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SUBJECT I An Bo time te of Soviet and Non-Soviet Reactions to US Jfuoloar Energy Teats and Probable Consequent Actions and Resulte
SUHl&RT
Soviet diplomacy and propaganda, in developing its *peace" campaign, vould utilise forthcoming US nuclear energy tests aa further proof ofaggressive" intentions, whether or not these tests were announced publicly. Tho nbeenoo of any US annouraemont uould enable tho USSR to rcloaoo an important novo story nnd thus capitalize on such publicity for propnrnnda purposes.
In Europe aad BrltjJn, general reaction to such tests will bo favorohlo aa an indication of continuing US loader ship in atomic weapons which they reflard ao their greatest protection against Soviet oggrooeion. Absence of any official US announcement might cause HATO alliea of the US to foel that tho US does not appreciate their stake in Euro peon defease. In any event, Soviet propaganda following the atomic testa will be of little significance in Vostein Europe.
There uill bo no significant reaction In the Rear and Middle Fast to euoh tests, announced or unannounced, eznopt in India where there will be renewed criticism of US atomic policy. Moreover, Sovlotuill have little effect in this area.
Little eignlfloant reaction will be provoked In the Far Faat aside from Japan, whore Increasing US military onpnbllitioe will eneourago clooer alignment with tho US. Soviet attempts to exploit these too to for propaganda purposes throughout tho Par &mt uill not have any value to the USSR whether or not there have been US public aanennccnento.
botex TMfl mtrrrnndum has not been coordinated with theof the Departments of State, Army,Ko.
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HO CJIAHGBYDKCUSSJFjfiDHAKGKD SOl I? 6 DIpr 77
Auth: Im MBi Trnns
On tbe baaLa of previous Soviet propaganda behavior in conneotlon with past announcanonts of US atomic woanona. It may be assumed that Soviet diplomacy and propaganda will utilise now testa aa further proof or US "aggressive" Intentions as compared with thantentions of the USSR. The USSR, without mentioning any specific weapons or revealing any details which Soviet intelligence might have obtained, will direct its activity to presa for the outlawry of nuclear enorgy weapons* It is possible, however, that latest US atomic developments iieht not bo fully exploited for fear of proclaiming furtiier potential US strength, especially to peoples In tha Satellite aUtea.
The US nuclear enorgy program has alwaysey target for infiltration, primarily for purposes of espionage. Prior knowledge that these teats are beingigJit increase Communist infiltration efforts but not to any groat degree. The major Communist effort will be expended in attempting to collect information rather than to sabotage tbe Task Force or related
It is worth noting that Soviet propaganda did not react inaedlately tooabomb announcements. In the case ofoab, the Soviet home audience waa not informed for approximately five weoka and then in terms intended to minimize the significance of tha US development. Doubts were expressed concerning the potential existence ofomb and of the "new atomichere has been no 3oviet propaganda reaction to tho US announcement that the Erdwetok proving grounds would be usedermanent basis.
In ita propaganda to tha Satellite and world-wide audiences, which was keptinimum, the USSR claimed that It would soon have the "know-how* of the "super-bomb." Also tha USSR, in attempting to divide the ITeatern Powera, developed the propaganda theme tliat the US was not sharing Ita atomic secrets and was, in fact, using than to intimidate its own alliea.
The USSR scarcely exploited its possession ofombrlmarly propaganda asset. Presidentnnouncement was followed by only the briefest confirmation of the report and little or no comment, even though Soviet possession ofeapon might be considered an excellent way of countering lagging confidence in Soviet strength, compared to that of ths US, throughout the Soviet orbit.
Jul' nil IIT
In tho eventublic announcement of US nuclear energy tests. Soviet diplomacy would be most likely to concentrate on such dovolopoenta as "proof of US aggresslvo intentions in support of ita "peace" campaign, especially the World Peace Partisans* appeal for the interdiction of all weapons. The USSR would especially utilise this line of argument in the United Rations in order to Btrongtnon its proposal for the control of atomic energy, nt the aame time Soviet propaganda, while only mentioning the new weapons and thoir capabilities in the broadest terms, will prob-bly cast doubt on their effectivewaa. In addition, efforts would be made to provoke suspicion among US Atlantic Pact alliea that, since the US was not sharing its atomic secreta, it intended to achieve ultimate domination over Soviet aa well as all flestern countrlea.
If no public announcement of tha tests la nude, Soviet diplomatic andreaction would follow the same general lines. If tho US anould fall to inform its .lesiern alliea of its intention to conduct such testa, and if foreign observers should be excluded, Soviet propaganda would have an excellent opportunity to exploit consequent 4eatern irritation. Finally, absence of any US announcement might enable tbe USSR to be the first to publicewa event of world-wide Interest. By capltslliing on the attentiontory would attract, tbey could expose their propagandauch larger audience.
2. European Reaction.
*i Europe, although most people will be conpletely apathetic to US atomic tests, responsive groups will be gratified over continuing US progress in atomic rososrahgre-tor US military capabilities agalnat the Soviet bloc. Also many people will speculate whether tho teste involve the hydro con boob. Tnero will bo oncour-jeuont for ,iestorn iCuropoon hopea that Soviet aggression can be deterred, and,mail degree, this will help to strengthen the will to resist.
In Germany, although the general reaction will be favorable. Socialists are likely to fear that the testa are subtle threats directed at the USSR and their concern over Soviet atomic progress will be revived-
In France, the reaction to the tests will be more favorable if the US announcement gives soma indication of their degree of success and of their importance to the development of atomic weapons.
If there ia no official US announcement, resentment and suspicion might arise in ordinarily friendly Vestorn European quarters. There wouldisposition to feel that tho US dooa not appreciate the Western European stake
defense against the Soviet bloc, and each government might suspect tha other governments had been made privy to the socnta of the tests. In addition, silence in flashington would seen to many Europeans to support tlie Soviotthat the US isreventive war. The Cuviunists mmldlearer field for spreading whatever prop- ;anda they chose, and non-Coomunlsts would criticise the US for giving tho Coomuniats this opportunity.
Soviet propaganda following ttio atonic teats will be generally of little consequence in lijrtaern and ;tejtern Bcrepe. Soviet propa-ardae effective, howev-r, ifutubllc US announcoaent of the tests b
Scandinavian reaction to US atomic tests will Ue favorable even ifdo public announcement, because tlwy will be encouraged by suchof growing US milit-ry strength. Also, they will hopo that, ansecurity will permit, the USare Uie results of such tests with NATO
b^ British re-ction touclear energy tests will be largely favorable since they regard US leadership In atcuic weapons ae vital in deterrinr the USSRggression in Western Surope, nevertheless, there will be acme unexpressed uneasiness over tlie continuing development of imsa destruction weapons among many British people who are aware of the vulmrability of tl.sir island. Also there will bo some advorse comment in the doctrinaire' ninority wing of therty, which does not fully trust the foreign or military policiescapitalist" state, ether or not thereublic onnouncennnt will oe or minor significance, although the shock effectews leak from Moscow would have an unfavorable effect on the British, especially those in official circles, who wish to regain the close collaboration on nuclear weapons development, that was instituted during the war. HowR interprets tha tests will bo of little or no importance in Britain.
3. Wear and ern faction.
There would be no significant reaction in the Hear und Middle Seat to nuclea-erergy tests, anno-inced or unannounced, except in the Ineian subcontinent, in fk?5. -nd people wouUha testa favorably a5 evidence tnat the US was making an effort to maintain its load over tho UJJS in the development of nuclear energy weapons.
The Indian reaction to tho tests would be one of strong disapproval, Tba government and the artlcul_te Indian .ubllcxistence of the atom bomb -nd condemn its use. The Indians apparently feelS supremacy in tbe field of .tomle weapons merely stren<,thens those elements ln the US opposed
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to any sort of rapprochement with the USSR, fcloreover, theyhe fact that the bomt waa uaod against an Oriental ratheruropean or white people. The Indian press and probably waters of tne government.especially Solumwouldat the nuclear energy tests, by actingeminder of US prep-redness,eckless intent to intimidate the Ccrounifit world.
Pakistan woulduch more realistic view of the tests, and there would be no adverse reaction either In official circles or among Pakistanishole. Nevertheless, the pro-Communist and anti-US press in Pakistan is disproportionately great, and reaction in tnat element of,the Pakistani prose would be similar to the reaction in the Indian press generally.
Tho reaction of the governments and people of the Near and Kiddle East to US nuclear energy tests would, in general, be unaffected by Soviet propaganda on tha subject. Soviet allegations of US bellicosity would fit in well with the reaction in India andertain element in Pakistan. Soviet propaganda that "American victories mean only destruction for tho nations America protects" would alsoeceptive audience in both countries because of reaction to U3 bombing on Korea. Thus, in effect, Soviet propaganda would merely intensify somewhat the feeling which already existod in India and among curtain Pakistanis.
(i. ;'ar eastern Heaction.
Knowledge of the conduct of US nuclear energy tests in tho springhether derived from official US announcement oronsequence of Sovietda exploitation, would provoke little significant reaction In the Far Knst. In the ll.-ht of known over-all US political, economic and mil* tory capabilities in the Far East and the comparative capabilities of the Soviet Union, the innease in US military potential implied by the tests would be viewed onlymall addition to an already rapidly developing strength.
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Tne Japanese,of tnoir experience in World War II, haveonsistently keen interest in atomic warfare developments. The conduct of tests Lmplying the development of even more destructive atomic weapons would tend to increase Japanese apprehensions for their future security, in view of their fear that Japan mightrospective battlefield in the eventhirdlar. Novorttieless, since other factors continue to orient Japan towardnd such orientation will probably be stronger in the spring1 than at present, knowledge of US nuclear energy testa probably rill arouse both hope and confidence in tlie -bility of the US toargin of superiority over the USSR in atomic capabilities. In other non-Communist parts of the ParGovernments and pooules look to the US for world
tests would be mildly reassuring a3 regardsS ability to deter further Soviet Inspired aggression.
It is anticipated tutt "oouaunist governments and propagandists in the For East would exhibit little significant reaction to the UJ tests. The Chinese Communist have given minimal attention to the 'S atomic program to date and nay bo expected to follow tne Soviet line by belittling the military value of nuclear weapons and at the same time citing the testa as proof of "aggressive aims" on the part of tho US. Tho occasion of the teats, however, might be used by the Chlneso Communists to launch their own diplomatic and propagandain support of tho USSR's proposals on the international control of atomic energy.
On tlie other hand, Soviet attempts to exploit US nuclear energy testa for propaganda purposes could notachieve favorable results for the USSR in the Far East, whotlior or not tho tests had been accompanied by US publicoviet allegations that the tests were proof of US aggressive intentions would hove no appreciable effoct on the situation in Korea. Soviet propaganda directed toward Japan wouldairly sophisticated audience, quite aware of Soviet atomic capabilities, but not impressed b- Soviet propaganda attack* on the tz It has been indicated that the Japanese believe toe Soviet 'nlon itself must takeoxt move in an effort to promote world peace and that such an effort, to be genuine, shouldonsiderable compromise of present Soviet position on international control of atomic energy. Soviet exploitation of the US tests would be completely ineffective in tho Philippines. In other parts of Southeast Asia, since the .'eneral line of Sovietthe US as anlrtoo rial lotbe supported bycloser to loral experience than nuclear cnerry tests, the effectiveness of CcnunJst propaganda would not be appreciably increased by tuo availability of this new "evidence.*
Long-Rango Effect on Soviet -'olicy.
The long-range effect on Soviet policyeault of the tests will not be distinguishable from the general effect of any increase in over-all Western strength. Increased -'astern strength will cause tne USSR to Intensify Itsqual US achievements in the nuclear energy field. If toe Soviet Union decided to engage in global warfare, tills decision would be basically determined by Lie USSR's measure of its own preparedness relative to that of the US and ita allies. Present prospects are, however, that bae USSR willto follow its policy of political pressure and intimidation hacked by tne throat of amed force aa evolved since the end of florid lar II,
Original document.
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