse mutual Jealousy and distrust among theespecially with reference lo the apportionment of military aid under
consolidation of Soviet control in Eastern Europe, including theannouncementorresponding defense pact
these efforts failed to prevent the successful lmplerrientation of the Pact and program, the Kremlin would still not be obliged either to abandon its basic purposes or to resort to preventive war. II could still continue Its efforts to obstruct and retard Western European stabilization nnd recovery. Whenever convinced that these tactics had become unprofitable. It couldetente ln Europe on terms Intended tothe long-term development of Soviet strength. Accustomed to the idea of an ebb and flow In thc tide of revolutionary opportunity, thc Kremlin would regardtabllutation of the European situation as merely temporary and preliminaryew crisis of capitalism opening the way to new revolutionary advances supported by an ever more powerful USSR.
If the assumed US military aid were to be withheld from the prospective recipients, the USSR would take advantage of the ensuing disillusionment in its efforts to extend Its hegemony by all political, psychological, and subversive means.
-SONFIDCNTIAL-
Original document.
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