COPT NO. 9S
FOR THE DEPUTT DIRTCTOR OF CENTRAL [NTELLICESCE
CONSEQUENCES OF US TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM KOREA IN9
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CONSEQUENCES OF US TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM KOREA IN9
SUMMARY
Withdrawal of US forces from Korea In the spring9 would probably In time be followed by an invasion, timed to coincide with Communist-led South Korean revolts, by the North Korean People's Army possibly assisted by small battle-trained units from Communist Manchuria. Although It can be presumed that South Korean security forces will eventually develop sufficient strength to resist such an/invasion, they will not have achieved that capability by the springt is unlikely that such strength will be achieved beforessuming that Korean Communists would make aggressive use of the opportunity presented them, US troop withdrawal would probably resultollapse of the US-supported Republic of Korea, an event which would seriously diminish US prestige and adversely affect US security Interests In the Far East,
In contrast, continued presence In Koreaoderate US force, would not only discourage the threatened Invasion but would assist In sustaining the will and ability of the Koreans themselves to resist any future invasion once they had the military force to do so and, by sustaining the new Republic, maintain US prestige in the Far East
Koto: Tbc intelligence organIzaUons of the Departments of State, Navy, and the Air Force have concurred In Una report.issent by the intelligence Division, Department of the Army, see Enclosure A, p.he InformaUon herein is as ofebruary
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CONSEQUENCES OF US TROOP WTTHDltAWAL FROM KOREA IN9 Assumptions:
Final US troop withdrawal would begin before
Economic and military aid, to the extent presently projected would continue; S. Continued antagonism between northern and southern Koreansegree
onstant danger of open hostilities.
Despite tbe real progress toward stability that has been achieved by the Republic of Korea In both political and military fields. It is doubtful if the Republic couldithdrawal of US troops in the immediate future. While Korean security forces now have the capability of maintaining Internal security In the face of opposition from strong and efficient underground Communist forces in South Korea (seehey arc neither sufficiently trained nor sufficiently experienced to undertake actions requiring coordination on regimental and brigade levels. Such coordinated action would be necessary against the large-scale border penetrations and simultaneous coun-Internal disorders which would undoubtedly follow the withdrawal of US troops. In the face of combined Invasion and uprising, in which local Communists and the North Koreans People's Army might have the assistance of battle-trained Communist units from Manchuria, as well as Soviet aid and advice, the maximum capability of Korean security forces would be control of certain isolated urban and rural areas.arge turnover of personnel resulting from the recently instituted screening system calculated to rid the ranks of Infiltrating Communists, thc Army has added anumber of recruits In the past few months and has nowtrengthhe present schedule calls for completion of all basic, battalion, andtrainingt Is estimated that an additional six months, at least, will be necessary to develop proficiency with organic equipment in large-scale field operations. Additional training in countering guerrilla techniques would enable the security forces to deal more effectively with large-scale Communist Infiltratioris. Completion of such additional training would be necessary before any appreciable ability to resist Invasion could be guaranteed.
If US troops are withdrawn before the security forces ol the Republic of Korea achieve such capabilities, they will not inspire confidence among their people, and until thc people possess thispirit of defeatism will grow; popular support of the government will diminish, and its will to resist Communist encroachment will be undermined. Although Soviet propaganda has been able to exploit the inherent Korean sentiment against foreign Interference, the majority of thinking Koreans in the South have come to accept the continued presence of US troopsondition necessary to free survival.
Thc presence of the American Mission In Koreand the United Nations Commission on Koreafter thc withdrawal of US troops, would mitigate
' AMIK Includes the IMplumaUc Mission, the fcCA Mission, and the Provisional Military Advisory GroupMIK Is generally responsible Tor supply and training of the Korean security force.
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the adverse effects of the withdrawal on the will of the southern Koreans to resist Communist revolts and Invasions. Their presence probably would not. however,the disintegration of the Republic of Korea and eventual CommunistS troops are withdrawn before the Korean security forces are capable ofombination of external and internal attacks.
i. Effects ik Jatan and Southeast Asia.
and Psychological.
The political and psychological consequences of US troop withdrawal from Korea would be felt most acutely In Japan Although many Japanese may anticipate eventual Communist dciniinatlon of all Koreaogical development, the Impact of actuality would be considerable. Japanese fear of Communist power would increase aiong with doubts ot US willingness or ability to defendhe Japan Communist Party would be strengthened by easier communication with Communist forces across the Tsushima straits and by the adherence of opportunistic converts. Similar political and psychological effects would followesser degree In other Far Eastern countries. Croups who have received or hoped for US support might question the sincerity of US Intentions to oppose Communism and might feel forced to collaborate with heartened native Communists andore moderate attitude toward the USSR.
Assuming that US troop withdrawal meant consolidation of Communistover all Korea, the USSR would be able to develop bases in thc South from which they could launch air, airborne, or amphibious attacks on Japan, Formosa, and the Ryukyus, or submarine forays against shipping In Japanese waters.
Economic consequences, as such, would be unimportant. Japan wouldotential small market for industrial goodsotential producer of rice. The USSR would gain an additional source of unskilled labor for projects In the Soviet Far East. The potential contribution of consumer goods, particularly textiles, might also enhance the total productive effort of an integrated Korean-Manchurian-Soviet Far East economy.
d Propaganda.
US troop withdrawal would, of course, enhance the US position by weakening Soviet propaganda on the issue of Imperialism and aggression, but It would subject Koreans to inevitable terror propaganda that would play upon their Isolated position in the Far East. Furthermore, it must be realized that the probable subsequentof thc Republic of Korea wouldews item of such magnitude as to offset any favorable propaganda effects that had been achieved cither in Korea or in the Far East generally.
"Trie deep concern aroused In Japan over the recent newipaper reports that the OS might wiUidraw troops fromample ot the reaction mat would follow US troop Withdrawal from Korea. The concernithdrawal from Korrn. of course, would not be as treat aa thatS withdrawal from Japan.
2.
Effects on US Security.
Withdrawal of US troops stationed in South Korea would permit consolidation of US Far Eastern troop strength in the home islands of Japan and also eliminate the danger of having some forces in an untenable position in the event of hostilities with the USSR Against this gain, however, must be weighed thc fact that suchwould allow Immediate exploitation of South Korea by the USSR. Bases built there before the outbreak of hostilities would greatly assist Soviet forces In their war task of Interdicting US positions in Japan, the Ryukyus, and the Philippines- In other Far Eastern countries, US withdrawal could and probably would be interpreted asand might further contribute to the fundamental realignment of forces In the Far East In favor of the Soviet Union for "practical reasons."
iscussion of Korean strategic and economic problems and of the contribu-
APPENDIX
Korea's Strategic Value
Consideration*.
A major military power holding Korea would beavorable position to dominate the Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea, and the Oulf of Chlhll, to threaten the Soviet Maritime Province and southern Manchuria by ground attack; to threaten Japan and adjacent mainland areas by air, airborne, and amphibious attack, ana to threaten targets deep within the USSR and China by long-range air attack. The Soviet Union, by means of interior lines of communication and relative proximity to sources of supply couldilitary position In Korea at much less cost and effort than could the US.
Southern Korea's strategic importance to thc US rests principally on thc fact that its denial to the USSR prior to an outbreak of general hostilities would prevent thc development of advanced bases from which Soviet forces could threaten or neutralize US operational bases in Japan and the Ryukyus Immediately upon any outbreak of hostilities. Such value as southern Korea would haveefensive or offensive US base after the start of war with the USSR would, however, tend to be negated to the US by the scope of military operations required to hold andosition there. Unless the US strategic plan permitted employment ot the major forces necessary toase there, any US force present in southern Korea at the outbreak of hostilities would have to be written off or evacuated.
Thc present function of US troops in South Korea is purely psychological but no less important for that reason. Aside from the entirely unlikely event that the USSR would be willing to risk war over the Issue of Korea, it is most Improbable, so long as US forces are present, that Soviet troops would participate In an invasion of South Korea. It is similarly less likely that the North Koreans themselves, with or without other Communist aid, would make war on the South. It Is obvious, however, that should an invasion take place despite their presence, US forces would either have to furnish active assistance to the South Korean Republic or be withdrawn, with serious loss of US prestige.
In the absence of US troops. It is highly probable that northern Koreans alone, or northern Koreans assisted by other Communists, would invade southern Korea and subsequently call upon the USSR for assistance. Soviet control or occupation ofKorea would be the result.
The armed forces of southern Korea, although completely dependent on the US for training and logistic support, are of considerable strategic significance to the US insofar as they enhance the security of Japan. If fully developed, the Korean Army could, by Itself, deny southern Korea's exploitationommunist offensive
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base in the period prior to an open sit.irk by cither major units of the Chineseforces or by the USSR. The security of US bases in Japan would thus be enhanced while the strain on US manpower Involved In occupying southern Korea would be decreased. Furthermore, If thc Korean Army were specially trained inwarfare techniques, it might continue to serve US strategic interests by carrying on guerrilla warfareoviet occupation.
c- Economic Importance.
Southern Korea,eparate entity apart from northern Korea,eficit economy andiability to the US. The area can supply no strategic raw materials other than small amounts of tungsten and graphite. Only the Intensive application of imported chemical fertilizers can bring about thc surplus rice production which would increase Korean economic and political stability as well as contribute to the feeding ot US-occupied Japan. Industrial production, presently Insufficient for domesticIs confined mainly to consumer goods. It Is not of strategic value to the US except lo thc degree that rehabilitation and development may reduce the economic strain on the US Involved in sustaining the economy.
Southern Korea is of some potential economic significance to the US In that Integration of the economy of the Republic of Korea with economies of Japan, Formosa, and the Philippine Islands could resultreater degree of economic stability in all thc countries conccrned-
d. Political Importance.
Survival of the Republic of Korea in the southern sine Is strategicallyto the US. The Republic not only serveseterrent to physical Infiltration of Communist agents Into Japan but, more Important, represents for the Japanese and other nationals In the Farymbol of US determination to resist further encroachments of Communist forces In eastern Asia. The Republic of Korea Is oneevidence that the US Is sincere In Its professions of support for the struggle of the Far Eastern world against Communism. Thc continued survival of the Republic of Korea would be proof to thc peoples of thc Far East that Conununist domination is not inevitable and would lessen the psychological impact of the fall of China.
US tactical forces In Korea now numbers opposed to thc original force ofheir task has been reduced or has been turned over to Indigenous institutions as the latter developed strength and efficiency. US troops today are only concerned with servingimited reserve which might be used to assist Korean security forces in maintaining Internal order andeterrent to, but not an absolute guarantee against, an overt invasion by northern Korean forces; and. most Important, as concrete and visible evidence to the Korean Army and to the Korean people generally that the US continues to support their government against threatened Communist domination.
Army force* In Korea are not charted, except indirectly, with awlsUnrforces In maintaining internal order. Uniteday Intervene to maintain internal order Inrotect US nationals or0nIy "or it required
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ENCLOSURE "A"
DISSENT BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
The Intelligence Division, Department of the Army, dissents fromonsequences of US Troop Withdrawal from Korea inhe Intelligence Division does not believe that US troop withdrawal would be the major factor In the collapse of the Republic of Korea. Neither does tbe Intelligence Division believe that "such withdrawal would allow immediate exploitation of South Korea by the USSR."
The Intelligence Division believes that an Invasion of South Korea by the North Korean People's Armyossibility at present, and recognizes that theof such an Invasion will Increase somewhat, following the departure of United States troops. However, tbe intelligence Division considers that an Invasion Is aratherrobability, for thc following reasons:
short of Invasion might bring about the result desired byand, presumably, Soviet authorities, without Incurring the risks involved inoperation. Such action could Include the instigation of Communist-ledin South Korea, thc infiltration into the south of armed and trainedguerrillas, and continuation of border incidents onh parallel.
People's Army stillelatively small, although well trainedmilitary force. At present it does not have, of itself, the preponderanceover South Korean military forces which would be required to Insurean armed struggle. Tbc People's Army,orce In being, may well beNorth Korean authorities to have greater valueonstant threat than ifilitary adventure which conceivably could result In Its defeat orof Its strength without proportionate returns.
The Intelligence Division concludes, for the reasons cited above, that anof South Korea by North Korean forcesossibility ratherrobability at the present time; and further, that this state will continue until such time as South Korean military forces arc reduced totate as to render them Incapable ofsignificant North Korean military action.
Further, it is thc belief of the Intelligence Division that political and economic factors other than the presence or absence of United States troops willecisive influence on the future course of events In Korea, and that thc continued maintenancemall United States Army force in South Korea would beelatively minor psychological contribution to the stability of the Republic of Korea. If continuedand military aid to the Republic of Korea, to the extent presently projected, plus the presencenited Nations Commission, are not sufficient to sustain South Korean morale and will to resist Communist expansion, it appears doubtful that the presencemall United States combat force would do so.
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Original document.
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