The Director of Central Intelligencecna
1
National1
EXECXJTTVE BRIEF
Crackdown In the Baltics: Objectives and Prospects
The Intelligence Community believes that Gorbachev will soon declare presidential rule in Lithuania and possibly ia Latvia and Estonia as welL This action almost certainly will lead to the closure of local legislatures and perhaps even the arrest of some Baltic leaders.
Enforcement of Ihe USSR conscription lawtalking horse for Moscow to establish the primacy of union authority over challenges by the republics to the center's writ
The Baltic governments will not assist the center In filling the military draft and rounding up deserters. There probably will be widespread passive resistance by the Baltic peoples that could escalate and become violent-partlcularfy in Lithuania.
s Although the Soviet military Iseading role In
pushing for and Implementing the center's tougher policies. It Is almost certainly acting under Gorbachev's general direction.
believes that while presidentlsl rule in Lithuania-and perhapsistinct possibility, It is not as certain as this Brief contends.
This Executive Brief was rtifteaed by Condoieexza Rice, Special Assistant to lhe President and Senior Direacrfor Soviet Affairs, National Securitys basedideo conference among InielUsenc* Cornmunity representatives. This Brief was produced by lhe National Inirlicence Officer for the USSR and Informally coordinated with NSA, DIA, and CIA. INR has an alternative view (above and on
All portionj datufied
Today's seizure of facilities in Vilnius, Lithuania, by Soviet troops marks the beginningew, much more dangerous stage in Moscow's effort to reassert control over independence-minded republics. The center has chosen the Baltic republics as the test bed foranuary announcement by the Defense Ministry that military forces would be used to enforce compliance with the draft and arrest deserters in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Moldova, Georgia, and western oblasts of the Ukraine. The Uthuanians had beeneadline ofanuary to comply with the draft, the Latvians and Estoniansanuary.
Objectives
These are tbe most dramaticeries of moves toward an authoritarian course that Gorbachev has made in the past few months. We believe that they are designed above all toine against disintegration of the union and reestablish central authority.
Noncompliance with the drafteen concern of the military, but it isey center-republic issue. By choosing to move forcibly on the draft, the central government is able torucial military concern and, at the same time, use itehicle to show the republics that the union's writ still holds sway.
Gorbachev is taking action in the Baltics first because the populations there are much less likely than those in the other regions singled out to react violently. He probably calculates that if the center can show tbat it is able to enforce ia authority there, this will convince the other republics toore cautious strategy in seeking greater autonomy or independence.
As Gorbachev strongly hinted in bis public statement ofanuary, he is prepared to declare presidential rule in Uthuania-the most defiant of the three Baltic republics. His complaints against the Umuanian leadership went far beyond the draft issue and focused on Vilnius' refusal to abide by union law. We believe he will also impose presidential rule on Latvia and Estonia unless the governments there comply fully with the military's efforts to fill the draft and round up deserters.
Gorbachev has backed off in the past but is not likely to do so (ids time. Failure to react strongly to Baltic noncompliance after giving sucb prominence to the issue would, in our view,evastating blow to the central government's credibility.
How Will Things Play Out?
The Ministry of Defense has said that Soviet troops will begin actions to enforce conscription and round up deserters after the deadlines have passed. There are not enough troops in the region for comprehensive house-to-house searches. Thus, they are likely to do this selectively butighly publicized manner to make sure the message comes across clearly. Such actions, along with troop movements, building seizures, and tough rhetoric will be designed to create fear, intensify pressure on Baltic governments, and provoke confrontations to justify even sterner measures.
The Baltic governments have already declared that they wiD not comply with the Ministry of Defense statement, although Estonian and Latvian leaders show some willingness toompromise. There is likely to be widespread passive resistance and could also be isolated incidents of violent resistance. Tbe center probably will arrest,inimum, lower-level offficials who refuse to aid conscription.
Although the center could stop here, it is more likely to go further and declare presidential rule in at least Uuruania. Indeed, the difficulties of actually rounding up those avoiding the draft and Gorbachev's failure to mention conscription in his warning to the Lithuanians make it likely that this issue
is being usedretext for asserting the central government's supremacy. Presidential rule probably would entail:
Tbe dissolution of the local legislatures.
The installationresidential plenipotentiary to rule by decree.
The eventual formation of pliant governments to give the appearance of local participation.
Perhaps the arrest of republic leaders.
Such steps would greatly increase the likelihood of widespread acts of civil disobedience, such as strikes, and limited acts of violence against the central authorities. Additional troops would be
"SEeREX^
sent in to control the protests and to perform basic economic functions. Despite the prospect of spiraling violence, the center has the capability to maintain control of the Baltics.
Tbe steps Gorbachev is taking now, however, will not squelch the Baits' drive for independence, and it is not clear what Moscow intends to do after imposing presidential rule. Gorbachev will have to be prepared to keep an enlarged military presence there for the long haul.
Moscow took similar moves in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijanhen itocal "state ofhe immediate violence between Azeris and Armenians was contained, but Gorbachev's plcni-poteniary was ineffective and local rule was turned back to Azeriear later. There couldimilar outcome in the Baltics.
Foreign Policy Calculations
The timing of Ckwbacbev's move seems purposefully chosen to constrain the United States' ability to react There was no pressing urgency to move in the Baltics now. By getting tough there virtually on the eve of the UN deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait andonth before the Moscow summit, he probably calculates that Washington will be too preoccupied with war in the Gulf to respond strongly.
He may also believe, that the summit would have been postponed in any event by the Gulf situation or by failure to come to closureTART treaty, and that the fallout for US-Soviet relationsrackdown in the Baltic would be less damaging now than at some future date.
Gorbachev's increasing reliance on tbe military at home suggests that the military's recent more prominent role in national security decisionmaking and arms control negotiations is likely to continue. Coupled with Shevardnadze's imminent departure, the United States will find it more difficult to dose on arms control negotiations where the Soviet military already believes it is making most of this concessions. Nevertheless, Gorbachev probably will maintain the broader thrust of Moscow's cooperative policy toward the West
INR Dissent
INR believes that while presidential rule in Lithuania-and perhapsistinct possibility, it is not as certain as this Brief contends. Gorbachev is clearly intent on intimidating the Baltic leaderships, but INR believes he understands that dismantling the current republic governments and possibly arresting some of their members would have serious repercussions for Moscow's relationship with the US and tbe West in general. In this regard, INR believes the Brief overstates the extent to which Gorbachev might feel the Gulf crisis has so preoccupied Western attentiontrong response to presidential rule would not be forthcoming.
Original document.
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