CENTRAL. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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Director;,Office.of European Affai
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SSIAN ^TT-rOWMUNISTTHE GERMAN_WAR
I INTRODUCTION
Once tbe German Army had been unable toomplete military victory ln the Eaet In the opening weeks of the war, lt became clear that Oormany would have toong, hard struggle to crush Russian resistance. It was equally clear that Germany lacked the military strength and manpower to Imposeoclslon by military means alone. Even with the total mobilization of German manpower and the use of all the available human resources of the European continent, Germany was unable to raise sufficient troops to carry.out military operations and at. the same time guard its lines of communication and maintain order ln the occupied areas, it wae obvious that ollltery action would have to be accompanied by parallel political and psychological warfare.
The groundwork for psychological warfare already existed in the hatredarge portion of the Russian population, and particularly the peasants, felt toward the Soviet regime. They were prepared to side with the Germans provided German leadershiplear political policy which would take Into account the desires of the population, and the peculiarities of the Russian situation. Tens of thousands of Russian prlsoners-of-war volunteered for service against the Red Army, while ln tbe early fighting the. rate of desertion ln the Red Army waa exceptionally high, and the peaeant population in the villages welcomed the Germans as liberators.
The Germans, however, were unable or unwilling to use this opportunity. Hitler's colonial policy based on the exploitation of the Russian areas ao Germany's "IndlaV
Slickly turned the Rus.slan population against the* Germans, le Hitler policy also necessitated the continuation of the 'collective farm system In order to facilitate this The failure of the Germane to liquidate thefarma more than any other single factor turned the peasants against the invaders and led to their support of-the Partisan Movement. This revulsion on tho part ofthe people? of the Soviet Union waa further hastened by tho brutal, and overbearing attitude of the Nazi occupation ithorltlea who treated them as Inferior beings.
Another factor in the Oerman attitude'which prevented full utilization of anti-Soviet forces within. waa the baalc Nazi fear that any Russian force which they created to fight against Stalin might in the end turn against them andefender of the Russiangainstithin even these limitations the Germans
might have made some headway had they ever been able to establish any single policy toward Ruosla. Instead various government agencies, as well as the German militaryimprovised policy as they went along, thus adding to the confusion and hastening the Oerman defeat. Only inhe Germans finally decided, far too late,
that the war ln the East could only be won If the Russian people were convinced that lt waaar directed against them,ar to free them from their Communist leadership. The effort which Himmler made to use. theof the former Soviet General Andrei Vlassov for this end proved abortive, and the'Vlaseov Movement waa engulfed and destroyed ln the over-all German defeat.
II OERHANI'S LOST OPPORTUNITX
As early asigh official ln the Oatmlnlsterlum (Ministry for the Eastern Territories) headed by Alfred Rosenberg reportedecret memorandum that "the feats of arms of our noble army have been by an inadequate political policy" (ln the occupied areas and toward the Russiannd that. In consequence, "the possibilityerman defeat moves into the immediate foreground.*
This estimate of German operations ln. la confirmed by very considerable documentary evidence recovered in Germany. Germany had an extraordinary opportunity to secure the cooperationreat number of Soviet subjects. Hot only did Germany fail to win Buch allies permanently, but, on the contrary, converted those persons who wereto be her friends Into bitterhenomenon which wae reflected ln the steady growth of the Soviet Partisan Movement. The Oermans were both unwilling and unprepared to make use of the tremendous numbers ofin. who were ready to asBlst the Germanaight to overthrown the Communlats. The fate of tbe movement of Generaligh-ranking Soviet military leader, who later aided with the Germans, Is an especially instructive example of this phenomenon, but its significance
cap"only be understood when it is studied ln relatlonto
actual German policy.'-
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For almost the whole "period of the war In thewae never, lnnified German Policyobjective. Various Nazi loaders,autborltlee had divergent objectives and
sought to carryorresponding policy. On the 6th ofor Instance, Dr. Paulropaganda wrote ln his diary, "Concerning our -Policies in thi Occupied Eastern Areae:- Here everybody is simply governing ricklessly, generally one against another,any clear objective."
In the final analysis, any policy declelon was But Hitler wasmany questions were only broughtthe
protracted struggles between variousers. lat of June Goebbols wrote: 'I have the impressionhe Fuehrer has not been Informed of the true situation by the Ostminleterlum."
" III HITLER'S COLONIAL POLICY
For Hitler and many of the old Nails, especiallymen like Eoch and Lohse. who rulcdthe
the-title of 'Reichhe German objective was clear andaimple. The struggle against Russia In out-and-out war of conquest. Although they also paid lip service to'the Orusade against Bolshevism, they would haveimilar war against any government whlcb was in power ln Russia.
Hitler had no detailed plan for the future organization of Russia, buteneral program ln wnlch he je-lleved with unebakeable resolution. ew sentences fromhis book "Main aampf' show what this program meant.
'Today there are eighty million German* in Europe! Only then will that foreign policyhen inundred years from now two hundred fiftyalllion Germane will live on this ir weoday in Europe speak about new territory land and soil, we can only be .thinking about Russia and its satellites.
:. Initler said, Onv0raationlth. with Otto Abetz, the German Ambassador In Paris, Russia wlll'be our India,ittle bit betterted' than the British one.- The new Germanillions andillions.
The practical Implementation of this program in the occupied areasolonial policy of the. woret sort, andolicy vas, in fact, carried out by both the Reich Commissars ln the East. Koch ln the Ukraine vas particularly brutal. This policy prevented any effort-to obtain the voluntary cooperation of the population and any local Belf-government.
IV POLITICAL IDEAS OF ROSENBERG
Many German leaders and even some old Nazis such as Rosenberg did not approve of the colonial policy. Rosenberg believed the policy of the Reich should have been toreaking up of the East and its peoples. For him tho var against Russiaar for the destruction of the greater Russian Empire, and for the dlaeolutlon of the greater Ruaalan Empire Into Its national components.
Instead ofivision of Russia into colonies, however, Roaenbergollection of small national stateo, whose independence was to be restricted but not entirely vitiated by their integration Into the Europoan Orbit (the Germans use the term "GroeBraum" meaning"Great area".) Within the framework of this Orbital concept Germany was not only toolonizing power but the leading power of the European Orbit. "An orbital order Is essential to the concept of an Empire. Empires ln this sense are the leading and supporting powers whose political ideaspecific orbit, excluding the Intervention of powero from otherKarl Schmidt. "Volkerrecht-llcketh) In practice Rosenberg's whole policy wae greatly affected by his fearuture reunification of the various peoples of. by the Great Russians.
Rosenberg was prepared to permit the formation of localln the Balticnd nationaland national armies ln other parts ofrid he recommended euch a'Btepemorandum he gave to Hitler. Be wae, however, opposed to any single all-Russlan or any all-Rueeian Army, and wao against theof Oreat Russians la positions of leadership ln any. organization. Be was-more Inclined to exploit the national animosities existing among the Oreat Russian and other ethnic groups belonging to the Soviet Union.- He did not succeed, :however/;ln making Eltler change his mind. When he suggestedpolicy lnitler retorted that "all -history, proves that one cannot make allies out of conquered people's.
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V ATTITUDE OF GOVERNKENT ECONOMIC GROUPS
Various government economic bureaus, such as the Vehrwirtechaftsstab (Military Economiche Ver-waltung des Vlerjahresplans (the Four-Year Plan group headed by Fleldmarshalnd the Relchsernahrungs-mlnleterlum (Reich Ministry or Food) considered the occupied areas from the viewpoint of'Immediate exploitation, primarilyource of food for tho Army and the German people. The need to maintain Russian food production waa of declnlvc Importance, because lt prevented the dissolution of the Xolkhozes (collectivend the return of the land to the ownership of the Individual peesente. Even during the very first days of the war the great Importance of this question was realized, and the Russian experts ln the German Ministry for Foreign Affaire emphasized the needolution.
One of these experts, Grosskopf, wrote anxiously onh ofhat BI have Justhat the fundamentally opposed attitude of the Military Economic Staff has so far prevented the exploitation of the propaganda value of the agrarian problem." Thefactor, as far as the Military Economic Staff was concerned, was the fact that any break-up of the collective farms wouldeduotlon ln agricultural products available for the troops. ompromise, it waa finally decided to promise the peasanta that the collective farms would be broken up rather than actually returning the. land to private ownership.
However, the mere promise, not only did not quiet tbe peasant population but,.on tho contrary, soonitter hatred among them agalnat their German liberators. They were quick to note that actual and continued dally operations of the collectlveairect and comple.te contradiction to the promleed return of the land.
' Early lnne of the Russian specialists of the Foreign Office, Ungern-Bterhberg, wrote: "Division of land among the peasants, or the reconstltutlon of private would be, beyond all doubt, the most effective propaganda theme 'for both the Russian civil.population and the Red Army. However, it would be invidious .to makoin these questions, which affect the masses mostr otrongly, when, ln the long run, there is no possibility of fulfilling them. The Russian, owing to the conditions under which he hes lived for the last twenty years, hasery sober and materialistic thinker and would
take It very hard, If he were to suffer new disappointments ln the question that for hia la decisive."
Another German observer during tbe same period warned that "orders, violence, threats of execution, etc. no longer have any effect on the Russian, after all the years that he has seen and heard nothing else anywaywith the vital difference that in that era there actually were executions ln every village and hamlet, because the Sovlete had plenty of people for the pursuit of their alms, while we, on the other hand, never will have enough people for such a And the Russian peasant today, even before we have begun to make him really happy, has long since comprehended that Tact."
eport of the German Army.High Command, dateduture developments ln the Eont were foreseen with significant exactness'.
"This population will reject everyone who appears to them toepresentative of the Collective Farm System and who therefore represents expropriation and poverty for the individual peasant. It -Is therefore possible, with very minor concessions, toopulation which can be very useful.
'If this is not done, then there Is the danger that the peasants, especially ln view of the hard winter and the Incipient war shortages, will fall prey to Communist propaganda and support the Partisan Movement. That will mean an additional heavy burden for the Reich ln maintaining the security of these vast areas.'
VI IMPLEMENTATION OF COLONIAL POLICY
There wore far-reaching differences of opinion among German.loaders as to the best .method of dealing with the Eastern Peopleswhether lt was possible to achieve better reaults through mild or through brutal treatment of the population. The Reich Commissar ln the Ukraine, loch, was more responsible then-anyone else for the brutaland ruthless exploitation of the Ukralnalnogical result of his view that all Slavs were sub-human (Untermenechen.)
An official report ofuotes himaying, "The Ukraine must deliver those things which Germany The feeding of the Okralnaln civil population, ln
JR. .SB^ET
.comparison with thla teak.atter of total lndirference
The bearing of the Germane In this Instance Is determined^by the fact- that we have to dealeople that is in every respect inferior. Association with Okrainalns; therefore. Is out of These people must be ruled with an iron If these people work tenay, then they must work eight of those ten hours for us.*
The Army leaders, who were well aware of what was taking place, were forced to remain inactive whileolicy created the bestl for the growth or the Soviet Partisan Movement. Even Roaenberg tried to inriuence Koch to change his policy, but he regarded hlmeelf as "responsible, only to the Fuehrer, and refused.
Inosenberg took the problem directly to Hitler,owever, supported the ideas of Koch: "The situation.compells us toigorous course of action that we can never secure the political support of'the We are subordinated to the merciless law of war which decrees that we.extract supplies and labor from the Okrainalns. Only weak generals can believe that we can secure workers with pretty
VII EFFORTS AND VIEWS OF MILITARY
The Army leaders, however, were influenced by the fact that, unlike Hitler, they did not by any means consider the Germanertainty and sought ways to change the balance of power in .their favor. Specifically, they were becoming alarmed by the steady growth of the Partisan In hie diary Goebbels noted under the date ofeport of the Commander of the Central Army-Group ofh.
"The situation is becoming constantly morehis report stated. esult of the dally Increasing cases of -attempted and .'successful sabotage and mining .ofailroads, the guard over the railroad lines has had to be further strengthened. .The result of that is that the areas between the railroad lines can no longer be kep in order. From all sides one receives calls for help against plundering and murdering by Partisans.*
oebbels wroteollowing commontlarming reports from,the Front: "From the East weeports dr increasing'Partlaan activity. This has gotten
so far out of. hand at the moifient, that whole regions of the' .occupied Eastern Territories oust be regarded as Imperiled.
- "Here we have*the development of an extremely serious crisis, which.we' can "onlyelieve. If we change certain features of our Eastern Policy."
ew excerptsituation-report compiled by the.Army High Command on Januaryeflect theviews .which many military leaders held.
Red Army's will to resist remains unbroken. The Soviets give evidence of increased strength with thehe report stated. -'The morale of those parts of the population which are pro-German becomes worse constantly. Guerrilla-controlled areas are growing Lines of communication vital to the war effort are Increasing anxiety on trie part of our own troops due to the obviously erroneous handling of the population: *We ourselves are creating the Partisans.'"
Among others the following reasons were given for
developments: "Secret German directives concerning the worthlessness of the Slay Peoples and the necessity for their extermination have become widely known among the Russian people, andertile soli for hostility
toncreased Partisan activity and grave errors in tho management of the population are Insufficient carrying-out of the New Agrarian Order, no return of'former private
Among high-ranking officers of the German Armyonviction grew that "Russia can only be conquered by Russians." Some Germans credit the origin of this theory to General von Sraucbitch, German Field Commander ln the .'East, ln It-was, however, shared fromeginning of the warumber of other military and civilian leaders especially the Foreign Office experts on
(Bchulenburg, Hilger- and Grosskopf.) It was these experts, as well as the people of the Ministry forastern Territories, such as Brautlgam, wh6 most sharply
the policy evolved by Koch for the occupied areas.
USSIAN VOLUNTEERS2
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f&ijg:.The lack of any fixed political policy also preventedpolicy with regard to the employment of Russian volunteers. To-be sure, Hitlerumber of specific
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directives on the subject, but there Is amplepractice.these orders were not always followedthat many military units dealt with the problem oninitiative, without the approval of higheranalysis of the measures adopted by such uniteIn.order toomplete.insight Intoof Russian volunteers by.the German'Army. Variouswere inclined from the"start-tovolunteers into German formations.- oodis *that givenemorandumd,by the General of Eastern Troops,'Hellmich. between space and the availableour people to help-he wrote. into existence the so-called Hllfswillige (thoseto help) and in the course of time theTroops.) These were in themselvesto which we were forced by the shortage"and finally ledtate of affairsguidance from .
Hellmich.emphasized that "the employment of local inhabitants in the battle against Bolshevism was begun by combat units, which fact should settle.the .question as.to whether there was need for suchThe" step wasilitary necessity by the'combat troops, and the improvisation was satisfactory becauseime at'; least the results were good.
For Hitler, on the contrary, the question was closely linked to the over-all politicalne permitted the formation of Oet Legionen (Eastern Legions.) To carry out this decision the OKV (High Command of the Armedirected onhat the following legions be created: urkietaneorgian Legion and an Armenian Legion.
Onitler authorized theof Tartar units involving primarily TartarsCrimea. However, on, hethe formation of volunteer units from prisonersor inhabitants of any occupied areas, except
Ond of March the High Command of the Armed Forcesecree which gave the basic reason for this policy.
If is Intended that the Turkish peoples and Inhabitant of. the Caucasus be permitted, "after.-the war,.to obtain
far-reachinghe observer stated: 'For that reason tho formation of volunteer legions actively participating in tbe war of liberation against the Bolsheviks from the citizens of these countries iswhereas citizens of the Baltic countries, the Ukraine, otc, may only be considered for the police services and not for employment at the front."
Inhe Army High Commandecret pamphlet entitled, "Directive concerning Employment of Local Inhabitants ln the East." The first sentence reads:vastnees of the Eastern Area and the absolutefor economy In the employment of Oermans have compelled us to employ the manpower of the conquered Eastern Countries in tbe most varlsd capacities ln the service of the Armed Forces especially ln the army in the field and ln the service of tho war economy."
The various nationalities were, however, to be employed in different ways. Members of the Turkish races and Cossacks, who wore fighting beside the Oerman troops as allies against the Bolshevist enemy,pecial group with the same privileges ss German soldiers. Other nationalitieswith the exception of Oreat Russianscould be placed in para-military formations to combat Partisans. There was also further discussion of the utilization of persons of all ethnic groups for police and various auxiliary services. On paper, everything-was ln order, but ln the field the various decreesar different result.
IX FAILURE OF EASTERN TROOPS
. . Inommander .'of an Eastern Battalionetter to* the Commander of Eastern Troops stating that conspiracies had been uncovered and. mutinies and desertions of whole companies had taken place.
"The recruiting, which was originally conductednd2 .carefully and accuratelyew politically giftedas undertakenass1 basis'in tho course. Errors ln recruiting have continued to The Eastern Battalions ere set to work from the day of their, organization. So-called training periods hove existed only on. etc."
The Germans who undertook the organization of these battalions were net, according to the author of this letter, able to distinguish between good and bad elemente. According
to thlfl report, the Ignorance of theee
who had not the faintest knowledge of
Bolshevism or Jewry, led to the recruitingproducts."
This orltlclsm Is sharp, hut lt does not get at the roots of the difficulty. The defects ln recruiting were not only due to the shortcomings of the recruiters but, to an even greater degree to German policy or lsck of policy. It was, of course, not stated publicly that only the so-called Turkish peoples and the Inhabitants of the-Caucasus were to receive far-reaching independence after the war, but the special handling and preferential treatment of the mentioned ethnic groups could hardly go unnoticed by the other peoples of the occupied areas.
The members of the other groups of necessity must have felt that they were being considered and treated as inferior beings. How could they, then, consider their service in the German Armyattle for their own liberty and that of their homeland?
It was only natural that many of the volunteers were only Induced to enter the German service for material reasonsto escape the horrors of the prisoner-of-war camps, and even in many cases .only to get an opportunity to plunder. No wonder, as the Eastern Battalion Commander wrote, that as one battalion efter another was organized,good elements were constantly diluted until we were confronted by an unsupervlsable, impenetrable, incalculable mass. "
His last comment refers to the3 (organization of the independent Eastern Battalionslnto the earlier Eastern Legionsstarted In) The increasingly threatening manner In which the situation was developing had already become easily -discernible, during the course
X" SEARCH FOR NEW POLICY
In his memorandum ofh ofiscussion of the Easternr. Brautlgaa wrote that: "With the instinct inherent ln Eastern peoples the ordinary man had soon found out also that for Germany tho slogan: 'Liberation fromas.retext to enslave the Eastern peoploso her own methods."
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. He added that in order that there should exist no doubt at all.on-the German war aloe, however, Germanreferred openly to this intention in Increasing measure. The conquered territory was claimed publicly not-only for Germany as an area of colonization, but even for'Geroany'a bitter enemies, the Dutch, the Norwegians, and.'others. The economic exploitation was proclaimed verbally and in print and carried out with almost total -disregard for the"requirements of the indigenous population, and with the greatest lack of consideration.
..Dr. Brautlgam went on to point out that the populace ln.. had more of an understanding of the measures and duties necessitated by war than the conquered peopleo of the West. Be added that-the Soviet laborer and peasant, who were educated to the highest degree ofby Bolshevism, soon perceived that Germany did not regard them as partners with equal rights, but considered them only as objectives of her political and economic aims. This, he said, had disillusioned them indescribably, all the more, since they had placed great hope in Germany.
As early as Juneoebbels wrote in "Our policy ln the conquered Easternstill notFundamentally, ln privateeveryone is of the opinion that we ousterecting puppet-governments, tooreon the part of the population of theareas. Our attackthis all are convincedbe directed mainly against Bolshevism and not
By chance, Goebbels wrote on the same day that,he enemy has attempted to break out of the 'Volkova very tense battled indeed." In the Volkovussian Army, the Second Assault Army, commanded by General Vlassov, was surrounded by the Germans. Vlaeeov himself was captured somewhat later, and his army destroyod. After his capture. General Vlassov became one of the most controversial figures in German policy in the East. umber of German groups sought to use the anti-Sovietwhich he later headed in Germany In their efforts to change German policy ao.as to permit the use of Russians In the war against. The so-called "Vlassovis movement, muet be carefully considered because it is of ifar.more than historical interest, since" it shows the basic weaknesses of.
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.GENERAL VLASSOV: THE HAN AND HIS PROGRAM
Many Russian generals were taken prisoner1ncluding several army commanders, but none of these made the same impression as that created by General Vlassov op his captors. Soon after he was taken prisoner,apture came to be considered an event of great significance. One official observer, Edwin Erich Dwlnger of the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs, statedecret memorandum:have not the least doubt that this man was sent to uo by Fato at the decisive moment and that hie employment can turn the course of the war completely in.our favor." After his first conversation with Vlassov {Augustllger. wrote that he appeared totrong and forthright person, with calm and balanced Judgment. On closerwith Vlassov, Hllger wrote ln "General Vlassov is inspiredurning hatred of the Bolshevik system and Stalin personally. Beceuse of hie preatlge lnnd because of bis whole background and hla spiritual force, Vlaeeov isuitable Instrument to serveounter-balance to Stalin to weaken Stalin's position decisively in favor of the German War Effort."
In another document, Dwlnger made the following appraisal, probably somewhat colored by his personal views! "General Vlassov armer, that ie to say he cornea from that stratum of Russian society which is the moat typically Russian. Hean of high intelligence andery loyal Tbe basis and drive for hie effectivenessn the genuinely Russian sense, religious. Even though he le not,ember of any.church, there can be no doubt that he le motivated far less by political considerations thanind of Messianic viaion of Redemption (for his people) which has its origin In his sympathy with the terrible suffering of his people which he has had to witness all his life. In spite of this he Is very clear-headed, and modestalthough stiffening proudly when one mentions 'Russian slaves.* He is not,ere seeker after political glory and accordingly will neverurchasable hireling and will never be-willing to lead hirelings."
Nor was Vlassov an unknown quantity to the .German Army High Command, Bllger points out that, oldier he enjoyed the reputation of having played an outstanding and decisive role ln the military operations which led to the preservation of Moscow from the German assault ln the fall
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Fromn Vlassov commended:h Army, which later counter-attacked and advanced northweet of Moscow. In the spring2 his resistance ln theEncirclement" east of Leningrad waa energetic nnd otubborn. He remained hidden ln the forest and swamps after.the destruction of his army until he wae forced to surrender.
His career ln. was most successful, in spite of the handicap of hie origin, as the sonrosperous peasant who was liquidatedulak during the organization of the collective farms. Vlassov was bornnd completed training for the priesthood, but entered the Red Army during the Civil Var. After that, heilitary career. He spent about two years as one of the military advisers of Chiang Kal Shek, and then waa made Commander ofh Infantry Division stationed in Kiev Military District late9 or early In the Fallis division wae decorated for being the best disciplined and best led ln the Soviet Union. He was promoted to the rank of 'Major General" aboutnd, after his participation ln the defense of Moscow, to the rank of "Lieutenant General."
onversation with Dwlnger, Vlassov quoted Stalinas saying to him ln the Spring2 that the Germans were "thank God making so many political errors that he (Stalin) could subsist on their consequences forever, but that this war would be won by the man whom the masseb would support the longest." It was Vlassov's Idea to win the masses away from Stalin.
ideas, as he presented them to the Germans, are described ln many documents, but because of theunder .which they were written they must be studied carefully. Vlaseov wanted to persuade the Germane to adopt bla prograa. Therefore, he had to be guided by his own Judgment or that of trusted Germanln order to avoid Ideas which were unacceptable to the. German Government.
Without some modification of his Ideas he could not have" achieved anything. Moreover, those Germans who shared Vlassov's Ideas sought to make these ideas as palatable for those ln power'as possible. Thus, for example, Dwlnger wrote that Vlaasov waa "antl-Bolshevlot and-which was quite correct, but he added, "ln our sense oford, therefore,ationalhichnl iip conclusion.
IV
.iv. Apparently Vlaesov talked frankly toan who had spent forty-seven years ln Russia, was entirely familiar with the language and the country, and warmly sympathetic to the Russians. Bllger, quite naturslly, did not report officially everything that vlassov told him.ecently written study on Vlaesov, Hllger summarizes Vlassov's fundamental ideas as follows: case was the same as that of many other Hussions: not until the catastrophead taken place did they become aware of the fact that there were otlll possibilities of.freeing the Russian people from despotism and making available to them the blessingsemocractlc regime.
thlo purpose, Vlassov allied himself with the Germans, but not because he felt any sympathy for the regime which existed ln Germany at that time. Be honestly believedecisive-defeat Inflicted upon the Red Army would cause the overthrow of the Soviet Government and that the Germans would achieve this goal.
. "On the other hand, however, he was deeply convinced that the Germans would never succeed without the active help of the Russian people. Thus, for the time being the Germans and Russians were natural allies. Id his view, such an alliance did notangeruture Russia because he was convinced that, although the Germans could dofeot the Red Army with the help of the antl-Communlst part of the Russian population, they would never beosition to conquer the whole vast country and subjugate
. These views coincide at all points with conclusions which can be drawnareful and critical analysis of the available documentary material. It is of the utmost importance to emphasize that, from the very beginning Vlassoverman victory impossible without-the helpussian anti-Bolshevist army. In hie report of hie first Interview with Vlassov, Bllger wrote that the Russian could not conceive how any victory could be won by the German military forces alone. This statement was made Int the time of the greatest Gorman successes anderies of grave defeats of tho Red Army.
Vlaesov warned against underestimating the Soviet powers of resistance. etter of Augustntended for the German Commanders and Jointly composed by;.Vlassov.and another Russian officer. Colonel Doyorskl, they said: "While taking advantage of the peculiarities of^Ruselathe endless distances, the tremendouo
resources and tbe patriotism of the peopleand supported by the Terror, Stalin will never voluntarily retire and will not be prepared to compromise. He will continue tbe war until he has exhausted all resources and possibilities of defense. There is no possibility of an Internal revolution under the existing circumstances.1
In that 6amc letter Vlassov formulated his own proposals: The formationenter forussian Army and the startlassov'organization itself.
Onh ofhat is to say during the Allied offensive in Northern Africa and after Stalingrad, Vlaesov spoke ln Mogilev much mpre franklymall circle of Germans. Thereeport of this speech madeepresentative of the Hlnlstry for the Eastern Territories. According to the report, Vlaesov was of the opinion .that Germany would lose the war against Russia unless large Oerman armies came to grips with Stalin very soon, and an effective paclflcatlon-policy broughtundamental change in the occupied areas.
He believed that, without the cooperation of the population of the occupied areasystematic undermining of the Russian front based thereon, Germany must lose the war in the course of time because of material and personnel shortages. If Germany cherished no intentions to colonize and enslave them this should be made clear to all concerned by means or authoritative words and corresponding deeds. There were still "sufriclent valuable non-Bolshevist rorces available. Vlassov felt it was etlll possible to use these rorces effectively and regarded thiB as his task. To accomplish it, however, it was essential to explain the German objectives clearly. The Russians whoational feeling of honor wanted to know what "role they would play. They would, however, under all circumstances oppose any enslavement of the Russian people.
Vlassov believed' that he could create an armysing the anti-Soviet Russian prisoners and civilians In German hands. With their help he believed lt would certainly be possible to liberate Russia from Bolshevism. -He felt that the.fundamental basis forussian Renaissance, however, wouldlearly defined policy whioh would satisfy the Russian national honor.
Vlaesov .wasareas.problem among-the German
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critical of German methods in theowever, had his own experiences and knew there were "differences of opinion leadership." For that reason he wanted a
favorable decision from the Fuehrer. Obviously with this objective ln mind he calledleader of great genius." Ha added that he hoped Hitler would makeebirth of Russia. The Russians, having received back. their national honor, would crush Bolshevism at the side of Germany andew Europe in close alliance with the Reich.
Nevertheless, VIbsbov-realized even inhortly after hie capture that the prospect of the revivalreat unified Russian state would not awaken much enthusiasm among Germans. Hllger himself mentioned the -point ln the course of the first conversation; "The Soviet Officers (Vlassov ande wrote, "replied that, besides an independent Russian Stateolony there were various other conceivable and acceptable solutions, such as, dominionrotectorate,rotected state with temporary or permanent German military occupation."
To what extent these two officers were sincere it is no longer possible to ascertain. In any event, Vlassov clearly understood that to get permission for his project he had to agree to some compromise solution acceptable to the Germans.
XII FIRST "VLASSOV PROJECT (VLASSOV ACTION)
In tbe Initial period, the opposition of thethe Eastern Territories wae quite effective,several months' delay for the Vlassov Project. of the German General Staff dated Juneentitled: "Development and Situation ofln.the East since the Falliscusses this
It etatea that after Vlaas'ov had placed hloself at the .disposition of the Germansfor the warolshevism"there appeared for the firstnlassov tract which met with such success that Armed Forces Operations Staff decided, with the fullf the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, to include in the propaganda plan, for theajor propaganda project "from Russians to Rueslano.Toasic platform for the project, VlassovnRussian Committee" summoned all to fight beside Germany against Bolshevism1. It soon' became apparent, that more than the decision of the Armed Forces to carry outlan of.
propaganda. The memorandum of the Command Starr stated that the Ministry for the Eastern Territories did not authorize the project until the middle of January, after the most favorable opportunity hed passed. Since;then, the memorandum continued, it had been ln constant operation, with striking success.
. The opposition of the Ministry for the Eastern Territories was closely linked to .the political views of Rosenberg. As far as Rosenberg was concerned Vlassov was firsts andreat Russian, and he was'accordingly afraid that the Vlassov Project wouldreat Russian Project, making any future partition*of Russia more difficult.
There was considerable negotiation between Vlassovhe Germane concerning his programew order in Russia. Vlassov himself maintained that every nationality had an' unlimited right to self-determination and should decide for Itself whether lt wished to remainnionthe other peoples of Russia or become entirely Ineeclaration ln which, among other things, were the following words! "In the new there will be neither national- euppreselon nor rule by force. Each race will receive its national liberty and.right to self-determination."
The Russian general declared ln various conversations that he fully understood that Russia would have to make great sacrifices. In particular the Ukraine and the Caucasus were involved, since Rosenberg wanted these areas separated from Greater Russia at all costs. In the end, the Ministry for tho Eastern Territories finally gave its consent to the propaganda exploitation of Vlassov. ew months later Rosenberg changeduch more favorable opinion of Vlassov and his movement after Vlassov hadeclaration which parallelled"Rosenberg's ideas.
. Onosenberg senteport dealingeclaration entitled,ationalanger forhich Vlassov had sent to the Armed Forbes' High Command's Propaganda Division -inccording to Rosenberg, Vlaseov acknowledged ln this declaration that'"Thenitedingle bloc,enace to Europe. Vlaesov considered that the menace-could only be nullified If the peoples and groups of peoples who belong to the bloc enteredew order asew and larger organization of. theamily of Peoples.
.IV
Under such circumstances, the Great Russians would bo prepared to surrender the Ukraine and the Caucasusin reality this would be no surrender, since the economic and cultural energies of these lands would then be available not only to western Europe but to all Europe and hence also to Russia. Thla declaration waa an obvious adaptation of Rosenberg's ideas. Whether lt was sincere or not, this statement helped to win Rosenberg's support for the Vlassov Project",;
After en Interruption of three or more months, the Vlassov Project became active again In The movement had been given the moans touaolan language newspaper calledhe Dawn-.) Vlaesovanifesto in the form of an Open Letter in this publication on the 3rd ofnd proclaimed the formationussian Committee. This committee, however, only existed on paper.
Vlassov also disclosed his program for the future Russia: the so-called 'Smolensk Program" or 'Vlaasov'soints." Finally, also ln March, Vlasaov waa permitted to speak In public assemblies ln the occupied areas, and his speechesery deep Impression on both the Germane and Russians who heard them.
The June memorandum of tbe Armed Forces Command Staff atated; "This Vlaasov Project, which waa begunropaganda trick, hasovement which from the enemy's viewpoint, due to Its threatening character, raises before his eyes the spectre of civil war.'
The memorandum included An appendix of some ten pages of reports concerning the effect of the project, which described how great the success of the Vlaesov propaganda had been.
argo numbor of reports received from all fronto show the deep impression that the Vlaaaov Manlfeeto haa made upon the Ruasianhe memorandumnd make it quite evident that material assistance bas been rendered toward the demoralization of the Russian will to resist and that the enemy's power haa been weakened and the tendency to desertion strengthened."
In-order to suggest action which they did not dare to recommend, the composers of the memorandum described the effect of the propaganda abroad: "The Vlasaov Project has aroused tbe greatest attention among our allies, our enemies, and neutrals in the months of April and May, and .
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The propaganda itself, as mere propaganda, was ining to lose Its effectiveness. The Tact that publof the project waa forbidden ln Germany aroua doubt among Russian prisoners-of-war as to German sincerity. Moreover, Vlassov's Manifesto was not allowed to circulate ln the occupied areao. The memorandum said that this measure, which was 'well known to theegative effect and was generally considered by the Russians as proof that the whole project wasropaganda trick. The effect of broken promises also boomeranged on the Germans', the Commend Staff reported.
"Recently there has been an Increase in voices that, because of the so far unfulfilled promises aredoubt as to the honesty of Germant stated.
The memorandum warned that "the opportunities offered to enemy propaganda by any eventual collapse of the Vlaeaov Project arend concluded that "the dangersurther delay or, perhaps, reversals ln tbe Vlassov. Project may bring.are unmistakable, when one considers thatussians are in German service as Eastern Troops, that the propaganda for encouraging Russian desertions is foundedreat extent on tbe Vlassov Manifesto, and that the development of the guerrilla-warfare altuatlon le decisively dependent upon the realizationho German promises."
XIII HITLER'S DECISION
Still, all these arguments did not serve to breakopposition of the Bazl exponentsolonialopinion of the High Command wae Ignored, as were the
wttti -
of Rlbbcntrop, who was strongly influenced by his Russian experts.
Rosenberg later, lnointed out: "At that tide, one of the greatest opponents of these efforts was the Relchsfuehrer S3 Hlnaler. He and other leading figures of tbe Fuehrer's Headquarters expressed tbe greatest hostility toward the peroon and the employment of General Vlassov."
Vlassov was eubjeoted to particularly strong attack because of his statement that Russia could not be conquered without the help of Russians. For that reason, support of Vlassov neemed to both Hlmmlor andign of defeatism.
In April,itler, after listening to an explanation by Rlbbcntrop of tbe Vlaeeov Project, commented that "euch political actions were not to be undertaken; they were not necessary and were worthless; their only results would be fraternltatlon between our people and the Russians; moreover, they would be considered as weakness."
Finally ln January, Hitler Issued the following directive:
"The national committees may not be used for the recruitment of volunteers.
"Vlaesov oust never again appear In the occupied areas."
As for the propaganda side of the Vlassov Project, Hitler further stated that ho did not object to lt but only under the condition that "no German authority la to take seriously-the lures contained in theoints of the Vlassov Program."
This ended the first Vlassov Project. Vlaesov himself was placed in houBe arrest and had to remainuburb of Berlin. He was allowedery restricted number of' visitors, and was prohibited from engaging ln any aotlvlty. All further Vlassov propaganda, until the Autumnasisuse of his name.
On the baBla of his own views, Hitler had handled the mattor logically. An honorable collaboration with the Russian opponents of Stalin and. his regime, such as General Vlassov, could not be reconciled with his political ideas.
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Onh ofitler said todare not employ any'membere of foreign races in the Ministry for the Eastern Territories J B V tn?he5hare ?orhen they are dangerous!*-
people.
' Until the time arrived when Vlassov himself wae allowed
SeedmaJ. propaganda toHuselan units vhich were integrated into the German Army.
e coasting of personsthe Movement.
Others functioned as guerrilla
Partisans and openly conducted themselves like bandits. *hr. lnttpr were hated by the local population, soviet propag-ano! ve" cleverly held Vlassov and his movement responsible for this lasthargecurrent today among the Russian emigreJrtlcularly among the older group, end possibly even ln. Itself.
XIV SECOND VLASSOV PROJECT
very well satisfied with the showing they made. As a
SEC^T
Concerning this second Vlaesov Project there le comparatively little documentary material available. However, this lack is not of decisive Importance because this new Project was clearly undertaken far too late, since the- course of the war could no longer have been turned in Germany's favor.
Inhe Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples-of Russia was formed under the leadership of Vlassov. Onhanifesto of the Committee was published ln Prague. This time lt wa6iction; the Committee actually existed and builtoodthough once more certain difficulties arose, because of German fears that Vlassov and his movement had Great Russian tendencies.
Rosenberg and Various committees of Russian national minorities shared these apprehensions. This time, however, the conduct of affairs In Germany lay in-the hand of Hlmmler, who wasosition to overcome all opposition.
Vlassov received permission and_ orders to organize two divisions. Of these two only one was formed before the war ended. It was ln action only once on the German side, ln tbe defense of the Oder River Line. The division was then sent to Czechoslovakia, where lt changed 6ldes and liberated Prague from the Germans. Vlaseov and hie staff went first to Karlsbad, and afterwards, as far ae can be ascertained, to Fueeaen in Bavaria onh ofhere they remained until the American troops arrived.
The question still, remains as to what motivated Vlassov aod his supporters to become activeime when the position of Germany was already hopeless. Certainly they 'could not have share'd'Hitler's insane, belief that help would be forthcoming from' Providence. Their situation was They knew what to expectictorious Soviet Russia. Nevertheless one may assume that the last Vlaesov Project was notesture of despair. Many sources indicate that he hoped to establish connections with the Western Allies and gain their support.
.This is confirmed byho remained in close contact with Vlassov during the entire period. Theof Prague by Vlassov's division and Vlassov's own bearing tend to further substantiate this assumption.finally thereocument which must be treated with great caution, but nevertheless very interesting. This
SEfRET
J
i
9
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i
eport madeussian who,erman secret agent, collected Information on Vlaesov and his organization.
This report, which was written ond ofonversation which Vlassov hadorman general ln the presenceumber of his own officers. One of the officers la supposed to have told about this conversation. According to the report, the German general asked Vlassov his opinion concerning "our common fight" against the, the Western Rowers.
Vlassov is reported to have replied that he wao not even thinkingight against the Entente and that, on the contrary, he expected that his interesto and those of the Western Powors would soon coincide on the ground of the common fight against Bolshevism. Vlassov was even said to have" had tho intontlon. In case of extreme emergency, to lead his troops Into Switzerland and to offer them to the Allies from there. .
It is .clear thateport cannot be regardeddependable source, although lt doesertainlt la partially confirmed from other sources. significant, ln any case, is that there Is noVlassov.actederoan agent, but on thein accordance with his conception of what wasany struggle agalnet the Stalin-reglne and ln theRussia, ea he understood the .
Itact of great historical Importance that,uarterentury of soviet rule, such phenomena as Vlaesov and his movement were possible, and that they could have grown to oonelderable proportions If they had not been prevented from doing so by German policy. '
Original document.
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