:- INTblLIDEilCS AGS21CT
minima maumm 0
for Anti-Soviet Underground Reoistanco in tlie
Event of War
1* To identify, with reopeot to certain countriea of Europe, the Near East, and the Far Eaat, thoae elements of the population sufficiently hostile toward the USSR tootential for organized anti-Soviet underground resistance in the event ofoutbreak of mar0 and during the course of ensuing military operations aa envisaged in
To estimate tha ability of the USSR to control these elements in the event of mar as envisaged in
To estimate tho nature and extent of the anti-Soviet action which it would be possible for underground resistance movements recruited fron these elements to accomplish in the clrcumotancoo assumed inither with or without prior US direction and old.
U, For discussion of the subject aith reference to specific regions and countries see:
he ussrastern Europeorthern Europeestern Europehe Near Eastortheast Asia
Notoi This memorandum has not bean coordinated with theof the Depertaents of State, Army, Navy, and
DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE- IN CLASS. tl tl DECLASSIFIEDCHANGED TO. TS NEXT REVIEWUTH;
1. There la already in existence In tho USSR widespread latentaffection which could be exploited in tine of war. If the elaborato Soviet police and security control systea could be disrupted and if Western support sere twiedlately at hand, an underground resistance aoveoent could hamper Soviet war tobilisation and in tine bringripplingof the Soviet war offort. The main areas of potential resistance ore the Baltlo Statea, tha Ukraine, tho Caucasus, and Soviet Central Asia.
Inav la, the Tito regine probably would try to maintain an armed neutrality but would conduct an extensive campaign of guerrillaif attacked.
In the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe, spontaneous,resistance demonstrations are likely to appear in the early stagesar, but these would be short-lived. The potential for mresistance sDvement, capable of planned sabotage and guerrilla warfare, could be developed In Poland, and,aller scale, in Slovakia and Albania.
Finland, Turkey, and Greeceonsiderable potentlsl for underground resistance. In most other oountriea In the rest of Europe ond in the Hear Bast, resistance efforts, if any, would be 1lad ted and largoly uncoordinated, at least until the prospect of liberation seemed close at hand, esistance potential exists in Northeast Asia, but the rnexiraia effort to be expected is unlikely to lnterfero with Soviet offensive operations in other areas.
R can control the subversive efforts that are likely to arise in any single region of potential underground resistance. ystematic campaign of resistance activitiesumber of areas,in the Soviet Satellite area or the USSR itself, would seriously Impede and harass Soviet military operations. Only full-ecale Insurrection In extensive areaa of the USSR would cripple the Soviet war effort.
In every area prior OS direction and aid would greatly lnoreaae ths effectiveness of anti-Soviet underground activities. In most areas, Ih fact, prior US direction and aid would be eeoential to the orgshizatioo of any effective underground efforts.
ENCUBUHE HE USSR
of Disaffection In tho USSR.
Three principal bases of potential disaffection exist in tha USSR;
a* General disillusionment and rosent-nentesult of the exactions, repressions, and personal insecurity characteristic of tba Soviet state*
b* The peasants1 intense rosentmant of collectivization, which caused" largo groups of the rural population to support the invading German Army in anticipation that Germany would abolish the collective farms and distribute the landasis of private ownership*
c* The hostility of minority nationalities toward Great Russian domination*
Aroaa of Potential Disaffection.
The main areas of potential disaffoction are tha Baltic States, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Soviet Central Asia*
a. Tto Baltic States: Strong anti-Soviet feeling is prevalent anwng*Ttal'iic'"haVfonaK'in" general* While the WTD apparently haa tha areahole under control at present, there was substantial aotiva resistance effort in the Baltio States inand some partisan activity may still continue. In tho event of war, the Baltic nationals, as distinct from transplanted Russians, woulderious menace to Soviet security* Their hope of regaining national Independence would be stimulated byid ant prospect of Soviet defeat. Many Baltic nationals would engage in underground resistance, despite intensive Soviet polico surveillance, particularly if US aid were available*
Byelorussia: Tha situation in Byelorussia is generally stable except' for areas incorporated from Poland. The HVD presumably has tha widespread disaffoction under control,imited active resistance effort might be organised with US aid*
^J'^rr^' Although forced/wdgratioo has eliminated many ofrainlans who actively collaborated with tba Has towardappears to bo under control, Ukrainian nationalism inecurity problem in the USSR, eopaoially in the newly annexed western areas of tha Ukraine. In the event of war, the Ukraine probably would not support tho Soviot war offort without coercion. If tho Ukraine should In tiao bo invaded, tho population would wo Icon, tho Invader,ubstantial underground movemont probably could bo built up Inof liberation if US aid wore available.
tu? SlWE * tte Caucasus haarouble-spot Tor tne ussr. Too ethnic croups that wore disaffected In Worldave been forcibly removed frcm tho area, but the profusion of rthtftf imjoplewj andarticularly the minorities loss pri rile god than tbe Georgians, Awrbeljeni, and Armenians,otential for an active underground reslstsnco offort.
e. Cartral Asiai erious rebelUon occurrod in Centraltbe earlyand there are Indications that since then thataken special security measures in this area, Uany politicalEuropean Russia. The local population
lo pretoirAntly Moslem and probably is unsympathetic to Comuniam; Whileinformation on disaffection ia presently unavailablo. Central
esistance potential, which could
ba developed if US dlroction and eld could establiah contact with dia-affeoted elements despite oloao police surveillance,
Tb!ar Eastt This aro* ia tbe baseeparate sdll-
tary coaaano, wmcn controls tbe principal cenmunioation centersand there la no known potential for underground resistancetha groat concentrations of forced labor camps, which arecompletely controlled by the
These potential sources of disaffection normally are kept under effective control through isolation of the Soviet people, internalconosdo coercion, Cosmunlat monopoly of political power, and-
rT!^' ura^preseatatiTO character of the government, ita high degree of centralisation, and its ultimatef^ 0 lfic weexnesses of ths Soviet system. iT the meohanism of close police control wore broken, disintegration would but. In..
So long aa Sovlot military operationo appeared to bo mooting with, complete sucoose and the internal soourity mechanisa remained intact, no serious hindrance to the Sovlot war effort would reault fron tho Latent disaffection withinR. If Soviet internal propaganda were disproved by events (especially If Allied capabilities proved greater than expected, and Soviet capabilitiesoviet morale would be adversely affected and resistance movosjants would baccoe sufficiently active to hamper war mobilisation* The effect would not be decisive; in the oense of bringingrippling disintegration of tba Soviet war effort, unions the Soviet security control nccharrLan ware thoroughlyand off active Allied support of dleaffected groups were immediately
(Yugoslavia and the European Satellite Statoa)
Assuaiing that the present Yugoslav regime remained in power, tlioof war between the USSR and the Heat would confront Iterloua dileiama. On balance, it appears that Yugoslavia would endeavor toan armed neutrality. If Yugoslav territory were' invaded by Soviet or Satellite forces, the regime would resist with determination.
Incircumstances the Yugoslav armed forces could not expect to hold tho core open parts of tiie country, which are, in general, the Danube plain and the main routes from it to Trieste and Salonika. Yugoslav strategy probably contemplates no more than delaying action in these areas, designed only toithdrawal into the mountains,tout partisan resistance could be maintained. This withdrawal would olear the lines of coirrsunications essential to tha broader purposes of Soviet strategy, but, in view of continuing Yugoslav resistance, large Soviet security forces would be required for the protection of those lines of comsanication. If Soviet forces went into the mountains after Tito, as might be deemed necessary for political as well as military reasons, an extraordinarily large diversion of Soviet strength would be required. Even if organized Yugoslav forces were finally isolated andarge and active underground movement would be formed from the remnants to harass and sabotage the occupation where-ever possible.
Inasmuch aa the majority of the Yugoslav people are anti-Ccmauniat as well as anti-Soviet, some of themtakn advantage of the disruption of political control to repudiate and attack Tito, thus dividing and weakening Yugoslav resistance. ery few erypto-Stallniata, however, would bo likely to collaborate with the invader. In the national crisis, most non-Communist Yugoslavs would probably be disposed to accept Tito's leadsrahip for patriotic reasons.
The existing regime would regard as subversive any US effort to develop potential resistance in Yugoslavia apart from general'aid rendered to the regime itself. In the event of Soviet invasion, Tito would, of course, call for moral and material support.
2.The European Satellite States.
Tho Communist governments of the Satellite States would of necessity support the USSR. The Satellite armed forces, however, would be unreliable, Wholesale defection probably would not occur in tho early phases of the war, but tho utility of tho Satellite troops would bo atriotly limited.
The vast majority of the people of the Satellite States aretowardR and the Oommunist regimes imposed onwould welcome war in the hope of eventual liberation. The outbreakwould probably occaaion sporadic acts of open resistance,be ruthlessly suppressed by the local Communist regimes and theactive resistance would be mainly clandestine, consistingespionage, and acts of terrorism, hero substantialorganized guerrilla warfare, would bo likely to spring upSlovakia, and
This situation would be radically altered if the USSR were to appear to be losing the war and if advancing Western forces wereosition to render effective support to popular resistance in the Satellite States. Tho Satellite armed forces, as well as many rank-and-file Satellite Communists, would then become increasingly unreliable, and tho resistance would develop into full-scale popular insurrections wherever there was prospect of Western support and comparatively early liberation. In some circumstances, crypto-nationaliat elements In Satellite governments, might attempt to assume atitoiat character, but the probability is that. In tho faceising tide of patriotic reaction, most Satellite officials would perceive no future for themselves apart from the fortunes of the USSR.
Although spontaneous resistance Is to be expected in the Satellite States, it could be rendered effective enough to impede and in some cases to lsrooril Soviet military operations only if there were prior and continuing OS direction and aid.
Poland. Slovakia, and Albania.
Between aquartor-Bdlllonalf-million Poles might actively reaiat Soviet occupation in time of war. !Jany of them would have had practical experience in the anti-Ceram underground. In whichdllion Poles were participating toward the end ofWar II. hembers and loaders would come mainly frvn the officer corps of the old Polish Army, former nationalist parties and patriotic organisations, the former Socialist party, and the Catholic clergy. This large underground would interfere with Russian military operations in and across. Poland by cutting lines of oomsunicallon, snaking armed attacks on Soviet personnel,ar material and installations, and transmitting intelligence on Soviet dispositions and installations. Polish resistance would be spontaneous be-
cause of strongly anti-Soviet nationalbut US aid would increase tha effectiveness of the underground activity, especially if tho Polos warer the US that Germany would not be allowed to regain Its former oastern territory.
Clandestine anti-Soviet resistance groups, organisedocal basis, ore already In existence In Czechoslovakia, mainly In theegion of Slovakia, th prior US direction and aid, an underground effort capable of concerted sabotage of war industriesimited scale and harassing attacks on Soviet conmunications could be developed. while the Czech peoples of western Czechoslovakia are more passive, the conservative Catholic political groups in the mountainous regions cf Slovakia probably would he able toase for underground activities,onsiderably number of Soviet and Czech Communist security forces for some time.
Because of the comparatively exposed position in Albania, Its rugged terrain, and the militant character of the population, the USSR is unlikely to be abls to control the whole country. The population Isanti-Coonuniet andonsequence anti-Soviet. Kith US direction and aid, active bands numbering as manyould be organized and used In guerrilla warfare and subversive operations aimed at the occupation authorities.
b. Hungary, RufMUila. Bulgaria, and fiaetfrn Ger.-vmy-
ln Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, as well as in Easternwhich is being treated virtually as another Satellitehostility to the USSR would result in spontaneous sots of sabotage and, possibly, in the formation of small underground groups with strictly limited resistance capabilities. Prior OS aid and the prospect of comparatively early liberation would be neceasary to convert those groups into an organized underground movement evenmall scale. For the moot part resistance in these countries would consist of non-cooperation rather than active subversion.
(Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark)
In all four oountrloo of Nor thorn Europe tho population In genorel would bo hostile to Soviet military occupation. In Finland and Morisay there lo ottrong potential for organised and offeotivo unde -ground reaiotaDco. oolstance potential le boing developed In Sueden. The possibilities in Deaoark are very lied tod.
The Firms hove deaoootratod their firm will to resist doaimtion. That the experience of having been overpowered0 and again4 has not weakened their doternination Is indioatod by their bold and stubborn, although discreet, resistance to Soviet political prco-ourefl in the postwar period. In tho event of war, tho USSR presumably woald try to gain tho uncontested ndnission of Soviet troops into Finland by Invoking tho rautuol aaoiBtonoe treaty Lnnxised on Finland undor Soviet pressure. Tho Finnish Oovernaent, however, uould roaka every effort to forestall tho entranoo of Soviet troops into Finland, and the Finnish araed forces would reelet their unauthorised entrance. In any event, Soviet military operations in Finland would be conducted in hostile territory. If Soviet foroee ware present with consent wrung from the Finnish Government under duress, resistance would oono from underground eleaonte operating with the eurroptitdone ooonlvanoe of the Finnish polioo and armed foroea. If the Soviet occupation came about entirely by force of area, those underground elements woald be relnroroed by the actlvo participation of whatever remnants of tho arejed foroee and polioo were loft at the and of organized hostilities.
rroa the armed forces and police, tbe main ol amenta of systnmatie resistance would be tho menbora of tho Social Demooratle Party and tho veterans of three previous wars with the OSSR. The Social Dooooratio Party not only boo on extensive political network and tradn union orgnnliation, but also an effective ajiti-Connuniet oountor-lnteJiigeaco aj^toai. The voterane organisations, including
Ifcio resistance, drawing oupport from cwst non-Corxniniat Finno, would occur without prior OS aid. It would bo rendered nore effective by strategic direction and by coral and material support. t could not prevent Soviet occupation of Finland, but the USSR would bo CMspelled to naintaln ai sable occupation forces there, and thevould seriously harass and impede Soviet military operations in or through that country.
tforusglaa alUtary corsaandors are under instructions touerrilla resistance wharever circumstances prevent effective frontal defense. Iforeover, tho Norwegian population contains tbo nucleufl and irfr^. 1 experienced underground rosistanco novonont in0 Norwegians (excluding Communists) who participated in such Iforld War II resistance activities ao clandestine coonunication of Intclli-gonee ana sabotego of ahippinG, transportation, or Industrialkeleton organization left over froa the World Hot II effort is now active. Considerably more0 Norwegians would be dio-posod to participate in resistance against Soviot occupation.
Such resistance would occur without prior US aid. The previous success of Iforvegian underground rosistanco, however, dopondod in large measure on tho training of personnol in the UK and theirinto Norway for tho acconpllataKmt of specific niasions. The effectiveness of resistance against the USSR would be greatly enhanced by prior organization and preparations for slrdlor aid, as veil as by tho continuing provision of strategic dirootion and of moral and material support after hostilities had begun.
ouid,notforway untenable, but would impose on theetirement for sizable occupation forces and wouldharaaa and inpede Soviet military operations in and from Norway.
^JL^f1d3 civn Popalation would bo willingbut Sweden has not experienced
COBhot5 and has not ucdergooe hostUe occupation for more
waX^eSSwSSi toomlngs of Swedish rosistanco
mSt^^ tradIUon QDd Practical experience
rather than lack of win to resist.
Neverthelessotential exists for developing effectiveand guerrilla roeietanee in Sweden. In parUculor, considerable reserves of manpower well trained in small unit operations are available
(which io not the ease in Jimmy and Denmark). Developing tola potential for Swedish resistance by prior organization and planning is apparently precluded by the governoent's devotion to traditional Swedish neutrality. The Swedish military euthorltlea, however,ifferent view of the situation, and, according to current reports, ore preparing for continuing guerrilla and underground resistance after Frontal defense has boon broken,
The Danish population would be generally hostile to Sovietbut the possibility of active resistance would be severely limited by the oxmll area and open terrain of thaith prior D6 aid, an organisation capable of affective espionage and sabotage might be established. Without such aid, Danish realstanjo would be likely to consist only of United randan sots of sabotage and espionage.
(floats rn Go many, tba Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Austria, Italy, and Trieste)
The majority of the population in all tha countries ofis anti-Cocnunlst and would be ho3 tile to Soviot military although there aro variations from country to country,an over-all Western European potential capable of supportingunderground rosistanco effort. It would derive itsfrom official police and st.te-securityeaserelements ofpolitical
2. Security Organisations.
Police, gendarmerie counter-intelligence, and other paramilitary organisations in all Western European countries have made sufficient progress toiard weeding out thair postwar Communist elements toa source of reliable members for an anti-Soviet underground* US aid and guidance could bo proffered only through official channels and would have to be harmonized with, current plans by the various national governments for tha employment of these organizations. The main sources of trained resistance personnel would be in the following organizations: the French Republican Guard, Gendarmerie, and police} the Italian Carabiniarl and Security Policej the West German zonal police forces. Border Polios, and Britiah Zone Constabulary} the Kotherlands police and National Resorvej the Belgian policeendarmoriej and,imited extent, the Austrian police and Gendarmerie now in training.
The Catholic Church, along with tha Protestant church organizations in the Netherlands, constitutes tho largest confirmed antl-Coaaunist group in Western Europe. These religious groups are relatively secure from Communist penetration and posaossclosely knit organizations, i'hair membership, their organisations, and their well established chains of cooaunlcation would contribute greatlyotential underground. Their
long-range outlook would provide tlie patlonoe necessary to begin tbe organizationermanent antl-Coanunist undorgound. Thisutlook, however, wo Id tend to Halt resistance activity In tba early stages of the war, restricting it for the most part toood source of clandestine intelligence*
h. Political Party Organ!rations.
Socialist, Catholic, and other rightist political parties In Western Europe, aspeolally in Prance, float Germany, and Italy, would form the nucleus or (oore probably) several independent nuclei for an anti-Soviet resistance aovosent during the later stage of Soviet occupation* Socialists ln west Germany and Austria already have olandastlno anti-Soviet organizations. These could bo doveloped into resistance movements if thslr membership were purged of Cosrauntst* wno Infiltrated in early post tar" campaigns,. In Franco, da Gaulle's Rally of tha French People is reported to havo cat up andrivate paramilitary protoc .ivo force of approxllately thirty thousand man to combat militant action by tha FrenchParty. In Italy, similarly, there are fragments of several groups of antl-Coomaniata formed at tbe time of tbaelection crisis to guardossible Coostunlet coup d'etat. These forces included tho "Oaocoo" Division, tba action committees of tha ChristianMonarchist, and Liberal Parties, and tha Catholic Action groups. These- Italian groups probably would notary active resistance rola in tho early stages of tba war, even with OS add and direction, but woulducleus for an underground.
5. SSSSSSSS Sources of Underground Members.
Frags--its of tha Western regular military forces, especially in Italy where partisan bands have proved effective in tha past, could. If brought under unified control and given prior OS guidance and aid,seful addition to tha ranks of any clandestine force. members of various associations of veterans of World war II would join any organised resistance aoveoent in considerable numbers and would provida exceptionally well-informed, vigorous leaders hip,those with experience in French and Italian guerrilla fighting in World War H. Finally, tba resistance movement would drear usuryfrom tha antl-Cosanmist trade unions,those ln Franca, Italy, Austria, and West Geraany. Special precautions in screening volunteers would be necessary because many of the trade unions have been penetrated by Communists.
Soviot controls would bo adequate to prevent underground activity free a* tar1ally interfering with tne progress of Soviet Military operations during ths combat and initial occupation phaoo of the war* These controls would be ruthless if cilitary securityire repressive policy. The occupation would work through surviving local Coocunists employed as Informant? and auxiliary occupation officials in all the Western European countries. Considerable intelligence cooearning potential resistance leaders has alreadyransmitted to Moscow through Communist channels.
Potential Strength of the neelstonco,.
In the absenoe of prior OS aid and direction, local efforts towardwould consist mainly of uncoordinated, "one shot" sabotageending in liquidation of the responsible underground organisations, Mth prior US aid and direction, underground resistance units would be able to axeoute cabotage of selected targetsimited scale and to set up contact and escape routes to western bases. In the initial phase of the war. Intelligence concerning essay dispositions and actions would be the wain benefit deriving to the west from the underground effort. Tbe vlgcc aad enterprise of ths resistance, aa sell as progress toward organisationermanent, large-scale underground noTenant, would depend loss on the national and organisational character of the various on dor ground oovoaento than on the estimate of Western Europeans generally as to tbe remotenoea of liberation and the severity of Soviet repression
./iCLOSUius t' hatdi iAST
(Turkey, Croeoe, Iran, Israel, and the Arab statoa) 1. General.
In the Near Eaat the potential for an active anti-Soviet resistance exists in Turkey and,oro United extent, in Greece. There is inesistance potential that right be developed if ths politioal structure of the country should withstand theof inrendin- Soviet attack. Insignificant reolotanco can be expected-throughout the Areb States srael if the Israeli definitely thro* In their lot with tha Weet, as they probably would, small but oplrlted and experienced undorground groups oould be organized.
There is in Turkey the potentiel for an effective resistance movement, strongly backed byeat Mjorltjetermined populationopposed to foreign domination. The resistance forces would oe formed priaarily from the large number or regular and reserve military personnel who have received OS training and equipment. The movement would be augmented by indiwi*ial Turks from nearly all classes of the population, whichtrong el) liary tradition and would vigorously support the resistance. The country's mountainous terrain and the vulnerability of transportation routes to sabotage Insure the possiblity of an extensive harassing campaign. ampaign, provided the local tribes (especially tho Kurds) did not mount an sffeotive counter-campaign against the Turks, would divert substantial numbers of Soviet troops.
Without continuing OS aid, the underground effort would be seriously impaired by ohortagea of military supplies ^nd lack of outside moral support, but tho underground would remain active as long as there was hope of eventual liberation. Prior moral support, direction, and aid by the US, particularly in the form of equipment and gold for conductingoperations and procuring local supplies, would greatly enhance tho effectiveness of the resistance effort. The main operations would be guerrilla warfare and eystunatlc sabotage of Soviet coominications.
The Greek urse Tor independence, animatln- perhaps as ouch asercent of the fiopulation with deep resentment against Soviet designs on Greece, would provide the basis for un active resistance movement. It would draw its membership mainly from Greek military personnel, government officials, and the mnny victims of recent Communist guerrilla campaigns. The leadership probably would come from military officers experienced in working under US guidance and with US equipment. It would take moreoviet occupation forces to control the country and even then the mountainous districts would providefor bases for which organised sabotage could be carried on.
Prior US direction and aid bo uid be essential to effective guerrilla action and the sabotage of the vulnerable main linea of Soviet oomrjunicatiors. Otherwise, the assistance which the Greek Communist Party could give the Soviet authorities in eliminating resistance leaders and groups gradually would roduoe the underground to uncoordinated and largely ineffective activity.
Units of the Iranian Amy, plus various tribal groups, wouldthe main elementsesistancethat would bs fairly active if the shaky political structure of the country held together In the period of impending Soviet attack. If the underground were organized before the outbreak of hostilities, it would be capable of impeding tho advance of Soviet forces by demolitions along lines of coinminicatlona,ferini with Soviet military supply In genersl, and hampering the use of Iran's petroleum and shipping facilities in particular. .'Eajor guerrilla operations would take place in the rugged sections of western and suuthwestern Iron. Soviet control would not be impaired in the Persian Gulf region, the focal point of Soviet interest in Iran.
In ad lition to the army, the resistance forces would be drawn from certain tribal groups, in northwestern Irann western Iran (certain Kurdishnd in southwestern Iran (Qaahqal, certain Lur, Bakhtlari, and Arab tribes).
Soviet rule would be rather ineffective in those sections of Iran whore the terrain is rugged, and baaee for active tribal resistance efforts could be developed.
; given to theVranian Covet
Failing US support (now being given to theVranian Government and its organized defenseny Iranian underground would surfer from poor morale, lack of equipment, and lack of competent direction.
States (Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia).
With the possible exception of the Assyrians of Northern Iraq and bodouin tribeanen of the daaert throughout the Arab region, there is hardly any potential for anti-Soviet resistance in the Arab states. Tha USSR would have little difficulty in maintaining complete control of all areas essential to the conduct of Soviet military operations in the Near East, nith prior US direction, accompanied by laviah suhaidiss, Assyrian and bedouin irregular forces could be formed for "hit-and-run" raids against Soviet communications, but-those would have only nuisance value. Without outside assistance there would be no useful resistance.
The Israeli are thoroughly experienced in underground activities,the organization and employment of illegal paramilitary unite for aabotago and terror-attacks on occupation authorities.. Theyotentialmall anti-Soviet resistance movement, provided the Iaraeli in general identified their hope for independence with ultimate Hestern victory, as they probably would in the event of Soviet attack and occupation
In tho event of war0 tho Chinese Cornunlat reglee Mouldeliable ally of the USSR, declaring mar on the TTestem Foeera when and if Soviet strategic policy required such action. Thus the USSR would have effective military control of Uanchuria and access to the manpower, military baaea, and other resources of China. The USSR would have quickly overrun and occupy all of Korea. There are some potential resistance elanenta in Northeast Asia,esistance effort in Southern Korea could be organised if prior and continuing US aid and direction were made available. It is assumed, however, that Soviet military strategy in the Far East would be fundamentally defensive in event of war In this case the laximum resistance effort poasible in the early phases of the war would only harass the occupation forces and could not Impede Soviet operatic in Europo and tho Near East.
Despite the facto-belligerent China righttrategic liability,on-belllger:nt China would cover an extensive Soviet front, the USSR probably wouldeclaration of war by the Peiping regl'seategorical proof of loyalty. In thie event, the effectiveness of Chinese support to the military operations of the USSR would be limited. Disaontent would spread among the Chineseesult of conviction that China had become involved ln war at theof the USSR. Tho combination of war-weariness and anti-foreign sentiment wouldsychological basis for the development of underground resistance. The resistance groups probably would be formed fron scattered remnants of ex-Nationalist units, son* small anti-Cccxaaiiat guerrilla units still In existence, nercenary and bandit groups, andconceivably but not very probably in the early stagesardisaffected elements of the Chinese Comunist field forces.
I lost Koreans in both zones are intense nationalists and, except for tho simII Cosrunist minority, would be hostile to Soviet occupation in the eventr Inonly opeclal groups, however, wouldotential for anti-Soviet action. The strongest potential for active reeistance exists in southern Korea, particularly among rightist Korean youth groups and anong theand equipped Korean National Police and the Amy,ore. Leadership for an underground resistance movement would come from the above groups and from officials of the southern Republic;
'.'a th prior US direction and aid, andledge ofiberation andorean resistance movement could supply intelligence on Soviet dispositions and installation; engage in guerrilla warfare against comraunlcatlon lines, railroads, and possibly amall Soviet and Korean Communist military units; end encourage hostility and passive resistance to the Soviet occupationhe general population,the peasantry. Under these circumstances the resulting unrest would rejuiro tha commitment of substantial Soviet forces in Korea to maintainsecurity, without prior US direction and aid, the resistance effort would be confined to minor, sporadic, and uncoordinated acts of violence cr sabotage. The USSR could eliminate any large concentrations oforces and prevent major acts of sabotage on communications or industrial installations, but could not prevent minor harassing actions, the collection of intelligence, or the maintenance of sea coramunicatlons" by the resistance with US forces in Japan.Original document.