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national intelligence estimate
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA DURING THE REMAINDER1
gency
secret
Jg.1
national intelligence estimate
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA DURING THE REMAINDER1
The Intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, tho Air Force, and the Joint Staffin the preparation of this estimate. Alt members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimateugust.
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA DURING THE REMAINDER OF
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the current situation and probable developments in Indochina during the remainder
CONCLUSIONS
current military stalemate inappears likely to continue at least through the endnless theCommunists directly intervene with forces over and above the0 "volunteers" which they can introduce as individuals or in small units in probable continuation of present assistance to the Viet Minh.
If the Chinese Communists directlywith large forces over and above those introduced as individuals or in small units, the French would probably be driven backeachhead around Haiphong. The French should be able to hold this beachhead for some time, unless the Chinese Communists achieve air
Direct Chinese Communistis not likely as long as the Chinese Communists are extensively committed in Korea.
If hostilities in Korea end, or thecommitment there can bereduced, there will be anlikelihood of direct Chineseintervention in Indochina. On balance, however, we consider suchunlikely during the period under review.
DISCUSSION
Current Situation
he present military situaUon in tadochina Is one of stalemate. In the period sincede Lattre de Tassigny assumed command, the Franco-Vietnamese forces have repulsed the Viet Minh drive to conquer Tonkin, and firmly hold the key Red River delta around Hanoi and Haiphong (seerenchapparently resulted from: (a) theleadership of General de Lattre, whoflagging French morale; (b) MDAP aid; (c) the arrival of French reinforcements; (d)
' The emphasis In tout estimate is on probable developments in the key area of Vietnam, and particularly Tonkin which Is Uie focal point of present military operations.
This esUmatc covers only Uie first part ofry season, the season mostfor large-scale operations. Available intelligence did noteliable estimateUie end
the inexperience at large-scale warfare of the Viet Minh guerrillas; and (e) the limitations of Chinese Communist support. Thestaff work and lack of supporting arms of the Vict Minh forces placed them at adisadvantage In pitched battles with the French, who were strengthened by the timely arrival of US military aid. Including aircraft, napalm bombs, patrol and landing craft, and ground combat materiel. The Chineseupon whom the Viet Minh forces are dependent for logistical support, have been supplying them with ammunition, lightand some artillery.0 Chinese personnel have been infiltrated into the Viet' Minh In cadre, technical, and advisoryThis number is believed lo beHowever, the Chinese Communists, while apparently maintaining roughly the same level of material assistance as of last December, have not intervened directly or with substantial "volunteer" forces orstepped up arms aid. Under theseGeneral de Lattre, drawingfrom other areas of Indochina and skillfully using mobile reserve forces, was able to hold the Franco-Vietnamese militaryintact and to inflict heavy losses on the Viet Minh.
olitical developments, however, have been less favorable. Despite the gradual French transfer of certain responsibilities, thegovernment has been slow to develop and has continued to sufferack of strong leadership. It has had to contend with: (a) French reluctance to relinquishcontrol of political and economic affairs; (b) lingering Vietnamese suspicion of any French-supported regime, combined with the apathetic and "fence-sitting" attitude of the bulk of the people, which has deprived theof broad-based popular support; (c) the difficulty common to all new andgovernments, of training thepersonnel and building an efficientand (d) the failure of factional and sectional groups to uniteoncerted national effort.
n1 the opportunity arose ofroad-based cabinet representing most non-Communist group In Vietnam;Premier Huuabinet composed primarily of members of his own pro-French faction. Although Huu has displayed some administrative skill and his government has gamed slowly in effectiveness, the weakness of the Huu cabinet and its alleged "French puppet" status have limited Its appeal tonationalism and have alienated strong nationalist groups, including the powerful Dai Viet group in Tonkin. Communist control of much of the country and Vict Minhof large areas under nominal Frenchhave also discouraged many people from .openly allying themselves with the
fforts toational Vietnameseessential prerequisite to growth in the political stature of the Vietnamand to an ultimate non-Communistinmade someand Vietnamese units have performed creditably in recent engagements. French intention to proceed with the building of the Vietnamese Army Is evidenced by theirof sizeable French cadres andmissions to assist In organization and training. Plans call for the expansion of the army from Its present strength0. However, it will take considerable time before the planned forces arc organized, trained, and equipped in battalion units, and even longer before effective divisional units can be put into the field. Progress in the formation of the army is retarded by lack of capable officers at all levels of command, shortages of equipment, and Uie apatheticof the population. At the same tune, differences of opinion between Uie Vietnamese leaders and the French, particularly over who will exercise control over the Vietnam Army, have prevented full cooperation andprogress In the army's development. Delay inietnam Army under Vietnamese control hasontributing factor In limiting popular support of theregime.
n the opposing side, the politicalof the Viet Minh has been reorganized upon more openly and aggressivelylines, following the usual pattern ofdevelopment in other Communist coun-
tries. The Communist Party role has been strengthened, with strict party-liners coming more into the foreground and Ho Chi Minh himself apparentlyess important part. This development may have been timed to forestallionalist-dcviationist" tendencies in the Viet Minh, andrelude to greater Chinese Communist participation in and direction of the movement. In theof further military victories, Viet Minh popular support appears unlikely to Increase. While we are unable to determine whether the Viet Minh is actually losing any of its popular appeal, the regime apparently ismore and more on tightenedcontrols. These tighter controls may prevent defections and facilitate theof people already under Viet Minh control.
Viet Minh and Franco-Vietnam Capabilities
The Improved morale of the French forces, scheduled reinforcements, the gradualIn the Vietnamese Army, and thearrival of MDAP aid will probably give the French, byhe capability ofimited offensive and possibly of recovering some lost territory. However, the French and Vietnamese will not, In the period under review, be able decisively to defeat the Viet Minh.
On the other hand, we consider It highly unlikely that the Viet Minh can seize the Hanol-Halphong area, even with continuation of the present type of Chinese Communist assistance. Although the Viet Minh, with continued Chinese aid, will be somewhat strengthened by the end of the rainy season in October, the Franco-Vietnamese forces will receive substantial quantities of MDAP aid during lhe next few months, and al least some of00 reinforcementsde lattre (of which four battalions are believed to haverench air strength, which Is completely unopposed, will be further Increased. The French Navy, which is to be reinforced by an aircraftcan Increasingly hamper the flow ofsupplies to the Viet Minh and facilitate French amphibious operations. Moreover, by
" See Appendixable of opposing forces.
December the French ring of fixed defenses around the delta will be completed. Under these circumstances, the French would have the advantage of fighting from fixed defenses, which would permit them to assemble larger mobile reserves and lo take advantage of their superiority In conventional as distinct from guerrilla warfare.
Chinese Communist Capabilities and Intentions
Itasic Chinese Communist andpolicy to promote Communisl control over Southeast Asia, and Peiping and MoscowIndochinaey to this regionof its strategic location and because of the advanced revolutionary situation already existing there. Peiping has already supported the Viet Minh regime by recognizing Ho Chi MInh's regime and by providing it withand material aid. There are numerous indications of Chinese preparations for greater mihtary support of the Viet Minh, possiblydirect intervention with Chineseforces.
The Chinese Communists are capable of substantially increasing their present type of aid to the Viet Minh, particularly by theof sizeable numbers of personnel as individuals or cadres into the Viet Minh Army. We believe that the reinforcedforces could hold the bulk of their Tonkin perimeter against the Viet Minh even If the Viet Minh were supported by as many0 infiltrated personnel, although with such additional support the Viet Minh might win some local victories. Continued Chinese Communist infiltrationarge scale,would gradually make the Frenchincreasingly precarious.
Turning to Chinese Communistfor large scale intervention with their own forces, we estimate thathinese Communist field force troops could now be made available and logistlcallyfor an Invasion of Indochina. The poor transport net and forbidding terrain of the border region limit the forces which could presently be employed to that number. They could be logistlcally supported only for short offensive operations of about one week at a
time, passing to the defensive during thefor replenishment of supplies.the Chinese Communists arc slowlytheir capabilities for stockpilingby improving road and rail supply routes into Tonkin and are improving airfields in the border region. Consequently Chineselogistical capabilities for offensive operations are gradually increasing.
In addition the Chinese Communists have the capability of mounting Intense airof short duration against the French, whose aircraft are concentrated on threeairfields in Tonkin. SuccessfulCommunist air attacks of this sort would materially enhance Communist capabilities for large-scale ground operations.air superiority in the Tonkin area would also materially hamper French surveillance and naval blockade of the Tonkin Oulf. and consequently permit increased over-water aid to the Viet Minh.
If the Chinese Communists intervenethe end1roops, they could probably eventually drive the French;eachhead at Haiphong. The French, however, should be able to hold thisfor some time, unless the Chineseachieve air superiority.
The Chinese Communists will undoubtedly be Influenced in deciding whether or not to intervene directly in Indochina by the future development of the situation in Korea. So long as the Chinese Communists remaincommitted In Korea, we consider it unlikely that they will intervene directly In Indochina. Although the Chinese Communists might drive the French from Tonkin,ajor victory Is not assured. An Indecisive andcampaign would place additionalstrains on total Chinese Communist
If tho Korean fighting is stopped under conditions which appear to remove the threat of renewed UN attacks, transportationin the border region would continue to limit the ground forces which could bein Tonkin, but the possible diversion of resources from the Korea-Manchuria area would permit early intervention with greater assurance of the continued arrival of supplies and replacements for the operation. Wethat by two monthsorean armistice. Chinese Communist capabilities for Invading Indochina could be significantlywhile air capabilities could be greatly increased The Chinese Communists and the USSR might then consider that Indochinamore favorable opportunitiesuick and decisive victory with less risk of US and UN Intervention than did Korea. They might calculate that the US and UN would beto undertake another operation of the Korean type and that some UN members would be unwilling to defend what theyas French colonialism in Indochina. Thus In the eventessation of hostilities in Korea, tlie likelihood of early Chineseintervention in Indochina,after the rainy season ends In October, would increase.
On the other hand, the Chinesewould probably hesitate to Intervene openly in Indochina while they werefor an over-all Korean settlement,the withdrawal of UN forces, and these negotiations would doubtless taketime. Moreover, if Communist acceptanceease-fire In Koreaesire toemporary "relaxation" of worldearly Intervention in Indochina would be unlikely, We also believe that theinadequacies of its line ofthe strengthening of the French forces, and the risk of foreign intervention, would probably lead Peiping to conclude that it still could not count with certainty onuick and decisive conquest of all Tonkin, but might become involved in anotherand costly campaign in winch the risk of foreign intervention might Increase.the Communists might expect that through increased cadre, material and technical aid to the Vict Minh they could still wear down the French and achieve successes without the necessity of early large-scale Intervention.
On balance, therefore, we believe that the increased Chinese preparations in the Tonkin border region probably reflect an Intent to facilitate the flow of "volunteers" andaid to the Viet Minh forces, while prepar-
ing for possible large-scale intervention, rather than an Intent to Intervene
onsequently, the probable outlook through the end1 in Indochina is one of continued military stalemate, if the Chinese Communists do not directly intervene. The tightening of Viet Minh political control, the further development of the Vict Minh forces, and increased Chinese Communist aid will probably be balanced by the arrival of French reinforcements, more MDAP assistance, and progress towardietnam Army. Some territory may change hands but we do not foresee any major victories on cither side, at least through the end
S E
APPENDIX
Opposing Forces in Indochina as1
Franco-Vietnamese Forces; French ground forces Armed Forces of Associated States Auxiliary troops
Semi-military forces (railway guards, etc.)
0
French Air Force
French Navy and Naval Air Force
Total
Viet Minh Forces:
Viet Minh regular forces Regional militia Irregular forces
Total
Opposing Regular around Forces in Tonkin: Franco-Vietnamese troops Viet Minh troops
0
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0
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Original document.
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