Created: 6/6/1950

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csttral tjffellig3tce aoehct


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subject: currant situation lo the philippines.

even though deteriorating conditions in the philippines ahould in tbs near future cause the downfall of president quirino, tho exceeding administration could be expected to be pro-os, if the present decline ln stabilitythe philippines oontinoos for aa much as un years, however, pro-coaamnxiot forcoe aijht be able to salsa power.

deterioration in the philippines isesult of seaknesses in tbe young nation's political leadership, together with the governoent'sto halt outbreaks of coabmniartmurected tlolence. econosdc difficultiesecondary- but wvara cause of unrest.

thereidespread and increasing loss of popular confidence in preoident quirlio, largelyesult of his adbdjxutration'a incompetence, corruption, abuse of power, and inability tolaw and order.

the,ood forces are at preoent capable of proiolent overthrow of the government by the ccrarunist-led rxukbalabap (whose actlvitios are now confined for the aost part toat are unable to destroy tbe boss or prevent their recurrent raids. if huk capabilities continue to iaprove and present conditions continue to lower the morale of governeeot forces, the rebels may eventually emerge victorious.

tbs quirlno acolnla trot ion is neither able nor apparently willing totbs reforaa required to bait present political andends in tbe philippines. qulrino's reaoval from office in faror ef vice president lopes might tenporerlly iaprove tbe situation, bat woold not go far enough is correcting present inequities to reverse the long-torn trend toward increasing instability. conomic end military assistanceontinuation of present clroaastsnces adght prolong tbe life of pro-cd reglaee bat even with such aid,re fares would still be necessary to prevent ultimate coawamlst control.

rbtei this meaerandun bas not been coordinated with tbe intelligenoe to^trdsatdons of tba departzaants of flute, arary, aavy, and, the air earoe.

Philip |iine apathy toncrd rovemrcnt,oliticalmaturity and inadequate education, is chan-inr to activeinatinefficiency and abuses. Lose of confidence in theand particularly in r* re aidantTuirino,econe general anc haa extended even to the inner circle icon shea the I'resldcnt has heretofore depended for auprort. These deveiotTaents, vJ.ich handicap an already >ioak and ineffective tdxinistrutlon in its eiforts tc maintain las and order. Also strengthen the 0oircunlst-ledovenant in Luzon.

a. Executive Leadership.

Stronc exeoutive leadership haeadltlonel in th* Philippine* and continue* to be expected by the Filipino people* The rhUl?rlne Constltuti:road rowers to the President, and the great popularity of th*uezon reflected -eneral approbation of hi* vicorou* leadership as first Pre aidant of the Sorwrmeslth. lrlno, on the other hand, despite andisregard fbr civil rights, has been uca'jle to ca in tainndu peraitted excessive ^rart, corruption, and Inefficiency. Loss of confidence Ln "hiirinD's ebilHy has led to growiru- popular concern over hij abuses of and those h* tolerates aoonr; hi* supporter* and subordino'.ae. Thereroning popularostered by opposition Kacionollit* r'arty charges but hav in- ribetantiol basis inhatn9 electlcEud and coercion.

It is probable that 3uirinocontinue to abuse hia posers in as attecpt not only to niell CocaaLiiat-inspired violence but to subduelegalas ftell. This developoeni,an increased lest cf coniiooncc and opposition to the cdrainistratlon, aoold itrercthon the Com oils ts. In the face of thla prospect and ofill insalth, itossible that aof his political subordinates end opponents may strip hia of all real authority. Generalring ln this direction, thich ha* already beanis an aoded source of administrative neekneas and of dLiiniahing public confidence.

Vice President Fsrnondo Lopez, the tact likely auccesuo? tohiirino.esiber of the wealthy lartd-oenlng class that dominates politioal Uf*. eouted ^oereaaive viewpoint, he hu alwayshla-self aith wstad econoede ana political interest*. Lopes is becoadngpopular and, if heossuned office, ni*ht be able to increase administrative efficiency sozeehat andmeasure of popular oonfidencs. Loptl1 background, iiunever, suggest* that no "ould not be able to Institute tho broadolitical, and eoono.xic reforms necessary to obtain

The tao aajor Philippine politicaliberal enc Haelonal la ta-have few di'ferencea ln their platfenea. ty loaders, shift their loyalties frequently and rapidly, depeidinn on their personal assesaaent of relativetrengths. Currently, for exanple,cany of tho senators elected on President "uirLno's Liberalicket havo turns: against the President. The Cojamista, aho have been quick to oense the sifnificanco of these neaknesses and *ho hope to discredit thepartyre continually propogandizinc ths Filipino people regardinj the self-intereat and venality of the nation's politicians.*


onditions cor so srs loos directly responsible thanor Instability in thealthough the consequences of such aspects of tl econorae situation as tho agrarian problen have been felt In the political and even the military field.

The .Jepurllcineet ahlch favors

long-range ot.ibility. Img^tanairc inequalities ln the nation's agrarian syster.ave been exploited by the Comunists and have not only facilitated thc development ofux eoveeent in Luton but are producing unrestin tho archi)elaeo. Continued failure of the Philippine gOTernijv: class Vie beneficiaries of Vis agrarian systesto alleviate these inequities has provided local Corminists with excellent opportunities to organise the otheral: leaderless peasantry.

The nation's rapidly deteriorating financial position,ess deep-rootedsrxwdiatoly critical one. Heavy budgetary deficitserious depletion of fbreign reserves have obliged the government to tighten import centrals drastically ond to propose tax increases. These wnsuj sere necessary, but inefficient adcdnistratlon sill continue to reduce their effectiveness. In addition, thc resultant sharp price Increases of ouch key ioportod consumer goods as textiles and the general difficulties andof conducting foreign trade have increased popular doubt as to the country's econooic future, thus aggravating the present political Instability.

easant organisationaaa foraed during tho last na oppose the Japanese and which is now under Conainlet leadership,0 stability of the rhUipnin* Ccverrawtrt. Although Hux activity is pre**ntly oonfined for the rxst pert to the inland ofxpanding and growine nor* Intensive. Total Huk strength todaynd is expected to increase. Their total aroed strength at any one ti bower, la believed to be between fl,OCC

Th* Irak* are equipped *ithsuitable for guerrillandunltlcn supply has been secured fron abandoned stocks or through purchaaea, theft, or aeiiure fron govorrvarrt force*. rood and clothing. If not alllinjly contributed by sympathetic peaaants and villagers, cay easily be obtained by force or intlnidatlon.

Loyalty and morale of the Huka are difficult to assess. The fact, however, that very fee Huk* have takenf pastinesty offers, lncicates that tho leaders have, by nhatever oeana, beon cbJe to retainof their following.

In the ruet, Huk activity took the fora orraids in oneanother, foLloaed by periocfl of relative quiet. Xecent raids, roaever

have been better coordinated and .xecuted,development ofcentralized control.

The military force* of theppineej cumberO. thi figure includes an Amy,onstabularyvy of I

^ of all veaacls andore*

l fighters andther aircraft.

lit irj action arainst the Hufce isinelpal risalon of the Aray end the Constabulary. The role of the llavy and the Air Puree ln ISofcecondary. Maval forces, however, are not considered adequate forhe extensive rhUiprine coastline, andld not be capable of preventlnr, outside support fron reaciilnr the dissident*. The Air Fbrco Is employed In tactical support of tho ground forces.

The jovsrnrent forces, all of whose notarial is of US origin, arein corxerlson with their opponents. Cocbat efficiency in both the Array and Constabulary suffers froa lack of coordination beteeen theee

anirnendi and fro- the failure to relieve orx.ll units lonehe field.there is as yet little indication that the deteriorating political situation has affected loyalty, aorale In reneral is not hlrh. Unitis not of hlrh quality, and an aryressiv* spirit is lacking in aU ranks. Ineffectiveness of -ovenv^nt forces is in part attributable to, difficult terrain and local ayrr-thy for the Ifuks

Original document.

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