ONSEQUENCES OFFORTHCOMING WEST GERMAN ElECTIONS*
SUMMARY
conditions precedingugust elections in Western Oermany generally favor the larger, established political part.es, which will profit from: (a) broader organization, (b) superior capabilities for parly(e) ability to presentubstantial record ofachievem-.'nt. and (e) certainof the electoral law which handicap smaller parties.
The latter, Incljding the GermanPartyre, however, unhampeied byriction* of responsibility, and can make extravagant campaign promises lo aU interests They will attempt to exploit fully the dissatisfaction voiced in many quarters with the prrties which are now in power. They will also, except for the KPD. gain volesesult of the rightist political trend in Western Germany today.
It is cslimnled that the German Social Democratic Parlyhe Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the KPD will retaintheir pas', electoral strengths The Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union allianceowever, may lose the votes of the rightist elements which supported It In earlier elections. In which case the smaller, rightist parties will be virtually the sole beneficiaries. The CDU/CSU alliance and the SPD are expected to win together al leastercent of the voles, and because of the provisions of the electoral law, an even higher percentage of the seats in :he Fedeial Diet (Bundesfeo).'
In view of the probable election outcome, in which no parly willajority, one ot two possible coal Hon governments Is expected to result. The first would probably be composed Of the CDU/CSU. SPD. and possibly the FDP, the second of the CDU'CSU, the FDP. the Zenlrum, and some of the smaller rightist parties. Despite the differences between the two major parties and the aversion of the SPD leadership to assuming responsibilityajority of itsDU/CSU-SPD government is the more likely of the two The formation ofoalition, however, will depend upon the ability of the SPD tothe cabinet posts necessary to ensure atartiEl realization of Its program, and upon its willingness to subordinate partisan political considerations to the creationtable German government.
Tha lower home
Of the twoDU/CSU-SPDwould be the more favorable to USbecause of Its control of the Federal Dirt, its greater stability. Its more progressive composition, and its firmness toward the Cora-muni*ts. The alternative coalitionbe far less favorable to US Interests because It: (a) would be less stable, (b) would face far more powerful parliamentary opposition, (c) would beore rightisttxa finni"tj'vi nf
It is assumed thai Ihere will be no JonrJimtnlal chances In the present situation In Germany prior to these election*eturnee Outline of Political Panics In Western Germany Is attached as Appendix.
Kola: The Intel licence ore. mirations of Ihe Departments of Stale. Army. Kavy. and the Air Pore* hasr concurred In this report. It Ii based on Information atatlable to CIA asuly
JaVC NT
PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FORTHCOMING WEST GERMAN ELECTIONS
The Pre Election Si'ootion,
a. The Established Major Parties, la the first federal election* under the Bonn Constitution which are scheduledhe estublished major parties, the Christian Democratic Union Christian Social Union alliancehe CtimanDemocratic Partynd the Free Democratic Partyave several distinct advantages ovtr the smaller independentThese three major parties operaterizonal basis and have fairly dependable party presses. The SPD is the most highly centralized, almost all authority being vestedentral executive committee dominated by Kurt Schumacher. The CDU/CSU and the FDP have both formed workingto coordinate the policies ofnd organisationsrizonal basis, but in both parties final authority has been telamcd by the hand party machine The smallerparties, with the exception of the German Communist Partyaveudimentary organization and press, and are active In most instances onlyegional, or attate (Land) level. None,for the KPD, Is organizedonal or trizonal ba^is. Some of the smaller parties, such as the Bavarian Parly and the South Schlesviig Association (SSV) are purelywith programs comprising both and separatist aims. Others, among which are the German Bloc (DB) In Bavaria, the National Democratic Party (NDP) in Hesse, and the Oerman Party (DP) In the British Zone, are rightist and nationalist, but have been unable to qualify for Militarylicense In all states.
The major parlies will also benefit from the electoral law, which provides that any party failing to win at5 percent of the state vote, or else Ihe majority of the votes in one constituency, cannot be given seats In the Federal Dietost smallwould be unlikely to win the majority vote In any constituency. Their only hope for representation, therefore, ic to achieve theercent of UN slate vole and thus participate in the state parly list system, whereby the percentage of the total votetate won by each parly determines theofeals it receives Of the seals in the Did, GO penf nt are allotted to candidates from the individual constituencies, so that onlyercent are available through the stale list system. The major parties have the further advantage of well-known political leaders, and. especially in the case of theair record of achievement in municipal, regional, state, and bizonal ew of the major KPD peisonalit.es. the smaller parties haveunknown leadership. They have also no recent experience in actual government b. The Independent Minority Parties. During the coming federal electionhowever, some factors will favor the independent over the established parties,those of the latter that have held office Independent party leaders will be able) lo exploit the considerable dissatisfaction felt toward the established parties by many social groups, most important of which are the eight million expellees from the east. Because these leaders arc unlikely lo assume actualthey will promise everything to all In'ercsls- They will make irKrrased use of the label of "collaborators" with the Powers lo embarrass the major parties. Their rightist-nationalist attitude should at iact the votes of the many Germans who have hitherto been apathetic to politics and to the activities of the established parties
2. Probable Results of theElection Returns.
In6 State Diet (landtag) elections, the approximate percentages of the total votes In west Germany won by each party were asercent.ercent, and otherB percent.istrict (Kreis) and municipal
5 9%
95%
meinde) flections, however, saw changes In the relative pa-ty strengths, generally al the expense of the parlies holding office. The approximate relative party strengths in these electionsercent;per-cent; and for small parties and Independent5 percent. .In several special district and municipal elections. minor conservative party candidates andhave gained an increasingof the voles. It cannot be assumed, however, thai they would do as aetl inelections where their lack of! be an important handicap. STATE DItT (Landtag) ELECTION6Percentage of valid votes cast)
CDU/CSU SPD FDP KPDum
German Party (DP) Economic Reconstruction
Party (WAV) Other Parlies
ESTIMATED FEDERAL DIETRESULTS.of valid voles
35%
10%
8%
Zentrum
German Parly (DP) Bavarian Party South Schlcswig Association (SSV)
Economic Reconstruction
Parly (WAV) Independents and other parties J
03
On the basis of there trends, following the State Diet elections6 and the district and municipal elections,9 federal election results are estimated as Of theillion Western Ot-imans eligible to vote, somewhat overillion will cast ballots No party willajority. The SPD iso win betweenndercent of aU votes, the FDPndercent. The KPD is unlikely to win moreercent of the votes, and because anti-Communist feeling in Western Oermany has grownesull of Soviet tactics tn Berjin. It will probably winercent of the votes. These parties, therefore, willretain their pasl electoral strengths.
The election results are most uncertain In the case of the CDU/CSU and the rightist parties, pr.marily because the rightist groups may win the votes of conservative elements that have hitherto given their support to the CDU/CSU. The CDU.CSU ahould win at leastercent of the vole, but may receive as high asercent. The minor rightist and regional parlies shouldinimum ofercent. They may gain as much asercent, however, mostly at the expense of the CDU/CSU.
The proportion of west German votersopposed to the establishment of the western Orrman Federal Republic is believed to be small and will be revealed primarily by the number of invalid ballots cast and the votes received by parlies of the extreme left andigh percentage of abstentions would also indicate disapproval.
Because of the electoral law provisionsnoted, the percentage of volesfor each party does not constitute an estimate of that party's probableIn the Federal Diet. Candidates elected by majority vote In Individual constituencies will ln most instances be those of the two major parties. Some of the smaller parties will not be able to gainercent of the state vole, and so will tie barred entirely from representation In the Federal Dietonsequence, the strength of the CDU/CSU. SPD. and FDP In Ihe Diet should actually be larger thin their share In the vote might Indicate. ForIt Is entirely possible that the CDU/ CSU and SPD together, while receiving onlyercent of the total popular vote, mightBO percent of the total Diet seats,wholly on tho distribution of the
voles they receive.urther example, the KPD may suffer loss under the electoral law In such slates as Bavaria and Sc hies wig-Hoi-ttein. where Its electoral strength has rarelyercent
b. Ctlimated Compotit.on o/ theelt.
esult of tbt probable outcome of the elections, the government Is expected to take the formoal it ten because neither Ihe CDU. CSU nor Uie SPD is hkeiy to assumeresponsibility. This coalition will probably take one of the following two forms:
Coalition with Ihe SPD.of the preponderantll have in the Federal Diet,the more likely coalition. Factorsformation, however, ate theIn Uie economic and socialof the two paitles and the aversionleaders to assumption ofwhen the parly docs notown working majority
The final decision jf the SPD Is likely to be based on two factors: first. Ita ability to obtain enough cabinet posts to ensure at least arealization cf its program, and second, its willingness to subordinate partisan politics to the attainmenttable government.
The stability of the coalition would beby the participation of the FDP which oftenosition midway between the two larger parties. Although the attitude the FDP would assume toward this coalition is uncertain, it would probably participate if given adequate compensation In theto executive positions.
h the FDP,and possibly Certain SmellAlthoughoalition Iswould be faced with the unwillingnessmore liberal elements to associaterepresentatives of the extreme right,and religious antagonismscomponent groups, and the problemexecutive positions to satisfyof all the partners.
ha New Government In Kelolion to US Interests.
a. CDV/CSV Coalition with the SPD.
A CDU/CSU SPD coalition, with or without FDP participation, would be broadlyand would be favorable to USThe two parlies, through theirof the majority of the seats in the federal Diet, would be certain of passing all mutually acceptable legislation, and lo this extent could provide cff-clive government Moreover. Ihe presence of the SPD would counteract the rightist wing of the CDU/CSU. piovldcithin the coalition, assure the support of most trade unions and the bulk of Ihe woiklng class and render remoteest German "deal" with an east German Communist slate or directly with the USSR
DV/CSV Coalition with the FDP, Zent-rum, and possibly Certain Small Rightist Croups.
overnment would present several features at variance with US interests. Its capability for effective and stable government would be sharply reduced by the opposition of theften coinciding with that of other opposition parties and factions. Laboroih union and otherwise, would be largely lacking, and in many Instances labor would offer strong resistance to governmental policies Its stability nVght be furtherby the unilily of the splinter groups forming the right wing of theIn addition, the reactionary wing of the CDU/CSU would gain in Influenceesult of the party's collaboration with these conservative small parties and the govern-
APPENDIX
REFERENCE OUTLINE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN WESTERN GERMANY
Rightist.'
German Partyctive only In the British Zone, with Its main s'.iength In lower Saxony, where It9 percent ol the votej In?lectrons. The DP will probably be supported by former members of the nationalistic Ocrman Rightist Partyhe lat'-er parly existed only indistricts of the British Zone, where It en-Joyed considerable suceccs until the rrcent prohibition of IU activities by the BritishGovernment.
South Schlesu-ig Associationctive only in Sehleswig-Holsteln in the British Zone, where Itercent of the voles Inlections The SSVeparatistrightist parly, given mild encouragement by the Danish Gc-vernmenl
Sational Democratic Party (HDP).Inof Hesse, in
the US Zone. The NDPewwhich has won surprising successes in by-elrrtlonsot yet licensedtate (Land) level. It ls reported to haveorking agreement wilh the Hesse FDP, whereby some of its candidates will stand on the FDP list.
Bavarian Party. Active only in Bavaria In the US Zone, where Itercent of the votes in7lections Aand separatist group, it is expected loercent of the voles in Bavaria, since its popularity has been increasing steadily.
'This does not purport loomplete 1UI of the rifhlist parlies, whteh are ilitj In flua. The parttea luted are those which have been moat active recently. At present, thr political activities ot all riant lit patties are limited by military government liccnilnf Their programs, therefore, are likely lo be Implicit rather nan announced, and theircharacter ts presently Indicated more by their asipportlrif element* than by their parly platforms In feneral. hossever. ihey tend to be authoritarian In principle andIn attitude, eitheregional or national basis.
Economic Reconstruction Partylthough it gainedercent of the'votes in, elections, the WAV, active only in Bataria, docs have some representation in Ihe Bavarian Diet- Despite the crowds vthich go to enjoy the speeches of its demagogic leader, Alfred Loriu, the WAV will probably winfewer of Ihe voles in Iheid.
2. Center.
CArMfM Democratic Union (CDU)/Chrls-tian Social Union (CSV).
Licensed In all stalca of all three rones, the CDU'CSUoose amalgam of statecoordinatedorkingon the western German level Its membership is heterogeneous, ranging from moderate liberal to extreme right, but inthe CDU/CSU can be characterisediddle class party subject to strong Catholic clerical influence in the south and Lutheran in the northwest. On Ihe economic side, the CDU/CSU stands as the chief protagonist of free enterprise. The CDU/CSU represents moderate federalism, as concerns the central government.
Free Democratic Partyicensed in all states of an three aones. the FDPorking un on of various state parties which generally subscribe tocommon program. The FDP supports the free enterprise system and parliamentary democracy, but Is more centralists than the CDU/CSU and is not subject lo clerical influence.
Center Partyctive only in theone, where it registered gains in7lections, the Centerurely Catholic party, in contrast to the CDU/CSU, which enjoys some Protestant support. The pa:ty endeavors to attract labor supportore progressive social program th.in that of the CDU'CSU. The Center has been under continual pressure to Join with the CDU/CSU,
andnion remains possible in the
3. leftist.
Social Democratic Partyicensed in all stales and all tones of Westernthe SPD Is very tightly organized. It Is very similar In aims to the British Labor Party, with ihich tt has close relations. It advocates parliamrnlaiy democracy, theOl all basictrong central government, and bitter resistance to Communism. The SPD Is supported by the trade unions and the great majority of west German labor.
German Communis! Party (KPD).in all slates and tones, the KPDIs an amalgamation of the usualobjectives and, for tacticaltrong rationalist stand against the western occupation powers. The KPD Is closelyby the Communist SociaUst Unity PartyD) In the Soviet Zone, though formally separated from it. KPD strength, never more thanercent of the voles cast in previouss believed to have been reducedduring the past year because oflacbcs tn Berlin and Fastern Germany.
europe
I. GERMANY: Political obstacles to US policy
S High Commission in Frankiortview that the US faces "extremely difficult problems"*ina German defense contribution andew partnership status between Western Germany and the occupying powers. It is clear to the Commission that neither of ihcse goals can be attained without the approval of the Socialists as well as the coalition government, and that Social.st leader Schumacher's attitude Is the main problem. The question is whether Schumacher will, in recognition of the seriousness of the world situation, abandon his present political tactics oferman defense contribution until assured of full political and military equality and until the Western Powers haveconsiderably greater military forces in WestThe Commission notes the existence of forcesthe Socialist Party opposing these "negative andtactics" but sees no sign that either Schumacher or Chancellor Adenauer is yet piepared to strive seriouslygrand coalition" government with Socialist participation.
The Commission also states that the attitude ofpeople towards the defense issue will remainproblem. The Commission believes,despite much popular uncertainty, apathy, andGerman people axe overwhelmingly an ti-Soviet
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DAILY DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does notomplete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
7<vol for Sflwasa
Cty-'AI>*f. Scandal resulting from theft ard disposal of_st_=ret.docucejiUparties! Thewest Geroan Chancellory" employee retrenching secretCabinet docurvsrts and disposing of thro to representatives of both the French Intellicence and tha opposition Social Democratic Party has aroused considerable concern In Bonn. The affair, *Mch has seriously eabarratsed the Social 3er*crats, has also placed Federal Covermcnt officialsad position, since ithe gap bet-fen the governr-ent ard the opposition Just at theipartisanship is Dost needed. Social Denocretic leader KurtxTacber, who allegedly receivedf the docuronls personally, has refused to testify in the tatter, claiming parliamentary Imunity. It Is not clear vtiat action the governnent will take. onn Unrobe red,
Oeman press is demanding in sensational articles that all guilty persons be prosecuted under the new treason law.
/
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OCI9 Copy No.
CURRENT INTEL IIGENCE DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does notomplete coverage of all current reportsComments represent the Immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
I
death may mean more moderate Social Democratic
policies ln Westdeath ol Kurt Schumacher^ chair-nanTest German social democratic Party,itter Chancellor Adenauer
year-old vice-chairman
of ths party aod parly wbeelhorse, will probably be confirmed as party leader by tbe Socialist Party Congress scheduled foreptember.
The party congress is not expected to produce anyformal changes io party policies, but is likely to resultradual increase in the influence of elements which desire to tOoe down opposition to German rearmament andEuropean unity moves. Consequently, in tbe period preceding tbe crucial federal election campaign, the party may be to give relatively more attention to domestic issues, although not reversing its present foreign policy stand. (Factual data from: ,
Aug 52
copy no.
oci no. 33
Intelligence Weekly
central intelligence agency
office of current inteuigence
THE EFFECT OF THE RECENT EAST GERMAN EVENTS INREPUBLIC
The threat to the Bodd coalition raised by the liberalization measures in East Germany has been largely cancelled out by tbe methodical suppression of the Soviet zone riots. Bovever, West German interest in
THE EFFECT OF THE RECENT EAST GERMAN EVENTS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
Tbe threat to the Bono coalition raised by tbemeasures proclaimed in East Germany onune bat been largely cancelled out by the methodical suppression of the Soviet atone riots ahlch followedeek. Tbe dow discredited East German puppet regime has lostouthpiece for Soviet uolty proposals, aod tbe Krc-alio Itself vlll probably have to coccede on tbe free election issue if It wants to defeat the Adenauer government >Dd Hestero European integration programs. Nevertheless, these developments have stimulated widespread demands lo West Germany for immediatetalks, ahich Chancellor Adenauer desires to defer until after tbe September elections
Wbco the East German polltburo suddenly announcedchanges ln its collectivization andthe West German press adopted a
took the position tbat it was yet too early to determineintentions. Bono
suspicion of the Cotuturlsts' motives]
That thm-fast German administration contemplated shaking the Adenauer governmenteries of maneuvers focused on unity appears evident from theune policy statement of Max Rclmano, chairman of the West German Communist Party. eries of early meetings between East and West Germans on specific matters such as interzonal trade and border Such meetings, be said, would engender mutual goodwill aod leadovernmental-level East-West German conference on free electlops and the formationnified
government.
a
spoke, rlota vere lo progress In East
Berlin. Tbe courage oi tbe rioters evoked Id Vest Geraaay an Irunrdlate surge of national feeling, strong appeals for unification, aod bitter condemnstloo of tbe East Geraar and Soviet regimes. pecial parliamentary meetiDg ooune Adenauer balled tbe rioters, and again dersoded tbat unity be achieved oo tbe basis of free elections, resolution of all border problems, and freedom of the uoified government to Join alliances. His statements were widely acclaimed, even by the Social Democrats, and lt was apparent tbat Vest German attention was firraly riveted on tbe cblef problem of unity free elections under International supervision.
The reaction In West Germany to tbe measures used Id putting down tbe riots bas been sucb that tbe range of tactics which tbo USSR can use against tbo Bonouse Dt Is do* Tbe present East Gcrcao government has beeo so thoroughly discredited that no responsible Vest Geraao vill saeet with Its representatives. Further Soviet efforts to ssay tbe Vest Geraan populace agalust EDC and the Boon coalition are likely to fall unless tbe USSR Itself approaches the Allies aod commits Itself on free electionsbich the riots have sbovn would be disastrous for East zone Communists.
Keanwblle, hovever, the reawakening of Vest GermaoIn unity bas loiev placed his partyompromising position for the September elections. Tbo chancellor lseeneral Soviet offer to negotiate Gcre-ao unity could be rejected by tbe Allies only with coo-slderable difficulty, aod that an offer ostensibly accepting the principle of free elections under international supervision could not be rejected without alienating tbe Vest Geraan populace. Be would, however, like at all costs to avoid four-power tslks Just prior to tbe elections lest his foreign policy accomplishments be overshadowed by Social Democratic unityt tbe polls.
Original document.
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