INDOCHINA: CURRENT SITUATION AND PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS
CONCLUSIONS
3
The French position* in Indochina Isendangered by the Vietmovement that has exploited native nationalism. The Chinese Coir.munist re-no la already furnishing the Viet Mlnh materiel, training and technicallcial French sources report that Chinese Communis: troops are already present In Tonkin In some strength. If this aidand French strength and militaryare not substantially Increased above those presently programmed, the Viet Mlnh probably can drive th3 French out of North Viet Nam (Tonkin) within six to nine months. French loss of Tonkin, eventhe evacuation of French forces hiUvntlal numbers, would jeopardize the French position in the remainder of Viet s'am, Laos, and Cambodia.
nder these circumstances there islight chance that the French caneir military position long enough to build up an in dependent Vietnamese! government end an effective national army which might win tho support of non-Communistand, in conjunction with French forces, contain the Viet Mlnh. For these and other reasons there ere grounds for questioning the French wjji to remain In Indochina. S. The Intervention of Chinese Communistorce In support of thelnh
this paptr, lor purposes of brevity, the words "French position" reler to that of tha three Associated States supported by the Frnteb,
would render the military position of the French untenable. At present there arehinese Communist troops in the Tonkin border area, and approximately half of these could be committed toIn Indochina.elatively small number of Chinese Communistould enable the Communist forces to drive tho French out of Tonkin In afeSOrt time.
irect intervention by Chinese Communist troops may occur at any time. It may have already begun (seet Is almost certain to occur In strength whenever there Is danger either that the Viet Mlnh will fall to attain its military objective of driving the French out of Indochina, or that the Eao Dal government is succeeding In undermining the support of the Viet Mlnh. The scale ofCommunist Intervention, hoWover, would be limited mainly by astt-CommunlstIn China and by Chinese militaryelsewhere.
The expulsion of the French by the Viet Mlnh, with or without Chinese Communist raterventlon, would almost certainly lead to the transformation of Indochina Into asatellite.
We believe that control of Indochina by the Vlot Mlnh would eventually entail Communist control of all mainland Southeast Asia in the absence of effective Western assistance to other countries of the area.
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discussion
French position in Indochina IsConfronted with rebelliontrong Communist movement that hoi exploitednationalism {the Viet Minh. led by Ho Chihe French hare tried to weaken It by winning over non-Communist natloiutl-ists toeml-autonomous, pro-Freirh government under native leadership (the Viet Namder Bao Dal).to nationalist sentiment, leading toward (ell sovereignty lor the Bao Dal Government, have been forthcoming so slowly and with such seeming reluctance on the part of the French thatai Government has not in facttrong nationalist following in any quarter.esult, the French so far have been unable to undermine the political strength of the Viet Minh.
At the conclusion of the Pan Conference in latehe Frenchew, intensive effort to convince thethat the powers of government would be turned over to them as rapidly as possible. The French agreed to establish anArmy of Viet Nam with Bao Dai,esponsible only to the French High Command In Indochina.to this plan French ofiicers end cadres would be employed by the Vietnamwear Vietnamese uniforms, and beto Bao Dai's command. It la too early to judge whet the effect of this new French old for native support will be. Even thoughsuspicions of French good faith should bo overcome, and Bao Dal shouldqualities of leadership hitherto unre-vsalcd, it would be wellear before en effective Vietnamese army could be organized, trained, end equipped and before broadsupport for Bao Dal could bo consolidated.
The armed forces of the Vietroops, ofre well-armedave for some time bocn successfully contesting French militaryIn many regions of Indochina and rc-
Gently have captured key French outposts and imitated heavy losses on French forces in the northern border area adjoining China. In tbe critics! area, Tonkin, where the French: now hold mainly the Red River Delta areaarrow strip along the0 French regular Army troops are0 Viet Minh regulars. The magnitude of the French military effort currentlyIn the whole of Indochina carl-.befrom the following facts; (a) the Frenchrmy regulars deployed throughout Indochina, and inative forces engaged in security tasks, para-mllitary duties, and local defense; (b) the regular army to Indochinaf France's career enlistedl its regular army officers,f its career NCO's; <c) French officer losses incurrently equal the annual output of graduates from St. Cyr; andf9 French military budget was spent on the Zndocbfna operation.
he Chinese Communists have boonand equipping large numbers ol Viet Minh troops in China and are supplying the Viet Minh considerable amounts ol material.small number of Chinese Communist advisory personnel wearing Vict Minh uniformsare already serving with the Viet Minh forces. In fact, official French sourcesthat Chinese Communist troops ara el-ready hi Tonkin in some strength. Although tho ability of the OMnese to furnish military equipment is limited, they should be able tovailable to theVIet Minh enough small arms and artillery to give the Vietistinct superiority over present French forces. Viet Minh capabilities contlnuo to befaster than the French have expanded own. Unless French strength and mJllt resources areabove those presently prognmimod/Aharo la only alight chance that the French1,can maintain their military position In theof steadily
increasing Viet Mlnh pressure during thaofear that would be required to strengthen Bao Dai's Government polltl-calty and toan effective Vietnamese army. For these and other reasons, there are grounds for questioning the French will to remain in Indochina.
he French position Is further Jeopardized by the fact thai Viet Mlnh strength can be increased by successive increments of Chinese Communist troops (as well as materiel)ounter to any increase In French In particular, if tho Viet Minn shows signs of falling to attain Its militaryof driving the French out of Indochina or If the Bao Dai government begins to show considerable promise of winning nationalist supporters away from tho Viet Mlnh, we be-Hcvo that the Chinese Communists will resort to direct substantial militaryndochina by committing "volunteer" troops for service with the Viet Minh unless other considerations intervene. Similarly, If US or other non-Communist military forcesdirectly In support of tho French, the Chinese Communists almost certainly would intervene.
C. The Chinese Communists may wellthat they can Intervene In force Inwithout tooisk of causing cither US or UJI military Intervention or ofeneral war. From the Soviet point of view, there might be substantialhi Involving the UStiU-scale war with tho Chinese Communists. ould bo further dissipatedar Zcstcrn military operation, and the US might lose or alienate some of Its allies andallies. Them ere considerations,that would tend to deter the Chinese Communists from direct Intervention In the Chinese Communist Intervention (ft) might bring certain Asian countries Intoto Communist China; (b) might mtngontee nationalist elements In Indochina find thereby weaken Ho Chi Minn's control
f
: his own party and his prospects fort from tho rest of the country; (c) would tivolvc tha use of Chinese troopsn already developing favorably from the 'Aimmunlst point of view simplyesult ol supplying equipment and training for Viet Mlnh troops.
he Intervention of Chinese Communist troops In force In support of the Viet Mlnh would render the military position of the French untenable. At present there arehinese Communist troops In tho Tonkin border area, and approximately half of these could be committed toIn Indochina, elatively small number of Chinese Communist ould enable the Communist forces to drive the French out of Tonkinelatively short time. French loss of*Ton-kln, even assuming the evacuation of French forces In substantial numbers, would jeopardize the French position in theof Viet Nam, Laos, and Cambodia. The scale of Chinese Communist intervention, however. would be limited by antl-Comnm-nlst activities hi China and by Chinesemilitary commitments elsr.vhere.
n additioneportChinese Communist troops
ore already In Tonkin In some strength, there are at present many other Indications or Li-pending Intervention In Indochina by the Chinese Communists. These includereports of tho recent movement ofCommunist armies to the Kwanju-Tonkln border and of tire concentration of armor In South China, the dosing of French consulates in China under Chinesepressure, Pelplng charges of French border violations. Viet Mlnh and Chinese Communist accusations of persecution of the Chinese minority in Indochina, and theChinese Communist propaganda line that names Indochina, together with Korea, Jaocn and Formosa,ase for "Imperialist aggression" against China.
here is little doubtiet Mlnhwould lead to the transformationommunist satellite. Ho Chi Mlnhoscow-trelned professionaland there have ervrays beenIncinmcnt. At the present lime, the Viet Minh regime Is openly Communist In Ideology and pvo-SovIot In statement) on foreign afTairs. Tho recognition of the llo
regime by various internationalroupsull-fledged "people'sormal recognition of the regime byChina and the Soviet bloc, and tho failure of tho Viet Mluh to acknowledge thetendered by Yugoslavia, all offerclear indications of the alignment of the Viet Minh leadership with the USSR, with Communist China, and the international Communist movement.
he strong probability is that the loss of Indochina to Communist control would mean the eventual loss of alt mainland Southeast Asia, In the absence of Western assistance to the other countries of the area. Without such assistance, the proximity of well-trained Viet Minh forces would place nearly irresistible pressure upon Thailand, Increasing theof Thai officialdom to accommodate
Itself to the winning aide. If Thailand were under Communist control, tho Communist rebels tn Malaya could bo furnished military assistance that would be very likely to cause tho British to loso control of the ana. The Burmese government, already plagued byCommunist problems, would find Itto resist diplomatic pressures backed up by both Chinese and Indochlnese Communist forces on the borders of Burma, In addition. In Indonesia and tho Philippines, theeffect of Communist control of Indochina would be to strengthen indigenousmovements. Moreover, there mightrend in Indonesia toward accommodation with the Communist bloc in Asia. As each successive country came under Communistthe non-Communist resistance In the remaining countries would be weakened.
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Original document.
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