NERVOUS REFORMERS, INDIGNANT OFFICERS: PROSPECTS FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION IN S

Created: 10/23/1990

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

The Direct Of of Central Intelligence

Intelligence Council

30

brief

Nervous Reformers, Indignant Officers: Prospects for Military Intervention In Soviet Politics

A tradition of staying ont of politics, cleavages within the military, the risks of detection, and difficulties In implementation make the likelihoodurely military coup very low. Military leaders would be likely to undertake unilateral action only if Ihey perceived the demise of civil authority to be at hand or to have already occurred.

Recent military activity in the Moscow area is probably connected with harvest support, rehearsals for the

7 November parade, and probable contingency preparations to deal with public disturbances.

Elite airborne and MVD units are capable of handling focalized incidents of domestic unrest, but quelling widespread violence would require the use of regular ground' forces, which suffer from growing morale and discipline problems. Use of regular forces to put down large-scale unrest would exacerbate tbe situation and further degrade the cohesiveness of military units.

As the economic situation continues to deteriorate, Gorbachev may consider using military forces to perform critical economic tasks or maintain political order by enforcing martial law. Tbe military likely would be only marginally effective in performing such roles for very long.

This Executive Brief presents the findings of Intelligence Community representativeseeting heldt was produced by the National Intelligence Officer for the USSR and coordinated with representatives of CIA, INR, DIA, and NSA.

Ail portions classified

"SETtcfrf-

For tbe past several weeks Moscow has been rife with rumors that the Soviet military isoup, lhe persistence of the allegations by spokesmen for the radical reformers has precipitated sharp denials from senior military officials, including Defense Minister Yazov and presidential adviser Akhromeycv, and has spawned countercharges from some traditionalists that radical leftists have been plotting the overthrow of Gorbachev's government

Tbe rumors have been promptedumber of factors:

Political polarization in the capital, exacerbatedapidly worsening economic situation, has ledrowing sense of gloom among the populace and created an environment conducive to rumor-mongering.

Disagreements between Gorbachev and some military leaders over domestic and foreign policy issues has created the public perception that the military is staunchly opposed to all reform and keenonservative restoration.

Recent troop activity in Moscow's environs-attributable in our view to the urgent need to assist in completing tbe harvest preparations forovember parade, and probable contingency planning to deal with public demonstrations-has added fuel to an already fired-up public imagination.

The Difficulty or Carryingilitary Coup

Although the mililary is beset with serious internal problems and its leaders deeply concerned over Gorbachev's policies and the country's future, the prospect or the military attempting to overthrow Gorbachev is very low.

The military leadership remains Imbuedradition of subservience to the civil authorities. While Yazov, Chief of the General Staff Moiscyev, and other leaders may question Gorbachev's policies, they have felt obligated to lend those policies their public support

The officer corps remains sharply divided over the issue of military reform; even If senior military leaders wereoup, their ability to secure tbe obedience of all the commanders needed to carryilitary seizure of power Is extremely doubtful.

Although the Parly and the KGBtrong presence in the military, these organs are also increasingly politically divided; even if traditionalists were toilitary coup, reformist elements would be quick to expose any plotting.

Mililary forces available tooup attempt would be limited In capabilities and numbers:

Although six airborne divisions, plus one regiment, are combat ready, these units are the most politically reliable and are directly subordinate to the Supreme Highorbachev. It would be difficult to conceal from the civilian leadership any effort to elicit their cooperationoup attempt

Relatively few ground force divisions are arrywhere near combat-ready5nd these are

deployed along the Soviel periphery, Most units are atercent or less of their wartime strength. Even if the High Command could overcome the many obstacles to mobilization,tep would tip off civilian leadersoup attempt

While the number of units in the Moscow area may be sufficient to seize control of tbe capital, they would be unable to extend their reach much beyond the dry. Their ability to maintain long-term control of Moscow in the face of popular resistance would be questionable.

met in the considerably more open Soviet political environment Indeed, the high visibility of and tbe publicity accorded to the recent troop activity around Moscow argues against its being connected with coup preparations.

Unilateral military action in the face of these constraints would probably be attempted only if senior military leaders perceived the collapse of the civil authorities lo be imminent or to have already occurred.

What's the Military Up To?

constraints are

what webe the practical

requirementssuccessfulcoup:

The neutralization of those military units likely totep that could presage open conflict between military units.

The rapid seizure of key installations (Kremlin, KGB headquarters, communications and transportationnstitutions (Council of Ministers, Supreme Soviets at both the national and republicnd individuals (Gorbachev and other key leaders) throughout the USSR.

The forceful containment of publicove that probably would lead to widespread protests and strikes, armed dashes and quite possibly-should the militarywar.

Overlaying these wouldore general need for the strictestonspiratorial requirement unlikely to be

We believe some of the recent military deployments around Moscow were ordered by Gorbachev In anticipation of demonstrations planned by the political opposition. Some units are likely to remain in the Moscow region throughovember holidayrecautionary measure. We do not believe mililary units will be used to prevent demonstrations; they likelyimited contingency mission of backing up internal security forces in the event public protests become violent However, any significant use of the military to quell disorder In the capital runs the very serious risk of aggravating the situation.

The military leadership likely views lhe use of its forcesomestic control roleno win" situation: regular conscript-based forces lack the discipline and the training necessary for this task, and the High Command is loathe to use its troopsole which would further erode public support for the Armed Forces.

Gorbachev's public and private statements have indicated that he does not believe the use of military force to

eliminate his political opponents or to stabilize tbe political and economic situation would work. Although widespread disturbances could prompt him to order military units to help restore calm, he is very aware-based on the precedent of Tbilisi-of ihe potential costs involved.

He is more likely to use military deployments as "shows of strength" to slow the growth of separatisthe did in the Baltic republics-arid to deter the spread of domestic unrest.

Thereeneral consensus among Community analysts that Gorbachev has not exhausted all bis options in coping with tbe growing internal turmoil; for that reason, the use of regular military forces would be the instrument of last resort. He will rely on his presidential powers and use political persuasion and mtimidation to try to control events.

Implementing Emergency Rule: An Alternative Scenario for the Military?

Gorbachev could consider using the military in other ways to deal with the country's mounting economic and social problems andasis for continuing reform. Even among proponents of radical economic reform, there has been some sentiment for Gorbachev to use his presidential powers to implement the changes necessary to prevent the country's economic collapse.

In the eventreakdown of important elements of the national economy, such as the transportation system, Gorbachev might be persuaded to call upon the military to step in and "run the railroads" on an emergency basis. In the event of large-scale domestic unrest, Gorbachev could also use the military to restore order by enforcing some form of martial law in affected areas. Such steps would at best be short-term solutions:

Popalar reaction to such moves probably would be hostile, unless Gorbachev carefully prepared the populace. He would have to convince his countrymen that mobilizing the military to perform key economic tasks and maintain domestic order would be stop-gap measures designed to save the country, rather than attempts to reverse economic and political reform. The republic leaderships would be especially wary of such developments.

Although the Armed Forces might succeedime, it is unlikely they would be able to run key transportation and other facilities efficiently over the longer haul. Moreover, while the military leadership would probably accede to Gorbachev's orders to step in, it would view the performance of such economic duties as an unwelcome diversion from the Armed Forces' primary mission of defending the country from its external enemies.

Although the military would be less reluctant to implement martial law in the event of widespread domestic unrest, the High Command probably realizes thattep risks polarizing the country, further degrading the cohesiveness of military units, and increasing the likelihood of violence.

Original document.

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