MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Bobertiol, Jr. Director
Office of Intelligence Department of Energy
Progran: Risry Business
The aLtached paper Is in response to your we haveumberthat -ill b, encountered
the Soviets, it you have any question! or cuanonts regarding this paper, please contact OSHR,
"Director Scientific and Weapons Research
DECI.: OADR CRV th: Multiple
directorate; or intelligence
Soviet Participation in US Accelerator Program; Risky Business
nergy physics research has been done
Iniecoditonally [or over three decades. Hanover, proposals
to build che Supttrconduccing Super Collider tSSCl with
international contributions mark the first rime the
United States has taken this approach tor accelerator
construct inn _in particular, negot iai ions with (ho USSK arc upcoming
ffc Believe that Soviet financial and technical capabilities to contribute to the SSC program in the next decade arc liaiced. Reliance on Soviet contributions toe essential SSC components could risk the project's success. We are unawareoviei decision on which ot several new acceleratorsincluding SSC--to support, but wc believe that the Soviets might cancel one or both of their planned new domestic accelerators.
This mesnorondun was preparedthe Office of
Scientific and weapons Research, mments' am. truest.ons are welcome.and may be directed to
o-ioosa cl m:
decl: oadr drv fh:l71plg
During the lastears, research in high energy tor particle) physics has been an international endeavor. ountry (or in the case ofroup of countries) has built an accelerator and other countries have been invited to contribute to the construction of detectors and to participate in the research (experimental) program. The United States is trying to enlist foreign help for the construction of the Superconducting Super Collider (SSC) . The United States previously has not pursued foreign participation in the constructionarge accelerator. Although this approach has been discussed for fusion projects suchjs CJJ and ITER, none have yet reached the construction stage.
Consequently, such joint construction activities do notrack record by which to judge their prospects. In the case of Soviet participation, tha upheavals in all areas of their society introduce even more uncertainties. Information on Soviet contributions to detector construction at foreign accelerator facilities and Soviot progress on domestic accelerator construction programs, howevnr, provide indications of what can gjC8XS*f' for Soviet contributions to the construction of the
In order toosition for negotiations with the Soviets about their contributions to SSC construction, it would be useful to know:
o what will the Soviets offer.
o What can thoy contribute.
o what will they want in return.
o Who will make the decisions.
An important input to these considerations will be Soviet intentions to complete domestic accelerators and to participate in tho construction of the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) at cern.
The Soviets have designated tltti InoLitute or High(IHEP) at Serpukhov aa their center for highresearch. Inngineers at IllBP finallytunnel (or their uhk accelerator '
The Soviet Government also has approved the construction linear electron-positron toll Ida. (VLEPP) at the JUTP. it unlikely, however, that ill actually
Horc details on accelerators being planneo by the USSR and CXM. are given in two CIA reportsthe Typescript "Prospt-cts for Soviet Cooperation oD the US Super Colliderosco- Horn Willing Than Able uiv ' '
a prl-ury consideration in Soviet decisions on contributions to SSC construction likely will bedevelopment of Soviet WO and production capabilities. Tbe Soviets probably -ant to use the SSC agreement to stimulate the development of new, or Improved, materials and equipacnt that would have applications in tho civilian economy. The proffered items could include:
o Superconducting cable and/or magneta.
o Electrical substation and power conditioning ecniipBient.
o Tunneling equipment and crews.
o Construction, technical, and scientific personnel.
o Construction materials and equipment.
o Electronics, possibly including small
He believe ihr initial Soviet offers willrice foi their participation in SSC construction. The "rewards" sought could be tho transfer of US scientific and computer equipment to the USSR or the US purchase of additional Soviet scientific equipmeni, likely in amounts exceeding ten million dollars. In view of the Soviet needs for food and other basic con&ummer goods, it is possible the Soviets could Link SSC and US provision of consavoier goods. Th* Soviets are likely to back off from theseaybe completely; but we believe some type of "reword" would help this agreement, and future scientific agreements, proceed more smoothly.
Tho SovieLs' bottom line Likely is full participation in the SSC oaperimenLol progiam after the accelerator becomes operational. Although they might want to stimulate their Domestic industries or to receive US equipment without an expenditure of hard currency, we believe they will not allow these goals to jeoparn'r* 'heir participation in the SSC exprnmer.tal program
. j' c-
The Soviet decisionmaking process is constantly evolving and has changed since our previous reports (see (ootnote) or. Soviet participation in the SSC experimental program. esult of Gorbachev's proposals in0 to restructure the government, the formerly influential President's. Council is being: abolished. At this time, which high-level bodies may be involved in decisions on SSC participation remains very unclear.We believe that the people most likely to be involved in negotiations will be high-level representatives from the Ministry of Atonic Power and Industry (MAPI) and from the mstitutesdirectly involved in the exchange. The institutes involved could be:
o Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy, Moscow.
o Institute of High Energy Physics, Serpukhov.
o Institute of Theoretical and Experimental Physics, Moscow.
o Institute of Nuclear Physics, Novosibirsk.
o Konstantinov Instituteuclear Physics. Leningrad
o Yefremov Electrophysical Institute, Leningrad.
o Lebcdev Institute of Physics, Moscow. Some of the people likely to be involved. F. Konovalov, MAPI. V. Nikipelov, MAPI first deputye. P. Velikhov, IAE. H. Skrinskiy, INP and. D. Solov'yev, IHEP director.
Onhe Soviet Council ofa list ofigh-priority SiTighwas on this list. The State Comittee for ScienceIGKHTJ was given the responsibility of funding Thus, it is possible that the Cknt, as well asof Sciences, might also become involved m It needs to be noted, however, that the GKNTdissovledlor replaced in upcoming restructuring of the
the Supreme Soviet had approved Soviet participation in the international fusion program known as ITER. The article also stated that the deputies felt that all Soviet republics should invest in the Iter progran This could bo an indication that ihe means fo: luntling Soviet participation in foreign piootams has not yet been established and renains problematic
We believe that Soviei capabilities, both financial and technical, to contribute to ihe SSC program are limited. ignificant amount of additional data on the capabilities of che particular Soviet industries and facilities involved are needed before an informed decision on Soviet participation can be made.if such data were currently available, the rapidly evolving nature of the Soviei society and economy means dependence on Soviet contributions for vital SSC.construction items could risk the success of the project.
The question of which accelcralor(s) to support probably has not yet been decided by Soviet officials. Ke believe that the Soviets are likely to cancel the VLEPP. and possibly (INK, and divert the resources to the SSC or LUC. Wn beliove ihat the Soviets cannot make substantial contributions to both SSC and LHC. Whether the Soviets support SSC or LHC likely will depend on which acceleratot appears, at the time of the decision, to have the greatest" actually being completedeasonable tine fram?Original document.