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SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA
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SOVIET CAPABILITIES ANO INTENTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA
SUMMARY
objective of the USSR In Latin America Is presumed to be to Impose the greatestlimitations on the support the USfrom thc area. Directly and through local Communists in Latin America, the USSR has capabilitiesinning support of Soviet positions by exploiting certain patterns in Latin American life that facilitate the Communist approach and by taking advantage of specific incidents for propagandaeducing the extent of Western Hemisphere solidarity by exploiting historicalopposed Intensely nationalisticand conflicting nationalausing dissension between political factions in some countries (particularly Bolivia.Chile, Cuba, and Guatemala) to the point of impairing political stability and of shifting the balance ofakingmilitary action by harassing sea lines of communication between the US and Latin America through submarine action and by landing sabotage agents and small commando parties;. and moat important,Latin American economic support of the US in several Important fields. Considerable damage and production losses could be caused by sabotage of the presently vulnerableInstallations In Venezuela, Mexico.Peru, and the Dutch West Indies, and of the railway and port installations necessary for the shipment of vital materials fromChile, Brazil, Mexico, and Peru By work stoppages Communists could, particularly during the penod short of actual hostilities, seriously reduceeriod of two weeks or more vital shipments from Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Cuba, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela By public agitation of Issues already having some degree of popular support Communists in some
countries areosition to foment massand encourage political action limiting the availability of strategic materials.
It is estimated that the USSR Intends, largely through local Communists, to make full use ot their limited propagandato win Ideological support by exploiting special Incidents and latent anti-USIn Latin America, but that they will not greatly increase their efforts to gain control of such propaganda outlets as newspapers and radio stations Latin American Communists will attempt to create discord betweennations. Effort* to Impair politicalwill probably be most accentuated in Bolivia. In Chile, Cuba, and Ecuador,will be more restrained, watching for favorable opportunities rather than initiating action themselves; Ouatemalan Communists intend to continue support of the Arevaloand to try to ensure that the next government is friendly to them. Sovietcapabilities, such as harassing sea lines of communication and attacking vulnerablefacilities with landing parties, willbe reserved for use in wartime. Soviet-directed sabotage will probably also befor the eve or first stagesS-USSR war, but local Communists will commitacts of sabotage under current Strike action during the period short of war will be largely for thc purpose ofCommunist labor organizations andof labor, and in wartime lo paralyzeindustries. Communists Intend, through public agitation, to reduce the supply ofand strategic materials by touching off mass disturbances, by exploiting the theme of nationalization, and by encouragingof foreign-owned properties.
SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA
Objective! in latin America.
In anticipation of continuing and deepening conflict with thc capitalist world, the USSR seeks lo increase its relative power by building up its own strength and undermining lhat of its antagonists With respect to Latin Amcr-tea. the objective of the USSR must beto be to reduce support of the US as greatly aa possible until the sovietlzalion of the area becomes possible and its resources become available directly to augment Soviet strength.
CapobiMies andin lolin Amoica.
a. Developing Support ol Soaet Positions.
Communismtin America is nownn Instrument of Soviet foreign policy. There ore. however, certain factors in Latin American life lhat facilitate the Communist approach, and such success as thehave had in winning ideological support derives largely from their skill In capitalizing upon these factors as well as from their ability to seise upon incidents for propagandaAmong the factors that have assisted lhe Communists arc the communal economic usages of some countries, the absence of any ideal of non-State controlled economy, and the extreme maldistribution of wealth. Into lhe factors thai favor support ofhowever, another group of factors, of which the most important are the influence of the Catholic Church, the relative smallness of the industrial working class, and theof ihe strongly anti-Communistforces, lends to limit Communistfor winning popular support. The net effect of factors favoring and factors opposing Communist ideology varies from country lo country On the whole, Communistfor gaining general ideological support of the Soviel position are not great but are important as they are reinforced by certain latent .'inti-L'S sentiments. In Guatemala, for
example, where Marxism has been important In both official attitudes and policies and where large US businesses have been popular objects ofmall number oflargely by taking the lead in attacking US businesses, gained government favor and access to official press and radioime and gained control of the two major labor
The Communists also have somefor gaining support of specificew groups in Latin America, usually for limited periods. For example, lhc Communists, playing uponeady response among non-Comimmlsts to their Incitement against lhe sending of Argentine troops to Korea. When the US owned Cuban light company petitioned for on increase In vales, this unpopular move was attacked at once by the Communists, who labeled it an example of "imperialisUcof weaker peoples" by US corporations. Communists were able to magnify thebehavior of two US sailorsuban park into an Incident showing disrespect for the Cuban hero Marli, thereby seriously, if temporarily, lowering popular esteem of the US. CominunisU have been able to collect thousands ot signatures fromas well as Communists to the so-called Stockholm "peace" appeal
During the period between the two world wars, the Communists Inat incountries supported and gained some credit from movements In relativelyand democratic directions. Thefor example, assislcd ln the passage of laws favoring labor and conferring social benefits In addition, the Communists have participated prominently in laboractivity, particularly during World War II when Soviet prestige was at itseservoir of good wiU In Latin America was thereby created for the Communists which has noi been entirely dissipated Moreover, since
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aspirations of large segments ofreater degree of democracy remain unfulfilled, the Communists are able to exploit their pose as champion of LheToday Communists are still tolerated and sometimes welcomed in the educational .systems of Chile, Cuba, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama. Uruguay, and Venezuela, and in this way are able to develop student or youthsusceptible to Soviet Influence.
Soviet-Communist efforts to gain suppori will consist largely of propaganda exploitation of latent anti-US sentiment. Althoughinfluence In Latin America hasover the last three years, there is no evidence that the Communists intend in the near future to intensify efforts to gainof such propaganda outlets as newspapers and radio stations.
essening af Hemisphere Solidarity. The Communists in Latin America cannot prevent cooperation and mutual support among nations of the Western Hemisphere bui they are capable of reducing cooperation and harmony by exploiting historical antagonisms, racial issues, opposed intensely nationalistic sentiments, and conflicting sectional interests. At thc moment, Communists In Argentina. Brazil, and Mexico, can add their weight lo local isolationism and augment thc forcesto prevent the governments of those countries from making effective offers ofor other assistance to the UN in Korea. On the Issueorridor to the sea forCommunists can add slightly to thebetween Bolivia. Peru, and Chile, and at lhe same time increase suspicion of the US; they can help keep alive and develop the issue of the boundary between Ecuador and Peru; they can exploit racial issues, especially in the Caribbean area pointing lo racial Inequality in Uie US; they can add their voices to those who oppose colonialism in the Western Hemisphere and who. for example, would like to see Belizeart of Guatemala or whoovement to "free" Puerto Rico from the US. In such countries as Mexico, Cuba, Chile, and Uruguay, liberal democratic aversion Ui "dictatorial" rulers con beby the Communists to make relations more difficult between these countries and the
"dictatorships" such as Argentina, Venezuela. Nicaragua, Peru, and the Dominican Republic.
Latin American Communists will oppose all strengthening of the inter-American system by arousing suspicions of the US and by allying themselves with isolationist and extremeelements in countries where they have influence
With the possible exception of the two French islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe, the Communists by themselves do not possess anywhere in thc area the capability of gaining firm political control either by peaceful means or byovernment. Because of special situations in several countries,they do have the capability of causing considerable dissension between exlsUngto the point of impairing politicalor of shifUng the balance of political power by entering into combinations with one of thc existing factions. The Communists arc also capable in some countries of causing aof violence that would embarrass the
The chronically unstable governments in Bolivia and Ecuador continue to exist largely because of dissension among opposition forces, of which Communists are one small group. Communist capabilities are probably slightly greater in Bolivia. ombination between the PIR (the leftist opposition party whichmost local Communists and IsMarxist in orientation, and commands considerable popular support) and the other opposition party, the rightist MNR. might be strong enough to overthrow the government and would result In chaotic condition*. In Ecuador, the otherwise negligible Communist strength might, if added to an existingcoalltiun, furnish the slight edgeto ensure thc downfall of the government. The Ecuadoran Communists, however, could not formoalition, but could onlylo overtures lor their support.
The Communists in Chile might havepoliUcal power within their grasp if they are successful in combining with other leftist groups. They still have appreciable public support, und, through their labor fo!-
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have the capability of augmenting or developing riots and disturbances, theof which might react unfavorably upon the Chilean Government.
Cuban Communists are capable ofeasure of political power by joining aof parties which could win anThey are also capable of disrupting some government services from their positions within the administration, particularly in tile Havana city government. In addition, Cuban Communists have the capability ofgeneral dissatisfaction with politicians and with many actions of the government. Thc Communists are capable of instigating riots and of starting some violent actions -such as small-scale demonstrations, assassinations, and political strikes in some ports and sugarthe government would quickly put an end to such disturbances. If the present political situation should change considerablyerious riotous or revolutionarydevelop, the Communists would havecapability for exploiting thebecause of the large number of militant Communists.
Communist influence has recently beenreduced in Guatemala, aridcontrol of labor has been challenged. Nevertheless, as long as Communists retain the control of labor they will be able totrong influence on political affairs, though they could not gain control over theor even seriously threaten Its stability.
Communist capabilities for causing political instability in Argentina, Brazil. Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela, and Uruguay are at present limited largely toannoyance through their propaganda, through increasing disrespect for andtoward the governments, and through small localized demonstrations. In theeventreakdown uf civil authority, the Communists could, of course, be expected to exploit thc situationumber of these countries. Communist political capabilities are unimportant in the Dominican Republic, EI Salvador. Haiti, Honduras. Nicaragua, Paraguay.and Peru
Communist action to impair politicalwill vary from country to country. The
Bolivian Communists will take advantage of any possible cooperaiion with other opposition groups to overthrow the present government. Chilean and Cuban Communists will watch for favorable opportunities lo lake advantage of an already strained situation rather than initiate action. Ecuadoran Communists will "lay low" unless an exceptionally favorablepresents itself lo ally themselves with what looksure winner.Communists may be expected toto support the Arevalo government and to demonstrate violently against any attack, civil or military, against that government; also they obviously intend to exercise theirpower in trying to ensure thai the next government of Guatemala Ls friendly to them.
d. Taking Direct Military Action. The most important Soviet militaryin Latin America is the ability to harass sea lines of communication to the US byaction. The USSR can also mineto ports and naval bases, can land and pick up saboteurs, or agents and possibly small commando forces to attack military or industrial establishments near thc coasts, and probably can shell or bomb certainfrom submarines or submarine-carried aircraft, although the latter type of equipment has not been identified in Soviet hands. The USSR probably intends to exercise thesecapabilities only in time of war.
Local Communists have negligible military capabilities in Latin America, and havepractically no significant infillra-lion into the local military establishments with the exception of the Ecuadoran army. Local Communists can aid and abet infiltrated saboteurs, give signals to help possibleoperations of Soviet submarines, anddevelop secret airfields. They may also be able to sabotage some militaryeducing Economic Support of the VS. The Communists can reduce Latinpotential economic value lo the US by sabotage, strikes, and public agitation.
Soviet sabotage capabilities in Latin America are probably most dangerous ininstallations. The USSR is believed to have infiltrated sabotage experts into the
industries in both Venezuela and Mexico Soviet saboteurs may also be presentihe petroleum industries in Argentina and Peru in these rour countries, present sccu-niv measures are Inadequate to deteroncentrated Soviet-Communistc effort againsi vulnerable key points inictroleum racililics. Other likely targets aVc the petroleum facilities in Curacao, Aruba, iind Trinidad.
Because of the highly vulnerable nature of some ol the railway facilities, which could be damaged with only small amounts olor technical ability, the Communists are capable of immobilizingonth or more vulnerable parts of railways serving the mining areas of Bolivia. Chile, Mexico, Brazil and Peru. Such action would restrict the flow of tin, antimony, and lead in Bolivia;iodine, and copper in Chile; antimony, arsenic, fluorspar, lead, zinc, cadmium, copper, graphite, manganese, mercury, mica andin Mexico; manganese in Brazil; and lead, vanadium, and copper in Peru.
Soviet sabotage agents could useterritoryase of operations against Panama Canal installations.in Cuba are believed capable ofsabotage in the sugar industry bycane fields and damaging communication and transport facilities. In other industries and countries, local Communists are capable of minor and sporadic sabotage.
it is estimated that Soviet-directed sabotage will be reserved for the eve or the first stagesS-USSR war, and that localwill perpetrate sporadic and isolated acts of sabotage under current circumstances.
Communists in most Latin Americancan develop labor-management disputes over wages and wurking conditions into strikes
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larly if their leadership is not too evident. They can also prolong and intensify disputes not of Communist instigation. They cannot, however, develop significant strikes forSoviet political purposes. Strikestwo weeks or more can be effected on such facilities as railways, ports, petroleum instal-
lations, mines, or sugar mills in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile. Cuba. Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. In addition to oil in Venezuela and Mexico strategicparticularly affected would bein Brazil, copper and iodine in Chile, sugar In Cuba, lead and mercury in Mexico, and tin and antimony in Bolivia.work-stoppage capabilities are greater under present conditions, because theconcerned, with some minor exceptions, would limit Lhe duration of work-stoppages If not prevent them entirely in times of
During the period short of war. Communist labor leaders will endeavor to promote strikes largely to maintain or improve their positions of leadership, to test their strength, and to develop situations for propagandaIn addition, they will promotelabor agitation, in some cases causing economic instability. They will notcarry such actions so far as to invite serious government countermcasures.ar period, however. Communist leaders, if so encouraged by Soviet exhortation, will risk their control of labor organizations and the livelihood Of their members in an effort to paralyze strategic Industries.
The Latin American Communists canthe supply of critical and strategicthrough public agitation.in Brazil have already organized front groups capable of exploiting the theme of nationalization of petroleum, monazlte. and other strategic minerals. Although Bolivian Communist strength is not great, thefavored by unstable political conditions that are likely to result in mass disturbances, can probably touch off considerable violence and destruction and stoppage of economicand will make every effort to do so.umber of other Latin American countries. Communists can and will add to agitation for any proposed measures tending to deterinvestments in the area, and they also will add their weight to any local movesexpropriation of foreign-ownedand reservation of national materials fornational use
Original document.
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