COP! NO. Jit
FOR THE ASSISTANT REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
WfflHfflttT
ESTIMATE OF THE EFFECTS OF THE; SOVIET POSSESSION OF THE ATOMIC BOMB UPON, THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES ^AND UPON THE PROBABrLITIESIRECT SOVIET MILITARY ACTION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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JTCxI'--OECfl?ET
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ESTIMATE OP THE EFFECTS OF THE SOVIET POSSESSION OF THE ATOMIC BOMB UPON THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND UPON THE PROBABILITIES OF DIRECT SOVIET MILITARY ACTION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
ENCLOSUREAtomic Capabilities .
ENCLOSUREIntentions and Objectives. Particularly with Respect to Use of
Military
ENCLOSUREof the Possession of the Atomic Bomb upon the USSR and Soviet
ENCLOSUREOutside the USSR of Soviet Atomic
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FOREWORD
subject matter ol the present estimate has been under consideration since At the outset, representatives of all the agencies concerned agreed that,asis for estimating the effects of the Soviet possession of the atomic bomb upon the probability of direct Soviet military action. It was essential to reexamine carefully the problem otSoviet objectives and Intentions. Theof this problem, as well as of the related problems of the effects of the Soviet atomic bomb upon thc probability of war and upon the security of the US, revealed widein attitude and opinion among the Intelligence agencies. The examination of these problems also brought to light many operational and policy questions ofImportance that will require some time to resolve and which are ln large part beyond the cognizance of the intelligence agencies.
A CIA draft was submitted to the IAConrom themade by the IAC agencies on this draft It was apparent that no early agreement could be reached. In view of the time already elapsed and the broader significance of many of the Issues that emerged during the study,
CIA considered that It was more Important to publish this paper at this time than tothe time-consuming. If not impossible, task of obtaining agreement. It considered, furthermore, that It would be more useful totraightforward point of view,by contrary opinions, than toa watered-down version.
Insofar as was possible in good conscience, theebruary CIA draft has been modified in consideration of the comments received from the IAC agencies, particularly to clarify passages regarding which agency comment revealed evident misunderstanding. Thisestimate is now presented with the final comments of the IAC agencies thereon.
The Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission, has concurred in this estimate The several dissents of the intelligenceof the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and thc Air Force are to be found in Appendixes A, B, C,t should be noted that these dissents are on various grounds and that the several departmental agenciesamong themselves as well as with CIA.
This paper is to be considered as an interim report. The subject Is under continuingconsideration in an effort to obtain thc greatest possible resolution of these differ enccs,ubsequent report will bewhen this has been accomplished.
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ESTIMATE OF THE EFFECTS OF THE SOVIET POSSESSION OF THE ATOMIC BOMB UPON THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND UPON THE PROBABILITIES OF DIRECT SOVIET MILITARY ACTION
of tho Problem.
To estimate the effects of the Sovietof the atomic bomb upon the security of the United States and upon the probabilities of direct Soviet military action.
Soviet atomic capabilities (see
Estimate of basic Soviet Intentions and objectives, particularly with respect to the use of military force (see
Effects of the possession of the atomic bomb upon the USSR and Its policy (seeC).
Effects outside the USSR of Soviet atomic capabilities (sec
andSoviet Atomic Capabilities.
Is estimated tentatively that thcprobablytockpileapproximately as destructive asbomb, some time
even less certain grounds it Isthat thc USSR will probablyombs some timeand the end
USSR either has or can easilyenough TLM'ss) andwilling and able to attempt theall key US targets any numberbombs tbe USSR can produce.
and highly tentative USIndicate that an atomic attackombs delivered on pre-
scribed targets might prove decisive Inthe US outar. There ls at present no reliable estimate of the size of therequired to Insure the deliveryombs on the prescribed targets. (For more detailed analysis, sec
oviet Intentions and Objectives in Re* lotion to the Probabilities ot War.
Before attempting to estimate the effect of the Soviet possession of the atomic bomb upon the probabilities of war, we believe it timely to reexamine basic Soviet objectives In thc world situation, as thc Kremlin conceives it, and to estimate the means which the Kremlin deems appropriate for their accomplishment, with particular reference to the use offorce. Our conclusions, as they apply to the probabilities of war. apart from anyof the atomic bomb, are given
a. The basic objective of Soviet foreignli dearly the attainmentommunist world under Soviet domination. In pursuit of this objective, the USSR regards thc US as its major opponent and will wage againstelentless, unceasing struggle in which any weapon or tactic is admissible which promises success tn terms of over-all Soviet objectives. Nothing in the subsequent analysis, therefore, should be interpreted to imply that Soviet leaders would not resort to military action at any time they considered il advantageous to do so. The purpose of this analysis islo estimate the methods which Soviet leaders are likely to consider advantageous in terms of their over-all objectives and theunder which they might consider
For thc position of thc olher Intelligence agencies withn preceding pace.
a resort to military action either ad^fiv tageous or necessary.
b. There would appear to be no firm basis for an assumption that the USSR presently intends deliberately to use military force toommunist world or further toSoviet territory if this involves warotentially stronger VS. An analysis of the Stalinist concepts which motivate Sovietas opposed to an interpretation of their motives and actions in the light of Western concepts, suggests strongly that the preferred objective of Soviet policy is tooviet-dominated Communist world through" rather than military means.of Soviet foreign policy likewise indicates that Soviet statesmen are following Slallnist doctrines and tactics in conducting Sovietrelations in the interest of the world revolution.
c. Soviet leaders, however, are thoroughly aware of the fact that they are pursuing their revolutionary objectives within the contextraditional world power conflict. They are responsive In this context to tlie expansionist aims and the security requirements of trieImperial Russian regime. Theirof the objectives and behavior of the Western Powers, however, probably Is stillprimarily by the Stalinist conceptapitalist-imperialist world ruled byforce which will eventually be used against the Soviet Union. To ensure theof thc base of the revolutionaryin the USSR, therefore, they mustinvincible military strength and useto improve the strategic position of the USSR in relation to the world poweras well as to further their revolutionary objectives. At thc same time they recognize fully the value of Uie threat of Soviet military power as an adjunct to their revolutionary program.
d The presently active Soviet threat to US security, therefore, while including the ever-present danger inherent in Soviet military power, appears tooviet intention and determination to hasten, by every means short
The term "revolutionary" lao connote all roeam thort of all-out war ir.volvmr the US
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of war, the economic and politicalof the non-Communist world whichleaders firmly believe will Inevitably come about according to the Marxist concept of the laws of historical development. In view of the magnitude of the economic, political, and social problems facing theworld today, lt Is unlikely that Soviet leaders will lose confidence In the validity of this Marxist concept until the non-Communist world has demonstratedonsiderable period of time that It can reverse the trends of the last forty years andtable and self-confident International economic, political, and social order. The first line of US defense In this context, therefore, is the restoration of International stability and the maintenanceound Internal structure.
e. In terms of this approach to theirthe role presently assigned by Soviet leaders to Soviet military power appears toefense In thc world power situation, accompanied by preparations for theofntimidation in support of their revolutionary program;here consistent with their objectives, local use against military and economic forces already weakened by Communist subversion but not in aggression that would automaticallywar with the US. Even if the USSR should gain military superioritynmilitary potential) over the US and Its allies, it is estimated that so long as it deems the opportunity lo exist it will still prefer to seek its objectives by exploiting measures short of an all-out attack.
lthough thc USSR may hope and intend to pursue its objectives by measures short of war, at least until it has military superiority over the US and ils allies, there ish continuing danger of war. based upon thc following considerations:
he strength of Soviet military forces in being and the aggressive Sovietprogram require that the UStrong military and strategic posture. Were It not for the likelihood of US Intervention, the USSR, when the situation was ripe, would probably use ils military forces in actualprogressively to support the ac-
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lo power of Communist parties ln the slates directly beyond its area of control.Internal resistance to the rise of Communism in these areas would weaken without the supporttrong US.
The USSR, with Its doctrinaire concepts of capitalist behavior and Its hyper-sensiUve-ness over security, may interpret, asaggressive, future steps which the US and the other Western Powers might take totheir defensive position against the threat inherent in Soviet military power. Similarly, continuing Soviet successes ln the "coldccompanied by an increasingon US and Western militarycould wellituation ln which thc USSR would estimate that the Western Powers were determined to prevent the future spread of Communism by military action against thc USSR. It is always possible, therefore, that the USSR wouldar if It should estimateestern attack was Impending.
The basic Soviet concept of hostility (the "colds the normal relationship between thc Soviet Union and thestales, operating as it doesackgroundower conflict In which each side Is armed and suspicious of the alms of thc other,ituation in whichor diplomatic impasses might result in war. Furthermore, as the Soviet military potential increases relative to that of the US and Its allies, the USSR will probably beto take greater risks than before In itsof diplomatic opportunities orsituations.
f. after gaining military superiorityn over-all military potential) over the US and Its allies, Soviet leaders should lose confidence in the Marxist concept of thcdisintegration of the capitalist world and hence in their ability ultimately lo attain their objectives by means short of war, the temptation to resort to military action against the US and Its allies might well proveThU conclusion should be qualified In Ihe light of the possibilities inherent In atomic warfare, as discussed in the following section. (For more detailed analysis, see
ffects of the Soviet Possession of the Atomic Bomb upon the Probabilities of War.
It Ls not yet possible to estimate with any precision the effects of the Soviet possession of the atomic bomb upon thc probability of war. The Implications of atomiceither military ornot yet been fully appraised. In particular we have as yet no clear indications concerning the place of atomic warfare ln Soviet militaryor concerning the effect of UScapabilities upon anyeliberate and unprovoked atomic attack upon the US.
The capabilities of atomic warfare, however, clearlyew factor Into an appraisal of Soviet Intentions which requires the most careful evaluation and which, ln any event, has vital Implications for US defenseAlthough, ln general. It appearsthat the possession of the atomic bomb will alter the basicunderlie Sovietoviet capability for effective direct attack upon the continental US must be considered to Increase the danger that the USSR might resort to military action to attain Its
The military services have estimated that thc doslruclivc eflect of atomic attack actually delivered upon selected targets In the US would be as follows:
bombs.
Would seriously hamper warand delay overseas shipments of US forces and material.
Would delay or reduce materially the scale of thc US atomic retaliation.
bombs.
ould Intensify the effects ofI, above, and prevent the immediate launching of an atomic offensive against the USSR.
ombs.
educe the US capability for an atomic offensive, possiblyritical degree, and create conditions that might destroy the US capabilities for offensive war..
Atomic altack, therefore, Introduces the possibility lhat the USSR under (n) and (b)
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above could seriously cripple tbe US and under (c) might well knock the US out of the war.
If. therefore, the USSR should estimate that il had thi' capability ofrippling attack upon the US that would eliminate the US margin of over-all military superiority, tho danger that war might develop eitheroviet estimateestern attack was Imminent, or from miscalculations orIn the normal diplomatic maneuvering within thc context of the world powerwould be mcreased.
oviet estimate that It coulda decisive attack that would quickly knock the US out of the war wouldhe possibilityecision deliberately to resort to military action to eliminate the major obstacleommunist world.ecision, under these circumstances, might conceivably be made priorovietthat the USSR could not ultimately attain its objectives by means short ol war. It could certainly be mado prior to the attainment ot superiority In over-all military potential as compared with thc US and its allies.
There Is no present means, however, ofwith any accuracy whether the USSR is likely to estimate that it has the capabilities to accomplish the resultsabove. In fact, no realistic US estimate has yet been made of Soviet capabilities to deliver atomic bombs on targets in the US. taking into account Soviet operational factors and OS defensive capabilities. In terms of general Soviet objectives and the methods to which the USSR appears to be committed in attaining them, it would appear that Soviet leaders wouldigh degree ofbefore deliberately undertaking the risk involvedirect atomic attack in thc face of thc substantial US retaliatoryThe following conditions wouldbe essential to any such decision:
Virtual certainly of attaining surprise (only ln this way could thc indicated results be achieved).
Virtual certainty that effective UScoutd be prevented. (Although the US may appear more vulnerable to atomic attack than the USSR. In terms of largeof population and industry, the
Soviet regime itself is probably peculiarlyto atomic attack.ictatorship, all elements of Soviet control are centered in Moscow. Initiative throughout the lower echelons and tbe provincial officialdom isThe destruction of thc controlmany of the leaders, and the means of communication might therefore lead todisintegration and revolution.)
ore effective means of delivery than theIf there are doubts about the ability of6 to deliver the atom bomb against the USSR, how much greater the doubts that the9 could deliver it successfully against an effective and alert US defense.)
The greatest danger that the Soviet atomic capability would lead to overt Soviet military action would appear, therefore, to deriveoviet estimate that It could launch asurprise attack that would seriously cripple or virtually eliminate US retaliatory capabilities. The likelihood that the USSR will reach such an estimate will vary inversely in relation to the effectiveness and alertness of the US defenses against such an attack, and to possible measures taken to make US retaliatory bases and equipment Immune to attack.
In terms of the above analysis, present US estimates of destructive effects (given above) of varying numbers of atomic bombs actually delivered on selected targets In thc US,with US estimates of the Soviet atomic bomb production schedule, can furnish only thc roughest guide as to thc timetable ofSoviet capabilities.
On this tentative basis it is estimated thai beginning shortly1 the USSR will begin to buildheoretical capabdity forrogressively crippling attack upon the US.
On the same basis, It Ls estimated that at some indeterminate time afterhe USSR wilt have thc theoretical capability oftomic bombs on targets in the US which might well constitutellh respect to the ability of tlic US to wage offensive warfare.
It appears imperative from thc foregoing that an effort be made to determine Soviet
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capabilities on the most realistic basis, that Is, In terms of Soviet operational factors and US defensive capabilities. For If lt Isthat an atomic attack could knock the US outar, the Implication would be that the atomic bomb is, after all, an "absoluteonclusion would have vast Implications for US foreign policy and for the composition of the entire US military
ossible Soviet Courses oj Actum with Respect to Its Atomicol Direct Attack.
Tlie precise effects of the Soviet atomic capabilities upon thc security of the US will depend In part upon how the USSR chooses to use them. Consideration must be given to several alternative courses of action that are available to thc USSR, and to the fact that we have no Information on the Soviet evaluation of atomic warfare In terms of the effects upon thc USSR of US atomic
a. Possession of the atomic bomb has not yet produced any apparent change In Soviet policy or tactics, and probably will not do so at leasthe USSR has merely integrated the "bomb" Into Its generaland Its "peacet willin any event continue to stir up mass opinion in the West against rearmament and against thc use of atomic weapons In the event of war. In this way lt may hope to create sufficient public pressure on the Westernto neutralize thc US bomb.
t would appear that on balance theof existing stockpiles of atomic bombs and the barring of further production would be militarily advantageous lo the USSR, except with respect to the possibilityirect Soviet attack upon thc continental US. Soviet considerations of security and national sovereignty probably preclude the possibility of an agreement for the control of atomic energy production that would meet the current requlremenU of the Western Powers, but thc USSR may renew pressure for an international agreement lo outlaw the use of the atomic bomb In warfare.
c. While the outlawing of the use of the bomb might be militarily advantageous to the USSR, In terms of operations in Europe or Asia, thc USSR may estimate that theand psychological advantages ofthe threat of atomic warfare outweigh the military advantages of excluding it When the USSR acquires what It considers anstockpile of bombs. Its capabilities for employing threats and Intimidation through diplomatic channels In an effort to detachstates from the Western bloc will be considerably Increased. With the exception of the UK, the US, and possibly Japan,this Increased capability will not result from apprehension on the part of these states that they will be directly attacked with atomic bombs, but rather from the Increased Soviet military capabilitiesis the US and from general apprehension concerning the effects of an atomic war. The USSR could notthat the threat of direct atomic attack would carry particular weight against those states which estimatedoviet attack would bring the USar and that under those circumstances their territories would not be of sufficient strategic importance to justify the use against them of the limits Soviet supply of atomic bombs.
(For more detailed analysis, see
ffects ol Soviet Possession of the Atomic Bomb upon thc Security of the US.
a. Assuming the conluiucd stockpiling of bombs by the USSR and thc US. Soviet atomic capabilities have thc following militaryfor the security of the US in the event of war.
The continental US will be for the first time liable to devastating attack. This has vita! implications for the mobilization of the US war potential.
The Soviet atomic capability wouldto make It Imperative not only that US defenses against atomic attack, particularly the requirements for air defense, be greatly strengthened, but that steps be taken to make US retaliatory bases and equipment, in part at least, invulnerable to surprise atiack. These measures arc clearly essential lo the
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preservation of US retaliatory capabilities which in turn would contribute the greatest deterrentoviet attack.
It is accepted, on the basis of aestimate, that an atomic attackthe US outar, theappear to be that the atomic bomball an "absoluteheof this Implication would in turnImplications with regard to theof the entire US military establishment.
Soviet military potential is
loss of the US monopoly ofbomb has reduced themilitarily and psychologically of theto defend the UK and
The US has lost Its capability ofa decisive atomic attack upon the war-making potential of the USSR withoutof retaliation In kind.
Soviet possession of the atomic bomb would seriously affect US capabilities for air operations from the UK or other advanced bases and for amphibious operations against the European continent or other areas within range of Soviet attack.
Soviet atomic retaliatory capabilities raise the question as to whether it ls militarily desirable for the US to base its strategic plans upon thc use of the atomic bomb exceptoviet attack. (In view of the preponderance of Its conventionalforces and the damage it would sustainS atomic attack, the USSR might consider It advantageous not to use the bomb first and hope thereby to forestall tho US use of the bomb.)
If the use of the atomic bomb were eliminated. US strategic concepts forar with the USSR would have to be drastically revised.
Should an International agreement be reached to outlaw the use of the atomic bomb the USSR would beetter strategicthan the US. We can probably assume that the USSR would not hesitate to violate the agreement In the event of war If Itit advantageous to do so, while the US
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would abide by the agreement. Under these circumstances the USSR would have thoof using the bomb or not, according to Its strategic plans, and thereby acquire theIf neither side used the bomb, the US would lose Its capabilities for Immediateattack upon the Soviet militaryand the USSR's relative capabilities would be increased through theof its conventional military strength.
b. The political and psychological effects on US securityontinuing Soviet atomicare estimated as follows:
possession of the bomb and theIncrease In Soviet military powersomewhat the effectiveness ofactivities and propaganda In the
"cold war."
0 at least, Sovietof the bomb will not cause any change In the present alignment of the principalor In the support of current USto counter Soviet aggression. It will probably result, however, in demands from Western Europe for larger amounts of US equipment and for further US commitments for the active defense of Western Europe
The UK. because ot its extremeto atomic attack, may becomecautious about joining with the US in any actions which the UK estimated might provoke the USSR Into using armed force against the Western Powers. It will continue0 at least, however, to base itspolicylose US-UK strategic and economic reUtionshlp.
The longer-range effects of Soviet atomic capabilities upon the politicalof the non-Communist states willin the first instance upon the extent and soundness of European economic and military recovery and upon thc policy and strength of thc US. If present efforts to restore theand military strength of Westernfall short of their goals, there willa strong, though not necessarilymovement for accommodation orIf at the same tune, there should be indicationserious weakening in US
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strength or in US commitments to resistIncreasing fear ol the effects ofaggression, the movement forstruggle may have produced inor neutrality would probablybut particularly in the UK, US,an irresistible, organized popularthat US support of its NATfor renewed efforts to bring aboutJapan remains firm and that thebetween the US and the USSRand military recovery of Europe isleast the prohibition of the useirm and stable basis, If, under thesetrong probability that thewere not attained, lt must bestates, including the UK andpossible that the UK and Japan,remain firm In their alignments withtheir extreme vulnerability, could beif the Soviet Union should threatenfrom the US camp and that thewhen It has attained anmight force an accommodationof bombs, oreterioration inUSSR
latlons between the USSR and theThe concept may become generally ac-
Pawers suggested that on atomic war wasthat thc threat of mutual retaliation
mlncnt. In the latter clrcTunstanccs. thepreclude the use of the bomb by either
would be strongly influenced by its Under these circumstances the effect
of the Issues at stake; lt would not beSoviet atomic capabilities would be neg-
to follow the US unless lt considered these
sues vital to itsThc present public attitude of Indlfler-
In the final analysis, however, theor relative unconcern may continue; or
public appraisal of the significance ofstrong determination to resist, regardless of
atomic bomb will probably bo themay develop. Under either of
factor on the will to resist. It iscircumstances, the countries concerned
at this time to predict with anyprobably stand firm in their alignment
what this appraisal will be. In general,the US.
alternative trends appear possible ir. themore detailed analysis, see Enclosure
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TOI'JPKCKET
OVIET ATOMIC CAPABILITIES
Information at hand permits thc follow, ing highly tentative estimate with respect to Soviet atomic capabilities:
USSR has. or can ln reasonableproduction of an atomic bombas destructive asausing major damage andof casualties within an areaircle with radiusiles).
USSR either has or can easilyenough TU-4'ss) andwilling and able to make one-waynecessary to attempt thc deliverykey US targets of any number ofthe USSR can produce.
bombs could also be deliveredharbors in Soviet ships prior to anof hostilities, but the effects of suchwould be limited In comparisonair attacks.
d The Soviet stockpile of atomic bombs as
of variousestimated as follows:
ell-ioundedbe made, and even forarge degree of uncertainty. Forpurposes, however, an estimateombs ls suggested onthat plant capacity may beercent
n estimate of the number of atomic bombs that the USSR would stockpile before consldering it possible to launch attacks of varying degrees of intensity on the US must be very imprecise Four essential elements of information are largely lacking at present and will remain hard to determine with any certainty:
estimates of the size of anattack required to accomplish adecisive attack and of the size of tbethe USSR would consider necessarylaunching such attacks.
US estimates of thedecisive" attack on the USterms of:
direct military and industrial damage;
Impact on the national will to resist.
of Soviet operationalln terms of atomic sorties, includingfactors for:
operational losses and malfunctions;
gross aiming errors;
due to total US anti-air
Kremlin's estimate of Sovietwith respectbove.
ithout consideration of either Soviet operational factors or US defensivethe US military services have estimated that the effects of Soviet military application of atomic bombs against the US during thc following periods would be:
a. Initial period (target objectives: political and population centers; most importanttargets) when the USSR hai the capability of deliveringotomic bombs ON TARGET:
Mobilization for war would be seriously hamperedonsiderable period in lhat the attacks would cause the destruction of thc headquarters of the Federal Government, the partial destruction of large cities, and the psychological shock effects of more than one million casualties.
A successful attack on thc mostinstallations of thc Strategic Airwould delay or reduce materially thc scale of the planned strategic air oflenslve.
The neutralization ol tlic key ports In thc United Stales would cause great delay in
top Secret
United States forces and materials overseas.
period (targetand population centers;Including manpowerand selected industrialthe USSR has the capability ofSOtomic bombs ON TARGET
An intensification of the effects of the initial period.
Prevent the IMMEDIATE launching of an atomic offensive against the USSR.
Serious effect on certain vital elements of the war economy.
period (targetand population centers;including manpower andcenters; and Industrial complexes)USSR has thc capability oftomic bombs ON TARGET:
tomic attacks during the long-range period would probably:
Reduce the United States capability for an atomic offensive, possiblyritical
Delay ^definitely the industrial and military mobilization in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom.
Reduce over-all military Industrialfor production in the United States upercent
Cause total casualties of moreeople In the United States.
Create conditions which might beas to the ability of the United Stales to wage offensive war.
n terms of the above analysis, present US estimates of destructive effects (given above) of varying numbers of atomic bombs actually delivered on selected targets In the US, combined with US estimates of theatomic bomb production schedule, can furnish only the roughest guide as to the tune-table of theoretical Soviet capabilities.
On this tentative basis it ls estimated that beginning shortly1 the USSR will begin to buildheoreticalforrogressivelyattack upon the US.
On the same basis it ls estimated that at some ^determinate time afterhe USSR will have the theoretical capability oftomic bombs on targets In the US which might welldecisive"ith respect to the ability of the US to wage offensive warfare.
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ENCLOSURE B
SOVIET INTENTIONS AND OBJECTIVES, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO USE OF MILITARY FORCES
Problem.
Before attempting to estimate the use which the USSR will make of Its capability to wage atomic warfare, wc believe It timely to re-examine carefully basic Soviet objectives in the world situation, as the Kremlinit, and to estimate thc means which thc Kremlin deems appropriate tor theirwith particular reference to the use of military force.
to ihc Problem.
It must be recognized at the outset that there Is no factual information on any of the decisions or plans of the Politburo which wouldefinite and authoritative answer with respect to the timing andwhich the USSR will employ in pursuit of Its objectives. Lacking such evidence it would be as unjustifiable to assume that tho USSR definitely intends to resort to militaryInvolving the United States as It would be to assume thc contrary. In either case an erroneous assumption could lead to amis-direction of US policy.
Thc essential character of the Soviet threat ln thc present world situation is clear. The USSR emerged from World War II not only as the scat of Communist Ideology which aims to subvert the world, but as the predominant military power on Uie Eurasian continent It has avowed its intention to attempt to bringommunist world under Sovietand to this end toelentless, unceasing struggle against themajorwhich any tactic or weapon is admissible which appears advantageous ln terms of over-all Soviet objectives.
The problem, therefore, is to estimate the tactics and weapons which Soviet leaders will deem appropriate to success ln this struggle and thc factors which arc likely to impel them
to, or restrain themesort to direct military action.
asts for estimating thebehavior of Soviet leaders In pursuit of their objectives does exist in the past conduct of Russian foreign relations and in the known ideological concepts of the present rulers of the USSR. Analysis In these terms reveals that Soviet foreign policy is governed by two distinct but interlocking sets of influences. These are:
power relationship between thebloc and the West, and the securityof the USSR therein.
Communist ideology, whichaffords an Infallible explanation ofworld situation, the directionit must inevitably develop, and theof thc USSR in ttie premises.
3. Import of Communist Ideology.
An analysis of the behavior and tactics of Soviet leaders in conducting both thc foreign relations and the Internal affairs of the Soviet stale indicates clearly that Marxist Ideology, as developed by Lenin and Stalin (hereafter calleds the predominanton the pattern of their thought andIt is the basis for the Soviet ambition for world domination, as opposed to the less ambitious expansionist aims of TzarlstIt ts an essential ingredient in theby which Soviet leaders define their own objectives, both domestic and foreign, andthe objectives of the Western Powers. It provides the framework within which they interpret all developments in the capitalist worldlueprint of tactics to be used in gaining Soviet objectives. Its basic tenets with respect to the historical development of society are deemed lo have the validity of scicntiAc truth. Communist ideology affords.
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a key to past, present, and future Soviet behavior.
Communism holds that all socialis the resultonstant struggleopposing interests, leading Inevitably to the establishmentommunist society. There can be no peace or mutual tolerance, at least not until this Ideal (Communist)has been achieved- Progress toward this goal is of necessity resisted by the vestedin the dying (capitalist) social order. Moreover, the exploited masses also cannot be expected to see the light. The goal will be too distant, therefore. If sought by persuasion and democratic processes. Force must be used to overcome the resistance of the capitalists and the inertia of the, masses. Satisfactorycan be achieved only by violentconducted by the militant minority who do see the vision.
Three conditions are essential, however, to the existencerevolutionaryituation in which the militantminority can hope to succeed inhe masses must beand disaffected toward thehe rulers must be themselves disorganized and unable to operate their former system of control;evolutionary minority must be organized and ready to take over byractical corollary to these three conditions would be the unavailability of strong outside aid for the reactionary forces then in control.
Thc Revolution having occurred in one couniry (thehat country mustthe undying enmity of thc capitalist world. No accommodation Is possible exceptactical maneuver to gain time to develop strength for the continuing struggle. In Its own interest as well as that of the worldthc USSR mustecure base and strong support for the revolution In other countries. In turn, all Communiststhe world must serve and defend the USSR, since its preservation is essential to the advancement of the world revolution.
Capitalism, however, hears within itself the seeds of its own destruction and willsuccumb. Its disintegration will take placerocess of ebb ond Sow; pe-
riods of recuperation and stability will follow periods of weakness. The timetable is wholly flexible. The last stages of capitalism will be marked by increasingly severe depressionsnd by imperialistic wars in which predatory capitalist states seek survival by preying on others. Thesewill weaken the capitalist world and create "revolutionary situations" forexploitation. But throughout thisthere will be grave danger thatstates, perceiving the trend of events, may combine to attack and destroy the USSR In the hope of averting their own Inevitable fate.
The basic objective of Soviet foreign policy is thus clearly the attainmentommunist world under Soviet domination. Communist doctrine suggests' equally clearly that, in its design to bringommunist world, the primary aggressive instrument of Sovietpolicy is the International Communist apparatus, acting through subversion and revolution, rather than military conquest by the Soviet armed forces. Neither Lenin nor Stalin has ever questioned the basic Marxist concept that the capitalist world is Inovitably doomed to disintegrate. The function ofCommunism is to hasten thisand to be prepared to grab thc pieces as they fall. The mission of the Soviet Union is lo support the revolutionarywith its diplomacy (backed by Soviet power) and propaganda.
A period of ebb In the tide of revolutionary opportunity would not be likely to cause the USSR to abandon this method, for an ensuing period of flow would be confidently expected. Only if the capitalist world succeededonsiderable period of time, that it had reversed the trend of the last forty years, and the Communists, hi consequence, lost faith in the verity of their basic doctrine of the inevitability of capitalist disintegrationadical new departure be expected.
Soviet military power ls essentially anlo international Communism Inthis objectiveommunist world. In terms of Communist doctrine, its primary and overriding function is to guarantee theof the USSR and the revolutionaryagainst anticipated capitalist attack.
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lis offensive function appears to be secon and limited, to be used locally against mili-tary and economic forces already weakened by Communist subversion, but not In head-on attack against strength In which the issue might be In doubt It might be used, forln the form of mtimldatlon of thegovernment to support the accession to powerommunist partyeighboring state by Intimidating the existing government It might even be used to Interveneenuine "revolutionary situation"eighboring state when the use of Soviet military power would Insure the success ot the revolutionary attempt and would not at the same tune conflict with over-all Soviet policy or involve the USSR prematurely in military conflicttronger adversary. Thesituations" which Communistanticipates will result from warssovereign states are those resulting from "Imperialist wars" between capitalist states and not from wars in which thc USSR itself would willingly participate. Thus, while military action Is recognized ln Communist doctrineeans of extending theits use Is strictly circumscribed. Any military venture prejudicial to the basicof the USSR and the. ultimate success of the revolutionary movement is clearly
Flagrant military aggression againststales, moreover, would not beto the USSR in terms of its objective ot advancing the world revolution. Theof world revolution is socialResistance to foreign aggression which Soviet miliiary uction would Inducenifying force both within and amongThc world has long known how ta combineould-be conqueror.formidable the military strength of the USSR, its unique power lies ln itsdoctrine and apparatus. Flagrant resort to military conquest would stultify theprofessions and the anti-lnipcrialist propaganda of the USSR, deprive It of its revolutionary power, and reduce It to theof just another powerful imperialistWhatever its bnlial success on that basis, the result would not be world revolu-
15
lion, but rather what the USSR mostthe combination of the world In arms against Itar of survival.
However, nobis concept that the end justifies thehave any scruples regarding the use of force,military aggression, to advance the world revolution. Were tbe USSR, In theof time, to achieve total military power sufficient to enable tt to defy (he interventions of the United States, it might be under strong temptation to Impose its domination onby military force. Even lnase, however, it would have reason to consider the cited of flagrant military aEgrcssion upon its world revolutionary pretensions.of the question, however, assumes astate ot disintegration and impotence In Europe and Asia. The potential strength of Western Europe alone, If realized, Isto preclude an easy Soviot conquest.
Were the USSR to achieve the over-all strength, or an atomic or similar capability, necessaryecisive direct attack on the United States (one resultinguick, it would bo under much strongerto resort to military force, for if the USSR could decisively defeat the United States, no power on earth could resist its
4. The Power Relationship between the Soviet Bloc and the Weil and the Security Requite menu of thc USSR Therein.
Soviet leaders are rulers of the Soviet state as welt as heads of the world Communist revolutionary movement. Even though their basic objective may be to extend Communism by revolutionary methods, they arealive to the fact that they arethis objective within the context of ansystem in which power hasecisive factor ln national existence. The military strength and tbe strategic position of the USSR in terms of this world powertherefore, must be of vital concern to them in the attainment of their revolutionary objectives.
Soviet leaders in their concern for theof the USSR as thc base of the rcvoluovement, or in thc use of their power
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position to extend either Sovietreas of Communist control, are inevitably responsive to the same geopolitical and power factors that Influenced the rulers of the old Russian empire. Similarly, they can hardly escape the Influences of tbe historical experience of the Russian people.
An analysis of Russian history In these terms reveals several characteristics that may be useful Inlue to the probable behavior of any rulers of the Russian state, be they Tzarist or Communist, In ansystem governed by power poUUcs. These are:
a. The lack of secure frontiers, resulting In an immemorial experience (since thc Tartar invasion) of being overrun by more civilised and technologically advanced foreigners,the basisorbid sense ofInsecurity and psychological Inferiority. (Moscow was occupied by the; the Swedes almost occupied Ithe Frenchnd the Germans made deep inroads in both Worldhewhich thc Russians have drawn from this experience are that the outside world is hostile, that space is an essential factor Inand that Russia can never bo secure against invasion as longotentialexists.
b The corollary lo this sense of Insecurity hasriving urge for expansion. The expansionism which resulted in the crealion of the pre-Worldussian empire,was characterizedarge degree by caution and opportunism. It succeeded by means of persistent nibbling at the territories of neighboring powers already in thc throes of internal disintegration and by following up upon foreign Incursions which exhausted the invaders.
c. Despite its generally opportunisticRussian expansion affords instances of patent miscalculation, where the resistance encountered proved stronger than waswhen the worth of allies had been overestimated, or when stronger powersto protect the Intended victim. The record also affords Instances in which Russia accepted diplomatic defeat rather than face the threatened intervention of major powers.
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The whole of this sorry Russian experience was the result of the Inherent weaknesses of the Russian state in the international power system. With their accession to powerhe present Comniunlst leaders of tbe Soviet state fell heirs to the position of their Tsarist predecessors. They were immediately subjected to experiences in the world power situation similar to those which had created the sense of Insecurity already Inherent In the Russian people: Tho German occupation of Finland, the Baltic States, White Russia and the Ukraine, and Turkish occupation of theater, British, French, US, and Japanese armed Intervention in the civilnd tho Polish Invasionnd above all, the German onslaught which reached Leningrad, Moscow,and Grozny. In the context of the international power situation,the Five Year Plans of thc Soviet state appear lessatter of building socialism in one country than of improving the power position of the USSR, for these Plans areless concerned with quickly bringing the blessings of abundance to the Soviet people than with enhancing the war potential of the Soviet state.
Communist doctrine has reinforced this basic sense of insecurity Inherent in theof the Russian people and in theof the early years of the present Soviet regime. It provides present Soviet leaders with rigid and wcll-dcflned concepts of thc pattern of behavior of the Western capitalist states In the imperialistic stage of historical development. These capitalistorld of power politics, willfight among themselves for markets and raw materials. They may at any time attack the Soviet Union in an effort to rid themselves of the menace of Communism. If they do not iaunch thc attack at an early stage, they will do so ultimatelyinal effort tothc Inevitable decay of the capitalistSoviet leaders, therefore, in terms of their revolutionary ambitions, must build up the military strength and improve thcposition of the Soviet state in order toit in this world of power pontics in which thc new Communist slate has grown up.
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Uie geopolitical position ol thc USSR, the historical experience of the Russian people, and the Communist concept of the capitalist threat combine to indoctrinateSoTiet leadersask sense ofin the world power situationorrelative urge for expansion ln search ofAt the same time they are heirsradition of caution and opportunism In power relationships which coincides with therevolutionary injunction to retreat before superior strength, to retrain from strikingituation is ripe, and tono risks that would jeopardize the base of the revolution in the USSR. Against this background, the postwar Soviet emphasis on military strength in being and the actualannexations during Worldn themselves be takenertainof an intent to employorld-wide scale.
trictly power point of view,the danger of war, as long as thc USa formidable opponent, would appear to be, not thatovlot attack on thc United States, but thatoviet miscalculation of the cumulative effect of characteristic piecemeal aggressions in Eurasia Inarlike US reaction.
There is obviously no assurance that the rulers of the Soviet Union will act in theas Russian or Soviet leaders have acted in the past, particularly In view of the greatlyworld power position which the USSR has now attained and the postwar powerin Western Europe; yet they cannot quickly or wholly escape the influence of their environment and historical experience. On historical performance the Soviet Union could be expected to take every advantage of the contemporary disintegration of power uiand Asia to expand the area of itscontrol in search of further security, Also on past performance, the Soviet slate could be expected to go no further Inaggrandizement than supposedly could be done without serious risk of provoking US intervention, at least until the USSR hadower parity with the US.
The following analysis of Soviet foreign policy Indicates that the enhanced Soviet
power position has not yet, at least, induced Soviet leaders to reject the influences oftradition, and the methods and tactics prescribed by Communist ideology as outlined above.
of Soviet Foreign Policy,
5. The .
Soviet foreign policy7 hasto both Russian tradition andIdeology. Disastrous defeat In the war with Germany7 created thesituation" which enabled theminority to seize power ln Russia. In the enthusiasm of that moment there were those who believed that universal revolution was at hand and that thc war should benot in cooperation with the capitalist West, but to liberate proletarian brethren ln Germany and eventually in the West as well. Lenin brought them back to reality byout that no "revolutionaryhen existed In Germany. The gist of hiswas that for the USSR to make war for the purpose of carrying the revolutionountry in which no "revolutionaryalready existed would be reprehensible adventurism, (or It would jeopardize the achievement of the revolution in the USSR without prospect of gam commensurate with Lhat risk.
The USSR, therefore, accepted the costly Treaty of Brest-Utovsk as the priceeriod of release from war in which tothe revolution in one country and gather strength to exploit thc "revolutionaryexpected to develop as the capitalist powers continued to make war against each other. The war did produce "revolutionaryn Eastern Europe. Germany, Italy. Greece, and Turkey, but the localproved incapable ol seizing andpower and, except with respect lo the Ukraine and thc Transcaucosusformer Russian territoriesthe USSR itself wasto render effective support to such local Communist revolutionary efforts as did occur.
Thorealler lhc USSR reconciled Itselferiod of stability in lhe West, and In true Tsarist fashion, redirected its effort lotheater: China. Thererevolu-
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situation" existed, but there also it was not the Communists who emerged as the successful revolutionists.
Alter the Chinese fiascohe USSR devoted itself to internal development and to perfecting the International Communistm certain expectation of new dangers and new opportunities. The economicof the capitalist world9onsequent period of Imperialist wars anticipated. Fearing that desperate capitalist states would take the occasion to attack and destroy the "Socialisthe USSR became an advocate ofnon-aggression pacts, and collectivethrough the League of Nations.
In the light of Communist Ideology,the outcome of the Munich crisis,war among thc capitalist powers,ure signecretagainst the USSR, or at least of aattempt to turn Hitler's aggressiveeastward. It became the prune task of Soviet diplomacy to turn the tables on the West; to bringar between Oermany and the West in which the capitalist powers would destroy each other while thc USSRaloof, conserving its strength and ready to pick up thc pieces. Thus, from thc standpoint of security, the function of9 pact with Germany was essentially the same as that of the Treaty of Brcst-Lltovsk, although superficially the effects of ll were to reverse that document by restoring to the USSR much territory losthe basic purpose was to keep thc USSR out of thc war until the capitalists themselves had created "revolutionary situations"tronger USSR could exploit.
This strategy backfired, of course, when the war in the westelatively quick stalcmaLc and the real battle of attritionIn the East after all. This situationealization or the fears of the USSR al tlie time of Munich. Germany and the USSR were in the process of destroying each other, while Great Britain and the United Stales remained relatively disengaged,i ii tr.eir strength instead of expend-Ing It- -the reverse of Soviet expectations To any Communist it would be obvious
that the Second Front was being deliberately delayed until Germany and the USSR had collapsed from exhaustion, when the United States would move In to take advantage of the "imperialistic opportunities" which would exist In both countries. Thus thc clamorecond Fronteeper political as well as an Immediate military significance. Evenay, until VE-Day Itself, the USSR was fearful lest the Germans succeed Intheir peace with the West and combining with It against thc USSR. That, in Soviet estimation, would have been the profier course of action for the capitalist world. Thecourse of action forew Treaty of Brest-Litorsk withrestoring the fundamental situation tohave beenbut was too risky, for Germany wouldhave used any evidence of Sovietto further Its preferred solution ofwith the West and combination against the USSR.
As the Soviet armies advanced into Europe, the USSR, of course, acted to perpetuate its control over thc territories actually occupied and also to exploit or develop thesituation" sure to exist, not only InGermany, but also in all the lands which Germany had occupied.
This review of the broad aspects of Soviet policy reveals three cardinal preoccupations:
To keep the USSR free of involvement in Imperialist wars among capitalist states
In particular, toombination of the capitalist world against the USSR.
To take advantage of "revolutionary situations" resulting from war to extend Ihc area of Soviet control and advance the world revolution
6. Posfwor Policy.
It has been asserted that only the existence of thc US atomic bomb prevented the USSR from carrying out an Intention to continue its military advance to the Atlantichere can be no doubt that the US atomic bombobering and deterrent effect on Uie USSR There Is no reason to suppose, however. Ihat thc USSR had any5 or subsequently. The evidence
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advanced in support of thatInterest In hastening USIs explainable In termsell-established Soviet fear of US intentions and an obvious Soviet Interest in developing thesituation" In Europe by removing theof strong outside support for theto be subverted. Even without the atomic bomb, outright Soviet militarywould have been self-defeating, for it would certainly have brought about rcmobili-zatlon and that combination of the capitalist world against the USSRar of survival which the USSR chiefly fears. Certainly the burden of proof lies on those who would assert that the Soviet rulers had become so drunk with power as to disregard all the precepts of Russian tradition and Communist doctrine and toazardous program of world conquest, unlikely to succeed, for ainfallible program of world revolution.
Actually, Soviet policy since VE-Day Isonly In terms of Russian tradition and Communist ideology. At the close of the war the USSR enjoyed ln the West irnmenseandooperative policy would have consolidated these advantages, facilitated Communist accession to power in Western Europe by democratic processes, and secured US assistance in the rehabilitation of the Soviet economy (and warut Soviet thought, rigidly predetermined byideology, could not comprehend the idea of peace and security through mutual tolerance and goodwill.
The alternative prescribed by Communist ideology, however, was not military conquest, but subversion and revolution. Sovietpolicy was true to Its Tsarist precedents and Communist frame of reference: tothe control over Eastern Europeexisting through the presence of Soviet troops and police (or of Communistgovernments in the cases ofando exploit thesituation" apparently existing inWestern Europe and ln Greece; to take advantage of ils power position to impose its will on Turkey and Iran, as any Tsarist government would have done, and to exploit the "revolutionaryxisting in east-
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cm and southern Asia. These policies were deemed to cost nothing in terms of Western goodwill, for Ideologically no such thing could exist They would expose the USSR to no risk such as that Inherent In direct military aggression. They were the Ideologicallycourses of action for the estimated situation.
A true "revolutionary situation" did appear to exist In Europe and Asia. The masses were disillusioned and ready tohange. The former rulers were discredited andof governing In the old way. Nooutside support seemed available to them after the precipitate demobilization of tbe United States. Communis Is wereand ready to take over. The powerful support of the USSR was at hand-Yet the revolution failed to come off ln Western Europe, and the USSR was checked in the Near East. The United Stateswith aid and support, therebythe development of the revolutionaryand took over the former role of Great Britain in Near Eastern power politics. Moreover, with the assurance of US support, thereatriotic reaction to the aggressive conduct of tbe USSR and theot local Communists to Soviet Interests.
This situation is one in which both Russian tradition and Communist doctrine counseland restraint, and it appears that the USSR is prepared to accept the status quo for the time being. The USSR can afford to be patient, being firmly convinced that time is on its side, lhat the conflicting interests of thc capitalist powers will prevent any truly dangerous development, and that theeconomic collapse of the capitalist world will present new revolutionary opportunities.
Meanwhile, the revolution has succeeded In Asia lo the extent that it has been able to identify itself with the dominant political force in thatationalistic reaction against Western Imperialism. In theIndia, and latterly Indonesia, wherehas been satisfied in cooperation with the West. Communism has not prevailed. Nevertheless, Communism has prevailed In China; the outcome in Southeast Asia re-
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In doubt, and the USSR has no reason to be dissatisfied with thc situation and
In Eastern Europe, with the exception of Finland and Yugoslavia, the USSR hasa degree of control comparable to that winch It exercises over Its constituentIt Is significant that, although the USSR could have imposed Its will on these countries In the roleilitary conqueror, it deemed It preferable to do so ostensibly through the processes of mlernal revolution. In Uie case of Finland, where these processes could not be made to work, the USSR hasfrom military coercion, although lt could have exercised that power with(but not without discrediting Its revolu-tlonary pretensions before Uie world).
The dofccUon of Yugoslaviaatter of gravest concern to the USSR, not merelyof Uie loss of Yugoslavia itself or even because of the bad example set in Eastern Europe, but because ultimately It threatens Soviet control of Uie revolutionary potential of Communism everywhere outside of Uie area of Soviet territorial domlnaUon. It isatter of primary Importance that Tito be overthrowntalinist orientation restored In Yugoslavia. Yet, even in soatter as this, Uie USSR is proceedingasis of conspiracy and apparenUy internal revolution rather than by direct military aggression.
Over and above Uie Soviet policy withto particular situations, the generalpolicy in the. postwar world appears to be to apply. In international relations, the proved techniques of Internal revolution and the "classhus Uie USSR has injected into its diplomatic relationships with Uie Western Powers thc language, tactics, and propaganda of the revolutionist. Rut this conduct, so foreign to traditional diplomatic practice, does not in Uielf imply an Intent of Uie Soviet slate toilitary attack upon Uie governments which it Is trying to subvert. By analogyrevolutionaryin one country, the global effort of the USSR Is to:
Sow disillusionment and disaffection among Uie masses throughout Uie capitalist world.
Promote antagonisms among capitalist states, deprive them of effecUve means of mutual support, and, in particular, toUie leadership of the United States In International affairs and disrupt Uie means whereby It exerts Its Influence,
Provide revolutionary organization and leadership prepared to act whereversituations" develop.
The conclusion to be derived from thisof Soviet postwar policy Is that the altered power position of Uie USSR In the postwar world has not caused Uie Soviet rulers to deviate from Uie course prescribed by,tradition and Communist doctrine. Their obJecUve Isommunist world order under their own dominaUon. Their preferred method of attaining It Is stillrevolution as "revolutionary situations" develop.
7. Conclusions.
The Communist foundations of the modem Soviet state, Uie revolutionary character and background of Its leaders (military men are definitely subordinated) and Uie peculiarof its diplomacy and propagandastrongly that Uie preferred objective of Soviet policy Is to achieve through Uieof international Communism, supported by Soviet diplomacy and propaganda, aworld under Soviet leadership, rather than to conquer Uie world by military force-In terms of basic Marxist concepts ofevolution, developed by Lenin and Stalin into an operating and tactical procedure as well, the USSR is using internationalsupported by the threat of Soviet power, to speed up Uie inevitable historical development by which Uie capitalist world, according to doctrine, will collapseesult of its inherent contradictions
Actual Soviet policy, however. In working toward this objective, will obviouslyynthesis of Marxist and traditional power considerations. Soviet leaders recognize that they are pursuing their objectivesorld Communist revolution within Uie context of a
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traditional power rivalryorld in which power has not become polarized. They expect the capitalist states to be folly prepared to use military force either to support theiralms" orinal attempt to stave off collapse. Military power and strategicare. therefore, essentialof their revolutionary approach. They lecognlze fully both the valuetrong military force ln being as an adjunct to their revolutionary operations and the necessity of being prepared to defend the USSR and its revolutionary gains against capitalist attack. In pursuing their revolutionary objectives, therefore, they keep clearly In mind at the same time tho strategic position of tbe USSR ln relationossible armed conflict, and view changes in the strategic position of their adversaries, particularly the' US, in similar terms.
Thus, the military strength of the Soviet Union appears to be presently committedfor the defense of tbe revolutionary base in the USSR and for the support of the world revolution only insofar as such support does not Involve tbe USSRar that wouldIts security or conflict with itspretensions. Only If the USSR should gain military superiorityn over-allpotential) over tbe US and its allies, and at the same time should lose confidence ln the Marxist concept of tbe Inevitableof the capitalist world and hence in Its ability ultimately to attain Its objectives by revolutionary methods, are Soviet leaders likely deliberately to resort to direct military action against the US and its allies. Thisconclusion should be qualified in the light of the possibilities Inherent in atomic warfare, as discussed elsewhere In the paper.
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ENCLOSURE C
EFFECTS OF THE POSSESSION OF THE ATOMIC BOMB UPON THE USSR AND SOVIET POLICY
upon rho Attitudes of SovlefPopulation.
a. Possession of tha atomic bomb hasreduced somewhat tlie so-called "fear" and "Inferiority" complex of Soviet leaders. They have now eliminated, or are In atoajor clement of weakness in their international power position. At the same tune they may have some apprehension that tbe US willreventive warthey can build up an adequate stockpile of atomic bombs. There is no reasonable basis for estimating at this time, however, whether thc possession of the bomb will tend to make Soviet leaders more reasonable or more intransigent. It seems probable that, as the USSRtockpllo of bombs, it may be willing to assume greater risks In its diplomatic disputes with thc Western Powers.
Although the Soviet Union has played down the Importance of the atomic bomb In its domestic propaganda, thc announcement that the USSR now has thc bomb shouldeassuring effect upon the apprehensions of the Soviet populationew war.
upon rho Soviet Approoch to theof Atomic Energy.
a. Does tlie USSR genuinely desire tothe atomic bombeapon of war? While no positive answer can be given to this question, and many arguments can bepro and con. It would at least appear that, on balance, tlie destruction of existing stockpiles of bombs and the prohibition of further production would be militarilyto the USSR, except with respect to the possibilityirect attack upon the continental US.
he diminution of the bomb would leave Soviet ground strength supreme on thc Eurasian continent. Soviet military capabil-
ities would, therefore, be relatively increased; and at the same time the USSR couldar In Europe or Asia without danger of an atomic attack upon Its Industrial resources.
he elimination of the bomb wouldthe US of Its sole meansossibly decisive attack upon the Soviet Union. It would correspondingly reduce the confidence of Western Europe in the value of US support.
owever, even if the USSR appraises the situation in these terms, lt seems highlythat it will be willing to acceptownership and control of atomic energy production or an unrestricted system of international Inspection as long as Itsof security and sovereignty remain as they arc today. It might be willing, however, to reach an agreement which did not provide for international ownership and control but which included the limited inspectionoutlined hi present Soviet atomic
c. Thc Soviet Union, however, may wellpressure for an International agreement to outlaw thc use of the atomic bomb.
egardless of how It appraises theof the possible use of thc bomb upon its power position. It might regard an agreement to outlaw the bomb as advantageous. The Soviet Union would remain free to boBd up its stockpile al any rate considered desirable and would obtain protectionS atomic attack in the meantime. If itestimates US public opinion, it will probably consider that tlie US will live up to the agreement in the event war breaks out and that the US will, therefore, lose theThe USSR, on thc other hand, could, in the event of war, either abide by theand capitalise upon its predominant ground strength In confidence that the US would not use the atomic bomb, or.'if it de-
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could violate lhc agreement andurprise attack, thereby gaining theIn the last analysis, however,with the requirements of an agreement of this kind, as ln the case of poison gas ln the last war, would probably depend upon anof the value of the attack as compared with the losses from retaliation.
he Soviet Union, purely forpurposes, might also make tbeto outlaw the use of the bomb lnthat the Western Powers would turn Itoviet estimate ofeaction might be based upon twoherefusal of thc Western Powers in the UN to agree to any Soviet proposals on control of atc-mic energy;ossiblethat thc US was basing Its militaryso firmly upon thc use of the atomic bomb as to be unwilling to outlawefusal of the Western Powers to agreeovietto outlaw the bomb would giveellingts "peace"and would tend to confirm the USSR In the belief that the US actually plannedatomic warfare.
robable Effect upon Soviet Policyondition of "Cold War."
announcement that the USSRthe atomic bomb has not yetapparent change In Soviet policy orThe USSR has merely Integratedof Its possession of the bomb into itspropaganda and Its "peacepropaganda has emphasized thatpossession of the bomb is anin the preservation of peace. Itperiod of US "atomic diplomacy"the plans of the Western aggressorsan atomic war. The point isthat the USSR will concentratedevelopment of atomic energy forpurposes
is estimated that the USSR willalter Its policy or tactics, asof Its acquisition of the atomicthe end0 at the earliestassuming that there Is noto outlaw or eliminate the bomb.for thc cold war will be enhanced.
The USSR can use its possession of the bomb toumber of threateninglines within the context of Its peace offensive "Peace Congresses" andorganizations such as the Work) Federation of Trade Unions, the Worldof Democratic Youth, and the various Soviet friendship societies as well as direct Soviet propaganda can now play on thepromising themes In an effort tonon-Communist countries from theirto the US, to bring pressure on the Western powers to accept Soviet proposals for the control of atomic energy, or to neutralize the US bomb by creating mass pressures against its use ln the event of war:
The USSR Is now capable of retaliating in kind against Western atomic aggressors. Therefore, those who lend themselves to the aggressive plans of the US arc dragging then people to atomic destruction.
The horrors of atomic war require that all peoples support the Soviet proposals to abolish the atomic bomb and destroy allstockpiles.
Soviet possession of the atomic bomb has greatly strengthened the peace front in relation to the Western aggressors.
US support of Western Europe has now lost its value. Soviet possession of the atomic bomb and the proximity of Western European countries to the USSR suggest the advisability of more friendly relations with the USSR.
US plans lo use the UK (and other British territories) as bases for atomicwill "force" the USSR to consider the Britishrimary target in the event the Western aggressorsar. This would mean lhal the UK would be quickly wiped out.
The US no longer hasomb monopoly. Therefore, Its war-mongering leaders must change their foreign policy which has been based on this monopoly.
c. When the USSR acquires what itan operational stockpile of bombs, its capabilities for employing threats andthrough diplomatic channels in an el-fort to detach individual states from the West-
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bloc will be considcrubly increased. With the exception of the UK, the US, and possibly Japan, however, this Increased capability will not result from apprehension on the part of these states that they will be directly attacked by atomic bombs, but rather from theSoviet military capabilitiesis the US and from general apprehensionthe effects of an atomic war. The
USSR could not expect that the threat of direct atomic attack would carry particular weight against those states which estimatedoviet attack would bring the USar and that under those circumstances their territories would not be of sufficientimportance to Justify the use against them of thc limited Soviet supply of atomic bombs.
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ENCLOSURE D
EFFECTS OUTSIDE THE USSR OF SOVIET ATOMIC CAPABILITIES
Except with respect to the US. the UK, and possibly Japan, the significance of the atomic bombactor In determining theof nations in the East-West struggle and the will to resist Soviet aggression liesin Its potential enhancement ofilitary poweris the US rather than in serious apprehension on the part of these nations that It will be used against them. The USSR would not use the bomb, lt lsin any localized war, and in tho event of war with the US, lt would reserve the bomb for the main strategic targets hi the UK, the US, and possibly Japan.
reaction of the outside world topossession of thc atomic bomb hascalm It appears unlikely thatSoviet military capability will ofabout changes hi theor attitudes of any principalleast
current US programs to counteraggression will continue to receive
loss of the US atomichad been regarded as in itself ato any Soviet militarythe efforts of the North Atlanticto build up thc Westernsystem. Increasing realization ofof building up Uiestrength of Western Europe willlead to demands for larger amountsequipment and for further USfor the active defense of WesternIt may also lead, either wlUiin thisor subsequently, to an agreement forI United restoration of Germanand the Inclusion of Westernwith Spain, In the NAT.
the UK there will be noduring this period for aBritish foreign policy and no weakeningfor continued reliancelosestrategic and economicreflective British opinion Isconcern with Uie ImplicationsSoviet possession of the bomb, andgreater vulnerability will become aconsideration In Britishcivilian thinking. This may lead topersistent demand than elsewhere forsoluUon" on atomic controlto Uie USSR andeluctanceany US proposal which the UKcould provoke the USSR intoforce against tbe Western Powers.
the other areas of Uie world onlyfeel themselves directlyUie Soviet possession of theeculiarly strong desire forof some effectiveof atomic weapons.eacenegotiated during this period, thean international atomic agreementmake the Japanese more insistentdemands for permission to rearmfirm assurances of US military andsupport. Similarly, if tbeto obtain these assurances, or lackin their effectiveness, thetoward neutrality or alignmentAsia and Uie USSR would beElsewhere, Uie atomic bomb willprimarilyactor of over-allpower and as an element inthe effectiveness of Soviet
here will be Increasing pressure forof effective atomic control from both within and without the UN, but, except for thc outside operations of Communist-front organizations and some Intellectuals, the
Cp.c
28
will be under greater pressure to modify Its position than will the US.
g. The non-Communist majoritythe satellite states of Eastern Europe will be discouraged, because they will probablythat the loss of the US atomic monopoly and the corresponding increase In the Soviet military potential reduce the chancesestern attack upon the USSR In which they have placed, their primary hope of liberation.
ft. Moscow's control over its satellites will be somewhat strengthened, but It will secure no real advantage In its campaign to regain domination over Yugoslavia. Worldwill be encouraged and will be morein their propaganda. They will not, however, obtain an appreciable increase ln their popular support.
n areas where there ls already atoward neutrality, there will be anIn this tendency.
3. os the USSR Approaches on Operational Stockpile.
The longer-range effects of the addition of the atomic bomb to Soviet militarywill depend in large measure upon thc extent and soundness of European economic and military recovery and upon the policy and strength of the US.
If present efforts to restore the economic and military strength of Western Europe fall short of their goals, there willtrong, though not necessarily decisive,for accommodation or neutrality. If at the same time, there are Indications of aweakening In US strength or in Itsto resist Soviet aggression, thc movement for accommodation or neutrality would probably become decisive
Assuming that US support of its NAT allies and Japan remains Ann and that theand military recovery of Europerm and stable basts, there willtrong probability that the non-So-
vlet states. Including the UK and Japan, will remain firm ln their alignments with tho US if the Soviet Union should threaten atomic warfare when it has attained an operational stockpile of bombs, oreterioration lnbetween the USSR and tbe Western Powers suggested that an atomic war was In the latter circumstances, the UK would be strongly Influenced by its appraisal of the issues at stake; it would not be Inclined to follow the US unless It considered thesevital to Its security. In tho final analysis, however, the future public appraisal of the significance of the atomic bomb will probably be the determining factor in the will toIt Is impossible at this time to predict with any assurance what this appraisal will be. In general, three alternative trendspossible of development tn the Interim:
fear of the effects of anmay have produced In allparticularly in thend Japan,organized popular demand forefforts to bring about an agreementthe US and the USSR for at leastof the use of atomic weapons.these circumstances this objectiveattained, It must be consideredthe UK and Japan, because of theirvulnerability, could be detachedUS camp and that the US publican accommodation with the USSR
concept may become generallythat thc threat of mutualpreclude the use of thc bomb byUnder these circumstances theSoviet atomic capabilities would be
r Thc present public attitude ofor relative unconcern may continue;trong determination to resist regardless ol consequences may develop. Under cither of these circumstances, the countries concerned would probably stand firm in their alignment with the US-
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APPENDIX A
DISSENT BY THE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Intelligence OrganlzaUon of theof State dissents from the subject paper.
The subject paper indicates that, except underapparentlycircumstances, the USSR will notemploy military force in Its struggle against the US.
We do not possess evidence which suggests that thc USSR is now planning toilitary attack on the US. Neither do we possess evidence, or have reason to believe, that al any given date the USSR will with certainty decide toilitary assault on the US.
We do not consider, however, that lack of evidenceoviet intention to use military force on the US can be taken as evidence of the absence atoviet intention.
The subject paper states that "the burden of proof"oviet intention to resort to world military conquest "lies on those who would assert" that this is the Soviet Intention.
We believe that this statementundamental misunderstanding of thewhich faces us at thc present tune. It ts accepted by all intelligence agencies of the government that thc Soviet Union's basicis toommunist world under Soviet domination. Il is also accepted that Soviet leaders will employ any methods and tactics which in their mind offer promise of success.
Prior Ui the Soviet development of an atomic weapon it was generally agreed that an early Soviet military attack on the West was unlikely, if noi precluded, because of Uie preponderance of strength which Its economic potential and its atomic monopoly gave the West. With Soviet possession of on atomic weapon this particular assumption obviously is subject to reconsideration.
In thc interest of Uie national security, therefore, we are faced with the necessity of
answering Uie question: Is there evidence on Uie basis of which tt can be assumed that Soviet leaders will not resort to militaryagainst the US now that they possess an atomic weapon?
The subject paper recognizes many aspects of Uie crucially important potential ofomb in expanding Soviet capabilities, but it falls to bring into focus Uie problem of whether or not this development willecisive effect on Soviet policy and intentions. While it recognizes numerous conditioning factors, it takes Uie position that the USSR ls still unlikely to employ military force in its struggle with Uie West. This position is based upon arguments to Uie effect that a) Communist Ideology rigidly prescribesupon Uie intemaUonal Communistrather than upon employment ofarmed forces for Uie attainmentommunist world dominated by Uie USSR, and b) Russian Imperial history reveals that Russian expansionism has tradlUonally been cautious and has not been pursued at Uie riskilitary clashmajor" power.
Considering Uie Import to US defense and foreign policy of an assurance that thc USSR is not likely to resort to military action, we consider these arguments undepcndable.
Tlie first argument Ls in direct contradiction to earlier assertion in Uie CIA paper that Uie USSR In pursuit of its objective "willelentless, unceasing struggle [against the US] In which any weapon or tacUc iswhich promises success in terms ofSoviet objectives" and that nothing in the paper "should be interpreted to imply that Soviet leaders would not resort to military action at any time they considered Itto dourthermore, this emphasis upon revolutionary policy not only restsoubUuI interpretation of the extremely complex question of Uie role of the USSR as lhe "first socialist state" in effecting
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world revolution, but alsoigidity inthe means to be employed inixedto the firmness with which that objective Itself is held, an assumption which ls demonstrably false.
The second argument,esort toaction by the USSR is precluded by the fact that Russia since time Immemorial has been cautious in Its foreign policy, is basedisreading of the actual historical facts. Russian history is characterized by neither recklessness nor caution ln foreign affairs,ixture of recklessness and caution, depending upon the circumstances existingiven time and on thcof thc rulers ln power. Russian rulers can no more be generally dubbedthan can the rulers of Prussia. Moreover, It Is questionable that the pattern of Russian history under the Tsars ls lnafe guide by which to predict the actions of Soviet leaders.
The danger of accepting these argumentsasis for assuming the line of action which Soviet leaders will follow is Illustrated by the subject paper itself.ime when ail evidence indicates increasingly militant activity on thc part of the USSR in virtually all areas of thc world, the paper assertshe existing] situation is one In which both Russian tradition and Communist doctrine counsel patience and restraint, and it appears that the USSR Is prepared to accept thc status quo for thc time being. The USSR canto be patient, being firmly convinced that time is on Its side, that the conflictingof the capitalist powers will prevent any truly dangerous development, and that the eventual economic collapse of thc capitalist world will present new revolutionary
Thc Intelligence Organization of theof State has reached thc following
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conclusions as to Soviet intentions regarding the deliberate use of military force In thestruggle against the non-Communist world.
here ls at present no evidence whicha Soviet determination at any given time to employ military force against the non-Communist world.
he Soviet Union Is, however, engaged In what Is considers toe-and-death struggle with the non-Communist world. In this struggle Soviet leaders can be expected to employ any weapon or tactic whichsuccess.
Thc only sound lest by which to judge Soviet intentions to resort to military action Is, therefore, the pragmatic test of whether or not such action would,iven moment,advantageous to the Soviet Union.
Prior to Soviet development of an atomic weapon, all evidence Indicated that theof strength enjoyed by the US ln consequence of Its over-all economicand its atomic monopoly madeoviet estimate that it would be to theof the USSR to resort to military action.
Soviet development of an atomic weapon may have decisively changed this situation, particularly If surprise employment of the weapon could sharply reduce retaliatoryor make it Impossible.
Thc subject report does not effectively deal with this possibilityhange. We feel that thc report confuses the issues on Soviet motives and leaves unclear thc new balance of factors which will probably determine thc Soviet estimate of the advantage the USSR could gaineliberate employment of military forces.
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APPENDIX B
DISSENT BY THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Assistant Chief ofith the subject paper. It Isthat this paper- be withdrawn and
e substituted thereforasis for resolving differences In attitude and opinion. The differences of opinion are considered to be so divergent that It Is impractical toresolving them on the basis of thepaper. 4
dissent ls based on the following;
a. Thc threat of Soviet aggression isto thc point where dissemination of the paper and Its use for planning purposes could seriously affect the security of the Unitedajor portion of the paper lsto developing thc thesis that It isto assume that. defi-
nitely Intends to resort to military aggression involving the United States. This portion of the paper is unrealistic and not germane to thc problem.
Thc conclusions as they apply to theof war are developed apart from any consideration of the atomic bomb (p.n,ast sentence) hi spite of tbe fact that the statement of the problem (p.) requires such consideration.
b. The second major difference of opinion is the manner In which the subject matter contained In the enclosure Is presented.of logic and multiplicity ofmake the paper extremely difficult to understand.tudy. It falls to reach clear-cut conclusions.
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APPENDIX C
DISSENT BY THE OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
Office of Naval Intelligence dissents from.
The discussionhrough D) Is generally In accordance with ONT's views, but it ls not considered that the Summary and Conclusions are properly drawn from theThe following comments aredirected primarily toward the Summary and Conclusions:
There is no integrated analysis of what thc effects of Soviet possession of atomic weapons will be. Instead, there ls anbased on several mutually exclusive hypotheses. From these hypotheses one may choose estimates which range from no change In Soviet policy to basic and alarming changes In that policy.
It Is noted that one argument Inests on extremely hypotheticalas to "what might happen" if the
Soviet leaders abandoned their Marxist view of the eventual collapse of capitalism and imperialism. There Is at present nothat the Soviets are losing confidence In their Marxist philosophy and. furthermore, there is no basis on which to predict what their policies might be should they abandon that philosophy.
The hypothesisajor war may result from miscalculation is considered. In the light of recent events, to be unrealistic. If either. or the USSR should let an Incident or diplomatic impasse developar, It is considered thatar, as well as the incident or the Impasse,lan, notlunder.
In many Instancesxceeds the bounds of Intelligence and drawsand conclusions of an operational and planning nature.
APPENDIX D
DISSENT BY THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
following comment concentrates on the one point which, us AF, considers of such overriding Importance as to make the CIA estimate,, dangerous as anbasis for national policy,
The Director of Intelligence, USAF,the primary reason why the Kremlin has not resorted to military action against the United States to date is the fact that the Kremlin has believed, and still continues to believe, it is operating from an inferior power position., therefore, failed to point out the full and true character of the Soviet threat Unless the full and trueof this threat is pointed out, Soviet total relative power may be permitted to grow to thc point where. can no longer cope with It successfully.
Subject paper states that (a) the USSR regards. as its main opponent; (b) it will wage againstelentless,struggle in which any weapon oris admissible; and <c) that nothing in the paper should be construed as implying that "the Soviet leaders would not resort toaction at any time they considered it advantageous to dohile thesein the opinion ofre correct as far as they go, the rest of the subject paper actually weakens and contradicts this original position.
The paper completely misses thebetween war and revolution. It does not realize, as the Soviets do,reat power such as. cannot be overthrown by revolution alone but that revolution can be thc result onlyreceding war. It therefore overlooks thc fact that Soviet policy alms above all at preparing for the show-down war against the United States. Therefore thc first line. defense is not, as the paper suggests, the "restoration of international stability and the maintenanceoundstructure" but is to recognize that wc
are at war right now, and that an all-outeffort designed to maintain permanent military and political superiority over theUnion, is required.
The paper begs the Issue underwhen it states that there appears "to be no firm basis for an assumption that the USSR presently intends deliberately to use militaryf this Involves war withctually, thereery firm basis for thc assumption that they would do no such thing, simply because anhas never resorted to war If he were sure that he would lose. The problem at issue is (a) whether thc acquisition of an atomic capability has provided the Soviet Union for the first time in historylear-cutthat would enable them to win the war againstnd (b) whether, underof atomic warfare, the lack of instantly available American military power vitiates the importance of the great American war potential. Another no less importantwould be to determine how the Soviets will integrate the atomic bomb into theirstrategy and tactics. Toocs not address itself.
, USAF, sets forth the following for the record:
thinking, from Maneclearly recognizes thebetween war and revolution, and,the fact that no major revolutionwithout war.
Soviets arc clearly on record thatconsider thc Soviet Union as anbasehey consider theas the main weapon of theSoviets know that they have neverbeyond their frontiers withoutof militaryll thcby them were taken by the Reda satellite force (Tito, Mao).
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In "Problems oftalin stated clearly that capitalism can be overthrown only by violence, and ultimately only by war. Actually the theory that capitalism will fall of Its own weight has never been Stalin's Idea, and there Is much evidence that he hasthis concept as Ideological "deviation-ism".
d The Sovietsajor contribution to the outbreak of World War IX They did nothing to prevent that war, and everything to makeeality.
e. There are numerous recent statements
by Soviet authorities to the effect that Worldroduced Communism In Russia; that World War II produced Communism inEurope and China; and that World War HI will see the victory of Communism
throughout the world.
f. There ls ample reason to believe that the Kremlin regards Its growing atomic capability to be the major force which will eventually place them In position to liquidate tbe center of hard-coreUnited States-utilizing all means at their disposal. Including military action.
Original document.
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