WW NO* 33
HowTHE CHIEF,
ISTRIBUTION DIVISION DEPT.OF STATE
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OFEACHHEAD IN SOUTH KOREA ,
(2
DcPARTHtHT OF STATE ACQUISITION AND distribution DMSION
1
5ECR
w Udson Officer. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DATE: 6
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SPECIAL ESTIMATE
INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OFEACHHEAD IN SOUTH KOREA
Number 1
The intelligence organizations of theof State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated in the preparation of this estimate and concur tn it. This paper is based on information available
SHtRET
INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OFEACHHEAD IN SOUTH KOREA
PROBLEM
Tu ostimate and enumerate the advantages andofN beachhead in South Korea.*
ESTIMATE
he maintenancenited Nations beachhead in South Korea would have the following major strategic and military implications for the United Nations and the United States;
a. Maintenanceeachhead would have the following
military advantages
Full attainment of the stated Communist objective in Korea would be denied.
The loss of US military prestige which would resultithdrawal would be avoided.
The continued commitment of major Chinese Communist forces in Korea and Manchuria would restrict the Chinese Communistfor rapid consolidation of China, for large scale expansion in mainland Southeast Asia, and for resisting invasion elsewhere on the mainland of China.
The Soviet Union would be obliged to continue the supply of material in support of Communist forces In Korea.
SE
T
*In the event of full-scale Soviet intervention in Korea, It is estimated that it would be impossible for UN forces tothe beachhead.
The Communist forces would be denied an additional operational base against Japan.
In the event that large scale operations against China become necessary, Korea would befor joint UN-US ground operations because.
The superior air and sea power of the UN forces could be brought to bear effectively against the numerically superior ground forces;
Chinese Communist attrition would be relatively high in the confined battle area in Korea;
The beachhead would provide an operational base that would tie down large numbers of Communist forces, could be used to mount subsequent operations in Korea, and could be used to support operations elsewhere in the Far East in the eventeneral war with China.
b. The maintenanceeachhead would have themilitary disadvantages:
critical proportion of the US Army andof US naval and air resources wouldln the area, thereby reducingcapabilities for building up forces elsewhere.
considerable drain on US military resources would
be imposed not only in the support of US forces in Korea, but also in the complete logistic support for Republic of Korea forces and the major part of the logistic support for all olher United Nations forces in Korea.
un forces within ihe beachhead would be subjected to constant attrition (and in the event of overt soviet intervention, danger of annihilation).
the continued deployment of the army forces of the far east command in korea would leave japan more vulnerable to hostile invasion.
the us would be required to continue its support of several million korean refugees.
n beachhead would have the following short-terrapolitical and psychological effects:
would be an avoidance of the great loss ofthe un and the diminution of confidence in the us thata withdrawal.
maintenanceeachhead would place stressesun coalition stemming from increased fear of generalcontinued communist propaganda opportunitiesa conflict between the west and asiatics, andconcern over the diversion of major usto the far east.
chinese communists would be prevented fromcomplete success in korea and the beachhead would provide
a continued symbol of un determination to resist aggression.
far eastern countries would react favorablyn beachhead. in japan, maintenance of awould be particularly advantageous with respectapanese peace treaty. those countries inasia vulnerable to an early chinese communist attack,be apprehensive about the possibilityeneral warwhile un forces were involved in korea, and indonesiaparticularly wouldithdrawal.
seorft
South Asia, India would react unfavorablyN beachhead because of Indian hopestho possibilityajor war and because ofinclination to sympathize with Asiatics asPakistan would react favorably to anyUS military strength. In the Near and Middleeachhead might salvage to somemilitary prestige among Iran and the Arab states;Turkey would oppose UN withdrawal unless it werea broader plan to attack Communism at Its source,they were convinced lhat Western Europe or thewere immediately threatened.
reaction in Western Europe would be influenced
on the one hand, by an intensification of the fear that prolonged and inconclusive fighting in Korea would result in theof hostilities elsewhere and on the other, by concern lest the UN failajor effort to contain Communist aggression.
American reaction would be favorable.
is unlikely that Soviet policy willN decision toeachhead in Korea.
Original document.
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