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SUTUtOTi Iropocanda Aopocto of tho Gormn Situation Since0
THE UAJOR POLITICAL, SCOXIOC, ADD SOCIAL
PHOPAGAiaU TREATUOT Hi
TTestorn Gormnyi Ibjor Icsues. A' Political.
1* Reunification of Ogrronyt Tho recent Pracuo proposal for tho ostablioliaontorman Constitutional Council with equal representation of East andGoroanyon effort In Soviot propaganda for the unification of Germany, Una propaganda uill continue toertain dogroe of appeal to soao West Gormn groupc nl.ich are Billing to achlovoool at any coot. On tho other handy tha nldospreadar and distrust of the USSR uill causost Gortnns to foregoodi ate attainaont of Gtnaa unification In favorolicy of closer iJeat Geman integration Into the west European oofi'intty.
2. Integration ofermany into thoEuropoan Conaunltyi Soviet otross that tho Western allien are formllzlng the opllt of Germany uill not, as atatod above, root nlth great success. Host Goroans are anxious to regain as quickly asrominent role in neat European affairs, and nlll realize that thia can boat bo achieved ot preaent by closer integration nith the noot European pouora and nlth the US.
Ronillt.irlaatlon cf Pest Gernanyt The USSR nlll continue to stress that Seat Gornony lo being thoroughly rearnod by the US and the uestorn Allies,art of US lrr;erlalistic alas in Europe. In vioo of Hast Gorman sentiment against rcarmaent, Soviet propaganda nay meet nlth coco success, and intensive oounter-propogonda mill bo noooasary.
Neutrality, and Third-Force Sentlaenti Soviet propaganda media have not placed great stress recently on this thamaj Conrwrdot propacanda haa shlftod ita ompliaais to di oaves al of neutrality and concentration on requiring an alitor-
Wotos This memorandum uaa_Dreparod at tho request of tho lntontopartooniol Foreign
DocucenlntornftMpn StaffI ft ha* not been ooordlnated ulth tho intelligence
ko cka JQTgaaiaartanna [Of thVDsportments of State, Army, Ilavy, and the Air Force.
tlaVs. CU"CTO to: TS S C
DDApruth: PDA
Dots: Vo^lT, hy:
nothing support of tho USSR and its policies,, neutrality ond Third-Forco sentiment lo otrong enough, however, to warrant propaganda treatment by US madia.
5. Conpunicnost Germany; Soviot propaganda attacks on Vest Gerrjnn offorto to suppress Coamniot il local octivitioa oill olno root nitli limited success, in vion of stronc popular fooling against tho Oonauniots ond their taoticQo Those attaela oill hove limited influence, honovor. In convincing sons Germans to insure their future by indicating frlondlinoss toward the Oocrninists and giving nana financial support to tho Party and ite press. Sons of the recent restrictions imposed upon Corrjunlat activity in Vfest Gornany ore regarded with nixed foolings byst Germans nho soo In tliese neasuroo an unwarranted Allied intorforence in internal Goraan affairohroat to civil rights. An Intensified information program to meet thie criticism aeons indicated.
Chauvinlam/Extremom, ngoaHazi Influencei The rise of chauviniot-oxtronist neo-Naai groups in .Vest Germany (the Bruderochaft,oes not present tho USSRortlmhile propaganda objective at the present tine, in vien of tho current negligible strength of these groups*
' 7- Tho Odor-Jteiaso Line; Soviet propaganda.onphaoin of thl3 issue haa incensed tho Host Germanoj itood subject for US media,
B. Economic.
. 1- .East-Best and Interzonal Trade; Tho great opportunities for trade with East Germany and tho rest of tho Soviet orbit win remain one of tho most effective Soviot propaganda lines, because of the natural appeal it holds forst German business interests. In view of standing Soviot allegations that the breakdown of interzonal trade negotiations is duo to allied pressure, Soviet obstructions to the resumption of trade negotiations in Berlin will not intorfore nith Soviet propaganda offorto to any appreciable degree. Hoeover, the USSR non nooda. neotom goods while pressure on iTost Germany for larketa)o oaaod by tho norld situation.
2. The Schumari Plan and Closer Economic Intepjation nithot; The USSR will probably have llmitod success In pointing up the differences nhich occur bet noon tho Germans and tho other nest Europeans in the negotiations for closor economic cooperation, and in oajhaoiting tho advantages of interzonal trade and trade nith the East,
Llvinn Conditions t loth thie thono which stresses tho rise In the coot of living in ifcst Germany and tho leu prices in IK) otoros in East Germany, ttw Soviets are lilcoly to meet vdth less success, ot leant for tho present, in vien of tho relatively good living conditions in neotom Gercony*
, ion of Controls- Relaxation of occupation controls will tend to reduce tho offectivonoaa of Soviet claims tbat Allied control neaauron, ouch ae tho Ruhr Authority, are harsh,,
5. rrfnnontltnr; and Reparations: This field niU present tho ussr nith Ineffective opportunit-ioa for propaganda, in vion of. tho virtual termination of disrontlinc activity by tha cootorn Allloa and the poor Soviot rocord in boat .
Occupation Coat a; Soviet and East Coram propaganda will dnoll heavily on the alleged oubstontial rise in occupation costs necessitated by the increase in Alliod forces in Germany and nill coaparo it unfavorably nith tlie steady decrease in Soviot occupation costs. Thie propaganda is likely to meet with oono measure of aucooos among tho Gorman public. Extensive treatment of all facts of the costs of "Gorman Security by US media coons necessary*
C, Social.
Thla lo an important Issue nhich la not extensively deal*
nith in Soviet propaganda, but ridch could bo stressed by US media. the troubles of tho rofugooa, they ore largoly in;orvlous to Sovietvice of their ortreae hatred for the
. . ' 2- POTi's in the usSRt This issue is another example of Soviot SoTlot propaganda, conoietlng. of oeak doniale
of Allied allegations that thousands of Gormanare still being held in the OSSR, has been acornfully rejected by tho Germans,,
II. East Germany: Uajor issues,'.
.A. Political.
1- Reunification of Germonvi Soviet propaganda In tliio field nill obviously meet nith more succoss in East tlian in Vttst Gornany, and niU attract many who, despite tholr distrust of tlie GDH, will be TdUing to follow tho notional Front lino in order to acliiove tho rouniflcatlon of Gornany,
20 Tho gdr Government; The Soviets ore likely to met nith gradual success in obtaining East Gorman popular support for the government of tho gdr, Ilovortl.oloos, fche undeencratic foatures of tho government presont goodor US media.
Roniiltariaatlon In Eoot Cormnv: Thia Io on issue nhlon la obviously not tho oubject of Soviet propaganda, but it presents ono of tho boat oprortunltioo for US oadia.
Tho Oder-IJeloso Linei Thio losuo is ono of tho coat unpopular issues ecThasized In Soviot prcpoeanda and ahould bo oxtonslvely axploltod by "JS
F ropog will,
ions: Tho East Corsonmlshad another floldtho Sovlote aro vulnorablo to attacks by US endia, in vlou of thonature of tho oinrle-liet eleotions, tho suppression of tliothe purees of all party loaders, oto.
3. Bconowj ^,
h East-rest ond Intery-ona! Trade; As In Rost Gernany, thia losuo is one an nlilch tho USSR la likely to liavo conalderablo propacanda success.
2- Idvlry, Conditions: Soviot allegationo in their propacanda that llvtoc coats are rioingot Oercnny, in contrast to reduced prices intores in East Gorrnny, aro likoly to meet with lncreaoinc auccess. US propacanda however, ahould point out continuously the relative scarcity of consumer goods, tho high price levels, and tho generally low standard of living in East Corrsmy, as contrasted uith tha situation in tho Cast,
3. Exploitation of Eaat Corman Labori In contrast to cloning Soviet propacanda accounts of labor's achiovocentaand tho Vicar Flan In East Cermny, US madia ahould stress tho exploitive charactor of Cocaunist labor policy, poor safety conditions (especially in the uraniumnd tho continuation of Soviet reparations.
C- Social.
POff'a in tho USSRi Tliia issue will continue toifficult one
for Soviet propacanda to deal with, and has incensed largo numbers of East Gercano as noli as those in 3Mt Germany. It la on iosuo wliich can etill bo emphasised toadvantage by US madia.
2- StruriTle Dytween Church and statot The inoreaslnc attempts by the GDR to control tho aetivitioe of tho Church in East Germany nlllifficult losuo for Soviot propacanda to liondle, and ia one nhlch US media ahould exploit,
3. Children in the GUI The cemnalgn of the COR and the USSR to win the children anay free the influence of the family haa net with popular resistance, and la an isauo ohlch ahould bo stressed by US radio.
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fEaCTIOIJ OF IKST-Jul EURGIEAII COUIUKIES TO CSKW! ISSUES*
ho Belgians and Inxonbourgors still Iinve reservations about hen nuch coo;>oration con bo oxjioetod iron tho TOot Germna. Informtion on concroto evidence of Vflst Gormny'o doeiro to enter aholchoartcdly in integration nooauros and of proGroBs mdo in ostablioliinc derncratic procoaoas in VTaot Gertnny uould probably bo of sons value 0
ho Moth or ion da has advocated for goto tine tho 'controlledof West Go many. Although Belgiun and Luxembourg ore. loss enthusiastic,accept tlio nocossity for rear nine ^st Gorcany touffer botnaon thenoviot invasion, Roassurine evidence that Heet Gernany io not activated by ultra-nationalistic rdlitariaa in joining in Western defense noaaures night bo useful,
ho Dcncluxoro uill natch closoly for tho development of any neo-Haal groups in Kent Gorntany but uould not be particularly influenced by Soviot propaganda on the subject, Tho continuationemocratic Govemnectost-Gernany and its actions nlll bo core reassuring to tho Qonolux pooplo titanelse,
I.IJ.E. Dusinaas groups in the Bonelux countrias aro. interested in trading with East Gorcnny and uould resent any groat or freedom granted Best Germany than their oua Govarnaonts alloa them. There seams to be little opportunity for effective propaganda treatment because of the informal nature of their Governmentcontrol over export of strategic matoriale.
mall group in tha Benelux countries nould be slightly susceptible to Soviot propaganda on lack of Rest German cooperation or ulterior neat Go roan natives in joining in economic integration measures. Generally, honovcr, the people are oonvinced of tho necessity of tiost German participation.
Tho Benelux countries aro more concerned nlth the maintenanceinimum of controls to prevent an independent ITS at Gernany acting contrary to
i/cstern European interests.
* "'Ro'actiorcnuabored according to headings in tho first section of this paper.
. Tho Itonolux pooplo ore noli aware of East Gorman remilitarisation ond nould not bo influenced by Soviot propaganda on tho oubjoct.
lw rjonolnx pooplo arc roll anaro of tho nature of trio Boot Germanand no special treatment sooth
ocauso of tho importance of religion and religious institutions In tho Benelux countries sonc troatmont of tlilc cubjoct night be uaofulo
HALT
. Soviot propaganda oUofing roarmoont of West Germany for US purposas of aggression nould causo apprehension anong cany peoplo (beoidos tho Coixiunists) who though looking nith favor upon the active reentry of Germany into the European economy, are dieturbod by tho rehabilitation of the Germany military. US propaganda could influence thia group,
if Soviot propaganda on East-West trade In Germany is extended toallegations of general blocldng of .natural lines of Eant-Sttst trodo in Europe, this theme night find sympathetic reaction anong norkora and cvon among non-Communist businessmen in Italy, If treated In this nay, tho thomo ohould bo countered by tho US.
hs OSSR nlll continue to stress tho rovival of German militarism. This lino in likoly to meet nith considerable success as long aa Franco is militarily seek and economic integration of Hast Gornany into the Wootom European Comainity io still bsing negotiated,
, Although not openly encouraging neutrality sentiment, Concainiot propaganda has proooted neutrality tlirough its peace campaign. Although noirtrality sentiment lias not grown recently, French popular opinion is susceptible to this type of Communist propaganda,
X,ri.2, The French Communist Party is planning toampaign against the Schuaan Plan, This typo of propaganda in conjunction with on ovor-ell Communist campaign to arouseontent is likoly to meet nith considerablo success this fall.
. Emphasis should bo made that any Gorman amy will boomponent partarger controlling groups
. Attempt night, ba rudo to allay Austrian Socialist Qusrioiona thatY&hrnacht gencrolo ars goininc influonco in tiio Adenauer Government.
* This situation also oxiots in Austria and any propaganda treatment by tlie BS of this problan nould bo of ornial interest in Austria.
, Socc effort night bo node to allay Socialist fearo of cartels.
, Austrinno aro oenoltlve about rofugoos in tholr country ond any attempt to aro us sympathies for Germany's problan in tlilo respect would antogoniao the Austriana nho want tlto most aympatly and relief.
. Auntriana nould like inclusion of tnoir own POyi'd in any treatment.
SPAPI
. Soviot propaganda on this subjoct will noteceptive audience Inthe la sue is enlarged and slanted oo as to identify it with tho political suppression of the Franco regime.
. In view of the Spanishnown interest in trade with the
OSSR and Eastern Europe, thla lino nould be off active in soao Govarnnont cireloo--
especially among Falangists.
Because of the large number of Spanish political refugees, thia topic would havo conoid arable appeal to tho Snaniah peoplo.
. Spanish "Blue Division" prisonersumber of Spaniah Loyalists ore still held in thepvlet denials that German PCT/'o are still hold In the USSR .rould receive llttlo credence.
. US propaganda on thie subject nouldeceptive audience, whereas tho Soviot line would not be effective.
. US propaganda on thla subject nould bo effective and aould be paralleled by the Spanish Government'e propaganda.
. ns propaganda on Clio subject would bo effective anong Spanish labor. In vien of similar conditions existing in Spain,
. US propaganda on thia subject would be offoctive in Spain, despite tilde-spread anti-cloricalisra stanrdng from identification of tho Spaniah Church with tho regime.
PUKDAuBrTAL SOVIET PROPAGANDA OBJECTIVES AHD THELES
nun respect to gsuwit
Tho folloninaobjoctivoo and thoaoa aro croupod according to tholr
mjma th0 CoograpMcol croupes, the order of llatios in dc^urdnod by tho relative OEphasin placed on then by Soviot nodia.
nxvtorartbal Soviot Propnf.-mda QMoctlvoo andn fl^ny.
A. To All of Gormany-
p^JccUyo: To obtain Gorman eynpathy and aupport for theand idoolocy of tho Soviot '
nriond. The USSJt eas novor
tasl0' Stalin haa olnayo boon
tlw friond of tho German pooplo,
(b) The.dssr ia otronfl (oil ponorful).
immrnir- If. Gnrnany'e historic (political and commercial)beat be furthered by coloration nith
!^ arly Co roan peace treaty, nith-dronal of occupation troope and reunification of Gornany.
Tho USSR favora participation of Germany in Euro noon
and particularly Satellite affaira,asis
(f) Tho USSR heads tho "peaoo"Oeetorn Pcwo,
The US doos noterman peace treaty, does not
Hg^sdttK occupation troops from Gominy, does not uont to see Germany
cnnopolintic, lta
tion fromoU^^
of the "peoco" to the overnhelninc strength
- fl
r
(e) Tho IE nor.to to plurco tho world Into another Tho U3 lo rccdlltorizing Objoctivo: To obtain Gormn acccptonco of tho Gder-IIoisooOdor-IIolflDO frontierponce frontier."
to plurco^ "ant to chance tho GderWfeiaoa frontier nant
(o) Rovinion of tho Cder-Boiose frontier noons ear.
East GermnT.
Govornrxslt.upport of tho East Oermn
ho GDR ia the locally recognised
JbJ ^to tho East Cornea GOTornrjont
and playo into tho hands oftenT^
united front" (of all political elonento) la
Uost Gornony..
1. Objective t To obtain aynpathy for tho GDR Gcvcrnaont. CarEany Thanes: he Cm Government can bring about the unification of
Mtmmmw s GP?btaia an oll-Camon peace
treaty and vdthdranal of occupation troops,
(c) Tho GDR GoTomacnt is an all-Geman Govornnont.
with tho GBR Government nlll rooult in
^WoWSuMR a^ th8 &
(e) An "all-Cerroh Constitutional Council" oliould bo fomod to prepare for an elL-Oercan Cc-nrnaont,
-9-
Objoctivst To undorrdno tho. authority of tho Donn Covcrnmnt,
(a) Tlie Donn Government lo tho tool (puppet) of tho US acsroeoore. The Bonn Covernmnt conflicts of traitors.
(b) Tho Bonn Govommnt uill embroil Gerrnny in another
(Covert there spread by nord of nouth:) The USSR.
ooperatinc uith Bonn ana the US will be punlalwd.
3. Objective-! To provost lost Goman aynpathy for participationEuropean Union and/or any Pastern military
TJwgos: (a) parUciapUon uill only mean anotherfor0n* to
Cooporntion nlth tho US uill result in Corahysical
^arantol Soviot Propaganda OVioctivoa and Thenon nlth Ba-yvW.
to Geraany-
Satellites" 0 the COS acceptable to tho Eastern European
, Thenesi Tho Mails have been eliminated in the om and the CarmenP^aco" loving and anxious to cooperoto nith
Europe.
j2iSi Cormny isajor propacanda topic in Soviet outputstern Europe or in Waotern European Cocnunlot media. Only In and to Franco and occasionally in tho Lou Countries docs Germany enteropic of Soviot propaganda,
To cause distrust and dlaacreenentatorn
Suropean countrlea and botuaan noatern European countrlos and the US.
Jbo9M8 (a) German rcorrmcont nlll endancor tho security ofHolland,
(b) The Fronch and Gorman loadoro are oorking contrary to tho interests of tho French and German people (Schuoan plan),
Original document.
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