NIE-5 INDOCHINA: CURRENT SITUATION AND PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS

Created: 12/29/1950

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ASSISTANT DIRECTOR j

FOR

NATIONAL-INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES ,

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

'..: - INDOCHINA: CURRENT SITUATION AND PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS

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; CENTRAL ELLIGENCE AGENCY

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

INDOCHINA: CURRENT SITUATION AND PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS

The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force participated in the preparation of this estimate and concur in it. This paper Is based on information available on

SECRET

INDOCHINA: CURRENT SITUATION AND PROBABLE

DEVELOPMENTS

CONCLUSIONS

French position" in Indochina isendangered by the Viet Minh, amovement that has exploited native nationalism. The Chinese CommunistIs already furnishing the Viet Minh materiel, training and technical assistance. Official French sources report that Chinese Communist troops are already present in Tonkin in some strength. If this aidand French strength and militaryare not substantially increased above those presently programmed, the Viet Minh probably can drive the French out of North Viet Nam (Tonkin) within six to nine months. French loss of Tonkin, eventhe evacuation of French forces Innumbers, would jeopardize the French position In the remainder of Viet Nam, Laos, and Cambodia.

Under these circumstances there islight chance that the French can maintain their military position long enough to build up an independent Vietnamese government and an effective national army which might win the support of non-Communistand, in conjunction with French forces, contain the Viet Minh. For these and other reasons there are grounds for questioning the French will to remain in Indochina.

The intervention of Chinese Communist troops in force in support of the Viet Minh

this paper, for purposes of brevity, tho words "French position" refer to that of the three Associated States supported by the French.

would render the military position of the French untenable. At present there arehinese Communist troops in the Tonkin border area, and approximately half of these could be committed toin Indochina.elatively small number of Chinese Communistould enable the Communist forces to drive the French out of Tonkin in ashort time.

Direct intervention by Chinese Communist troops may occur at any time. It may have already begun {seet is almost certain to occur in strength whenever there is danger either that the Viet Minh will fail to attain its military objective of driving the French out of Indochina, or that the Bao Dai government is succeeding in undermining the support of the Viet Minh. The scale ofCommunist intervention, however, would be limited mainly by anti-Communistin China and by Chinese militaryelsewhere.

The expulsion of the French by the Viet Minh, with or without Chinese Communist intervention, would almost certainly lead to the transformation of Indochina Into asatellite.

We believe that control of Indochina by the Viet Minh would eventually entail Communist control of all mainland Southeast Asia in the absence of effective Western assistance to other countries of the area.

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DISCUSSION

French position in Indochina IsConfronted with rebelliontrong Communist movement that has exploitednationalism (the Viet Minh, led by Ho Chihe French have tried to weaken it by winning over non-Communisttoemi-autonomous, pro-French government under native leadership (the Viet Nam government under Bao Dai).to nationalist sentiment, leading toward full sovereignty for the Bao Dal Government, have been forthcorning so slowly and with such seeming reluctance on the part of the French that the Bao Dai Government has not in facttrong nationalist following in any quarter.esult, the French so far have been unable to undermine the political strength of the Viet Minh.

At the conclusion of the Pau Conference In latehe Frenchew, intensive effort to convince thethat the powers of government would be turned over to them as rapidly as possible. The French agreed to establish anArmy of Viet Nam with Bao Dai,esponsible only to the French High Command in Indochina.to this plan French officers and cadres would be employed by the Vietnamwear Vietnamese uniforms, and beto Bao Dai's command. It is too early to judge what the effect of this new French bid for native support will be. Even thoughsuspicions of French good faith should be overcome, and Bao Dal shouldqualities of leadership hitherto unre-vealcd, it would be wellear before an effective Vietnamese army could be organized, trained, and equipped and before broadsupport for Bao Dai could be consolidated.

The armed forces of the Vietroops,0 are well-armed regulars) have for some time been successfully contesting French militaryin many regions of Indochina andhave captured key French outposts and Inflicted heavy losses on French forces in the northern border area adjoining China. In the critical area, Tonkin, where the French now hold mainly the Red River Delta areaarrow strip along the0 French regular Army troops are0 Viet Minh regulars. The magnitude of the French military effort currentlyin the whole of Indochina can befrom the following facts: (a) the Frenchrmy regulars deployed throughout Indochina, and lnative forces engaged in security tasks, para-military duties, and local defense; (b) the regular army In Indochinaf Franco's career enlistedf Its regular army officers,f Its career NCOs; (c) French officer losses incurrently equal the annual output of graduates from St. Cyr; andf9 French military budget was spent on the Indochina operation.

he Chinese Communists have beenand equipping large numbers of Viet Minh troops In China and arc supplying the Viet Minh considerable amounts ofmall number of Chinese Communist advisory personnel wearing Vict Minh uniformsare already serving with the Viet Minh forces. In fact, official French sourcesthat Chinese Communist troops areIn Tonkin In some strength. Although the ability of the Chinese to furnish military equipment is limited, they should be able to make available to the Viet Minh enough small arms and artillery to give the Vietistinct superiority over present French forces. Viet Minh capabilities continue to be enlarged faster than the French have expanded their own Unless French strength and military resources are substantially increased above those presently programmed, there islight chance that the French can maintain their military position in the face of steadily

increasing Viet Minh pressure during theofear that would be required to strengthen Bao Dai's Governmentand to organize an effective Vietnamese army. For these and other reasons, there are grounds for questioning the French will to remain in Indochina.

French position is furtherthe fact that Vict Minh strength canby successive increments oftroops (as well as materiel) asto any increase In FrenchIn particular, ii the Viet Minhof falling to attain Its militaryof driving the French out ofif the Bao Dai government begins topromise of winningaway from the Vict Minh, wethat the Chinese Communists willdirect substantial military interventionby committing "volunteer"service with the Viet Minh unlessintervene. Similarly, If USnon-Communist military forcesdirectly ln support of the French,Communists almost certainly

Chinese Communists may wellthat they can Intervene ln force inwithout tooisk ofUS or UN military Intervention ora general war. From theof view, there might be substantialin involving tbe US in a with the Chinese Communists. would be further dissipated ln amilitary operation, and the USor alienate some of its allies andallies. There are considerations,that would tend to deter thefrom direct intervention in Chinese Communist Interventionbring certain Asian countries intoto Communist China;ationalist elements inthereby weaken Ho Chi Minn'shis own party and his prospects forfrom the rest of the country;he use of Chinese troops in aalready developing favorably frompoint of view simplyesult of

supplying equipment and training for Viet Minh troops.

The intervention of Chinese Communist troops in force in support of the Viet Minh would render the military position of the French untenable. At present there arehinese Communist troops in the Tonkin border area, and approximately half of these could be committed toin Indochina.elatively small number of Chinese Communistould enable the Communist forces to drive the French out of Tonkinelatively short time. French loss ofeven assuming the evacuation of French forces in substantial numbers, would jeopardize the French position ln theof Viet Nam, Laos, and Cambodia. The scale of Chinese Communist intervention, however, would be limited byactivities in China and by Chinesemilitary commitments elsewhere.

In additioneport from Frenchsources that Chinese Communist troops are already In Tonkin In some strength, there are at present many other Indications ofintervention in Indochina by the Chinese Communists. These includereports of the recent movement ofCommunist armies to the Kwangsi-Tonkin border and of the concentration of armor in South China, the closing of French consulates in China under Chinesepressure, Peiping charges of French border violations, Viet Minh and Chinese Communist accusations of persecution of the Chinese minority in Indochina, and theChinese Communist propaganda line that names Indochina, together with Korea, Japan and Formosa,ase for "Imperialist aggression" against China,

There is little doubtiet Minhwould lead to the transformationommunist satellite. Ho Chi Minhoscow-trained professionaland there have always beenIn his government. At the present time, the Viet Minh regime is openly Communist ln Ideology and pro-Soviet in statements on foreign affairs. The recognition of the Ho

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by various international Communist groupsull-fledged "people'sormal recognition of the regime byChina and the Soviet bloc, and the failure of the Viet Minh to acknowledge thetendered by Yugoslavia, all offerclear indications of the alignment of the Viet Minh leadership with the USSR, with Communist China, and the international Communist movement.

he strong probability is that the loss of Indochina to Communist control would mean the eventual loss of all mainland Southeast Asia, in the absence of Western assistance to the other countries of the area. Without such assistance, the proximity of well-trained Viet Minh forces would place nearly irresistible pressure upon Thailand, increasing theof Thai officialdom to accommodate itself to the winning side. If Thailand were under Communist control, the Communist rebels in Malaya could be furnished military assistance that would be very likely to cause the British to lose control of the area. The Burmese government, already plagued byCommunist problems, would find Itto resist diplomatic pressures backed up by both Chinese and Indochlnese Communist forces on the borders of Burma. In addition. In Indonesia and the Philippines, theeffect of Communist control of Indochina would be to strengthen indigenousmovements. Moreover, there mightrend In Indonesia toward accommodation with the Communist bloc in Asia. As each successive country came under Communistthe non-Communist resistance In the remaining countries would be weakened.

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