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rtistic and intellectual
D. Attitudes of the
Nationalist
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toward government
Attitude toward war and national
Attitude toward foreign
C. The
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List of Figures
Fig.
Principal Iraqi ethnic and cultural8
Religious and ethnic0 Iraqi qada's (districts) designated for official use of Kurdish and Turkoman! languages
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Sheikhs of the Shammar al-Jarba' Bedouin hammar al-Jarba' Bedouin In camp Marsh Arab village Kurdish tribesmen Metalworkers' bazaar. Baghdad Turkoman couple, Kirkuk Outdoor coffee house, Baghdad Mandean silversmiths, Baghdad Arab and Kurdish0
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Section was prepared for the NIS by the Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State.
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42. Characteristics of the People
General
The population of Iraq Is characterized by ethnic, linguistic, religious, and socio-economic differences which are pronounced. Race and languageseparate the Kurds from the Arab majority; dinferences of race, language, and religion separate the other minorities from the Arabs; and adifference, in the case of the Sunni and Shiah Muslims, divide even the Arab majority. The amount of national unity achieved onissues is dependent on the degree to which these differences can be subordinated to thegood. An aid to this end Is the continuous role played by the Tigris-Euphrates valley inthe physical and psychological barriers that divide the various ethnic groups.
The socio-economic factor as an apparent force toward disunity is not in proportion to the size of the gulf that exists between the economicThe mlddlo classelatively small, closely-knit group made up of urban merchants, artisans, traders, etc. The great bulk of the populationural one in which poverty Is the usual accepted norm. At the opposite extreme are the tribal sheikhs, the wealthyand the Arab aristocracy, ahandful who control the wealth and theof the country. Custom, Ignorance, ill health, and malnutrition all are factors in theattitude toward these economic extremes. Most compelling, however,ombination of the powerful tradition of tribal unity, according to which the head of the family or tribe cares for those in need, and the concept of feudal overlordship which by recognition of the relationship between lord and servant has become through the centuries the conventionalized social pattern. At the same time the tribal tradition which erases the purely social gulf which might otherwise exist between the rich and the poor hasowerful force toward family or tribal cohesion beyond the bonds of political or national unity.
These differences, and the absence of antradition of group cooperation within theframework, make national unity on policiesontroversial nature unlikely. They also have an adverse Influence on Iraqi national receptive-ness to opportunities for honest and advantageous
Noteaaed on material available in
cooperation with other nations both within the Arab League and beyond.
Individually the average Iraqi is unrealistic in his outlook, emotional, and intense. He expects much for little effort and at the same time isover his social and material backwardness.
Sociological factors for strength are found In the qualities of loyalty to the tribe or family,and patient acquiescence to the hardships of life. Factors for unity exist in the common bond of Islamajority of the population, and in pride of race, language, and history on the part of the Arab component Despite these, the factors which make for weakness and disunityin Iraq.
For the purely religious aspects of theconditions to be discussed below reference should be made to Sectionf this Chapter,Religion. For the political interpretation, see Chapter V, SectionsPolitical Dynamics) andNational Policies).
B. Physical characteristicsrabs
oaioiNthe Arab forcesIslam entered the. it was evenand whichhad been continuously inhabited bygroups of people who, though of diverseand ethnical origins, had evolved intohomogeneous anthropologicalthis evolution the basic physicalremained Semitic-Mediterranean despiteleavening influence of alien peoplesperiodically from the highlands toand east. The Arabsheof Centralominantestablishing this physical pattern, servinghad since time immemorialeservoirfor the needs and opportunities ofvalley.
typeAnthropologicallyArabs of today range from the classicof Central Arabia to the somewhatwho have evolvedmillennia in the Tigris-Euphratesterra "Arab" as used in the broad sensea Unguis tic designation, since itthose whose native tongue Is now Arabicthe Jews) without regard for their social
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within the easy confines of tribal law. To the bulk of the population the Bedouin epitomizes theArab virtues, but from the viewpoint ofreality heiminishing element which in ever-increasing numbers is being forced into agricultural and industrial labor.
The nomad tribes are located chiefly in western and southern Iraq (see. The great Bedouin Shammar tribe of north-central Arabia and of Syria is represented In Iraqranch, the Shamrnar al-Jarba') They range the Al Jazlra from the Jabal Sin jar region in the Mosul Jftca" (province) to the regions immediately west and south of Baghdad. Their sheikhs are politically powerful and wealthy,invested extensively in Irrigated farm land. While as Bedouin they traditionally scorn the farmer,hammar al-Jarba' families homestead ed in Mosul liwa'n all they number0 persons.
Other important nomad tribes are the 'Amarat 'Unayzah and the az-Zaflr. The 'Amarat 'Unay-zah, like the Shammar al-Jarba',ubsectionistinguished and much larger Central Arabian clan. They summer along the western bank of the Euphrates, extending as far south as Karbala, and In the winter migrate to and often across the Syrian border to the west. They number0 persons in all. Their relatives, the Ru-walla, with whom they are on hostile terms, often cross into westernmost Iraq in transit between Saudi Arabia and Syria.
The az-Zaflr (often spelledhile not of as aristocratic lineage nor as wealthy as theal-Jarba' or the 'Amarat 'Unayzah,occupy an important positionufferSaudi Arabia and the rice growers of the lower Tigris. They are very poor and are reduced toents or families.
Subdivisions of other tribes also still depend" on the camel and adhere to the Bedouin tradition of nomadism, the most important being theajority of whom continue in thepattern. They number in ailersons and migrate from the Tigris to the Kurdish foothills in the area between KirkOk and Baghdad. Other tribe* with Bedouin subdivlRions are the al-'Azzah, the Shammar TSqah. the Bani Tamlm, and the Ban! Lam.
Shepherds today far outnumber the Bedouin, and the ad-Dulaym constitute the most extensive of the shepherd tribes. They range throughout northern Dulaim Hwi' and are found in aof subdivisions on either aide of the Euphrates upstream from Al Falhlja. In ail, including both the nomadic shepherds and the substantialwhich has taken up farming, they numberersons. Many other tribes in lesser
4 but important degrees are divided into settledand nomadic sheep-herding sectionsthe al-KhaEi'l) of the Middle Euphrates, the Zayyad and the al-Budhur of the lower Euphrates, and various of the tribes in the Muntaflq
The Sulaybah are also true nomads, whomall group of outcasts range undisturbed through the tribal districts of the Bedouin as hunters, tinkers, smiths, carpenters, and purveyors ofmedical services for man and beast. Their abilities in specialized skills arc utilized by allgroups. They are primitive in dress,and cultivate an appearance of poverty. In Iraq they numberents or families.
rab stilled and semi-settled tribes
upper EuphratesThe ad-Dulaym, already mentioned as nomadic shepherds, are equally numerous and important as settledon either side of the Upper Euphrates as far south as Ramftdi. The al-Jumaylah and Albu 'Isa are the most important of the Dulaym subtribes which have settled on the land.
middle euphbattjThetribes are: al-Fatlah, the most Important tribe In the Middle Euphrates; al-Khaza'il, in realityribeheikhly family (aboutembers) of great prestigearge following among adjacent tribes, the Bani Salamah in particular; the Banionfederation of aboutmaller tribes now becoming disunited; thearge but scattered tribe; and the AfaJ, antribeich farming district.
lower EuphratesThe area along the Shalt al Gharraf from KOt al Hai south to the Shaft al Arab and from the Euphrates almost to the Tigris Is the land of the great al-Muntaflq federation. This is the tribal area par excellence. The tribes are well armed and display an altitude of aggressive Independence that makes thehesitant to press seriously such matters as conscription and other public obligations. The proportion of small landholders here is larger than In other tribal areas, and while feudal control is absolute among the separate tribes itatoward individuals are perhaps more atrictly observed than elsewhere. Ultimate control of the Muntaflq is in the hands of the powerful Shabib-Sa'dun family, who epitomize the traditionalvirtues and who. though Sunni. still maintain control over their uniformly Shiah tribal followers. The Muntaflq isederation of confedera-tfons. and though declining In unity It Isowerful force in tribal and national matters. It consistsultitude of separate tribes, only the most Important of which will be mentioned The first confederation is the Ajwad, In which are the
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following leaser confederations and tribes: the Banl Rutin and al-Humayd. themselves confederations of smaller groups; the rich farming tribe Banl Zayd,nd the shepherd Khafajahhe second confederation, the Banl Malik, is made up of the rice growing Ahl al-KQt, the largeBanl Rhayqan, and the seml-nomadic Albu SaMlh. The third confederation, the Banl Said, consists primarily of the semi-nomadic tribe of that name which occupies the region between the Shatt al Ghana! and the Tigris marshes.
uttertiohisal-'Ubaydhavobeen mentioned under nomadic tribes but also deserve attention here as the beneficiariesthe governmental Hawljah Land Scheme for tribal settlement in Kirkuk Una'. The al-Jubur are settled peasants; though they are one of the largest tribes In Iraq they are scattered and
middle tiobisgreat tribesin this section, though remnants of tho once great, such as the Banl Tamun. are still to be found. The al-Juhayshart of the tribe of the same name found near Mosul. The Zubayd areImportant, though of diminishing tribaland the al-'Azxah, while mainly nomadic shepherds, also have important numbers of settled peasants. The Shammar Toqah are dividednomadic herdsmen and settled cultivators along the Tigris and in the Balad RQz area. Most important of the Middle Tigris tribes are the Banl Rabi'ah, who in themselvesederation of smaller tribes. Their sheikhs are extremely wealthy, having appropriated to themselves the government land intended for tribal ownership. Extending southward from Kiltlong the Shatt al Gharraf they come within the area of the Dujaila Land Scheme through which Improvedland Is made available to landless peasants for homesteadlng.
(f) lower tighisThe tribes of the lower Tigris, from Shaikh Sa'ad to the Shatt al Arab, are more peaceful and settled than those to the west, who look down on the former as lacking In purity of blood and in the traditional tribal virtues, in this region there isendency toward the disintegration of the tribe and the substitution of feudal estates worked by any peasants available for service. The sheikhs lease their land from theand support their own personal troops in proportion to their importance.
The Albu Muhammad are the most numerousersons) and the mostof the lower Tigris tribes. They- are wealthy rice cultivators and buffalo herders, and In their mode of living they share many features with the Ma'dan or Marsh Arabs, among whom they are interspersed and with whom they have intermarried. Most of their land Is marshy, and their dependence on the mashhQf or skiff forand on reeds for building material is common to other marsh dwellers. The Banl Lam,reat Bedouin federation and lords of the Lower Tigris, areoverty-stricken group. They still retain some few Bedouin sections, but the bulk of their members have been forced Into manual labor in the fields and In the cities. The al-Usayrij, tho as-Sawfi 'Id, and the Albu DarrfiJ are important as rice growers.
The Marsh Arabs, or Ma'dan. Inhabitcres of swampland roughly bounded by the Tigris from A] Qurnah almost to 'Amara on the east,mmar (Lake) totriya on the south, and by the Shatt aln the west as shown in They are Interspersed with the Albu Muhammad and various Muntaflq subtrlbes, living in the mostportions of the marshland well beyond any effective government control. They depend on the mashhuf for transportation and on buffalo, fish, and rice for food. The towering jungles of reeds that border and often obscure theiralso serve as sources of food, fuel, building material (seend the raw material for woven reed products made for sale. Theand physical characteristics of these obscure people suggest that they are not of Arab descent but are perhaps the relatively unmixed descendents of aboriginal marsh dwellers. Unlike the Bedouin they are tall, thick-set, and muscular, with broad faces and high cheek bones. Their language,is an Arabic of archaic character and their religion is Shiah Islam. Their reputation is one of piracy, treachery, and disregard for tribal and civil law, and to other Arabs they are considered as outcasts. Their total number as3 was estimatedersons, but since the term Ma'dan is often loosely used to refer to all marsh dwellers It is probable that this figureenerous percentage of other tribes who are not Ma'dan in the strict sense of the word. There are five principal Ma'dan tribes, the moat important of which is al-Fartfls.
(g) siratt ax arabThe population along the course of the Shatt al Arab, from Al Qurnah to the Persian Oulf, has almost completely lost Its tribal character. The area is subject,to large seasonal influxes of tribal Arabs in late summer and early fall to work in the date harvest. Economic control of the area is in the handsew dominant families such aa the Sa'dun and the Naqib, andesser degree to the sayyidi (descendents of theho here in particular have prosperedandlord class,
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Kurds
a. Racial originThe Kurdish homeland as such does not correspond to present-day national boundaries. In general terms it comprises themountainous area which straddlesIraq, northwestern Iran, southeasternand southern Azerbaijan, while separatecommunities are found well beyond these limits. Within Iraq there is no established line tobetween Iraqi Kurdistan and the remainder of the country. For practical purposes it may be considered as the area northeastine between Tel Uwainit on the northwest and Khanaqin on the east (for details see2.
The origin of the Kurdish peoples is obscure, but it Is probable that the ancestors of the present-day Kurds were western Iranians who gradually absorbed or displaced an earlier people living In the present Kurdish homeland. Whatever theirthe Kurds were fully establishedistinct ethnic and linguistic entity in their presentby the time of the Arab conquest of Iraq in the seventh centurys far back as Kurdishcan be traced the same spirit of rebelliousis found to exist that characterizes this people in modern times.
b. Physical typeThe basic Kurdish stockfghaniberal intermixture ofNordic. The Kurd of todaynchesnches in height. He isIn remaining essentially dolichocephalic even though in the closest association with the brachi-cephals from Armenia and Anatolia. The Kurdish nasal profile ranges from straight to markedlythe face is predominately long and narrow as shown in. and usually theand hair are dark, though thereerceptible tendency toward blue eyes and Light hair color. Beingerder, cultivator, and tribal* warrior, ratherity dweller, his complexion has taken on the same deep copper color that characterizes thetraightcr nose and broaderizable Kurdish minority. ..
The stamina of the Kurd is proverbial, and Is demonstrated by his feats of strengthorter, in which trade heirtual monopoly in Iraq. His resistance to disease when introduced to urban life is certainly no greater than that of the urban Arabs, but in his natural upland habitat his life expectancy exceeds that of the urban or desert Arab. His chief occupational hazard Is the rifle bullet.
c. Number ant* distributionThe population figure for Kurds in Iraq as of8OO" orf the total population of the country. Distribution follows the pattern shown
6 in2hile the Kurds of Iraq are essentially mountain-dwellingonsiderable number are settled and prosperous agriculturalists in the rain-fed upland plains of northeastern Iraq. The migratory tribes which once migrated northward each year beyond the borders of Iraq are no longer permitted access to their traditional Turkish pastures, but established routes of seasonal migration between Iraq and Iran are open lo peaceful tribes.
d. Kurdish trussRacial character and geography combine to accentuate the inherent separatism of tbe Kurdish people. Their passion for individual independence encourages anda division into many tribes which are either mutually antagonistic or at best suspicious of their neighbors. Among the Arabs, this insistence on tribal freedom of action hus discouraged theof large or enduring tribal confederations and at the same time has been the greatest obstacle to the united action necessary to achieve the political Independence that they desire. In addition, the inaccessible country in which many of them live stimulates and fosters this concept ofThe same characteristics that make the tribaluspicious acquaintance and aenemy color also the relations between tribes. Only on tbe western boundary ofwhere the terrain Is less confining and where there have been centuries of contact with other peoples, has tribal cohesion and intoleranceto any marked extent.
6 shows only the principal Kurdish tribes, and the following text describes only the chief among these:
akowarlike tribe wall protected geographlcaj'y. conaliUng of over ZD subtribe* inillage! They are agricultural and pastoral, with nomadic sections mlgraUng into Iran during the summer.
remnantnce powerfulthe main portion of which Is now nettled in Turkey. The Iraqi branches numberamilies, some of which are sUll nomadic.
haprosperous tribe of settledofamilies, of interest chiefly as beingurkoman*
relaUveiy prosperous, settled uibegriculturalists and shepherds numberineighting men.
BARAparamount tribe of northeastern Iraq though now less powerful than formerly. They an remote, warlike, and numberamilies of fanner* and shepherds.
present an unimportant tribe as an Internal force, but of special significance because of the flight of Its leader. Mulia Mustafa, and soma of his tribesmen to the Soviet Union for refuge after their unsuccessful revolt against the Iraqi central governmentanant tribal leaders Inare noted for their truculenee-
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important tribe of farmersamilies, living onland. It is famous for lis One wheat, horses, and mules, and for it* good fighters.
arlike tribeamilies. In the past it hasonstant threat to tbe town of Kifrt
very large, wealthy tribe, considered to be the most progressive of all tribal Kurds. ThU tribe consists of both cultivators and shepherds who ore nomadic within their area, numbersamilies. Many adjacent non tribal Kurds are of DOal origin.
DCribe of farmers and shepherdsamilies It Is characterised by strong anU-government leadership.
tribe of fanners and shepherds number-insamilies. It Is known for its One horses und for the skill of Its members as cavalrymen.
KAMAwarlike tribe of fanners and shepherds whichtrong Influence on tribal intrigue In Sulaimaniya. It Is estimated tn consist ofamilies
second largest ol the migratory tribes, the Herkl, numbering0 persons. This tribe Is made up of several subsections, some of which are turning to agriculture. The migratory range of the tribe Is from the plains north of Eroil Into northwestern Iran. It la noted for having good fighters who resent government attempts at control.
largest of the nomadic tnbea.atood fighting men. Largeof this tribe have settled around Halabla, the chief town of the Kurds, and their chiefs havewealthy landowners. Divided Into many seml-autonomous sub tribes, often at odds with each other,tile tribal cohesion and no centralTbe Jaf have tbe longest migratory range of all Kurdish tribes, extending Into Iran In the
federation of three tribes numbering in all0t Is made up oftraders and growers of fruit and tobacco, with some pastoral subsections
MIZL'RIribe made up of peaceful fanners and shepherds, numberingamilies.
A tribe consisting mainly or village dwelling fanners, with acme nomadic elements which migrate into Iran. Outstanding and powerfulighting strength variously estimated aten, tho tribe is famed for Its self-developed bicameral parliament, high morale, and rcalstance lo effort* at government control.
SAJiOALUwine of prosperousformerly attached lo Sheikh MahmOd, long the leader of Kurdish revolt against the central II numbersrmed men.
aprosperous tribe of farmers and horse and tattle breeders, unusual In its tribal cohesion.ood -fighters, who live within easy striking distance of tbe KirkOk oil fields.
small tribe of fanners, with some-shepherd subsections,eputation for turbulence and treachery. The presence of Ncatorlanhe tribe along with the traditional Sunnl Muslims Is exceptional.
small tribe of farmers and shepherds consisting ofrmed men who arecelllon to control the strategic Splllk Pass.
Important, prosperous, settled trine whose leaders art active In government service. It numbersighting man.
Isolated tribe of farmers andnumbering In all about TOO lamllios, knownaven for deserters, biindlle, and otherelements. IU members, however, fought against Mulla Mustafa of the Darzanl In his revolt against tbe central government.
Kurdish tribal leaders In most cases bear the honorific title agha. Among the Kurds the title "Sheikh" applieseligious leader or to the headouse distinguished by such leadership In the past. Such sheikhs often build up an extensive following not only from their own family andbut from the various tribes. The Qara-daghli Barzinji family of Sulaimaniya, headed by the famous Sheikh MahmOd, is the prime example of extra-tribal leadership. Other sheikhs, such as the Sargalu sheikhs, have builtore or less permanent following, and In effect have become agha* though they retain the older title.
urkomans
originOf the ethnic groupsthus far the Turkomans are the firstnot to some degree indigenous to the land-twelfthraq was overrun byInvading the Fertile Crescent by way oftheir homeland In Central Asia, andIn Iraq today are the descendantsinvaders,
roup thelike the Kurds,acial sub-typeIrano-Afghan family, which in turn is aof the Mediterranean race. The chief pointfrom other Irano-Afghans liesvery high head vault. Their head formthe face and nose are long,reach the exaggerated lengths foundproper. The lips are thin, the hairof fine texture, and the eyes are browntrace of the Mongoloid traits seenfurther east. Theaches in height andturdybody (see
The health of the Iraqi Turkoman is comparable to that of the Kurd and Arab in the same area. His capacity for work exceeds that of the average Arab. His staminaorker perhaps does not equal that of the Kurd, but it is compensated forreater sense of individual responsibility toward the Job in hand.
and DiaTRracnoNTheof Iraqi Turkomans as8 wasapproximatelyf the total population. As
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peaceful settled agriculturalists they are found in scattered villages extendingine from Nusay-bin In Turkey through Kirkuk to Mandall, forming in their southeasterlyough ethnic buffer between the Kurds to the east and the Arabs to the west (see.
thers
The Jews of Iraq, as cognateof the Semiticfamily, bearclose cultural, linguistic and physicalto the Arabs, since they come from theprogenitors as the successive wavesArabs which flowed outward InCentral Arabia into the Tigris-EuphratesThe first Jews in Iraq, distinguishable asthrough deportations from Palestine intimes. However, the deportations byruler Nebuchadnezzarlater. were the largest andthe beginning of the so-calledand arrivals of freshthe following centuries, up to theof Islam, account for tbc persistence ofminority in Iraq.
The Iraqi Jew is of moderate statureis face and nose are narrow, and the nasal profile Is either straight or convex. His skull formation ranges from dolichocephalic to mesocephalic in south and central Iraq to brachy-cephalic in the areas of northern Iraq in conf orrniiy with the prevalent characteristics of those areas. He is distinguished on thropome trie ally, however,rue Jew and notudaized Iraqi by his smaller head and face and proportionately larger nose.
The number of Jews in Iraq as of0 was established at. of which0 were in0 innnn Kirkuk, and the remainder scattered throughout the other urban and village centers as merchants, traders, and artisans.
The number of Iraqi Jews who desire to emigrate to Israel Is reported to be large. Consequently, the population figures given above are subject toreduction as the opportunities forimprove.
The Christian populationup of Nestorlan. Chaldean, Jacobite,Greek Orthodox. Armenian Orthodoxlesser sects and accounts in all forpeople. While the native Christians,exception of the Armenians, are Indigenousthe various sects takeof the character of separate ethnicthrough their preference for segregationurban, village, and tribal communi-
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ties. Each such community has been affected anthropometrically In proportion to its contact with peoples of differing ethnic origins.f Iraq's Christians live in the liwa's of Kirkuk, Erbil, and Mosul,oncentration In Mosul city and in the many agricultural villages that surround it The Christian population in central and southern Iraq Is localized largely in the cities, with Baghdad and Basra as the chiefign meant proportion of the south Iraq Christians are Armenians who as city dwellers account for0 of the population of these centers.
The Assyrians or Nestorlans arenatives of the northern Iraqi plains who sought refuge in the mountainous area south and east of Lake Van in Turkey following the savage Mongol invasions of the thirteenth and fourteenth. During their sojourn in Turkey they became brachycephalic through localbut their characteristic Mediterranean facial features remained despite strong Armenoid
0 Nestonan Assyrians estimated to be in Iraq7 were located mainly in 'Amadiya. Ruwandiz, and in villages in the Mosul liwa'.the period of the Mandate their chiefwas that of professional soldier under British command. With the disbanding of the Levies (mercenaries) they have returned to primaryon agriculture, but considerable numbers of men And urban employment as domesticand clerks in hotels, foreign households, and offices.
Yezldlsaganphysically and linguistically they areas the Kurds. Because the Yezidiof Iraq has for centuries been largelyIntercourse with ita non-Yezldi neighbors, iton the charactereparate ethnicIts obvious Kurdish descent. Theestimated to0 and theirof concentration are in Jabal Sin jar andplains extending northeast and northwestnorthward to tho foothills of Dohuk.center is at Lalcsh (Sheikhf Mosul.
Also called Sabians orMandaeans areagandiffer from other Iraqi groups in religion,and physical characteristics. They areby pronounced hirsuteness amongthey are mesocephalic, and their physicalaffinities lean more toward thosepeoples of Iran thanroup ofmen is shown inumber hardlyersons,majority of whom live In the middle and Their centers are at 'Amftra and Suq ash
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Shuyukh. The Mandaeans are primarily occupied as metalworkers and boatbuilders.
e. IraniansEstimates of the number ofresident In Iraq who are Iranians byor recent derivation range uput it is probable that the total is closerxclusive of the large numbers of transients onimited number live in scattered villages on the Iranian frontier south of thearea. The majority, however, are to be found in the cities of Kh&naqln, Karbalfi, and An Najaf, with lesser numbers In Baghdad, Basra, Al Kadhi-main and Samarra. For Iranian physicalsee
C. Cultural characteristics I. Language
alinguistic history has been dominated from early times by the Semitic family of languages, despite periodic incursions of non-Semites from the north and east and the cultural dominance of the non-Semitic Sumerians until. Babylonian, Assyrian, and Nco-Ba by Ionian, the languages which established the linguistic pattern of ancient Iraq, were all variants and developments of the same basic Akkadianspeech. The successor to these dialects was Aramaic, another Semitic tongue, which from the Achaemenld Empire in the fifth. lo the Arab conquest in the seventh. was the lingua franca of most of the Near East At the same time an Aramaic dialect. Syriac, was inuse In the non-Kurdish areas of the north and northwest. Arabic, the official language ofIraq, came from the Arabian Peninsula as an essential accompaniment to militant Islam, and by the end of the twelfth. It hadin replacing all but Isolated pockets of the other Semitic dialects in Iraq.
The modern Arabic of Iraq closely resembles the nomad dialect of Central Arabia. Internaldifferences exist, owing to the prevalence in northern and central Iraq of loan words from Kurdish and Turkish and to the differing Arab origins of the various speech communities. The differences, however, are nowhere great enough to interfere materially with verbal communication.
Arabic in its colloquial form has evolved since the early days of Islam, becoming simpler inand more varied in vocabulary In accordance with modern needs. Classical Arabic, however, as the language in which the Koran was "divinelyis still considered by the cleric, the scholar orold school, and by QM tjBOouad tun at |SaV eral as the only truly correct medium for formal public utterances and Is frequently so used at the expense of full public comprehension.
ritten language Arabic is mutuallythroughout the literate Arab world, and is thus, despite dialecticalorce for unity and common understanding, not only within Iraq but throughout the Islamic world. Theor naskht script is used exclusively today, serving both for manuscript and printed copy.
Arabic is the sole language of southern, central, and western Iraq, except in occasional Mandaean villages in the river valleys and scattered Kurdish-or Persian-speaking communities on thefrontier and in the Shiah holy cities. The northern and eastern limits of Arabic correspond theoretically to the ethnic and religious frontier presented by the Turkoman, Christian, andcommunities of upper Iraq (see. Actually. Arabic as the official language and as the language of International Near Eastern trade is understood far beyond these limits, by many in all cities and by some few in practically allup to the fastness of the Kurdish mountains.
The number of persons claiming Arabic as their primary language is estimated to bef the total population.
b.Kurdish Is aof the Indo-European family. More specifically it is West Iranian although it is clearly distinct from modern Persian, and verbal communication between speakers of Kurdish and Iranian, though possible, is difficult. It bears no linguisticto Arabic, Turkomani, or Neo-Syriac, except through the use of loan words acquired through long periods of contiguity.
The Kurdish of Iraq Is divided into numerous dialects which, because of the isolation of thetribes, tend to become Increasingly distinct one from the other and even mutually Their number, location, andare far from clear. The predominant dialect in Iraq is Kurmanjl. East Kurmanjl predominates east and south of the Great Zab, with Sorani as itssiicdiiili. urther subdivision of Sorani, Is the language of the little KurdishIraqi Kurdistan has produced and is closer to being an "official" language than any of the other Kurdish dialects. West Kurmanjlwest and north of the Oreat Zab and extends beyond the boundaries of Iraq. Bohtani Is itssubdialccL The only example of Iranian Kurdish spoken in tho country, distinct fromis Ourani, which is found hi thetip of Iraqi Kurdistan and among suchgroups as the Kaka'i and the Shabak. None of the dialects can be precisely delimitedsince the tribes concerned are often migratory and not infrequently change their migratory range. There are also no data on which may be estimated the numbers of individuals speaking the separate
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dlalecta,otal ofurds live in Iraq. The amount of bi-luigualism among them is small, for the Kurdsotable resistance lo linguistic assimilation.is the most commonly understood "foreign" language, though even that is restricted to urban and official centers. Persian Is understoodimited extent by those few Kurds who annually migrate far enough Into Iran to get beyond that country's own Kurdish-speaking belt.
c. Turkoman iWhile the Turkomans ofIraq are descendants of Seljuk Turks whoIraq in the twelfthhebetween their language and that spoken in Turkey today (secs slight. Both are mutually Intelligible, and dialecticalbetween the various Turkoman villages within Iraq are Insignificant. The language has little or no written literature.0 Iraqis are Turkomani-spcaklng, living Inextending from the Syrian-Turkish border northwest of Mosul to Mandall. Arabic Is widely understood among them since the Turkomanmerges with the Arabic-speaking areas to the west.
Prior to Worldodern Osmanli Turkish was (he chief secondary language of Iraq, athereof being an essential prerequisite forwith ambitions in government or professional life. But since the dissolution of the Ottomanand the establishment of an independent Iraqi state, Turkish has lost Its importance, and the number of those who speak it is constantly diminishing.
d Others
Is the primaryof0 persons in Iraq. The accretion of Iranians around the Shiah shrine cities of Iraq and the business connected with the local pilgrim traffic account for the presence of theof Persian-speaking Iraqis. Arabic is widely understood among this group.
raqis are to be found In the urban centers, chiefly Baghdad and Basra. Of these the great majority are equally fluent in Arabic and Turkish.
SyrlacNeo-Syriac is spoken in several variations among the Christian sects which center upon the city of Mosul. Though these dialects are Semitic and therefore related to Arabic theare too great for mutual understandabllity. However, Arable can generally bo understood by at least some few in each village. An accurateof the total number of Neo-Syriac-speaking individuals is difficult East Syrlac is spoken by0 Assyrians and0 Chaldeans estl-
mated to be In Iraq. West Syriac is the language of the Jacobites and Syrian Catholics, estimated at0espectively.
MandaeanA dialect descendant from the pre-Islamic Aramaic of Iraq is spoken by the Mandaeans,f whom Inhabit the middle and lower Tigris-Euphrates valley. Equal proficiency in Arabic makes them entirely bi-lingual.
EnglishEnglish Is the most widely understood of all European languages In Iraq. The physical presence of Britishtroops in World War I, as officials during the Mandate, and today as governmental adviserstrong effect on the spread ot the language. Knowledge of English has been further augmented by the compulsory study of English in the public schools, the presence ofIraqi students at the American University of Beirut and at universities in the United States and Great Britain, the influence of the British ad-ixiinistration of the oil fields, and the use of Iraq as an Allied depot during World War II. Anof the numbers whosefulof English is impossible, but there are few centers of trade or government where the English-speaking foreigner could not find someone with whom he could communicate.
FrenchA limited number of Iraqis claim Frenchecondary language. Thethough Indefinite, is small and Is made up chiefly of Jews who have qualified for Frenchin their schools, and of graduates ofFrench-sponsored missionary schools.
ocial structure a. Class stratification
The stratification ofIraq is multiplied and complex. Not onlythe usual horizontal divisions based ondistinctions, but also verticalacross these, which stem from racial,and linguistic differences.
(a) arabsIn the broadest sense the term Arab refers to all Iraqis for whom Arabic is the primary language, exclusive of the Jews. Inpractice, however, It excludes Arabic-speaking Christians, who even though ethnically the same as other Arabs are excluded because of theirdiflerentiation. The chief subdivisions among Arabs consist of the two great groups, tribal and non-tribal.
Among the tribal group the Bedouin, the true nomads, consider themselves to be the aristocracy. In fact, there is among Arab Iraqishole soradition of the heroic days of their desert past that this claim would seldom be challenged.
Among the non-Bedouin tribes, which comprise by far the majority of tribal Arabs, socialIs similarly apt to be based on historicallineage, size, military prowess, wealth, etc.
Nor. tribal Arabs are those whose tribalare so far in the past as to be either abandoned or forgotten. They arc largely urban and range from humble laborers to leaders in government. The divisive factors in this important group are limited lo the socioeconomic and the religious.
The Arabs of Iraq raise no color bar against tbe country's few Negroes. Negro blood, however, is looked upon unfavorably by the Bedouin, with their emphasis on purity of descent, to the same degree as other outside strains.
kurdsTho Kurdson-Arab people are divided from the majority of theof Iraq by an ethnic difference. OthersucheU-deflned and isolated habitatifferent language, serve to reinforce their separateness from the Arab majority. This isaccentuated by the fringe of Syrlac- andspeaking groups which cushion the Kurds from direct Arab contact along the greater part of the Kurdish-Arab boundary. Tribal division among the Kurds in most cases is precise and emphatic and is perpetuated by the isolation of one group from another inherent In their ruggedThis sense of intense tribal independenceowerful deterrent to any united KurdishBeing fighting men by avocation, If not strictly by profession, prowess In arms Is one of the chief criteria of superiority among tribes and families;
othersIraqis who are of recent derivation from another nationality or ethnic family, such as those of Iranian or Armenian origin, form natural ethnic subdivisions within the total population. Since such groups are differentiated further by deviation in language, and often intheir separateness from tbe remainder isgreater. The Turkomans, while not differentiated from the norm by religion, find that their ethnic and linguistic deviation is more than enough to keep themroup apart from their Arab and Kurdish neighbors. The Assyrians and the Jews may legitimately be considered as ethnic variants from the majority Arab populationand for that reasonroup apart.since religion is the dominating divisiveIn both cases they will be discussed below under religious distinction,
inguisticEach of the languages and dialects native to Iraqignource of class differentiation within the country, and each fortifies the religious, ethnic, and economic dlffer-
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ences that in varying degrees distinguish one group from the other. Thus all speakers of languages other than the dominant Arabic are individually set apart from that group, accentuating at tbe same time such differences as may already exist through divergence in race, religion, or economic status.
Social superiority is claimed by themajority, who think of Iraq as an Arab country. This attitude of superiority is held by the Arabic-speaking component bothlass and as
In recognition of the linguistic differences in northern Iraq, and in execution of the provisions of the Mandate relating to minorities, concessions have been made legalizing the use of Kurdish and Turkoman! for the Internal administration and courts in those qada's (districts) where thesepredominate (see. Moreover, the Kurdish-speaking qada's of Mosul liwa', which is outside the predominating So rani dialect area (Kirkuk. Sulaimanlya, and Erbilay choose their own particular dialects for official use. The right of trial in Arabic is guaranteed to all Arabic-speaking litigants, while the schools arc conducted in Kurdish,r Arabic in accordance with local majority usage. Thelanguage for local internal administration shown In3 reverts to Arabic for technical departments and for communication with higher authority.
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Of the several factorsthat contribute to social distinction, nonepositive, so sharply defined, and so closelyas religion, It is inorefactor toward separatencss, and unityseparate divisions, than either race,economic status, since it has often beenwith national or political importance.
Iraq's preponderantly peasant population still adheres fiercely to the conventions of religion, and its religious convictions are deep-rooted and sincere though seldom fully understood. To these people religion Is the dominating cultural influence in life. Deviation from the group pattern affects their opportunities foriving and thus is avoided for practical as well as doctrinal reasons.
As the state religion andfaith of the Arab peoples, Islam isover all other schools of religious thoughtIslam itself emphasizes its superiorityreligions, and Muslim Iraqis have notheir social and doctrinal superiority, todaythe past. To them adherents of all otherpeoples apart.
Islam, however, is itself divided into mutually antagonistic sects. The dominant Sunni and Shiah sects comprise the most conspicuous internal division. While the Shiah are in the majority, the Sunnis traditionally control thenderhus the pinch ofhence economic, inferiority is felt by the Shiah, accentuating the differences already created by doctrine and Shiah religious zeal. Lesser sects within Islam tend also to be mutually antipathetic, but the numbers involved are small and the effect on the whole social pattern is correspondingly less pronounced.
While it is true that the Muslims In Iraq, asare beset by denominational differences, the power of Islamatent unifying force in times of emergency still exists, as shown in theof Iraqi Muslim Arabs to support thewar regardless of differences in creed.
influence or Christianity in Iraq is vitiated by excessiveThus, not only arc the Christian sects looked upon by the Muslim majorityeople apart, but the various Christian denominations also look upon each other with mutualThis differentiation from the majority also takeseographical overtone, since the great bulk of native Christians are found in the vicinity of Mosul city.
JudaismThe position of the Jews In Iraq paralleled that of the Christians in regard to its separateness from and degree of tolerance by the Muslim majority prior to the Palestine war. Since that conflict the isolation of the Jewishfrom contact with the Muslims has beenand the tolerance with which they were formerly accepted by the Muslims has changed to bitter antagonism. There is no prospect in thefuture of an easing of the sharp lines of distinction Isolating the Iraqi Jews from theof the population.
(e) othersThe same separateness from the majority that characterizes the Christiansin equal or intensified form with the lesserThe fact that the Mandaeans areosition of tolerancear with thataccorded to the native Christians and Jews, or that the Yezidis are despised by the Muslims, docs not alter the pattern of social differentiation based on religion. Even among the Yezidis thewith which they are viewed by their Muslim neighbors is merely an accentuation of the vertical distinction and has little effect on the Individual's opportunity to riseigher horizontal orlevel. The Yezidis, on their part, fully reciprocate this Muslim antipathy and haveby force efforts of the Baghdad Government to recruit them into the army where they would be obliged to live in close contact with Muslims. Iraqi Yezidis, on the other hand, have willingly served in Christian forces in Syria under French command.
ocio-economicIn common with neighboring Arab states, Iraqicture of sharp contrast between economic groups. The rich by local standards are very rich and the poor by any standards live in great poverty. Theclass is relatively small and has only recently begun toart in influencing public affairs. Opportunities for change from one economic level to another are strictly limited. The laborer's or peasant's inability to accumulate capital in money or produce beyond that needed for subsistence holds him effectively within his class.
The middle class is made up largely of small merchants, traders, clerks, lesser government'professional men, and the various white-collar occupations of metropolitanery considerable portion in the past were Jews. They madeajority of the metropolitancontrolled the import and export business, andtrong hold on such professions asbanking, money changing, and goldsmithing. With the restrictions and boycott imposed upon the Jewsesult of the Palestine war thissegment of the middle class has beenliquidating its assets and emigrating to Israel without any clear picture yet emerging as to the character of its replacement. Opportunities for rise to the upper class exist, but occurrences are
relatively rare, not becauseack of enterprise but because the upper class retain within their own group the greater opportunities for profit.
The upper class In Iraq represents theof feudal and tribal overlordshlp into present-day life. Its members govern Iraq, nil Its high administrative posts, sit In Parliament, andsuch native big business as the country affords. This class is composed of the tribal sheikhs, the sheikhs-turned-landlord, the water monopolist, the plantation owner, the cleric, the military leader, and the politician. The Sunni Arabs maintain their dominance in this stratum of society, and except for the Shiah Muslims there Is littlefrom other ethnic or religious groups. Straddling all classes, but affecting mainly the middle and upper class groups, are the government employees, who. as representatives or the governing bureaucracy, are consideredroup apart by the general mass of the people. The cleavagefrom this antagonism between the governors and the governed Is social as well as political.
Despite the extremes of wealth, classin Iraq based on economic status does not compare with religion, race, tribe, or languageivisive factor. The patriarchal concept ofin Iraq is still pronounced. The leader is the recognized head of the family and,eudal lord with responsibilities, deals with those under him as true or nominal members of his family. Contributing to this concept is the Muslimof the fixed and traditional social order in preference to change.
rendsMinor changes, both vertical and horizontal, can be expected in the various classes discussed above. It Is anticipated that the present trend among the Bedouinettled life will continueace proportionate to the availability of arable land for homesteadlng. With improved communications and the Increase in radio transmissions the area in which Arabic is understood probably will expand steadily. With the increased opportunities for education (seenderontinuance of the gradual Increase in the numbers and importance of the middle class can ulso be expected. Among the religious communities, the proportion of Jews In relation to other religious groups Is beingby the continuing exodus of Iraqi Jews to Israel. Within Islam little change in number is anticipated, though the impact of westerncan be expected toontinuedeffect on religious observance among upper-class Muslims.
The political implications of the various classes are complex. Arab Muslims are capable of actingnitational emergency, as demonstrated in the Palestine war. but in other matters they are seriously split between conservative, ruling Sunnis and the zealous "have not" Shiah. The Sunlit controlling party leans toward international cooperation,ore tolerant view of theBritish interest tn Iraq than their Shiah counterparts- The Kurds, while predominantly Sunni. are more influenced In their actions by what will benefit their specific group than by any bonds of common sectarianism. Long the stalwartof British policy in the hope of anKurdistan, the Kurds are presently aminority receptive to Soviet propaganda which Is also directed toward the two other large "have not" groups, the Shiah and Industrial labor. The Jews,owerful minority In politics, no longer are an influential factor. The Christians, the Ycxldis, and other minor religions and sects, motivated by their traditional fear of extinction by Arab Islam, are interested primarily In preserving their own cultural identity. Their attitude, like that of the Kurds, is essentially anti-Arab rather than anti-Iraq. This lack of national solidarity, the Inability of the government to make Itsgroups feel as one family rather than asantagonists, indicates the essentialof Iraq's national structure. Sincere unity of effortational emergency could not be expected except among the Muslim Arabs.
b. Social organizations and movementsIn Iraq, the individual's desire for groupfinds expression through identificationeligious body. His informal patronage of the local coffee house, which provides the atmospherelub. Is evidenceimilar desire. There are no large-scale social movements in Iraq, butsmall social and business organizations do exist. Iraq's limited labor organizations areinther small associations center their interest in athletics, science, the arts, and education. Youth groups, organized mainly along ethnic or religious lines. Include the YMCA (Young Men's Christian Association) in Baghdad and Mosul and the YMMA (Young Muslim Men's Association) in Baghdad, but even these lackSecret societies are of no importance,thereabylon Lodge of Masonsmall membership In Baghdad.
Most religious groups. Including minoritysuch as the Armenians, Chaldeans. Syrian Orthodox, and Jews, have their ownsocieties. The largest organized charity among Muslims is the Iraqi Red Crescentember of the League of Red Cross Societies. Organiicd2 to raise money for the support of charities in Iraq and neighboring countries, the Society nowembers, almost all of whom are upper-class Iraqis without professional training in welfare work. The Society receives some flnan-
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clal atd from the government and in addition raises funds privately for support of its child welfare and home nursing program. It also furnishes aid in emergencies, as in0 floods, but it does not engage in rehabilitation work.5 tbe Women's Branch of the Red Crescent Society, in conjunction with other smaller women's societies, formed the Iraqi Womon's Union to work with women's organizations In other Arab countries and with international organizations such as the United Nations.
Most larger Iraqi citieshamber ofbut tbe most Important of the numerous professional and trade associations in Iraq Is the quasl-offlclal Iraqi Date Association, centered in Basra (see Chapter VI,nder Foreign trade).
Cooperative enterprises are not widespread in Iraq.ncluding an agricultural association among the Dujaila homesteaders, were registeredost cooperative groups are consumers' cooperatives such as the Consumers' Cooperative Association in Basra, whichadembers, three stores,apital0 Iraqi dinars.
attern of living
The Muslim Arabs are themajority and can be considered toa regional norm from which themay deviatereater or lesserFactors relating exclusively to otheror linguistic groups win be cited
marriage, deathTo theof Iraq the prospect of survival for ais too uncertain to have fostered theany special festivities connected with birth.belief is that Its eventual survival isthe hands of Allah than In those of itsoffspring are preferred to female, sinceof the family line or lineage Ismale progeny. Male membersreater economic asset asfemale, and are symbolsamily'sare attended by the local midwife, whobut the most remote districts has by nowsome degree of government-sponsoredin hygiene. Registration at the timeIs mdiflerently observed, with thethat few rural children know theirCircumcision of male children Isof religion and is the occasion forfestival connected with the child'sboys and girls alike, are brought upwomen of the family, with the manactive part in the growth and discipline of There is no fixed age at which aaccepted into adult society, but there are few among the great peasant majority who are not bearing their full share in the economic andlife of their communities by the time they reach their fourteenth year.
Marriage throughout Iraq is accompaniedusiness agreement on the price of the bride. The choice of the bride is usuallyamily affair. According to Arab custom, the girl's first cousin on the paternal side, haa the first choice of her hand. Marriage within the kinship group tends to reinforce family solidarity, and is the basis of clan and tribal organization. Marriage outside the range of kinship also takes place, and is often performed in order to widen and strengthen the circle of those related by blood. Young girls may even be given in marriage in the settlement of feuds. The choice of the bride is usually left to the bridegroom's mother and sisters, thestaying aloof except to select the family or clan fromhoice may be made and to have the final say in the spirited bargaining thateach betrothal. The bride price varies in accordance with the degree of kinship and other factors. The marriage ceremony itself is theof elaborate and costly entertainment.to occidental custom, it is the groom rather than the bride's family who bears the expense of the festivities. The groom's mother is the chief feminine member of the family during her lifetime.
Among the Muslims polygamy is permitted but is more the exception than the rule. Lower-class men cannot afford the expense and the upper classes tend toward monogamy as being more in harmony with the Westernized social pattern of the modern educated Iraqi. The well-to-do middle class is the remaining stronghold of polygamy. Divorce under Islam technically is easy, but it alsouxury most available to the wealthy, since it involves the return of the dowry and aof the often Involved financial agreement entered Into at the time of marriage. Divorce among Iraqi Christians Is practically nonexistent.
Death with Iraqi Muslims is followed byceremonial washing of the body,inding sheet, and burial, the body lying on the left side facing Mecca. Special days are set aside, such as the seventh or fortieth days after death, for friends to congregate at the home of the deceased to feast and lament his passing. Among the Shiah great merit accrues from burial at Kar-bala or An Najaf. and families will sometimes save for years until they can afford reinterment of the head of the household at one of the shrine cities. Lesser shrines also collect their communities of dead about them (sec photo in thisf the cemetery surrounding the tomb of Sheikh Ma'rOf al-Karkhl). Among the Bedouin
and peasants natural promontories and mounds marking the sites ol ancient cities ore customary burial places.
c Status orstemming from antiquity and legalized by Islam (seehapter IV.nder Religion)woman In Iraqosition unequivocably secondary to that occupied by man. While she has legal rights and can inherit and own property, to enforce those rights in legal disputes the Muslim woman must always be representedale relative.'
Family life Is patriarchal. The status of wife is one of subservience to her husband, although shearge measure of authority and responsibility in purely domestic affairs. Though polygamy is not as prevalent as formerly, the veil and seclusion in the harem, sanctioned but not demanded by Islam, are still predominant among urban Muslim women in Iraq. Except within the family circle men and women do not meet socially.
Confined to the home and largely uneducated (seenderhe average Muslim woman remains inexperienced andAt the same time she has almostresponsibility for the health and upbringing of her children, whose training is apt to beby ignorance and superstition.
There Is no veiling and little seclusion among the Bedouin and the peasants. Polygamy among the Bedouin is not infrequent, and the wife's status, in spite of her apparent freedom, remains inferior to that of her husband.
In contrast to Arab custom Kurdish women, though Muslims, move about with freedom among men outside the family circle; Christian wives may on occasion Join their husbands at social functions; and Jewish women who formerly veiled have dropped the custom more quickly than have the Muslims.
Contact with the West and travel abroad have begun to break down many of the old prejudices in regard to women in Iraq. The spread of girls' schools hasesire for liberalization among the younger women of Iraq Muslim women of tho older generation and of the more conservative social groups, however, do not object to seclusion which theyign of respect on the part of their husbands or parents.
d. ReligionTo the great mass of illiterate. Impoverished peasantry that are the bone and body of the Iraq nation, Islam has still much of thequality that characterized its days ofThe name of Allah constantly recurs in their everyday speech in forms which, though they now have become part of everyone's workingstill retain their flavor of original piety. Islam among these very poor is at one tuneationalization of their present statusolace for ever-present hardship. It offers themommon cause and interest, and an opportunity to Identify themselves, even though remotely, with the conquests and achievements of Islam's early days.
The unifying value of Islam in Iraq is severely restricted. While it identifies the individualorld-wide body, its power to overcome racial and Interdenominational antagonisms isThe Kurds, for example, arc devoutbut their traditional antagonism to the Arabs was too strong to permit them to give more than Up service to the Iraqi-Arab plea for united effort In behalf of their co-religionists in the Palestine war. Within Islam dissension between sects isby the intolerance with which the Shiah view the more moderate Sunni sect and the lesser groups within the Muslim world. The Shiah, at the same time, remain more closely tied to the prescriptions of the faith than do the Sunnls.
The Iraqi city dwellershole show anlaxity in the observance of religious laws duerocess of secularization, which haspronounced since World War I. To them Islam has lost its position of autocratic authority over social conduct, and its influenceoral and ethical guide Is on the decline. The obligation of personal and congregational prayer is widely disregarded, as are the requirements for theof the fast of Ramadan and the obligation of pilgrimage to Mecca. Neither are such Koranic prohibitions as those against pork and alcohol observed with any regularity or sincerity. Only such elemental dictates as are religious by adoption such as circumcision, are strictly adhered to.
The stalwarts of religious observance in Iraq are the great peasant majority. They are the ones who are faithful In daily prayer and who most fully keep the daytime fast required during the month of Ramadan. Their observance of the rules and superstitions accepted by and expected of thewhile not always complete, at least Is more universal than that of any other group. Theto Mecca, for example, is beyond the means, If not the dreams, of most peasants, but in compensation there are few local shrinesof faith or nature that do not receive the steady patronage of Muslim men and women in spiritual or physical need. The Bedouin, while fiercely maintaining their belief In Allah, In theof tho Koran, and in the mission ofobserve with characteristic independence only such rites as they please. (For Islam as aninstitution, seender Religion.)
The Christian population nullifies throughsectarianism the power that It could wieldolid bloc. Each denomination, while fervent In its Christianity, is dogged in its determination
to preserve its own identity and independence against all other faiths and sects. This separation of the various Christian sects is not purely aconflict but is in mosturther accentuation of differences that are also ethnic, tribal, and linguistic.
The same separation that distinguishes the Christians from the Muslim majority also can be cited for the remaining minorews, Yezidis, Mandaeans, etc. Each molds the actions of its members in accordance with its special customs, and each jealously guards its independence and existence from submersion in the surrounding majority.
pastoral andlife that comprises the chief businessthe peasant majority is described in Sectionof this Chapter andf Chapter VI.
The business life of the typical Iraqi merchant and artisan is built around the family, the sons and nephews learning the business through actualas apprentices. Thus businesses .in the vast majority of cases are individual, specialized, and small. Shops and workshops cling to theshallow stall regardless of whether they beovered bazaar or along an open street (seehe few larger stores in Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul describing themselves as "department stores" fall far below even the standards established In Lebanon and Egypt Purchases in all but the most Westernized shops follow the same traditionalceptical scrutiny, animated bargaining, and sudden
Larger businessanks, export-import companies, insurance offices,ore occidental appearance, but the leisurely pace and the atmosphere of indolent confusion is still in the spirit of the bazaar stall. The very few factories that can be classed as Iraqi share these same characteristics. Only the largecompanies approximate occidental standards of efficiency and even that is slowed in pace in conformity with national custom.
The most striking characteristic of Iraqi business is its static, nonaggressive character. Business thinking Is in terms of the small merchandiser, the maintenance of whose established trade is more important than possible growth,
lifeThe use to which thehis leisure time varies little throughoutregardless of locality, race, orthe tribal Arabs and Kurds the sheikhshold open house for all men who comedoor. The facilities for their hospitalityproportion to their wealth, rangingquarters of the settled minorto the great black tents of the Important Bedouins (seeospitality is accompanied by customary observances regardless ofeat near the host in relation to the guest's importance and among the Bedouin, bitter black coffee, while in localities fartherfrom the desert and the mountains, coffee plain or spiced, or even overly sweetened tea.is animated or desultory, or evenby long lapses of silence, as the moodIn villages and cities where the tribal customs have been discarded, the coffee house takes over as the chief place of public recreation and discussion (see; see also photograph of coffee house in. Refreshments, the nargileh or water pipe, and backgammon boards are providedee, newspapers are available, and conversation in endless quantities is there for all. In settled areas coffee houses often provide radio entertainment. In recent years the cinema has offered some competition to the coffee house but as prepared entertainment rather than asexchange. Only among the upper class, who have taken on Western customs, is there anyin the home based on the occidentalEven there mixed gatherings of the two sexes are extremely rare.
The most striking aspect of the social activity of the Iraqi male is the amount of leisure at his disposal during working hours. It is at the same time an apt demonstration of the more deliberate tempo of business life prevailing In Iraq.
The social life of the Iraqi woman, unlike that of the man, is centered in the home. Whileit is hardly less extensive than that of the men and Includes numerous gatherings toholidays, weddings, funerals, etc.
g. MoralityThe morality of the Iraqibe judged in the light of Western standards alone, nor solely In respect to laws which in many cases reflect Western concepts of right and wrong more closely than those of the Iraqi. Tribal and Sharia law (see this Chapter,nder Religion) is accepted and respectedatural accompaniment to the Iraqi's way of life. The Iraqi's attitude toward civil law, however, Isand is conditioned by centuries of autocratic rule where laws were imposed from above rather than evolved through customary practice.he tends to view these laws as rules to be obeyed when necessary, but to disregard themno stigma. Centuries of corrupt government have also left their imprint on the morality of the public official. The concept of "public servant" is extremely rare among office holders. Theirinstead, are considered posts of privilege and opportunity in which legitimate salaries areto beortion of the ultimatefor high and low officials alike.
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This same ^difference to Individual morality is paralleled by an official indlfTerence to conditions of poverty, disease, and unemployment. Tradition deeply rooted in Iraq's tribal past makes aid to theamily or clan responsibility ratherublic charge. Onlyimited degree has there been any public concern for the welfare of the very poor, and little effort has been made toor ameliorate the Increased beggary and vagabondage following World War II.
Since the tribal tradition is weakest in the cities, the greatest amount of unameliorated need is also found there. Similarly, codes of personal honesty are lowest and incidences of theft are highest in the cities, and supplies of salable goods mustbe guarded against pilferage. The precept "Let the buyer beware" Is accepted and normal In all business transactionsegree well beyond that customary In the United States.ode of personal honor does exist through which the pledged word becomes morally more bindingegally executed contract.
Supply depots in desert or Kurdish areas must be protected from organized tribal raids. Tribal law, which stilltrong influence on all Iraqis, has its own set of moral values. Tribal feuds are accepted as part of the normal pattern of desert life, with intertribal murder and raids demanding satisfaction In blood or In payment of goods or women.
Sexual morality is entirely one-sided.by the man carries with it no reproach; but even the suspicion of scandal on the part of the woman is grounds for her murder by father, brother, or husband, with little likelihood ofmore than token punishment under the law.
h. AppearanceIn addition to the physical characteristics of various ethnic groups described above in Subsection D, individual differences of dress distinguish certain racial, social, andgroups from each other. Headgear, asin the Near East,istinctive article of dress and one by which the wearer's nationality,status, or ethnic affiliation may often beThe urban Iraqi man of the middle and upper classes has adopted occidental dressexcept for the hat. which is regarded as the badge of tbe Westerner. Theort of overseas cap introduced during the Mandateform of national dress. Is now seldom used, men preferring to go bareheaded. The fez, the usual headdress of the upper classes during the Turkish regime, is today In almost complete discard. The urban lower classes still cling to such remnants- of native dress as are convenient and at hand (seeifferences of race or religion distinguishable by dress among the upper and middle classes have largely disappeared; the cleric is Inclined to yield more slowly, as are also the Mandaeans, whoodified Bedouin dress (see) Urban women of the middle and upper classes also have adopteddress, but custom demands still that Inie they be well and discreetly covered, with the face either partially hidden by their cloak or by the traditional veil.
Bedouin and other non-urban Arabs retain their traditional dress with individual variations (see,haracteristic is the head cloth held in place by the woolen fillet or 'aq&l.rotection against direct sun,reflection, wind, and blowing sand It can hardly beong cotton gown or shirt, with or without baggy trouserseavy sleeveless cloak, or aba, complete the essential features of their costume. Addedsuch as the dagger or the long or short coal beneath the abaeasure of the wearer's economic status. Bedouin women dress inlayers of black but are not required to wear the veil or otherwise to cover their faces.
Tho second major rural pattern of dress is that affected by the Kurds (seeit consists of loose-fitting trousers, shirt with exaggeratedly long sleeves, multiple sash, jacket, heavy cloak or aba, upturned leather slippers, skull cap, and colorful, carelessly-wound turban with fringed ends. The larger the turban the greater the personal importance of tbc wearer, but rich or poor consider the dagger and the rifle an essential personal requirement. As with the Bedouin, the women are unveiled and somewhat more given to color and ornamentation in their dress than are the desert dwellers. The dress of the Yezidl and the Turkoman (see) follows the Kurdish pattern.
L FoodBread in Iraq is truly the staff of life. It comprises the major item in the daily diet of the poor throughout the landeryportion of the upper-class diet as welt The local product is In the form of flat, leathery chapattles of unleavened wheat flour. Barley and rice flour are common adulterants during wheat shortages and in those rural areas where barley and rice are the major crops.
The average diet of the urban laborer or the peasant consists of bread and heavily sweetened tea for breakfast and supper. His midday meal would include someegetable such as onions or radishes, and protein (If he is fortunate) in the form of meat. fish, lentils, pulses, etc. Variations in accordance with locality and means consist of rice, boiled wheat, dates, eggs, and fresh vegetables. Sheep fat or clarified butter is used for cooking,ainstay for protein consists of variousof artlflclally-soured ewe's or goat's milk,
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hole buttermilk, through thecustard-like labanard, white cheese. The food of the upper classes differs from that of the working man more in quantity than in quality, since cooking In Iraq hasbut little beyond the stage of rustic
The Bedouin subsist on what Is perhaps thediet of all theilk from their camels, sheep, or goats, dates, and occasional gorges on rice and meat. The working man throughout Iraq is accustomedower caloric intake than theThe average diet of the Basra stevedoreor example, wasalories per day, and many among the peasants subsist on less.
Regional variations in the menu conform to cropates and rice in middle and lower Iraq, citrus fruits In middle Iraq, wheat in north-central Iraq, and lettuce, tomatoes, melons, grapes, and other vegetables and fruits in abundance in the upland plains separating northeastern Iraq from Kurdistan proper.
Food taboos are limited in number. Pork is not partaken by any of the native groups, though it is expressly forbidden only to Muslims and Jews. Alcoholic beverages are also forbidden to Muslims, but Itrohibition which Is widely disregarded by the upper classes. Lesser food taboos are found among the minorities, such as the Yezldt ban on lettuce, and the Mandaean and Jewish ban on foods not ceremonially pure.
rtistic and Intellectual expression Life for the present-day Iraqi revolves aboutbusiness, and politics; and artistic orexpressions without obvious practical benefits are viewed by the average Iraqi with
ride in the past, there are few forms of artistic expression in Iraq which are founded on national tradition. During the lastlight Interest In the arts has grownimited circle of Baghdad sophisticates, but the techniques and standards are European and reveal neither individuality nor originality.
The visual arts, which have little place in the life of nomadic peoples, find expression in thecrafts of the settled population. Mostamong these is the silver work of the Mandaeanshich follows stereotyped andmotifs. Potters, coppersmiths, and leather workers continue skillfully to produce by hand, following traditional patterns, the wares long in demand because of their utilitarian value. Glazed tile and brick for the decoration and repair of mosques continue to be made, though theis Iranian and the artisans are of Iranian descent. In weaving there is more creative talent observable. The silk weavers of Al Kadhimaln are
amous for their abas, though the patterns areand the peasant weavers of northern Iraq show unusual variety and some originality in the production of their woolen fabrics. The rugs of Iraqi Kurdistan as original artistic expressions are spontaneous and of all Iraqi handicrafts the least affected by external forms, though they do notIn workmanship with the best Persian rugs.
Iraq's architectural forms are unoriginal. Mosques continue to be built in traditional style, being patterned after those of Iran (see photograph of mosque at Al Kadhimaln in thisodern government buildings are usually poor imitations of Western types (see photograph of College of Engineering at Baghdad in this Chapter,.
The Arab, who loves his language, most oftenhimself artistically in poetry and oratory. Declamation, all by memory, is popular among the Bedouin. There haveew modern Iraqi poets, notably the late Ma'ruf ar-Rusafl, who are much admired in educated circles. There are no outstanding libraries or magazines of merit in the country, and Iraqis interested in literature depend mainly on imports from Egypt and Lebanon. Among Turkomans there is no developed literature and but little more among the Kurds,
Music is similarly undeveloped. Ancientforms and instruments, neither of which has progressed for centuries, are still in use. Egyptian tunes made popular by the cinema are widelybut there is no Iraqi music per se, nor is composing done in Iraq. The Royal Iraqi Bandymphony orchestra in Baghdad playof Western classical music to limited audiences.
D. Attitudes of the peopleeneral
mall percentage of the Iraqi population Is interested in public affairs. Public opinion as such is restricted mainly to the large cities -innd iseflection of the thinking of the effendi class.
Most vocal on questions of national policy are the students, whose demonstrations Influence even the otherwise indifferent urban lower classes. While an awareness of public affairs is nowspreading out into rural areas, the majority of peasants and tribesmen do not take an Interest In pontics.
Popular attitudes in Iraq are extremely difficult to assess. There are no scientific surveys of opinion, and the press, limited by rigidsupervision, reflects the opinions of editors and owners rather than the sentiments of thepublic. Dissident attitudes of large groups such as tho Kurds are seldom published. Election
returns rail to reveal significant trends in popular thinking both because the aims of political parties are not clearly defined and because the public,that elections are governraent-infiuonced, has little interest In voting.
Purely governmental attitudes toward internal and international affairs are covered in Chaptxr V,nder National policies. Attitudes of specific racial and ethnic groups toward oneare covered in this Chapter, under Cultural characteristics, above, and in Sectionf this Chapter, under Religion.
ationalist attitudes
The stress placed by Iraqi leaders on nationalismnifying force has had little effect inthe mutual antipathies resulting fromin religion, race, and language. As athere does notlear-cut majority group in relation to which all other groups could be classified as minoritiesociological orsense. In the rural areas of southern Iraqis chiefly to tribe and religion. Hence therereater consciousness, particularly among the Shiah tribesmen, of being members of the larger Arab or Muslim world than of being citizens of the Iraqi state. In northern Iraq loyalty to the government is almost non-existent. The Assyrians profess loyaltyatter of expediency, but most would prefer to emigratehristian country. The Yezidis.radition of autonomy during most of the Ottoman period, have not yetthemselves to being partentralized state. The Kurdsationalism of their own aiming eitherreater degree of autonomythe Iraqi state or an altogether independent Kurdistan made up of the Kurdish areas ot Iraq. Turkey, and Iran. Many Kurdish nationalists would be willing, under favorable circumstances, to flght for an independent state, and even theKurdish tribesman, with no interest indesires Independenceatter of ethnic pride.
Iraqi national consciousness is strongest among the small but growing educated middle class in Baghdad and Basra. Their mllltaiitlyorientation, revealed in many demonstrations, has even awakened some national feeling in the urban lower classes in those cities. Theiraim Is to free Iraq completely of British control. The more moderate, realizing Iraq's need forguidance, wish merely to choose their ownOn several occasions the Sunnis and Shiah have forgotten their differences long enough to Join forces in this struggle against foreign
Nationalism in Iraq often coincides with pan-Arabism. Pan-Arab sentiment, considerably strengthened5 with the creation of the Arab
League, was sufficiently widespread to unite all Muslim Arabs of Iraqery real sympathy with their fellow-Arabs displaced by the formation of Israel. While many nationalists want continued progress for their country alongizable number look toward theof Iraqarger Arab state or
Nationalism in Iraq Is also spurredense of national inferiority. Great emphasis ls placed in the schools on the glories of Iraq's distant past, and any backwardness, whether Justified or not, is apt to be blamed on the period of the BritishTo bolster their national self-assurance and to bring themselves more quicklyar with the West the middle and upper classes have eagerly adopted Western techniques where applicable to the practical aspects of life, but Western social and moral concepts have received little more than lip service since they do not coincide withcustoms.
a Attitude toward the government rjr powerThe attitude of the rank and file of Iraqis toward their government ranges from apathy to dislike. There is widespread conviction that the Iraqi oligarchy rules for the benefit of its own ranks, chiefly Sunni Arab,eneral belief that the government Is corrupt and Inefficient Urban laborers, unaware of higher politics, are generally anti- or pro-government in direct proportion to the coat and availability of food.
Except among the privileged classes,authority is regarded as oppression. In outlying districts, where it threatens to upset time-honored practices, such as tribal feuds. It Is often flouted. At the same time, in its rare moments of strength, the government wins grudging respect from Iraqis, who arc accustomed by tradition to absolutist rule.
The royal house is disliked by many, particularly among the Shiah, who resent having the Sunni Hashimlies imposed upon them. The presentis generally unpopular except among theclasses and the armed forces, but he gained some prestige by vigorously backing Iraq'stn the Palestine war. Iraq's boy king iswith affection by those Iraqis who would not be In favor of eliminating the Hashimite house altogether.
Government officialslass are looked upon by the mass of the people with distrust. As athereleavage, both social and political, between the governors and the governed. Theof Basra, both Sunni and Shiah, believe traditionally that Baghdad does not pay them the attention warranted by their importance to tbe country. In Baghdad, young, politically minded Iraqis feel keenly the lack of dlalnterestcd leader-
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and the refusal of old-guard politicians to allow Western-educated, reform-minded men their due share in government. Youthful holders of lower positions in the Civil Service resent what they feel in some cases to be subordination toofficials.
Tribal hostility toward the government is strengthened by the deep-seated antagonismtribesman and townsman. Urbanites, while monopolizing political offices and the civil service, tend to ignore the agricultural needs and interests of the vast bulb of Iraqis.esult the rural Iraqi thinks of the government as an organization of persons who neither understand nor like him. The average peasant is so poor and neglected under the present government that he would welcome almost any change as preferable. On the other hand, tribal sheikhs, many of whom are extremely wealthy, resent the consistent attempts of theto limit their power.
The minorities of northern Iraq are of necessity increasing their acceptance of governmentaland looking to Baghdad for educational and social services. Their hostility toward the central power, however, has diminished littlehe majority of Kurds feel that the Baghdad Arabs take little interest in their welfare andagainst them economically, socially, andThe smaller minorities, whilemore friendly to the government, bow to It only because It is stronger than they.
Although antipathy to the governmenta grave internal problem and causes theclique intermittent periods of anxiety,elements lack the organization and cohesion to bringovernment more to their liking, or even to force through long overdue reforms. While members of the armed forces, whose loyalty, where it exists, is to the Hashirnite house rather than lo the governmenthole, are openlyof governmental treatment of the military, no one officer or group of officers is believed capable ofoup d'itat.
b. Attitude toward government policiesIt is difficult even to approximate the extent of popular support for Iraqi governmententralized school system, tight control of the press, and suppression of activities not favored by the regime allow the government to mouldertain.extent;ersistentcampaign will sometimes arouse strong sympathyarticular policy in an erstwhile apathetic populace. On the other hand, the public position on some questions, particularly in thefield, has been extreme enough* to force the government against its better Judgment to yield to popular pressure.
Many of the government's internal policies are decidedly unpopular. Authoritarian methods are resented particularly by the press and the better-informed public, Manipulation and dishonesty in elections are bitterly criticized by the losingbut are otherwise taken for granted andProgressive elements are impatient with the slowness of social reforms and feel that the government is deliberately stalling in this respect.
In international affairs, the government'sare more popular with the rank and file of Arab Iraqis, which oftenart in shaping them. Strong feeling among Iraqi Muslim Arabs caused the government to aid Palestine Muslims more actively than it might otherwise have done and is preventing the government frompeace negotiations with Israel. Publicis also partially responsible for government refusal to re-open the Haifa pipe line, although its continued Idleness has increased Iraq's financial difficulties.
Because of nationalistic pressure, the Iraqiis unable to maintain aselation with the United Kingdom as it would like. Forin8 popular riots andagainst the provisions of the Portsmouth Treaty (revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treatyorced its rejection by the Iraqiand the fall of the pro-British Safin Jabr cabinet.
Attitudes toward the government's Syro-Iraqi union policies arereat many Iraqi Arabs are interested in establishing closerfederation, or union with Syria. There are,ertain number of politically mindedwho mistrust any scheme of this sort as involving some British trick. Many of the middle class, such as doctors, teachers, and merchants, would not welcome the competition of Syrians, who are widely felt to be more intelligent and shrewder than Iraqis. The Shiah are also unenthusiastic overnion since it wouldtate predominately Sunni In faith. Non-Arab groups are generally uneasynion basedommon Arab heritage.and Kurds, for example, fear that theof Arab union would be likely toa harsher Arab rule over non-Arab minorities.
ttitude toward war and national defense Iraqis are neither martial nor militaristic and, except in the case of Palestine, have had no desire for war. The average Iraqi is uninterested Inaggrandizement and is unwilling to fight for it. The Iraqi Army has no distinguishedand the prestige of the armed forces is not high. However, years of reliance on the United Kingdom in all military matters haveeeling of confidence in Iraq's military strength, a
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which ls unwarranted in fact While the wealthy ruling class favors the army as aof the status quo, the general attitude of the lower classes toward the military is one of apathy.owever, the welcome given by the Regent and government officials to army units returning from Palestine,overnmental propaganda campaign extolling them, somewhat Increasedpride in the armed forces.
Few Iraqis volunteer for army service and most, particularly among the tribes, are bitterly opposed to conscription. Army pay is so low that thefamily is in danger of starvation. Exemption from non-commissioned military serviceone of the basic reasons for the popularity of the academic secondary school.
The participation of their country In thewar initially had widespread support from Iraqi Arabs although few volunteered for duty at the front. Non-Arab minorities, on the other hand, were little interested in the Palestine situation. Throughout most of the Palestine war lack of awareness of the true situation, because ofon military matters, generally kept civilian morale somewhat higher than that of the army. Excitement, tension, and brave words about the Arab effort in Palestine boosted public moralethe first months followingyof that year, however, enthusiasm for the cause waned and was replacedidespread sense of the futility and hopelessness of the struggle. Factors such as food shortages,and martial law with its accompanyingof civil liberties also dampened public spirit. As It became more obvious that nothing could keep Palestine for the Arabs, the Iraqis were glad to turn their attention to other matters, such as Syro-Iraql union.
Until recently the need for national defense had little place In the Iraqi mind. The Palestinethe fear of another war with Israel, as wellrowing fear of the Soivet Union, have Increased governmental propaganda for and public supportarger army.
ttitude toward foreign nations
In Iraq, whichackground of centuries of foreign oppression and control, nationalism most often takes the form of vociferous resentment against interference or control by foreign powers. The politically conscious Iraqis are proud of Iraq's historical and cultural traditions. Self-conscious about their technological deficiencies, they balk at paternalistic help as much as at outrightThey are extremely sensitive to theoften displayed by foreigners in Iraq orby the foreign press abroad. Even legitimate criticism from foreigners is resented by Iraqis, who like to attribute their illsack of complete control of their own affairs.
Not all classes or groups in Iraq, however, are antiforelgn to the same degree. Some of thefor example, would gladly turn to any outside power which expressed the desire to help them. For group attitudes toward foreigners see this Chapter,nder Religion.
a. Unitedhe Iraqisreat admiration for the United States.missionaries, schools, and archaeologicalin Iraq, unrelated to political or economic advantage, had builteservoir of good will over the. ideals of democracy, observed both on the American and the world stage,onfidence in the United States as the one world power which would abide by the principles of right and Justice. However, the consistent American support of the Zionist cause in Palestine drastically reversed Iraqi views toward the United States and was responsible for the attack on the Baghdad United States Information and Educational(USDS) headquarters in. prestige reached an even lower point following. recognition of Israel, thought by Iraqis to be both ill-timed and unwise. Iraqis, in proportion to their interest In the Palestine question, are bitter and disillusioned over what they consider to be this sacrifice of the Arabs on the altar. domestic politics. The United States, consequently. Isthe most hypocritical of nations, and isaccused of embarking on an imperialist program in the Middle East, using Israelpearhead.
Bitter hostility toward the United States had ebbed somewhat byhen public emotion over events in Palestine was no longer at fever pitch. Most United States actions in the Middle East, however, are still suspected as subterfuges to advance Zionist interests. While many Iraqi commercial elements in particular hope thatTruman's Point Four program will hasten much-needed irrigation and agriculturalprojects, the more ardent nationalists are suspicious of the implications of. aid of any sort-Bitterness toward the United States is reflected in the attitude of many Iraqis. military action in Korea, While most responsible Iraqis have approved of the Security Council resolutions and their implementation, ultra-naUonalists and leftist have not hesitated to label. position as imperialism. Iraqis generally consider thesituationest of strength between the United States and the Soviet Union.
In the technical field the average Iraqi has long had the impression that the United States is rich and powerful, with virtually urilimited resources
of machines, weapons, and goods. Educated Iraqis consider the United States supreme In engineering, economics, mechanics, and science and despite anti-American sentiment want tokill. products. On the other hand, certain educated groups of Iraqis encouraged in part by both the British and tho French, consider Americans materialistic. American propaganda, which tends to overemphasise the technical aspect. culture, has not effectively corrected this misconception and American moving pictures have added to it.
b.riefduring the Palestine war, the0 has been the chief object of Iraqi xenophobia. British domination following Worldas bitterly resented In Iraq, and thedisillusionment and distrust has not yet been overcome despite progressive concessions on the part of the United Kingdom. Almost allconscious Iraqi Arabs are furtherby the broader Issues of sterling blocand, in sympathy with their Arab neighbors, by Anglo-Arab treaty relationships throughout the Near East.
Anti-British sentiment is unanimous exceptew small groups. Christian elements in southern Iraq, who look to the United Kingdom for support against the Muslim majority, are generally pro-British. Both the politically significant urban upper classes and the sheikhly landlords of the Middle Euphrates tribes, who have often hadhelp in maintaining their prosperity andare more favorably inclined toward thethan most of their feUow-Mushms.
Middle-class Arab Muslims, the vanguard ofresent any British control or influence^imitation on Iraqi sovereignty. Manythe British for supporting corrupt Iraqias much as they criticize thosefor accepting British support. While better-informed Iraqis realize that Iraq requires theof foreign experts, they resent theof some of the advisers appointed by the United Kingdom. There is,eneralthat British advisers place the Interests of the British Commonwealth first, and even that they arc allreater or lesser extent British agents. Suspicious of British motives, the nationalist Iraqi does not admit that British administration and tutelage have been of much benefit to Iraq.
Minorities of northern Iraq are also anti-British, but their reasons differ radically from those of the Arabs. Kurds and Assyrians feel that the British -have let them down repeatedly In failing to help them against the Arab majority. The Britishis further criticized for Its support of the Arab Union. While both Kurds and Assyrians In-
itially preferred to Uve under British politicalthey now have no confidence that the United Kingdom could or would safeguard their future.
The pro-Allied policy of the Iraqi Government of Worldhich succeeded the pro-Nazi Rashid 'All group was due more to the presence of British troops than to any sympathy for the British or the Allied cause. Wartime supply shortages. Inflation, and the black market were all attributed to the British. At the close of the war the politically conscious younger generation found another cause for bitterness against the United Kingdom in its failure to ensure an independent Arab government over all of Palestine. The United Kingdom5 has lost much prestige in the eyes of the Iraqis.
8 the Palestine situation decreased anti-British sentiment at the expense of the United States. The United Kingdom's friendly attitude toward the Arab cause, its supplying of arms until the UN arms embargo innd its delay in recognizing Israelavorable effect upon Iraqis. However, this gain was temporary, and by9 the United Kingdom was again the most-disliked nation.
c Tbe USSR.attitudes toward the Soviet Union are difficult to distinguish fromtoward communism. For the extent to which communism has penetrated Iraq, see Chapter V.nder Soviet and communistactivities.
Soviet Russia's proximity to Iraq, Its Importance during World War II. and the current East-West conflict have focused Iraqi attention in itsWhen, earlyhe United Kingdom and the United States appeared lo be acceding to Soviet demands, Iraqis were impressed with Soviet political as well as military strength. Moreparticularly since the invasion of South Korea, politically conscious Iraqis have developed an increased fear of Soviet aggression in Iraq.
For varying reasons anti-Soviet feeling, to one degree or another, is found uniformly amongall Muslim Arabs. Only among those of the young educated group who have been pushed into the background politically and economically, and who are ready to turn to any powerful outsidepromising support, are there pro-Soviet tendencies. The lower-class urban unemployedroup containing discontented elementswhich Soviet propaganda has been directed. The upper classes, whose position would beunder communism, fear the Soviet Union. The middle classes see itossible imperialistic threat They were further alienated by its backing of Israel, although the fact that the Soviet Union is
rofessed friend of Israel lessenedtoward.
Conservative Muslims are Influenced against the 8ovlet Union by religious leaders, who condemn Soviet Irrellglon. The principles of Islam are not easily adaptable to the communist system, andin the Iraqi press regarding the treatment of Soviet Muslims have turned many of the informed populace against the Soviet Union. The ordinary tribesman, who thinks of Soviet Russia as theenemy of Islam, ls strongly antl-Soviet.
The Kurds, despite their adherence to Islam, and the Assyrians have been turning with greaterto the Soviet Union for encouragement in their desire for autonomy or independence. On the whole, however, Soviet propaganda, which makes lavish promises of independence, hasin gaining the friendship of these groups rather than In Inculcating communist ideals. Members of the Orthodox churches are also to some degree receptive to overtures from the Soviet Union (see Chaptrr V,nder Propaganda).
d. OthersIraqi attitudes toward statesof the Near East, other than the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Sovietarge extent on the relations of these states to colonials or to other Muslim peoples. In the past few years the Dutch, for their Indonesian policy, and the Italians for their actions in Libya, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, have been unpopular among better-informed Iraqis. Hostility toward France, which grew rapidly during the5 increased7esultoroccan propaganda mission to Iraq regarding the reported lag between French reforms in the governments of her North African territories and nationalist aspirations In those areas. France, whose prestige has never been high in Iraq, is now disdained by many Iraqis,those in the army, for its military
The defensive Inferiority which Iraqis feelthe West extends even to such states as Egypt, Turkey, andesser extent. Syria and Lebanon; each of these, the Iraqi knows, considers itself more progressive than Iraq. Despite the common bond of Islam and pan-Arabism, Iraqis tend totheir Near Eastern neighbors. During the war with Israel, this lack of faith was intensifiedopular belief, encouraged by governmental propagandaeneral unwillingness to admit fault, that only Iraq had assumed its share in the struggle.
The affinities and enmities of the royal house with the rulers of other Near Eastern nations do not necessarily reflect the general attitudes of the Iraqi people. The populace feels no specialfor King Abdullah of Jordan, and no personal animosity toward King Faruq of Egypt. Egypt, however, is generally unpopular among Iraqisof its assumption of leadership in the Arab world, and more recently, because of its failure in Palestine. Egypt is now resented more intensely by advocates of Syro-Iraql union for its opposition to tbe scheme. Egypt's refusal to confirm theSecurity Council resolution to send troops to Korea, however, and tho reference to UN injustice in Palestine in Its statement of abstention, received widespread popular approval in Iraq. Turkey, whose occupation of Iraq has not been forgotten, is disliked by almost all Iraqis. Many among the politically minded further resent Turkey's rapid turn to the West Iraqi Kurds are particularly bitter about Turkish suppression of Kurdishand the alleged cruelties suffered by Kurds in Turkey.
The Iraqi attitude toward the other Near Eastern states is strongly Influenced by religion. The Sun-nis are generally sympathetic lo theirSunni neighbors, such as Syria andThey have strong ties with the great Bedouin tribes and families of Central Arabia, though little sympathy with the Wahhabi belief. They admire Ibn Saud for his strength, and while the general feeling toward him among the Sunn Is of Iraqhole could hardly be called one of friendship, it does not equal the deep-seated dynastic antagonism in that direction on the part of the Iraqi royal house and its close supporters. The Shiah. on the other hand, are predisposed toward Iran and thelr corcllglonists in Syria and Lebanon, while their special animosity Is directed against the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia, because of doctrinal differences aggravated by the memory of the burning of Kar-bala by Wahhabi raiders In the nineteenth century.ttitude toward international organizations The people of Iraq are generally apathetic toward Iraq's participation in International organizations. They neither trust international bodies to makewith equity nor credit them with the ability to carry out these decisions. They further feel that foreign states when acting collectively, even as in* ternational bodies, should not have the authority to make settlements which affect the sovereignty of Iraq. Iraqi participation in such international activities is undertaken primarily as an expression of national sovereignty and prestige.
a. Arab LeagueThe prestige of the Arab League is not high in Iraq. While the politically informed were in general sympathy with the Leaguehey were not prepared toany of their sovereign rights in Its behalf. Many who felt Initially that the League was merely an Instrument of British policy in the Near East have resented more recently the leading role played by Egypt in the organization. When the League
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powerless to cope with the Palestinemost Iraqis lost faith in its ability to give effect to the aspirations of the Arabs,
b. United NationsPublic opinion In Iraq leans overwhelrningly to the belief that the UN exists solely for the benefit of the great powers, Just as before Worldt regarded the League of Nations as the instrument of the colonial powers Of Europe. Since7 recommendations on Palestine, the UN has meant to the Iraqis support of Zionistn common with the other Arab states, they claim to have lost all hope of UN Justice or support for the smaller powers and have declared that they will participate in future international activities solely on the basis of self-interest.
Continued resentment toward the UN hasIraqis from giving unqualified support to the Security Council resolutions on Korea. Iraq, which has likened the North Korean aggressors to the Zionists, has complained that the UN helped rather than hindered aggression In Palestine, and that its present position is Inconsistent. Only the outright pro-Soviet elements in Iraq, however,sympathy for the Korean Communists.
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