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iT< CENTRAL IrrTELUGENCE AGENCY.
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tEJiORAWDUH FOR IK. JOHN D. HICKSRSOW .
Office of European Affairs
of Russianorces in-th*
aato you herewith two copiestudy^which haa been worked up ia ny office andeliore will bo of*.Interest to you and certain-cambers of'your' ataff.
This is not regardedefinitive- fcr conclusive study of this important subject and rill bg-followod by additional end supple-aentary studies, but evsnis'its present forn.'I boilers- that it is
J worth your"
.hould be very interested to receiveobmxents whioh you may care to rieizo in regard to the evidence presented in this
roccrt.
ssistant.Director for 'Policy Coordination.
FEB "
Onco tho German Army had been unable to win it complete military victory in the East ln the opening weeko of tho war, lt became clear that Germany would hove toong, hard otruggle to crush Russian reelatonco. lt waa equally clear that Germany lacked tho military strength and manpower to Imposeecision by military means alone. Even with the total mobilization of Germanmanpower and the use of all the available human resources of the European continent, Germany was unable to raise eufflolent troops to carry out military operations and at the same time guard its llnee of communication and maintain order ln the oocupled areas. It was obvious that military action would have to be accompanied by parallel political and psychological warfare.
The groundwork for psychological warfare already existed ln the hatredarge portion of the Russian population, ond particularly the peasants, felt toward the Soviet regime. They were prepared to side with tho Germane provided German leadershiplear political policy which would take into account the desires of tbe population, and the peculiarities of the Russian situation. Tens of thousands of Russian prleoners-of-war volunteered for service against tho Red Army, while ln the early fighting the rate of desertion ln the Red Army woo exceptionally high, ond the peasant population in tho villages welcomed the Germans as liberators.
Germans, however, were unable or unwilling to use this opportunity. Hitler'a colonial policy baaed on the .exploitation of the Russian areas as Germany'sulokly turned the Russian population against thehe Hitler policy also necessitated the continuation of the collective rarm system in order to facilitate thistation. The failure of the Germans to liquidate the
"-collective farms more than any other single factor turned the peasants against the invaders and led to their support of5the Partisan Movement, This revulsion on the part of
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the peoples of the Soviet Union was further hastened by theand overbearing attitude of the Naziauthorities who treated them as inferior beings.
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Another factor ln the German attitude which prevented full utllitatlon of antl-Sovlet forces within tbewas the basic Rail fear that any Russian force which they created to fight against Stalin might ln the end turn against them andefender of the Russian people againstithin even these limitations the Germans might have made some headway had they ever been able JO establish any single policy toward Russia. Instead Jrtooi government agencies, as well as. thetics Improvised policy aa they went along, thus adding to the confusion and hastening the German defeat. Only inhe Germane finally decided, far too late, that the war ln the East could only be won if the Russian people were convinced that it wasar directed aKalnst them,ar to free them from their CommunlBt leadership. The effort vhich Hlmmler made to use theof the former Soviet General Andrei Vlassov for this end proved abortive, and the'VlasBov Movement was engulfed and destroyed ln the over-all German defeat.
II GERMANY'S LOST OPPORTUNITY
As early asigh official ln tho Oetminlsterlum (Ministry for the Eastern Torrltorlesj headed by Alfred Rosenberg reportedecret memorandum that "the feats of arms of our noble army have been
by an inadequate political policy tin the
occupied areas and toward the Russianna mat, in consequence, "the possibilityerman defeat moves into the immediate foreground.-
This estimate of Oerman operations ln. la confirmed by very considerable documentary evidence recovered in Germany. Germany had an extraordinary opportunity to secure tho cooperationreat numbor of Soviet subjects. Not only did Germany fall to win such allies permanently, but, on the contrary, converted those persons who wereto bs her friends into bitterhenomenon which vas reflected ln the steady growth of the Soviet Partisan Movement. The Oeroana were both unwilling ana unpreparod to make use of the tremendous numbers ofln. who vere ready to assist the Germaneight to overthrown the Communists. -The fato of the movement of Generaligh-ranking Soviet military leader, who later sided with the Germans, is an especially instructive example of this phenomenon, but Its significance cap only be understood when lt Is studied in relation to aotual German policy.
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For almost the whole period of the war In the East there waa never, lnnified German policylear objective. Various Nazi leaders, ministries and military authorities bad divergent objectives and each sought to carryorreepondlng policy. On the 6th ofor instance. Dr. Paul Goebbele, Minister for Propaganda, wrote in his diary, "Concerning our Policies ln the Occupied Eastern Areas:- Here evorybody lo simply governing recklessly, generally one against another,any clear objective.*
In the final analysis, any policy decision was Hitler's responsibility. But Hitler was not informed of everything, and many questions were only brought to hie-attention after protracted struggles between various Party leaders. On the 1st of June Goebbele wrote; ave the impressionhe Fuehrer has not been informed of the true situation by the Ostministerlum."
III HITLER'S COLONIAL POLICY.
For Hitler and many of the old Nazis, especially for men like Koch and Lohse, who ruled the occupied areas with the title of 'Reich Commissars,'1 the Oerman objective was clear and'elmple. The struggle against Russia was for them an out-and-out.war of conquest. Although they also paid lip service to the Orueade against Bolshevism, they would haveimilar war against any government which was in power in Russia.
Hitler had no detailed plan for the future organization of Russia, buteneral program ln which hewith unehakeable resolution. ew sentences from his book "Keln Kampf" show what this program meant;there are eighty million Germans In EuropeJ Only then will that foreign policy be acknowledged to be right when lnundred years from now two hundred fifty million Germane will live.on this If we today in Europe speak about new territory, land and soil, we can only be thinking about Russia and its eatellltlee."
Initler said,onversation with Otto Abetz, the German Ambassador In Parle, that, "the new Russia will be our India,ittle bit betterthan the British one;- The new German Empire willillions andillions."
practical lnplenentatlon of thla program in the occupied areasolonial policy of the worst Bort, andolicy was, ln fact, carried out by both the Reich Commissars in the East, loch ln the Ukraine wpb particularly brutal. This policy prevented any effort to obtain the voluntary cooperation of the population and any local self-government.
IV POLITICAL IDEAS OF ROSENBERG
Many German leaders and even some old Nails such as Rosonberg did not approve of the colonial policy. Rosenberg believed the policy of the Reich should have been toreaking up of tho East and its peoples. For him the war against Russiaar for tho destruction of the greater Russian Empire, and for the dissolution of the greater Russian Empire into its national components.
Instead ofivision of Russia Into colonies, however, Rosenbergollection of small national states, whose independence was to be restricted but not entirely vitiated by their integration Into the European Orbit (the Germans use the term "Qrossraum" meaning"Great area".) Within the framework of this Orbital concept Germany was not only toolonising power but the leading power of the European Orbit. "An orbital order is essential to the concept of an Empire. Empires in this sense are the leading and supporting powers whose political ideaspecific orbit, excluding the intervention of powers from otherKarl Schmidt. "Volkerrecht-llcketh In practice Rosenberg's whole policy was greatly affected by his fearuture reunification or the various peoples of. by the Oreat Russians.
Rosenberg was prepared to permit the formation of(In the Balticnd nationaland national armies la other parte ofrecommendedtepemorandum he gave towas, however, opposed to any single all-Russlanor any all-Russlan Army, and was against theof Great Russians ln positions of leadership ln Be was- more Inclined to exploit theanimosities existing among the Oreat Russian and otherbelonging to the Soviet Onion.- He did notIn making Hitler change his mind. When hechange of policy lnitler retorted thatproves that one cannot make allies out of conquered peoples. .
V ATTITUDE OP GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC GROUPS
Various government economic bureaus, such aa the Vehrwlrtachaftsstab (Military Economiche Ver-waltung dee Vlerjahresplans (the Four-Year Plan group headed by Fleldmarshalnd the Relcbsernahrunga-mlnleterlum (Reich Ministry of Food) considered tbe occupied areas from tho viewpoint of immediate exploitation, primarilyource of food for the Army and the German people. The need to maintain Russian food production was of decisive Importance, because lt prevented the dissolution of tho Kolkhozes {collectivend the return of the land to the ownership of the Individual peasants. Even during the very first days of the war the great importanoe of this question was realized, and tho Russian experts ln the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs emphasized the needolution.
One of these experts, Groeekopf, wrote anxiously onh ofhatave Justhat the fundamentally opposed attitude of the Military Economic Staff has so far prevented the exploitation of the propaganda value of the agrarian problem," Thefactor, aa far as the Military Economic Staff was concerned, was the faot that any break-up of the collective farms wouldeduction in agricultural products available for the troops. ompromise, lt waa finally decided to promise the peasants that the collective farms would be broken up rather than actually returning the land to private ownership.
However, the mere proclao, not only did not quiet the peasant population but, on the contrary, soonitter hatred among them agalnat their German liberators. They were quick to note that actual and continued dally operations of the collectivesirect and comple.te contradiction to the promised return of the land.
" Early inne of the RusBlan epeclallata of the Foreign Office, Ungern-Sterhberg, wrote: "Division of land among the peasants, or the reconstltutlon of private would be, beyond all doubt, the most effeotlve propaganda theme for both the Russian civil population and the Red Army. However, it would be Invidious to makeln these questions, which affect the masses moot-strongly, when, ln the long run, there Is no possibility of .fulfilling then. The Russian, owing to the conditions under which he has lived for the last twenty years, hasery eober and materialistic thinker and would
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take it'very hard, if ho were to suffer new dleappointraenta in the question that for him is decisive."
Another Oerman observer during the same period warned that "orders, violence, threats of execution, etc. no longer have any effect on the Russian, after all'the yearB that he has seen and heard nothing else anywaywith the vital difference that ln that era there actually were executions in every village end hamlet, because tho Soviets had plenty of people for the pursuit of their alms, while we, on the other hand, never will have enough people for such a And the Russian peasant today, even before we have begun to make him really happy, has long since comprehended that fact."
eport of the German Army High Command, dateduture developments ln the East were foreseen with significant exactness.
"This population will reject everyone who appears to them toepresentative of the Collective Farm System and who therefore represents expropriation and poverty for the individual peasant. It -is therefore poselble, with Tery minor concessions, toopulation which can be very useful.
this Is not done, then there lo the danger that the peasants, especially in view of tho hard winter and tho Incipient war shortages, will fall prey to Communist propaganda and support the Partisan Movement. That will mean an additional heavy burden for the Reich ln maintaining the security of these vast
VI IMPLEMENTATION OF COLONIAL POLICY.
There were far-reaching differences of opinion among Gorman.leaders as to the best .mothod of dealing with the Eastern Peopleswhether it was possible to achieve better results through mild or through brutal treatment of the population. The Reich Commissar ln the Ukraine, loch, was more responsible than-anyone elae for the brutaland ruthless exploitation of the Ukralnalnogical result of his view that all SlavB were sub-human (Unteraenschen.)
'.-An official report ofuotes him asThe. Ukraine must deliver those things which Germany; The feeding of the.Ukralnaln civil population, in
comparison with this tack, atter of total. Tbe bearing of the Germana ln this instance la determinedly the fact that wo have to dealeople that la ln every respect inferior. Association with Okralnalns, therefore. Is out of the These people must be ruled with an iron If these people work tenay, then they oust work eight of those ten hours for us."
The Army leaders, who were well aware of what was taking place, were forced to remain Inactive while this policy created the best possible soil for the growth of the Soviet Partlean Movement. Even Rosenberg tried to lnfluenoe Koch to change his policy, but he regarded himself aa responsible only to the Fuehrer, and refused.
Inosenberg took the problem directly to Hitler, who, however, supported the Ideas of Koch: "The situation coapelle us toigorous course of action that ve can never secure the political support of tbe Ve ere subordinated to the merciless law of war which decrees that we extract supplies and labor from the Ukralnains. Only weak generals can believe that we can secure workers with pretty speeches."
VII EFFORT3 AND VIEWS OF MILITARY.
The Army leadere, however, were Influenced by tho fact that, unlike Hitler, they did not by any means consider the Germanertainty and sought ways to change the balance of power in .their favor. Specifically, they were becoming alarmed by tbe steady growth of the Partisan In his diary Ooebbels noted under the date ofeport of tbe Commander of tbe Central Army Group ofh.
"The situation le becoming constantly morehis roport stated. esult of the dally Increasing caaos of -attempted and successful sabotage and mining of the railroads, the guard over tho railroad lines has had to be further strengthened. The result of that le that the areas between the railroad lines can no longer be kep ln order. From all sides one receives oalle for belp against plundering and murdering by Partisans."
Ooebbels wrote the following comment about these alarming reports from tho Front: "From the Eaet we receive -reports of Increasing Partisan activity. This has gotten
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so far out of hand at tho moment, that whole regions of'the occupied Eastern Territories must bo regarded as Imperiled.
"Here wo have the development of an extremely serious crisis, which.we con onlyelieve, if we change certain features of our Eastern Policy.'
A few excerptsituation-report compiled by the Army High Command on Januaryeflect the views which many military leaders held.'
Red Army's will to resist remains unbroken. Tho Soviets give evidence of increased strength with the slogan 'National Var,'* the report stated. "The raorole of those parts of the population which are pro-German becomes woroo constantly. Guerrilla-controlled areas are growing Lines of communication vital to the war effort are Increasing anxiety on the part of our own troops due to the obviously erroneous handling of tho population: 'We ourselves are creating the Partisans.11
Among others tha following reasons were given for these developments! "Secret German directives concerning the worthlessness of the Slav Peoples and the necessity for their extermination have become widely known among the Russian people, andertile soil for hostility to Increased Partisan activity and grave errors ln the management of th'e population are damaging Oerman Insufficient carrying-out of the New Agrarian Order, no return of former private
Among high-ranking officers of the Oerman Army the conviction grew that "Russia can only be conquered by Russians." Some Germane credit the origin of this theory to General von Brauchltch, German Field Commander in the East, in It was, however, shared from the beginning of the warumber of other military and civilian leaders especially the Foreign Office experts on Russia (Schulenburg, Hllger and Groookopf.) It was these experts, as well as tho people of the Ministry forastern Territories, such as Brautigam, who most sharply condemned the policy evolved by loch for the occupied areas.
VIII RUSSIAN VOLUNTEERS2
K; _ The lack of any fixed political policy also preventedpolicy with regard to the employment of Russian -vqlunteera. To be sure. Hitlerumber of specific
directives on the subject, but there ie ample evidence that in practice these orders vere not -always folloved strictly and that many military units dealt with the problem on their ovn initiative, without the approval of higher headquarters. An analysis of the measures adopted by such units ie necessary in order toomplete.insight intoof Russian volunteers by the German Army. Various Army headquarters were inclined from the "et^rt to integrate Russian volunteers into German formations. oodis'that givenemorandumritten by the General of Eastern Troops,'Hellmich. "The relationship between 6pace and the available forces compelled our people to helpe wrote. 'There came into existence the so-calledhoseto help) and in the course of time the Oettruppen (Eastern Troops.) These were ln themselves undesirable expedients to which we were forced by the shortage of personnel, and finally led.tate,of affairs which required guidance from above,"
Hellmlch. emphasized that "the employment of local Inhabitants In the battle against Bolshevism was begun by combat units, which fact should Bottle, the .question as.to whether there was need for such assistance."wasilitary necessity by the combat troops, and the improvisation was satisfactory becauseime at; least the results were good.
For Hitler, on the contrary, the question was closely linked to the over-all political problem. Ine permitted the formation of Ost Leglonen (Eastern Legions.) To carry out this decision the OKtf (High Command of the Armed Forces) directed onhat the following legions be created: urkl6taneorgian Legion and an Armenian Legion.
Onitler authorized the unrestricted formation of Tartar unite involving primarily Tartars from theowever, one expressly forbade the formation of volunteer units from prisoners of war or inhabitants of any occupied areas, except those specified above.
Ond of March the High Command of the Armed Forcesecree which gave the baeic reason for this policy.
" "It"is Intended that the Turkish peoples and Inhabitantst- the Caucasus be permitted, after theo obtain
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far-reachingtho observer stated. Tor that reeeon the formation of volunteer legion6 actively participating ln the var of liberation agalnet tbe Bolsheviks froa the cltizene of these countries lewhereas citizens of the Baltic countries, tbe Ukraine,ay only be considered for the police services and not for employment at the front.'
Inhe Army High Commandecret pamphlet entitled, "Directive concerning Employment of Local Inhabitants in the East." The first sentence'reads; "The vastness of the Eastern Aroa and the absolutefor economy In.the employment of Germans have compelled us to employ the manpower of the conquered Eastern Countries In the most varied capacities ln the service of the Armed Forces especially ln the army in the field and ln the service of the war economy.*
The various nationalities were, however, to be employed ln different ways. Members of the Turkish races and Cossacks, who were fighting beside the German troops aa allise against the Bolshevist enemy,pecial group with the same privileges as German-soldiers. Other nationalitieswith the exception of Great Russianscould be placed ln para-military formations to combat Partiaans. There was also further discussion of the utilization of persons of all ethnic groups for police and various auxiliary servlcoa. On paper, everything was ln order, but ln the field the various decreesar different result.
IX FAILURE OF EASTERN TROOPS
Inommander.of an Eastern Battalionetter to the Commander of Eastern Troops stating that conspiracies had been uncovered and. mutinies and desertions of whole companies had taken place.
recruiting, which was originally conductednd2 carefully and accuratelyew politically gifted officers, waa undertakenass1 baelo ln the course. Errors In recruiting have continued to The Eastern Battalions are net to work from.the day of their organization. So-called training periods have existed only on etc."
The Germane who undertook tho organization of theae battalions were net, according to the author of thia letter, able to distinguish between good and bad elements. Accordla
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to thia.report, the Ignorance of these Geroan organizers, who had not the faintest knowledge of Eastern peoples, Bolshevism or Jewry, led to the recruiting of "purely Soviet products."
This criticism is sharp, but lt does not get at the roots of the difficulty.* Tbe defects in recruiting were not only due to the shortcomings of the recruiters but, to an even greater degree to German policy or lack of policy. It was, of course, not stated publicly that only the so-called Turkish peoples and the inhabitants of the-Caucasus were to receive far-reaching independence after the war, but the special handling and preferential treatment of tbe mentioned ethnic groups could hardly go unnoticed by the other peoples of the occupied areas.
The members of the other groups of necessity must have felt that they were being considered and treated as Inferior beings. Bow could they, then, consider their service ln the German Armyattle for their own liberty and that of their homeland?
It was only natural that many of the volunteers were only Induced to enter the German service for material reasonso escape the horrors of the prlsoner-of-wer camps, and even in many cases only to get an opportunity to plunder. Ho wonder, as the Eastern Battalion Commander wrote, that as one battalion after another was organized, "the good elements were constantly diluted until we were confronted by an unsupervlsable, impenetrable, incalculable caes.*
Hie last comment refers to the3 (organization of the independent Eastern Battalionslnto the earlier Eastern Legionsstarted in) The increasingly threatening manner in which the situation was developing had already become easily discernible.during the course
X* SEARCH FOR NEW POLICY
In hie memorandum ofh ofiscussion of the Eastern Battalions, Dr. Brautlgam wrote that; "With the instinct Inherent in Eastern peoples tbe ordinary man had soon found out sIbofor Germany the slogan: 'Liberation from Bolshevism'retext to enslave the Eastern peoples according <ito her own methods."
Il
Be added that in order that there should exist no doubt at all on the Oerman war alms, however, Germanreferred openly to this intontion in increasing measure The conquered territory was claimedot only for Germany as an area of colonization, but even for Germany's bitter enemies, the Dutch, the Norwegians, and others. The economic exploitation was proclaimed verbally and ln print and carried out with almost totaldisregard for the requirements of the indigenous population, and with the greatest lack of consideration.
.Dr. Brautlgam went on to point out that the populace in. had more of an understanding of the measures and duties necessitated by var than the conquered peoples of the West. Be added that the Soviet laborer and peasant, who were educated to the highest degree ofby Bolshevism, soon perceived that Germany did not regard them as partners with equal rights, but considered them only as objectives of her political and economic alma. This, he said, had disillusioned them Indescribably, all the more, since they had placed great hope ln Germany.
As early as JuneoebbelB wrote ln "Our policy ln the conquered Easternstill notin privateeveryone is of the opinion that we musterecting puppet-governments, tooreon the part of the population of theareas. Our attackthis all are convincedbo directed mainly against Bolshevism and not
By chance, Goebbele wrote on the same day that, "the enemy has attempted to break out of the 'Volkova very tense battled Indeed.1 In the Volkovussian Army, the Second Assault Army, commanded by General Vlassov, was surrounded by the Germans. Vlaesov himself was captured somewhat later, and hie army destroyed. After hie capture, Oeneral Vlaesov became one of tho most controversial figures ln German policy in the East. umber of Oerman groups sought to use the anti-Soviet aove-ft ment which he later headed in Germany ln their efforts to
change Oerman policy so as to permit the use of Russianshe war agalnat. The so-called "Vlaesov Action, f, bis movement, must be carefully considered because lt Isar.more than historical interest, since it shows the basic .weaknesses of.
XI GENERAL VLASSOV: TBE MAN AND HIS PROGRAM
Many Russian generals were taken prisoner1noluding several army commanders, but none of these made the same Impression as that created by General Vlassov on his captors. Soon after he was taken prisoner,apture came to be considered an event of great significance. One official observer, Edwin Erich Dvlnger of the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs, statedecret memorandum:have not the least doubt that this man was sent to us by Fate at tho decisive moment and that his employment can turn the course of the war completely in.our favor.* After his flrat conversation with Vlassov (Augustilger. wrote that he appeared totrong and forthright person, with calm and balanced Judgment. On oloeerwith Vlassov, Hllger wrote ln "General Vlassov is inspiredurning hatred of the Bolshevik system and Stalin personally. Because of his prestige innd because of hie whole background and his spiritual force, Vlassov isuitable instrument to serveounter-balance to Stalin to weaken Stalin's position decisively ln favor of the German Var Effort."
In another document, Dwinger made the following appraisal, probably somewhat colored by hie personal vlewel "General Vlassovormer, that la to nay he comes from that stratum of Russian society which Is the most typically Russian. Hean of high intelligence andery loyal The basis and drive for his effectivenessn the genuinely Russian sense, religious. Even though he is not,ember of any.church, there can be no doubt that he is motivated far less by political considerations thanind of Messianic vision of Redemption (for his people) which has Its origin ln his sympathy with the torrlble suffering of his people which he hoe hod to witness all his life. In aplto of this he is very cloar-headed, and modestalthough stiffening proudly when one mentions 'Russian slaves.' Be Is not,ere seeker after political glory and accordingly will neverurchasable hireling and will never be willing to lead hirelings."
Nor was Vlassov an unknown quantity to the Oerman Army High Command, Hllger points out that, oldier he enjoyed the reputation of having played en outstanding and decisive role ln the military operations which led to the preservation of Moscow from the German aeaault ln the fall * .
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Fromn Vlaeaov commanded thevhich later counter-attacked and advancedMoscow. In the Bpring2 his resistance InEncirclement" east of Leningrad was energetic He remained hidden In the forest andthe destruction of his army until he was forced
His career ln. was most successful, ln spite of the handicap of his origin, as the son of a
prosperous peasant who was liquidatedulak during
?hc organization of the collective farms. Vlassov was bornnd completed training for the priesthood, but entered the Red Army during the Civil War. After that, heilitary career. He spent about two"of the military advisers of Chiang Kal Shek, and then wae cade Commander ofh Infantry Dlvlalonin Kiev Military District late9 or early In the Fall0 his dlTlalon was decorated for being the beat disciplined and beet led in tho Soviet Union. He was promoted to the rank of "Major General" aboutnd, after his participation in the defense of Moscow, to the rank "of "Lieutenant General.
In a' conversation with Dwlnger, Vlassov quoted StalinBaying to him ln tho Spring2 that the Germane wereGod making eo many political errors thattalin-could subsist on their consequences forever, but tnaL mis war would be won by the man whom the masses would support tho longeBt." It was Vlaasov's Idea to win the DaeseB away from Stalin.
Vlassov's Ideas, as he presented them to the Germans, are deacrlbed ln many documents, but because of theunder which they were written they must be studied carefully. Vlassov wanted to perouade the Germans to aaopi his program. Therefore, he had to be guided by his own . Judgment or that of trusted Germans ln order to avoid laeaB whiota were unacceptable to the, German Government.
Without some modification of hie ideas he could notanything. Moreover, those Germans who shared Vlaasov's ideas sought to make those ideas as paiataoie ior those ln power'ae possible. Thus, for example, Dwlnger wrote that Vlassov was "anti-Bolshevist and anti-capitalist, : which waa quite correct, but he added, "in our sense of thetherefore, reallyationalhich'false conclusion.
Apparently Vlaeeov talked frankly toan who had spent forty-seven years ln Russia, was entirely familiar with the language and the country, and warmly sympathetic to tbe Russians. Hllger, quite naturally, did not report officially everything that Vlassov told him.ecently written study on Vlaesov, Hllger summarizes Vlassov'e fundamental Ideas ae follows: "Vloosov's case was the eamo as that of many other Russians: not until the catastrophead taken place did they become awar< of the fact that there were still possibilities of.freeing the Russian people from despotism and making available to them the blessingsemocractic regime.
"For thla purpose, Vlassov allied himself with the Germans, but not because he felt any sympathy for the-regime which existed ln Germany at that time. He honestly believedecisive-defeat Inflicted upon the Red Army would caueo the overthrow of the Soviet Government and that the Germans would achieve this goal.
"Cn the other hand, however, he was deeply convinced that the Germans would never succeed without the active help of the Russian people. Thus, for the time being the Germans and Russians were natural allies. In his view, such an alliance did notangeruture Russia because he was convinced that, although the Germane could defeat the Red Army with the help of the antl-Communlst part of the Russian population, they would never beosition to conquer the whole vast countryubjugate lt."
Theso views colnolde at oil points'with conclusions which can be drawnareful and critical analysis of the available documentary material. It is of the utmost importance to emphasize that, from the very beginning Vlassoverman victory impossible without-the helpussian anti-Bolshevist army. In his report of his first interview with Vlassov, Hllger wrote that the Russian could not conceive how any victory could be won by the German military forces alone. This statement was made Int the time of the greatest Gorman successes anderies of grave defeats of the Red Army.
Vlaesov warned against underestimating the Soviet powers of resistance. etter of Augustntended for the German Commanders and Jointly composed by Vlassov.and another Russian officer. Colonel Boyarsxi, hey.said: "Vhlle taking advantage or the peculiarities of. Russiathe endless distances, the tremendous
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resources and the patriotism of the peopleand supported by the Terror, Stalin will never voluntarily retire and Kill not be prepared to compromise. He will continue the war until he has exhausted all resources and possibilities of defense. There Is no possibility of an internal revolution under the existing circumstances."
In that same letter Vlassov formulated his own proposals The formationenter forussian Army and the startlassov'organization itself.
Onh ofhat is to say during the Allied offensive in Northern Africa and after Stalingrad, Vlassov spoke in Mogilev much more franklymall circle of Gormans. Thereeport of this speech madeepresentative of the Ministry for the Eastern Territories. According to the report, Vlassov was of the opinion .that Germany vould lose the war against Russia unless large German armies came to gripe with Stalin very soon, and an effective paclflcation-pollcy broughtundamental change in the occupied areas.
He believed that, without the cooperation of the population of the occupied areasystematic undermining of the Russian front based thereon, Germany must rose the war In the course of time because of material and personnel shortages. If Germany cherished no intentions to colonize and enslave them this should be made clear to all concerned by means, of authoritative words and corresponding deeds. There were still sufficient valuable non-Bolshevist forces available. Vlassov felt it was still possible to use these forces effectively and regarded thle as his task. To accomplish it, however, it was eesentlal to explain tho German objectives clearly. The Russians whoational feeling of honor wanted to know what role they would play. They would, however, under all circumstances oppose any enslavement of the Russian people.
Vlassov believed' that he could create an armysing the antl-Sovlet Russian prisoners and elvlliane in German hands. With their help he believed it would certainly be possible to liberate Russia from Bolshevism. .He felt that the fundamental basis forussian Renaissance, however, wouldlearly defined policy which would satisfy the Russian national honor.
Vlassov .was sharply critical of German methods in the occupied areas. He-had;ad his own experiences with the problem and knew there were "differences of opinion among the German leadership." For that reason he wanted a^
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favorable decision from the Fuehrer. Obviouely with this objective in mind he calledleader of great genius.* He added that he hoped Hitler would makeebirth of Russia. The Russians, having received back, their national honor, would crush Bolshevism at the side of Germany andew Europe in close alliance with the Reich.
Nevertheless, Vlassov realized even inhortly after his capture that the prospect of the revivalreat unified Russian state would not awaken much enthusiasm among Germane, flilger himself mentioned thepoint ln the course of the first conversation: 'The Soviet Officers (Vlassov and BoyarsklJ' he wrote, "replied that, besides an independent Russian Stateolony there were various other conceivable and acceptable solutions, such as, dominionrotectorate,rotected state with temporary or permanent German military occupation."
To what extent theue two officers were sincere it Is no longer possible to ascertain. In any event, Vlassov clearly understood that to get permission for his project he had to agree to some compromise solution acceptable to tbe Germane.
XII FIRST VLASSOV PROJECT (VLASSOV ACTION)
In the initial period, the opposition of the Ministry for the Eastern Territories was quite effective, resulting In several months' delay for the Vlassov Project. emorandum of the German General Staff dated Junend entitled: "Development and Situation of Military Propaganda ln%the East since the Fall2 (Vlassoviscusses this situation.
It states that after Vlassov had placed himself at the dlepoeltlon of tbe Germanefor the war against Bolshevism"there appeared for the flrat time, inlassov tract which met with such success that Armed Forces Operations Staff decided, with the full permission of the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, to Include ln the propaganda plan for theajor propaganda project "from Russians tooasic platform for the project, Vlassovroclama->Vf tlon lnRussian Committee" summoned all toeside Germany against Bolshevism1. It soon became apparent,that more than the decision of the Armedigh Command wao necessary to carry outlan of.
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ho memorandum of the Command Staff stated that the Ministry for the Eastern Territories did not authorize the project until the middle of January, after the most favorable opportunity had passed. Since tnen, the memorandum continued, lt had been In constant operation, with striking success.
. The opposition of the Ministry for the Eastern Territories was closely linked to the political vlewB of Rosenberg. As far as Rosenberg was concerned Vlassov was first, andreat Russian, and he vas accordingly afraid that the Vlassov Project wouldreat Russian Project, making any future partition"of Russia more difficult.
There was considerable negotiation between Vlassovhe Germans concerning his programew order in Russia. Vlassov himself maintained that evory nationality had an' unlimited right to self-determination and should decide Tor Itself whother lt wished to remainnion with the other peoples of Russia or become entirely Ineeclaration ln which, among other things, were the following words! "In the new there will be neither national suppression nor rule by force. Each race will receive its national liberty and.right to self-determination.*
The Russian genoral declared ln various conversations that he fully understood that Russia would have to make great sacrifices. In particular the Ukraine and the Caucasussince Rosenberg wanted these areas separated from Groatcr Russia at all costs. In the end, the Ministry for the Eastern Territories finally gave its consent to tho propaganda exploitation of Vlassov. ew months later Rosenberg changeduch more favorable opinion of Vlaesov and his movement after VlasBov hadeclaration which parallelled Rosenberg's Ideas.
On Novemberosenberg senteport dealingeclaration entitled,ationalanger forhich Vlaesov had sent to the Armed Forces High Command's Propaganda Division -Inccording to Rosenberg, Vlassov acknowledged In this declaration that "Thenitedingle bloc,enace to Europe. Vlassov considered that the menace could only be nullified if the peoples and groups of peoples who belong.to the bloc enteredew order as membersew and larger organization of the European Family of Peoples.
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Under such circumstances, the Oreat Russians would beto surrender the Ukraine and the Caucasuein reality thlo would be no surrender, since the economicultural oncrgiee of these lands would then benot only to western Europe but.to all Europe snd henceo Russia. This declaration was an obvious adaptation of iRosenberg's Ideas. Whether it was sincere or not, this
statenent helped to win Rosenberg's support for the Vlassov Project;;
an interruption of three or more months, the
Vlassov Project became active again ln The movement had been given the means toussian language newopapcr calledhe Dawn'.) Vlassovanifesto in the form of an Open Letter in this publication on the 3rd ofnd proclaimed the formationussian Coomlttes. This committee, however, only existed on paper.
Vlassov aloo disclosed his program for tho future Russia: the so-called "Smolensk Program" or "Vlaesov'soints." Finally, also in March, Vlassov was permitted to speak ln public assemblies in the occupied areas, and his speechesery deep Impression on both the Germans and Russians who heard them.
The June memorandum of the Armed Forces Command Staff stated: "This Vlaesov Project, which was begunropaganda trick, hasovement which from the enemy's viewpoint, due to its threatening character* raises before his eyes the spectre of civil war."
The memorandum Included an appendix of some tenreports concornlng the efrect or the project,how great the success of the Vlassov
arge number of reports received from all fronts show the deep Impression that tho Vlassov Manifesto has made upon the Russianhe memorandum continued, . and mako lt quite evident that matorlal aoslstance has been rendered toward the demoralisation of the Russian will to resist and that tho enemy's power haa been weakened and tne tendency to desertion strengthened."
In order to suggest action which they did not dare to rocommend, the composers or the memorandum described tho efrect of the propaganda abroad: "The Vlassov Project has arouaed the greatest attention among our allies, our enemies, and neutrals in the months of April and Hay, and
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led to the general opinion among them that thia project. If oklllfully continued by Germany couldecisive turn to the war ln Germany's favor.*
The Vlassov Movement was not continued, however. At the time that the memorandum of the Command Staff was written, the movement atarted by the Vlassov Project had run Into very considerable difficulties. In ordor to continue the project effectively it would have been necessary to use Vlaasov not only for propaganda purposes, but also to giveeading position ln the field of political aotlvlty with real influence upon recruitment, organization and other activities of the Russian volunteers.
The propaganda Itself, aa mere propaganda, was beginning to lose Its effectiveness. The fact that public discussion of the' project was forbidden ln Germany aroused doubt among Russian prlsoners-of-war as to German sincerity. Moreover,anifesto was not allowed to circulate ln the occupied areas. The memorandum said that this measure, which was "well known to theegative effect and waa generally coneldered by the Russians as proof that the whole project waaropaganda trick. The effect of broken promises also boomeranged on the Germans, the Command Staff reported.
there has been an increase in voices that, because of the ao far unfulfilled promises aredoubt as to the honesty of Germant
stated.
The memorandum warned that "the opportunities offered to enemy propaganda by any oventual collapse of the Vlassov Projeot areand concluded that "the dangersurther delay or, perhaps, reveraala ln the Vlaasov Project may bring are unmistakable, when one considers thatussians are ln German service eo Eastern Troops, that the propaganda for encouraging Russian desertions la foundedreat extent on the Vlassov Manifesto, and that the development of the guerrilla-warfare situation Is decisively dependent upon tbe realization of the German promisee,."
XIII HITLER'S DECISION
Still, all these arguments did not serve to break down the opposition of the Nazi exponentsolonial policy.The opinion of the High Command was Ignored, as were the
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efforts of Ribbentrop, wbo was strongly Influenced by hie Russian experts. .
Rosenberg later, lnointed out!"At that time, one of the greatest opponents of theee effortswas the Re1chefuehrer S3 Himmler. He and other leading figures of the Fuehrer's Headquarters expressed the greatest hostility toward the person and the employment of General Vlassov,"
Vlassov was subjected to particularly strong attack because of his statement that Russia could not be conquered without the help of Russians. For that reason, support of Vlassov seemed to both Himmler andign of defeatism.
Initler, after liatening to an explanation by Ribbentrop"of the Vlassov Project, commented that "such political actions were not to be undertaken; they were not necessary and were worthless;-their only results would be fraternization between our people and the Russians; moreover, they would be considered as weakness."
Finally ln January, Hitler issued the following directive:
"The national committees may not be used for the recruitment of volunteers.
"Vlassov must never again appear ln the occupied
As for tho propaganda side of the Vlassov Project, Hitler further stated that he did not object to lt but only under the condition that "no German authority is to take seriously-the lures contained in theoints or the Vlaesov Program."
This ended the first Vlassov Project. Vlassov himself was placed ln house arrest and had to remainuburberlin. He was allowedery restricted number of visitors, and was prohibited from engaging In any activity. All further Vlassov propaganda, until the Autumnas merely a'mlsuse of hie name.
On the.basis of his own views. Hitler had handled the matter logically. An honorable collaboration withussian opponents of Stalin and his regime, such as Generalcould not be reconciled with his political ideas.
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luVrt^f'eSrn^lorLSi they are dangerous!
people.
which were Integrated into the German Army. Movement.
Others functioned aa*andeteelf.
XIV SECOND VLASSOV PROJECT
an ArW or_Llherat10n.
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Concerning this second Vlassov Project there is comparatively little documentary material available. However, this lack Is not of decisive importance because this new Project was clearly undertaken far tooince the course of the war could no longer have been turned in Germany's favor.
Inhe Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia was formed under the leadership of Vlassov. Onh the Manifesto of the Committee was published in Prague. This tine lt wasiction; the Committee actually existed and builtoodthough once more certain difficulties arose, because of German fears that Vlassov and his movement had Great Russian tendencies.
Rosenberg and various committees of Russian national minorities shared these apprehensions. This time, however, the conduct of affairs in Germany lay in the band of Himmler, who wasosition to overcome all opposition.
Vlassov received permission and orders to organize two divisions. Of these two only one was formed before the war ended. It was in aotlon only once on the German elds, in the defense of the Oder River Line. The division was then sent to Czechoslovakia, where lt changed sides ond liberated Prague from the Germans. Vlaesov and his staff went first to Karlsbad, and afterwards, as far ae can be ascertained, to Fueeeen ln Bavaria onh ofhere they remained until the American troops arrived.
The questionemains as to what motivated Vlassov and his supporters to become activeime when the position of Germany was already hopeless. Certainly they could not have shared Hitler's Insane, belief that help would be forthcoming from* Providence. Their situation was They knew what to expectictorious Soviet Russia. Nevertheless one may assume that the last Vlassov Project was notesture of deepalr. Many sources indicate that he hoped to establish connections with the Western Allies and gain their support.
.This Is confirmed by Hllger, who remained ln close contact with Vlassov during the entire period. Theof Prague by Vlassov's division and Vlassov's own bearing tend to further substantiate this assumption.Finally thereocument which must be treated with great caution, but nevertheless very interesting. This
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docunehteport madeussian who,erman secret agent, collected Information on Vlassov and hie organization.
This report, which wai written ondonversation which Vlassov bed withgeneral in the presenceumber of his One of the officers is supposed to havethis conversation. According to the report,general asked Vlaesov his opinion concerningfight" against the, the
Vlassov is reported to have replied that he was not even thinkingight against the Entente and that, on the contrary, he expected that his Interests and those or the Western Powers would soon coincide on the ground or the common right against Bolshevism. Vlassov was even said to have had the intention, ln case or extreme emergency, to lead his troops Into Switzerland and to orrer thea to the Allies rroa there. .
It Is clear thateport cannot be regardedependable source, although lt doesertain value because it is partially conrinned from other sources. What Is significant, ln any caBe, is that there Is no evidence that Vlassov actedermanut on the contrary only in accordance with his conception of what was necessary ln any struggle agalnat the Btalln-reglme and in the Interests of Russia, aa he understood them.
Itact or great historical Importance that,uarterentury of Soviet rule, such phenomena as Vlasaov and his movement were pooslble, and that they could have grown to considerable proportions If they had not been prevented from doing ao by Oerman policy. *
Original document.
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