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NAT ONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION IN KOREA
NIE-2
6 November 1M0
Advance Copy
In order to expedite delivery, this estimate is beingpecial preliminary distribution. The final printed copy will be disseminated as boot, as available.
The intelligence organizations of tne Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force participated in the preparation of this estimate and concur in it This paper is baaed on information availableor
CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION IN KOREA
THE PROBIVEM
c estimate the scale and purpose of Chinese Communist intervention in North Korea and Chinese Communistand Intentions.
SUMMARY and CONCLUSIONS
Chinese Communist troop strength in Northestimated0hinese Communistare engaging UN forces at various points ranging from
iles south of the Korean-Manchurian border. Recent action has been marked also by the appearance of Soviet-type Jet fighters in combat with US aircraft over Korea.
Present Chinese Communist troop strength in Manchuria is estimated. Of this number, there are ategular field forces. These troop strengths, added to the forces already In Korea, are believed to make the Chinese Communists capable of: (a) halting further UN advancethrough piecemeal commitment of troops; or (b) forcing UN withdrawal to defensive positions farther south by aassault
The objective of the Chinese Communist Intervention appears to be to halt the advance of UN forces In Korea and toommunist regime In being on Korean soil. In accomplishing this purpose, the Chinese Communlsbj would: (a) avert the psychological and political consequencesisastrous outcome of the Korean venture; (b) keep UN forces away from the actual frontiers of China and the USSR; (c) retain an area in Korea as
a base of Communist military and guerrilla operations; (d) prolong indefinitely tbe containment of UK, especially US, forces ln Korea; (e) control the distribution ofpower generated in North Korea and retain other economic benefits; and (f) create the possibility of apolitical solution ln Korea, despite the military defeat of the North Koreans.
The Chinese Communists thus far retain full freedom of action with respect lo Korea. They are free to adjust thetr action ln accordance with the development of the situation. If the Chinese Communists were to succeed In destroying the effective strength of UN forceB in northern Korea, they would pursue their advantage as far as possible.hesituation is stabilised, they may well consider that, with advantageous terrain and the onset of winter, their forces now in Korea are sufficient to accomplish their immediate purposes.
A likely and logical development of the present situation Is that the opposing sides will build up their combat power in successive Increments to checkmato the other until forces of major magnitude are Involved. At any point ln thisthe danger la present that the situation may get out of control and leadeneral war.
The Chinese Communists, in Intervening ln Korea, haverave risk of retaliation and general war. They would probably ignore an ultimatum requiring their withdrawal. If Chinese territory were to be attacked, they would probably enter Korea in full force.
The fact that both the Chinese Communists and the USSR have accepted an increased riskeneral war Indicates either that the Kremlin is ready tohowdown with the West at an early date or that circumstances have forced them to accept that risk.
-it -
PlSCU&SIQIi
ctual Development of Intervention to Date.
Prior to mid-October, Chineae Communist support of the North Koreans consisted solely of logistical aid and moralSince that time, however, the Chinese Communists hare been committing troops in Increasing number so that at present UN forces are being engaged by Chinese Communist ground units In varying penetrations, ranging fromiles Bouth of the Manchurian-Korean border.
To date, elements taken from the Chineaeh,d armies of the Fourth Field Army have been Identified in the combat zone of Korea. Units of approximately battalion else from each division of three or more of the Chinese Communist armies along the Korean border In Manchuria have been combined to form units of approximatelyze. One regular Chinese Communist division has been tentativelyPresent Chinese Communist troop strength in North Korea ls estimated to number0his number,with an0 North Koreas troops, constitutes an over-all enemy strength0f this total, an0 are In contact with UN forces.
The arrival of Chinese Communist ground units in the Korean fighting has been accompaniedarked stiffening of North Korean resistance. The previously confused and disorganised North Korean units now appear to be In process of recommitment as reorganized and re-equlpped combat units. There arethat Chinese Communist forces in Korea are being reinforced.
Although the nationality of the hostile aircraft Involved in recent incidents over the Korean-Manchurian border has not been definitely established, the fact that Soviet-type Jet aircraft were
involved Indicates tha* Ihe North Koreans ai* receiving air assistance from Manchuria tn addition toground force support from the Chinese Communists.
hinese Communist Capabilities for Armed Intervention.
The over-all strength of the Chinese Communist ground forces Is estimated. Of thisre well-trained and well-equipped regular field forces, and the remainder are fairly well-trained and well-equipped military district troops, ln addition, there areoorly-trained and poorly-equipped provincial troops.
Sincehere haseneral build-up of Chinese Communist tactical troop strength in Manchuriaoint which exceeds normal security needs. The movement of numerous major units from south and central China Is estimated to have brought current Chinese Commuriiit strength into. Ot this number, there are ategular field forces, comprising possibly eight to ten armies, plus elements cf at least four other armies.
The Chinese Communist Air Force, not tested ln combat to data, is believed to consistombat aircraft in tactical units. Of,re TUight bombera,reround attack,reighters. It Is possible that the CCAF mayoviet-type swept-wing Jet fighters formerly stationed In the vicinity of Shanghai, some of which are believed to have been ihe jet aircraft which have appeared in recent operations tn North Korea.
With these ground forces and this air strength, the Chinese Communists could probably make available aa manyroops withinoays for sustained ground operations In
Korea and could provide limited air support and some armor. This could be done without Jeopardizing their internal control In Manchuria or China, proper. The Chinese Communist Forces are therefore believed capable either of: (a) halting further UN advance northward by matching any foreseeable UN build-up with piecemeal commitment of forces presently along the Yalu River; or (b) forcing UN withdrawal to defensive positions further southowerful assault.
hinese Communist Motives for Interverition.
The Chinese Communist decision to commit troops in North Korea, entailing as it does the serious risk of widening the Korean conflict, would not have been taken by Communist China without Soviet sanction or possibly direction. It must therefore bethat both parties consider the anticipated benefits to justify the acceptance of the calculated risk ofeneral war In China which could eventually Involve the Soviet Union. This calculated risk Includes the possibilityeaction on the part of the US directly to meet the broader issue with the USSR rather than to allow Itself to become involved in an expensive andwar with Communist China.
The Immediate occasion for Communist Chinese armedappears to have been the crossing ofh Parallel by US forces and the consequent swift collapse of North Korean resistance. Unless the Chinese had intervened, UN forces would soon have reached and secured the Yalu River line. The Korean People's Republic would have ceased to exist exceptovern-ment-ln-exile anduerrilla movement. Confronted with this possibility, the Chinese Communists have apparently determined to prevent an early UN military victory in Korea and toommunist regime in being on Korean soil.
It Is significant that the Chinese Communists refrained from committing troops at two ea. ner critical phases of the Korean war, namely when the UN held no more than atoehold In the Pusan perimeter and later when the UN landings were made at Inchon. The failure to act on those occasions appears to indicate that Pelping was unwilling toerious risk of war, prior to the US creasing ofh Parallel. Since the crossing of tke Parallel Chinese Communist propaganda has Increasingly tdentdled the Pelping canes with the cause of the North Koreans.
The immediate objective of the Chinese Cummunlstin Korea appears to have been to halt the advance of UN forces. Chinese Communist military operations to date, Including the nature of the forces employed, siejgest aa interim military operation with limited objectives. This view Is strengthened by consideration of the limitations imposed on military operations by winter weather In this mountainous area.
In assisting the North Koreans, the Chinese Communists can derive several advantages for themselves, the Soviet Union, and world Communism. They are:
o avert the psycholottlea) and political consequencesisastrous outcome ol the Korean venture.
The prestige of the world Communis; movement and, more particularly, the domestic and International political position of the Chinese Cosamuftist regime, are linked with the fate of the North Koreanomplete UN victory In Korea would adversely affect the power of international Communism to attract and hold adherents. Por the Chinese regime Itself, the total eliminationatellite state In Korea
woulderious loss ol political lace In China and in the world at large, mom notably In the Asiatic areas that hare probably been selected by the Chinese Communists as their primary sphere ot Influence.
fceep UN forces away from the actualChina and the USSR.
eetero-oriented and US-supported regime on the south bank of the Yalu River ls probably viewed by Peipinghreat to the security of the Communist regime in China. The USSR would likewise be sensitive to the advance of UN forces to the northeastern tip of Korea. The Chinese Communists apparently regard the USostile power, determined to bring about their eventual overthrow.
retain an area In Koreaase ofand fruprriUa operatjons.
The terrain of North Korea adjacent to the Manchurian border is especially suitable (orase.
prolong^indefinitely the conteinment of UN,forces in Korea. t
Prolonged Involvement of UN and US forces In Korea, is favorable for Communist global strategy. The containment of these forces in Korea prevents their redeployment toor to other areas where they might be required to oppose Communist aggression.
conirol lhe distribution of hydroelectrictn North Koroa and retain olher
Peiping has an immediate economic stake inriendly state south of the Yalu. Theinstallations In North Korea, particularly the Sulho punt, are important sources of power for South Manchuria. The port of Antung ln Manchuria Is part of an economic entity that embraces the Korean city of Slnuiju across the river; trade In the area would be hampered severely if noexisted lor the operation of the Antung-Slnuiju portingle unit. River traffic on the Yalu awl the Tumen Rivers Is dependent upon workable agreements between political authorities ln Manchuria and Korea.
create the possibilityavorableIn Korea, despite the military defeat ofKoreans.
It Is possible that the Chinese Communists and the USSR hope toilitary situation that will make the UN willing toettlement of the Korean conflict in preferenceong drawn-out and expensive campaign.
ossible Developments
The Chinese Communists thus far retain full freedom of action with respect to Korea, They are free to adjust their actions In accordance with the development of the situation. Their current violentas It has on (a) the "will of the Chinese people" (rather than theto supply "people's volunteers" to aid the North Koreans and "defendnd (b)use of Japanese" and
e
"aping of Japan" In Its "aggression againstexcellently adapted for preserving maneuverability. It could mean equally: whipping up of public opinion that seems chilly toward any Koreanart of awar ofeal Intention to organize an anti-UN military campaignpeople's volunteer" basis;sychological preparation of the Chinese people forwith the US, iforld war.
If the Chinese Communists were to succeed inthe effective strength of UN forces in northern Korea, the Chinese Communists would probably pursue thatas far as possible, bringing In reinforcements from Manchuria to exploit the opportunity.
If the military situation ls stabilized, the Chinesemight well consider that, with advantageous terrain and the onset of winter, their forces now In Korea are adequute toilitary decision favorable to the UN, at least until spring.ilitary deadlock would contain UN forces in Korea and expose them to attrition. It would also permit the reconstitutlon of North Korean forces and facilitate the development of guerrilla operations behind the UN lines. In these circumstances, the possibility of asolution as the most convenient means of bringing the situation in Koreaonclusion would be Increased.
A likely and logical development of the present situation ls that the opposing Bides will build up their combat power in successive increments to checkmate the other until forces of major magnitude are involved. At any point in thisthe danger is present that the situation may get out of control and leadeneral war.
The Chinese Communists appreciate that ln Intervening tn Korea they have incurred grave risks of retaliation and general war, but have accepted the risk. They would probablyN ultimatum recmlrlw' L',ielr withdrawal. If Chinese territory were to be attacked, ihey could and probably would enter Korea ln full force, with the purpose of expelling UN forces altogether.
The fact that both the Chinese Communists and the USSR have accepted an Increased riskeneral war Indicates either that the Kremlin Is ready tohowdown with the West at an early date or that circumstances have forced them to accept that risk.
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DISTRIBUTION
The Ptestden'. Secretary of State Secretary of Defense Secretary of the Army Secretary of the Nary Secretary of tbe All Force Chan-men, National Security Resources Board executive Secretary. NaUonal Security Council Chief c: staff. U8 Array Chief of Naval Operations Chief cf Stafi. US Air Force Assistant Chief of. Operatlora. OS Army Deputy Chlof ot Naval Operations (Operations) Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations. US Air Force Director of Plans and Operations. US Air Force SpcciBl Assistant- InteUlaence.f Slate Assistant Chief of, inUlllaenee. US Army Director of Naval inlelUfence Dlreetor of Intelligence, US Air Force Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff Assistant Secretary of Navy tor Air joint In'-elllatenc* droop, Joint StatT Deputy Chief of Staff (or Plans. US Array Director. Armed Forces Security Aaencj"
Original document.
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