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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION TO
NIE-25
This document has been approved tox release through the HISTORICAL REVIEW PTOSSMJ Of
the Central Intelligence tysaeff.
The Intelligence organizations ol the Department of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated in the preparation ol this estimate. Allof the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate, except for thc reservation of the Director of Naval Intelligence noted on page 5.
CONTENTS
I.-Soviet
Military Considerations Underlying Soviet
Possible Soviet Courses of Action Without Intent to Precipitate or Incur
Serious Risk of General
of Chinese CommunistandKong and
of European SatelliteandWest Germany, and
of Sovietand
of Soviet Forces against USGermany, Berlin, Austria.
Possibility of General War
PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION TO
THE PROBLEM
To estimate probable Soviet courses of action toith particular reference to the probability of direct hostilities between the US and the USSR.
ESTIMATE
Objectives
I wi. We believe that the ultimateommunist world dominated by the USSR and that the Kremlin believes Its vital interests can be assured over the long run only by the elimination ot all governments itcontrol. This objective probablyremlin conviction that peacefulof the USSR and Its empire on the one hand, and the US and its allies on the other, is Impossible and that an armed conflictthem Is eventually inevitable.
principal Immediate Sovietare:
divide the West;
prevent Western, West German,rearmament;
prevent Implementation of thepolicy.
believe the USSR, In the pursuit ofwill during thc period of this
to maintain an advanced stateand offset any Increase Inof the US and Its allies;
to prevent the development ofto the vital interests of the USSR orcontrol of the Satellites;
to expand the territorial limitsSoviet orbit;
to undermine and secure controlnot yet under Soviet domination;
e. Seek to force countries of the free world toolicy of neutrality in the East-West struggle and to deny their resources,strategic sites, to the US and Its allies. j
II. Military Considerations Underlying Soviet Action
We estimate that the armed forces of the USSR have the capability of overrunninglnental Europe and the Near and Middle East (except India and Pakistan) within ashort period.
The USSR does not now have and would be unlikely to secure adequate naval forces or sufficient shipping to permit it touccessful invasion of thc Westerneven if it should seize the Eurasian continent and the UK.
The Soviet Air Force is capable of providing adequate tactical support of all groundwhich the USSR might launch against continental Europe and the Near and Middle East (except India andndoftrategic airagainst the United Kingdom and the North American continent.
t Is Impossible to estimate with anyuracy the Kremlin's conclusion with regard to the relative effectiveness of Soviet and US atomic warfare capabilities or with regard to the relative importance of atomic andweapons In detenrunlng tlie Issueuture general war. We believe it probable,
however, tliat uncertainty concerning relative atomic warfare capabilities and concerning the effectiveness of atomic weapons Inthe Issueeneral war willajor, though notecisive,to the Kremlin inecision to initiate or deliberatelyeneral war with the US during the period of this estimate.
USSR is capable of employinga variety ot targets and ofmethods to altack the US andwith atomic, biological, andWe believe, however, thatwould be exercised on anscale only in conjunction with orpreceding general militarythat they would notecisiveany Soviet decision toeneral war.
III. Possible Soviet Courses of Action Without Intenl to Precipitate or IncurRisk of General War
In Soviet theory and practice waracceptable, and on occasion necessary,for attaining Communistthe Kremlin presumably prefers ifto attain its objectives by coursesshort of resort to generalrobably estimates thatfor making limited progress towardImmediate and long-run objectives, atthc period of this estimate,genera! war. because of:
deterrent effect of thecapability to overrun mostat wiU;
deterrent effect of Soviclfor atomic warfare;
divergent interests of theand
general reluctance of theto become involved In
discussing courses of action shortwar.s necessary for clarity toeach separately. Sovlcly policyvarious courses oflimited Satellite or Soviet armedand even general war. While, therefore.
separation for purposes of exposition Isthe inseparable connection of allcourses of action must bo kept In mind.
Warfare
he Kremlin may consider the prospects of success by political warfare" sufficientlyto make other courses of actionFor example, with the immediateof dividing the Western Powers,US mobilization, obstructing the NATO program and frustrating prospective German and Japanse rearmament and with the ultimate objective of paralyzing opposition to Communism, the Kremlin may fraudulently propose peaceful coexistence of the twoand may encourage the West to hopeettlement of outstanding Issues by mutual agreement In the vital area of Western Europe the Kremlin will almost certainlyto press its "peace" campaign, tothc fear of war. to intimidate byof force, lo raise hopes of Germanand lo use the Communist Parlies of France and Italy in an attempt to confound the political situation and obstruct effective government. Wherever elsewhere ln the world non-Communist governments are weak, as In Iran. Indochina, and Burma, the Kremlin will almost certainly seek to strengthen theposition and. If favorable situations develop, will support Communist coups.
of Chinese
he Kremlin might, during the period of this estimate, attempt to achieve some of Its objectives by inducing the Chineseto engage in additional militarySuch operations would involve risk of general war between the US and the USSR, but the Kremlin might estimate that suchcould be so conducted that general war would not be precipitated.
' Polilical warfare, as here used, include! all manner of polilical and economic pressure,action In Ihe UN and elsewhere, propaganda and front activities. Communist Parly andtrade union activities, support of all kinds or revolutionary movements, andwarfare.
2
Indochina and Burma. In particular, the Kremlin may estimatehineseinvasion of Indochina or Burma would noterious risk of general war and that such an invasion would facilitate aadvance throughout Southeast Asia and the consequent denial of the resources of that area to the free world. The Chinesealmost certainly have the capability for conquering Burma. We consider anof Burma possible, but we do notit probable during the period of thisThe Chinese Communists are now capable of overrunning virtually all ofIndochina, and wc consider an Invasion of Indochina possible at any tune.
Taiwan. The Kremlin probably estimates that thc Chinese Communists alone do not have the capabilitiesuccessful Invasion of Taiwan so long as the US policy ofUS fleet units for the defense of Taiwan remains unchanged. Under existingthe Kremlin must realize that active Soviet participation In an attack on Taiwan would substantially Increase the risk ofwar without necessarily ensuring theof the operation. We therefore believe It unlikely that thc USSR, In prevailingwould either encourage or participatehinese Communist attack on Taiwan.
Hong Kong and Macao. Chineseseizure of Hong Kong and Macaowould be militarily easy, but wouldentail political and economicfor the Communists, if presentcontinue, wc believe It unlikely that forceful seizure of these ports will take place during the period of this estimate.
C. Employment of Europeon Satellite Forces
he Kremlin might, during the period here considered, attempt to achieve some of itsthrough local military operations by European Satellite forces However, the Kremlin probably estimates lhat. because of the more direct impact on NATO interests, such operations would involve greater risk of general war between lhc US and the USSR than similar local operations by Chineseforces.
Yugoslavia. The Kremlin undoubtedly attaches great Importance to regaining control Of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia Is strategically important and Is gradually developing close ties with the NATO powers. Tltolsmtootential menace to Soviet domination over the Satellites and over thc world Communist movement. Satellitefor launching an attack on Yugoslavia are steadily Increasing. It is possible that the Kremlin regards the Yugoslav issue as of such importance as to warrant acceptance of the risks Involvedatellite attack. However, in view of the increasing Western support of Yugoslavia, it Is more probable lhat theestimatesatellite attack wouldnot only serious risk of war between the US or UN and the Satellites, but also thethatonflict would developeneral war between the US and the USSR. On balance, wcatellite attack on Yugoslavia during the period of this estimate is possible, but not probable.
Greece and Turkey. Satellite capabUities for attack on Greece and particularly on Turkey are too limited for conquest of those countries. Furthermore, thc Kremlin almost certainly realizes that an operation against either of these countries would probably entail US or UN intervention with the possibility of general war developing. We believe, therefore, that the USSR is unlikely toatellite attack on either Greece or Turkey during the period of this estimate.
Berlin. West Germany, and Austria.capabilities for military action against Allied forces In Berlin, West Germany, or Austria will probably remain so limitedthe period here considered and the risk of general war Involved in such action would be so great that Uie USSR Is unlikely toatellite attack during this period.
D. Employmont of Soviet Forceshe Kremlin must realize thatof major Soviet forces In any European Satellite or Chinese Communist operation would greaUy increase Uie risk of general war between the US and the USSR. Wherevertherefore, the USSR would rely upon European Satellite or Chinese Communist
DDOnU'P
forces for carrying out military operations against non-Communist areas. Itwould provide such forces with technical and logistical aid and might participate in rear area operations; If It considered the risk acceptable. It might even provide "volunteer" Soviet forces in the forward areas. Openmilitary intervention, however, would be unlikely excepting in areas considered of great importance lo the USSR and where Satellite forces are either unavailable or incapable of successful action.
reece and Turkey. The Kremlinaims to secure control of Greece andin order to eliminate bases that could be used for attack on the Soviet orbit and at the same lime lo secure bases from which theof thc free world in the Near East might be threatened. However, the availableforces alone are probably not capable of conquering Greece and certainly not capable of conquering Turkey. Therefore, suchcould be accomplished only with theparticipation of Soviet forces. Theprobably estimates that the US and UN almost certainly would come to the support of Greece and Turkey and lhal in thosea general war between thc US and the USSR would probably result. An attack on Greece or Turkey is therefore unlikelythe period of this estimate.
ran. Of the areas where only Soviet forces are available for immediateIran Is unstable and Important.control of Iran would eliminate abase for hostile action against the USSR, would deprive the Westast oil supply, and would facilitate the subversion orof the Near and Middle East. However, the Kremlin probably estimates lhat theand economic instability and thcanti-British feeling ofTer good prospects of increasing Communist influence andof establishing Communist control without direct Soviet intervention. Under these circumstances we believe it unlikely that the Kremlin would consider It necessary to Incur the risk of war with the WesternInvolved in Soviet military intervention. But if the British should use military force in their dispute with Iran, the Kremlin might
then invoke1 treaty and occupy at least northern Iran, estimating lhat It could do so with relatively little risk of general war.
E. Employment of Soviet Forces Against US Forces
Kremlin almost certainlyovert and recognized commitment offorces against US forces in any areanotocal war with the US.the US might well use atomicalso the strong probability of generalthe US,S strategicon the USSR. Unless, therefore,had decided to accept generallhe US, weoviet attack onBerlin, Austria, or Japan wouldunlikely during the period of this
the Korean conflict continues orease fire, the Kremlin willcontinue lo aid the Communists inthe Kremlin estimates would notserious dangerreak betweenand US/UN. If, however, theforces In Korea were threatened withdefeat, the Kremlin would probablyits aid. ThU aid might wellintroduction of "volunteer" forces.even include the employment ofto such an extente factobetween the US/UN and the USSRAt every stage the Kremlin willendeavor to keep open the possibilitythe Korean conflict by politicalif the global interests of thebe served by disengagement In Korea.
IV. Possibility of General Waronsideration of the degree of probability of Soviet military action in speciflc areas must be related to over-all Soviet strategy andH the Kremlin should decide toor to accept general war, il might launch an attack in any area at any time and In any formrelude to such general war. Soviet forces arc in an advanced state ofand could initiate general war at any time with Utile or no warning. The danger of general war exists now and wilt continue to
oijonn-n
exist so long as the USSR isosition to take action which threatens, wholly or in part, the vital interests ol the Western Powers.
We believe that the most importantobjectives ot the Kremlin are to divide the West and to halt Western. West German, and Japanese rearmament. If thc Kremlin should fail to make sufficient progress toward that end by methods short of general war and If in addition it should become convinced that its superiority in conventional forces were about to be offset (whether through NATO and West German or Japanese rearmament or through Western advances in unconventionale believe the Kremlin would consider the advisability of precipitatingwar. We believe it unlikely that the Kremlin would adopt this course of action so long as Western rearmament appeared to it onlyransitory impediment to furtherand Satellite expansion. On the other hand, if the Kremlin were to conclude that this rearmament threatened the vital Interests of the USSR, we believe: (a) if it estimated that the USSR had sufficient means to wage war successfully and that the delay would tip the scales of power Irretrievably against the USSR, tho Kremlin would precipitate general war; but (b) if it estimated it did not have sufficient means to wage war successfully, the Kremlin would modify Its policy and attempt to relax international tension until such time as the Western Powers relaxed their vigilance or other factors favorable to the USSRIt is possible, however, that the USSR might precipitate war even under adverseif it considered the threat to its vital interests sufficiently real and immediate.
We do not believe that during tho period of this estimate the Kremlin is likely tothat US, NATO. West German, and Japanese rearmament constitutes anthreat to the vital interests of the USSR, it is possible, however, that the Kremlin may at any time conclude that the Westernprogram constitutes an eventual butunacceptable threat to its vital interests.
or that the Kremlin may at any timeWestern defensive measures as Indicating an imminent attack on the USSR.
There is,erious possibility of general war developing within the period of this estimate from an action or series ofnot Intended to produce that result. The Kremlin might, for example, miscalculate the degree of risk involvedarticular action or underestimate the cumulative effect ofactions. Or. it mightarticular action as so necessary or so advantageous as to warrant assumingerious risk ol general war.
We recognize the desirability and thcof concluding this estimateimple and direct statement of the likelihood or unlikelihood that the Kremlin willprecipitate or provoke general warthe US and thc USSR during the period here covered. Existing Inlelligence does not enable us to makerecise forecast. The USSR has the capability to launchwar and may decide to precipitate general war. Moreover, the international situation is so tense that at any time some issueoint beyond control.*
It Is the view of Uie Direclor of Naval intel-lieence. with respect lo Section rv above, that the final paragraph of this estimate should read aa follows:
"It la recognized thai precise Information on enemy intentions Is rarely available and that enemy counteraction cannot be accurately predicted. However, all aspecta of thc Soviet problemwc believe It unlikely Uiat the USSR will deliberately choose to precipitate or undergo Uie haaards ot general war during the period covered by this estimate. Although the possibility of war by miscalculation cannoi be discounted duringof high International tension, we believe that In pursuing various courses of action short of war with the US. the USSR will seek to Increase Its power and damage thc Interests of the USand wherever feasible, but will at every turn attempt to exploit each course of action with such caution aj to avoid direct military aggression against the vital Interests of the United Stales."
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