SOVIET/ COMMUNIST ACTIVITY
Communist China and Korea Military Assistance Numerous reports ol Chinesetroop movements in Manchuria, coupled with Peiping's recent charges of US aggression and violations of Chinese territory, have increased speculation concerning both, Chinese Communist intervention in Korea and disagreement between the USSR and China on matters of military policy. It is being argued that victory in Korea can only be achieved by using Chinese Communist (or Soviet) forces, that the USSR desires to weaken the US by involving itrotracted struggle with China, and that the Chinese Communists are blaming the USSR for initiating the Korean venture and thus postponing the invasion of Taiwan. Despite the apparent logic of this reasoning, there is no evidencea Chinese-Soviet disagreement, and cogent political and military considerations make it unlikely that Chineseforces will be directly and openly committed in Korea.
Global War The commitment of Chinese Communist forces in
Korea, by enlarging the scope of the conflict, would substantially increase the risk of general war. Soviet actions since the Korean fighting began indicate that the USSR still not only wishes to avoid global war but believes it can make substantial gains in Asia by continuing its strategy of relying on indigenous "liberation" forces assisted, but not to the point of overt intervention, by neighboring Communist regimes.
Political Difficulties Purely aside from these considerations,
and even if the USSR were willing toreater risk of general war, commitment of Chinese Communist forces in Korea would entail serious politicalfor both the USSR and the Peiping regime. It would tend
to strain rather than solidify the Chinese-Soviet alliance, partly because in the event of the conflict spreading to China, the Peiping regime would expect substantial aid beyond mere material assistance from the USSR, aid which the USSR would be reluctant to grant for fear of itselfinvolved in the conflict. The Soviet Union consequently might faco serious political problems in retaining control over Peiping and Pyongyang, and prospects for Communist China's admission to tho UN would be virtually eliminated.
Indirect Aid The decision to provide indirect assistance,
such as the commitment of Manchurian "volunteer" units, would present some difficulties.victory might not be assured by the maximum scale of such indirect assistance. If large numbers of non-Korean manpower were necessary, they probably could not be supplied without being recognizable as direct Chinese Communistthus inviting retaliation against China by UN forces, as would direct involvement.
Interim Considerations Although decisive Chinese Communist
mtoi^ention, either direct or indirect, is thus unlikely, both the USSR and the Peiping regime willtheir attempts to exploit Western fears of this eventuality. Charges of US border violations and aggression not only fit Into the "peace" propaganda campaign but are designed by increasing Western fear of Chinese Communist military action to obtain Western political concessions for the Peiping regime as well as to create an atmosphere foravorable settlement in Korea.