NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
SOVIET CAPABILITIES
AND INTENTIONS
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW. RELEASE IN FULL
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMAT
SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS
NIE.3
Spproted for rolruta thrrjugh the HISTORICALPhOGBXMcentral Intelligence fcgMttj;.
^ s
The present estimate is an editorial adaptation of0 with certain modifications and additions to brin* It up to date. The intelligence organizations of theof State, the Army, the Nary, and the Air Force participated in the preparation of this estimate and concur In it. This paper is based on information available on II
top odonn
SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS
THE PROBLEM
To estimate Soviet capabilities andwith particular reference to the date at
which the USSR might be prepared to engageeneral war.
Soviet rulers are simultaneouslyby Marxist-Lenlnfst-Stallnlstby considerations related to thethe Soviet Unionorld power.objective is to establish aworld controlled by themselves orHowever, their immediateall consistent with Uiat objective, are:
maintain the control of thethe peoples of the Soviet Union.
strengthen the economic andposition and defend the territory ofUnion.
consolidate control over theand Asian satellites (includingChina).
make secure thc strategicthe Soviet Union, and to prevent thein Europe and Asia, of forcesof threatening the Soviet position.
eliminate US influence InAsia.
o establish Soviet domination over Europe and Asia.
g. To weaken and disintegrate the non-Soviet world generally, especially tothe power and influence of the US.
The Soviet Union will try to pursue these immediate objectives simultaneously. In case of conflict between one and another of these objectives, however, it may be expected that the Soviet rulers will attach greaterto thc first four listed, and in that order.
as the Soviet ultimateimmutable and dynamic, the Sovietcontinue relentlessly its aggressiveon the non-Soviet world, particularly on
the power position of the Western nations. Consequently there is, and will continue to be, grave danger of war between the USSR and its satellites, on thc one hand, and the US and its allies on the other.
The Soviet rulers could achieve and are achieving the first three of their, b, and c) without risk ofin armed conflict with the United States.
Their remaining immediate objectives, e, f, and g) are Improbable of achievement without resort to armed force, although there are still factors in thewhich might well lead the Soviet rulers to suppose that, in favorable circumstances, they might eventually achieve thesewithout the use of Soviet forces.
In pressing to achieve these latterthe Soviet rulers will inevitably impinge upon vital Interests of the Western Powers and thus incur the risk of involvementeneral war through Western reaction.
In the belief that their object cannot be fully attainedeneral war with the Western Powers, the Soviet rulers mayprovokear at the time when. In their opinion, the relative strength of the USSR is at its maximum. It Isthateriod will exist from now' with the peak of Soviet
ssumed lo be the date by which North Atlantic Trealy forces In Europe will have been built up to such strength that they coutd withstand the InlUal shock of Soviet attack and by which the gap between the military strength of the Western Powers and lhat of lhe USSR will have besmn to close.
1
strength relative to the Western Powersreached*
From the pobit of view of military forces and economic potential, the Soviet Union lsosition toeneral war nowt least to conduct tlie campaigns listed In., if the Soviet rulers should consider It desirable or expedient to do so.
Intelligence Is lacking toalid prediction as to whether or when thc USSR would actually resort deliberatelyeneral. war. It must be recognized, however,rave danger of generul war exists now, and will exist hereafter whenever thc Soviet rulers may elect to take action which threatens the vital Interests of the Western Powers.
Specifically with respect to thc Korean situation, to date there ls insufficient evidence to Indicate that the USSR intends to commit Soviet forces overtly In Korea. However, the
'After the USSR bas made good en mm Im-portant deficiencies in atomic bomb stockpile and In certain types of aircraft and before the Western economy has been fully gearedar effort.
commitment of Chinese Communist forces, with Soviet material aid, indicates that the USSR considers the Korean situation ofImportance to warrant the risk ofwar. The probability ls that the Soviet Union considers that the US will noteneral war over Chinese CommunistIn North Korea and the reaction thereto. The principal risk of general war Is through the exercise of Soviet initiative which the Kremlin continues to hold. Theis that the Soviet Government has not yetecision direclly to launch awar over the Korean-Chinese situation. Thereood chance that they will not in the Immediate future takeecision. At what point they willecision toeneral war ls not nowby Intelligence.
Note: The foregoing1 represent lhe best conclusions that ran be reached on the basis of Uie lnforrnaUon available at Uils lime. The problem of whether and when lhc USSR may resort deuberalely to general war la under continuing consideration and will be Uie subject of futureas pertinent Information Is developed.
TOP OUOIIUT
DISCUSSION
The Soviet rulers are simultaneouslyby Marxlst-Lenlntst-Stallnlst doctrine and by considerations related to the position of the Soviet Unionorld power. Their ultimate objective is to establish aworld controlled by themselves or thoir successors. However, their Immediateall consistent with that objective, are:
maintain the control of thethc peoples of thc Soviet Union.
strengthen the economic andposition and defend the territory ofUnion.
o consolidate control over theand Asian satellites (includingChina).
make secure the strategicthe Soviet Union, and to prevent thein Europe and Asia, of forcesof threatening the Soviet position.
eliminate US Influence in Europe
o establish Soviet domination over Europe and Asia.
o weaken and disintegrate the non-Soviet world generally, especially tothe power and influence of the US.
The Soviet Union will try to pursue these immediate objectives simultaneously. In case of conflict between one and another of these objectives, however, It may be expected that the Soviet rulers will attach greaterto the first four listed, and in that order.
AFFECTING SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS
There ls nothing in Soviet Ideology, or In the internal situation of the Soviet Union, which requires or precludes cither deliberate resort to war or the achievement of any particular objective by any given date.
Tlie Soviet rulers appear to believe that, provided the security of the Soviet Union can be assured, lime will be on their side In the achievement ot their long-term objective ot world communizatlon under Kremlin,
The Soviet rulers have shown, however, that they are more Immediately concerned with the power position of the Soviet Union than with their long-term objective. Inthey have made it clear that they will not rely solely on the operation of historical processes, but will actively and aggressively press for the realization of their alms, using
1 Sec alsoiscussion of political alignments and morale factors In the event of war.iscussion o! Soviet objectives and prospects ln particular founti
armed force, if necessary, even though serious risks may be involved.
oviet decision to risk general war by the use of armed force In any particularand, eveneliberate resort to general war. would depend on:
Soviet rulers' estimate of theof the particular situation lnto their over-all security.
prospects of accomplishing theinvolved by other means.
estimate of their chances oftheir over-all power position inwar.
Feonomic*
hc Soviet Union has already largelyIts Industry for war. It now has, tlirough manufacturing and stockpiling of war materiel andreatof military stocks, which enables It not only to maintain superior military
'excludes eonH derail on of Soviet capabilities in nuclear energy production capacities.
strength in being but also to have at itsa readily realizable additional strength. The West, on the other hand, exceptew specialized arms, ls only beginning to mobilize its industry for war.
The over-all economic war potential of the Western Powers Is now, and for annumber of years will continue to be, superior to that of the Soviet Union and its satellites. However, the Western Powersimmediately assert their greatly superior economic war potential, since it will require several years to mobilize their strength.
Under these circumstances, the present move among the North Atlantic Treatyfor gearing part of their industries to production of armamentsost Important consideration, because1 onward, the great preponderance of Soviet military strength, derived from Its large holdings of war equipment, will begin to decline, and3 may have ceased toignificant factor.
There are, however, other considerations which might well induce the Soviet rulers to interpret their own economic preparedness for warifferent light. Inar against the Western Powers at an early date the Soviet rulers could look forward to sweeping Initial successes. They must, nevertheless, take Into account thatar would probably be prolonged and become one of attrition, and that the Industrial and economic structure of the Soviet Union would be exposed to severe losses, although some of these could be at least partially offset by Soviet control over the resources of Western Europe and other areas obtainedesult of Soviet conquests in the early stage of the war.
There arc, moreover. Indications that in the next and succeeding Five-Year Plansattention will be given to the strategic problems of bringing the manufacturinginto better balance with thc basicimproving the transportationand obtaining better results in the planned dispersal of Industry.
The Soviet rulers may hesitate tolobal war If they consider that the future economic military strength of the West out-
weighs the Immediate military advantage they hold over the Western Powers.the date at which the Soviet rulers might be prepared to take the risksajor war against the Western Powers is unknown since there Is no Intelligence availablewhat evaluation the Soviet rulers are making of this factor. Consideration of the known factors Indicates that from "the point of view of output and stockpiles of warthe period when the Soviet Union could assert its military strength mostagainst the Western Powers ls between now and the end
Weapons of Man Destruction and Scientific Dovclopment.
Thc atomic bomb Is the only weapon of mass destruction which wouldajor factoroviet decision to assume thc riskajor war.
Thc current estimate regarding thc Soviet atomic bomb stockpile is as follows:
95
.
The Soviet Union has and will haveaircraft, trained crews, and bases of operation to warrant an attempt to deliver In the United States and in the United Kingdom thc full stockpile of atomic bombs that are now and will become available. Should localrequire the dropping of bombs by other than visual means, the efficiency of Soviet bomb placement may be adversely aflcctcd. In addition, the Soviet Union has thefor clandestine atomic explosions in ports and In selected inland areas, and may be able to launch guided missiles with atomicfrom submarines within the periodconsideration.
In view of present and future Soviet atomic capability, It ls apparent that the total power of the Soviet Union has been and Is beingrapidly.
The United States nowideof superiority In numbers of bombs in stockpUe over the Soviet Union. However, It would be illusory to conclude that the United States and Western Europe wlu remain safe from atomic attack so long as the United
Slates maintains Uus numerical superiority. When the Soviet rulers believe that they haveufficient quantity of atomic bombs to be seriously crippling or decisive against thc Western Powers, thc danger ofattack will be greatly increased. When the Soviets have attained this atomicthe US superiority in total numbers of atomic bombs will no longereterrent to the Soviet decision for war. In the samedegree as before. The extent of Soviet vulnerabilityetaliatory US attack will, however, affect Soviet calculation.
It Is impossible to state when the Soviets may estimate they have reached thisThis may occur at any time and themay become critical at any time within the next two years.
As regards other Items of scientificIt Is considered that the Soviet rulers would probably bo willing to assume the' riskajor war at any time after the end
Ground Forcot.
military effectiveness of theis being steadily Increased. AtSoviet Army comprisesineand could rapidly mobilize aboutand subsequently Increase thisrequired. By4 indicatedtraining, and equipmenthave been completed. By that daterulers should be able to placethe satellites to the extent that anproportion can be expected to fighthereditary enemies. Thc Sovietthc advantageoncentrationon interior lines and potentially ofthe Initiative.
hc state of readiness in the NorthTreaty Organization countries Is far below that of the Soviet Union. Reaction to the Korean conflict caused many of these nations to plan increases in national armed forces. Evenowever, North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries cannot achieve parity with the Soviet Union In numbers of menarms or In quantities of certain items of equipment.
the Impetus of expectedfrom the United States, coupled withln appropriations at home, theshould be available to NorthOrganization countries for14ndivisions respectively.
At present the Soviet Union possesses the capability nf-initiating hostilities In Western Europe without any additional warning and Invading Western Europe with an Initial force of aboutivisions at present located In East Germany and Poland, and of rapidly building this force to aboutoivisions. In such event the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries are not at present capable ofthe overrunning of Western Europe,the United Kingdom.
It is accepted that It will be foundprogressively to build up the NorthTreaty Organization forces ln Europe so that,hey will be capable ofthe initial shock ofurprise attack,
In thc Near and Middle East area, the planned Improvements in the armies ofGreece and Iran arcatter of modernization rather than expansion. There Is. therefore, little military advantage from the viewpoint of the Soviet Union ln opening hostilities In this area In any particular year between now'
From purely an army viewpoint, if therulers are willing to Initiate, to provoke, or to accept the riskeneral war, it would be In their best interests to do so at aome time between nowith the optimum date probably being about the middle of thc period.
Air Forces.
authorized military aircraftoperational units of the Soviet Airestimated to0 aircraft at thetime. While definite Information Islt Is believed that the actualof the operational units may befifteen percent below tbetn addition to thc aircraft inunits it ls estimated thatombat aircraft In storedthe stored reserve, the combat units
would be supported by thc scml-mllltary civil Air Fleet with un operating strengthajor transports, and an unknown number of concealed aircraft, for example those of the MVD, plus combat aircraft ln the trainingcommand support aircraft, and those assigned for test, research, and No significant change ls expected In the organization of the Soviet Air Forces over thc next few years nor Is there evidence to suggest that the front line strength will change materially over the same period. However, it is estimated that thc proportion of high performance aircraft will increaseand advances in bomber interception and strategic bombing capabilities can be expected.
The Soviet Military Air Force issuperior to Western tactical air forces and Is adequate to support all land campaigns which thc Soviet Union might be expected to undertake in event of war in the next few years. Its combat value Is being increased steadily by re-equipment of fighter and bomber units with high performance Jet
The Soviet Naval Air Force Is an effective coastal adjunct to the Soviet Air Force and could be used ln direct support of the Soviet Army. It Is anticipated that as ln the case of tho Military Air Force, the combat value of the Naval Air Force will increase as theof re-equipment ln the next year or two and as thc result of further training.
The Soviet Union possesses In quantityday interceptors for fighter defense, but at present Is handicapped in the bomber interception field by the lack of efficient all-weather interceptors and effective groundInterceptor radars. It Is anticipatedood all-weather interceptor will probably be Introducednd that difficulties with ground control Interception radars will have been largely overcome by thc time this Interceptor appears in service.he Soviet Union should havetate of training and re-equipment sufficient toa relatively effective fighter defense
The Soviet Union has nnd will have the capability in aircraft and trained crews lo en-
able it to attempt to deliver in the United Kingdom and North America the fullof atomic bombs that ore and will become available. In the next few years the strategic bombing capability of the Soviet Air Forces will increase substantially, particularly in view of the Increasing atomic bomb stockpile. The introduction of jet medium bombers2 and heavy bombers3 in tliebombuig force will increase thcof this force, although the problemswith high-speed bombing andmay not be fully solved by that. Based on tlic above considerations, theUnion may assess its present airas adequate for the conductajor war. It Is expected that Soviet air capablH-ties will be improved steadily and probably reach optimum relative to the Western Powerstate of readiness which the Soviet Union considers favorable for the conduct of major operatlona may be reached al any time from the present
Naval
The surface naval forces of the Western Powers arc so much stronger than those of tho Soviet Union that the latter will not be able for many years at least to dispute by surface forces thc control of the major oceanThe Soviet Submarine Fleet,is strong in comparison with theforces of the Western Powers, and Soviet mlnclaying potential Is high Inwith thc mlnesweeping resourcesto the Western Powers.
The Submarine Fleet Is able now toerious threat to Allied sea communications. Tills threat will become progressively more serious with the estimated Increase in strength and Improvement In performance of theFleet during the next few years.
The Surface Fleets pose no serious threat to Allied control of the sea, but arc probably ready now to accept the following roles:
of sea frontiers of the
of thc seaward flanks ofArmy.
Naval Air Forces are capable nowthe surface fleets ln the above roles.
7
The Soviet Merchant Plect Is capable of providing the lift for short range amphibious operations, and of sustaining the wartime economy of the Soviet Union, except, possibly in the Far East.
Civil Defense.
Indicates that neither the Soviet nor NATO blocs have yet taken effective measures of civil defensecale sufficient to cope with atomic attack.
COURSES OPEN TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT-
Review.
The basic problem here considered Is to estimate the courses of action that may be followed by the Soviet rulers in pursuit of their objectives as stated in paragraph 1.
It must be recognizedeneral war might occuresult of some Soviet action undertaken without deliberate intention toeneral war and even before the Soviet rulers considered themselves fully ready for lt.
The Soviet rulers, while so far eschewing the direct use of their own military forces, hove shown themselves willing to employ every available means short of this. Furtherin the face of Westernwill carry withn Increasing danger of general war. Short of abandonment by the West of its policy of resisting Communist aggression, the only circumstance lhat could remove that danger would be theby the Soviet Union of Its policy of
the basis of Soviet conduct andof policyhere is nothat the Soviet rulers will modifyof aggression. In fact, during thetheir actions have shown andisregard of possible WesternIn particular, the North Koreanappears toignificant stepin the Kremlin's strategy, since,the Soviet rulers may havethe risk of US reaction to themove, they have persisted indespite actual US reactions.
he Soviet rulers can be expected totheir aggressive pressures on the power position of the Western countries. In their choice of time, place, and method they will
continue loolicy of expediency. They can be expected to continue to attempt to exploit every apparent soft spot, employing such weapons and tactics as seem best adapted lo particular situations.
hc Soviet rulers have shown that, while applying the rule of expediency in choosing among the possible courses of action, they will not necessarily-reject such courses as carry the risk of armed conflict, logically, they would prefer not to take action of this nature so long as they believed that they were attaining their immediate objectives without It If, however, they came to the conclusion that they wore falling to obtain these objectives by other means they would be willing to assume the risk of Involving their own forces, dependent on their estimate of their chances of success both in attaining their Immediate objectives and In coping with any resultant reaction by the Western Powers. Generally, the more closely they considered their objectives related to the security of the Soviet Union the more readily would they risk Involving their own miliiary forces.
In view of the above, an estimate of the danger and Uominence of war can be based onlyeview of the critical situationsand Impending, together with aof Soviet aims and prospects In each case, the relative strength and state of over-allof the powers Involved, and the Impact of likely Western counter-moves on Soviet planning.
In dealing with various critical situations existing and pending, Soviet rulers mayto achieve their objectives by either:
Courseshort of deliberateto general war. or.
Courseresort to general war.
One would ln turn coverlines of action which might beseparately or concurrently. These are:
a. To use means other thanrontier.
o instigate local military aggression by satellite armed force.
e. To undertake local aggression by Soviet armed force.
Two could follow cither of twolines of action:
direct attack on the Unitedits allies; or,
deliberate provocation involvingcertainty of general war, andprecipitate it.
of Course Oner Course Oneseem to depend, at least in largethe urgency of Soviet preoccupationarea ln which such limitedinstigated or undertaken. ChoiceTwo, on the other hand, wouldan attempt to destroy tlie power positionWestern countries either once and forat least In Europe and Asia, and wouldupon global considerations. Promstandpoint, Coursesthan Course Two b.
Course One (Means Short of Deliberate Resort fo General War).
the basis of the discussion Inand apart from possible long-termsuch as economic crisis In thethe Soviet rulers may think will workfavor, they probably estimate theirsomewhat as below:
CourseMe uother thanrontier).
Tibet and Indochina appear to be the only countries In which the odds presently favor the establishment of Communist control. In Indochina, Chinese aid for indigenouselements is essential and is beingIf Indochina were to come under Communist control, then Slam and Burma would probably quickly follow.
The state of public opinion In Western Europe, particularly In Prance, and in Western
Germany may give the Soviet rulers reason to hope that their Immediate aim ofthe development of continental military strength can still be accomplished through agitation and Internal pressures. Generally, however, the West European governments do not reflect this state of popular opinion, and public opinion Is changing and will continue to change as Western defense measureseffective. From now on, apart from thc possible effect of thc above-mentioned long-term considerations, any hopes which the Kremlin may now retain for success inEurope and Western Germany willdiminish.
Tlic development of the situation in Iran is less predictable, but here again it can be expected that as Western support increases, the prospects for thc achievement of Soviet domination of Iran without the use of external force will decline.
In Scandinavia, Turkey, the Arab States. Israel. Afghanistan, Pakistan. India,and Japan, the national authorities are apparently capable of coping with anyof violence designed to lead tocontrol of the country. On the otber hand, thc Kremlin could, by propaganda and other means, hope to Influence, in some casesthe political attitude of the Arab States. India, Pakistan. Israel, and Indonesia.
In Yugoslavia the government to atcapable of coping with outbreaks ofdesigned to lead to Soviet control.the economic situation might deteriorate substantially in the next year ot two. in which case the authority of the government might be
In Malaya and thc Philippines, current Communist guerrilla operations can probably be sustained Indefinitely; and In Greece, the Soviel Union may attempt to revive large-scale guerrilla activities at any time.ver, thc authorities of these countries,by the United States or the United Kingdom, should be able to control the
CourseLocal military aggression by satellite armed forces).
The Soviet Union hasto Indirect aggression by means of
satellite forces in the case of Korea. Similar employment of non-Soviet forces could bein the following areas, although the Kremlin would have to recognize thataggression In any of them (except Tibet) would in varying degree carry risk of general war:
In Europe: Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Western Germany, and Berlin.
In Asia: Tibet, Formosa, Hong Kong, Macao, Indochina, and Burma.
Europe. Miliiary success would bein the cases of Turkey and Greece, and questionable in the case of Yugoslavia. In Western Germany it would also be unlikely in the present state of development of the Polizei Bercitschaften. The Incorporation of Berlin is an essential step towards the Soviet aim tonified Germany subservient to the Kremlin. An attack by the Polizeichaften at Soviet instigation upon theoccupying forces In Berlin might wellto Soviet rulers to have prospects of local success, although the Soviet rulers would have difficulty in disavowing responsibility for such an attack unless Soviet occupation troops had been previously withdrawn from the Berlin area.
Asia. Tibet can be occupied at any time without any risk of extension of hostilities-Military success In Formosa Is problematical but success could be assured against Burma, Indochina and Hong Kong, and Macao.of Burma and Indochina wouldSiam and control the major sources of rice to Asiatic countries at present outside the Soviet orbit. Slam could not then avoidunder Communist domination, andwould thus be directly threatened. Uong Kong wouldesser strategic prize and the difficulty of localizing the war would be greater than In the case of Burma and
CourseLocal aggression by Soviet armed forces).
Soviet mlers may well consideragainst Finland and Yugoslaviaforces be used directly withoutof Immediately precipitatingand would recognize that even In those
cases their use would bring general warnearer.
Cm Balance.
The Soviet rulers may have reason tothat they can achlcvo some of theirparticularly In South and Southeast Asia, through measures short ofrontier. However, the existing situation, apart from the possible effects of long-term considerations, gives them littleto hope for achievement, through these means alone, of their major objectives,those related to the rearmament of the West including utilization of West German and Japanese military potential.It can be assumed that they will continue to exploit every opportunity for theof such means In order to retard Western defensive preparations and lo weaken and divide the non-Soviet world.
A decision to employ Indirect or directaggressionocal scale will probably depend on developing circumstances,on the progress of Western defensive measures. Thc Soviet rulers might accept serious risk of general war in order to prevent tlie actual development of hostile military power on the strategic approaches to the Soviet Union. They would be particularly concerned at the recreation of West German or Japanese military power. It must bethat Soviet rulers may well regard the progressive development of the situation in Korea in the same light and may take local action accordingly.
Course Iwo (Deliberate Retort fo General War).
Soviet rulers might, underconsider that It was todeliberately to engage In war with
I the Western Powers. However, it ishat they would be unlikely to take thiseliberately unless they were convincedheir most Important objectives were plainly
Jeopardized. In addition, Ihey would have to
be confident, cither:
(a) of speedy neutralization of USpower; or,
<b) of their ability toegree of control over the Eurasian land mass,the neutral Izatlon ot the United King-
SBCRBT
jP-
by occupation or otherwise, that would give them the benefitonsiderableof European industrial potential and would present the United States with atask of such proportions that the United States would be unwilling or unable to make the effort necessary to carry itecision by the Soviet rulers lo resort to war under assumption (a) above would presuppose their estimate that they had atomic or other capabilities to deal the Unitedlow sufficiently crippling to enable
the Soviet Union to attain their war
ecision by the Soviet rulers on Uie basis of assumption <b) above would presuppose their estimate that, either with orimited attack on the United States, the Soviet economy, strengthened by theof Western "European industrial resources, would be capable ofrolonged war. and also their estimate that Sovietcould prevent crippling attacks on the resultant Soviet economy.
IV. SOVIET STRATEGIC INTENTIONS ANO CAMPAIGNS IN THE EVENT OF GLOBAL WAR
the event of global war between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies, It isthat Soviet action would followalong lhe lines set forth below.
The Soviet plan would be to undertake the following operations:
A campaign against Western Eu-ropo Including Italy.
An aerial bombardment against the British Isles.
Campaigns against the Near and Middle East including Greece and Turkey.
Campaigns in the Far East.
Attacks against Canada and the United Stales. Including Alaska and the
A sea and air offensive againsi Anglo-American sea communications.
Subversive activities and sabotage againsi Anglo-American interests In all parts of the world.
Defense of the Soviet Union against hostile attack.
soon as possible, after theof tho Channel Portull-scale
sea and air offensive against the British Isles Including an attempted invasion.
soon as feasible, campaignsand the Iberian Peninsula.
necessary, air attacks against
It Is believed that the Soviet Union would have sufficient armed forces to undertake all the campaigns listed above and still havoarmed forces to form an adequate
Opportunist campaigns by Chineseforces, which may or may not beby the Soviet Union, againstterritories In Asia might be undertaken at any time.
If war occurs during the period underlittle or no warning will beand.ayay should, for planning purposes, be considered the same. The Soviet armed forces are in an advanced enough state of preparation to achieve the objectives outlined ln thiswithout requiring any appreciable period of notice.
TOP CliqniiT-
Bloc
L The following countries are likely to re-maln in alignment with the Soviet Union:
Europe: Poland, EasternHungary, Rumania,probably Albania, (There is aAlbania may cease toovietthe course of the next few years,remains outside thc Soviet bloc.)
Asia: Communist China and
the eventajor war in Europesatellites may be expected to
thc eventar between theand tlie Western Powers.is not likely to deny to the Sovietfacilities or resources, and Is likely toan opportunist policy of expansion.Treaty0 requires eachrender assistance to the other In theattack by Japan "or any other stateunite with Japan directly oracts ofommunist Chinato forfeit the advantages of thisin present circumstances.
political alignment of Korea willon the outcome of the presentaction there.
Ami-Soviet Bloc
the event of any war between theon tbe one hand and the Unitedand the United States on the olher, itthat the following countrieswllh their overseas possessions) willalignment against tho Soviet Unionoutbreak of the war:
United Stales, United Kingdom,Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Ceylon.
following countries (with theirpossessions) would probably also be
aligned against the Soviet Union, but notunless the provisions of the NorthTreaty were involved:
France, the Benelux countries, Italy, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, and Portugal.
Those countries not participating aswould be at lcasl benevolently neutralndia end Pakistan. India and Pakistan may well decide to maintain non-belligerent status unless directly attacked, though their attitude would be sympathetic to the Western Powers.
reaty commitments (all subject to the provisions of thc United Nations Charter) also exist between the United Kingdom and Turkey. Egypt. Jordan, and Iraq.
Under the Treaty9 (which expires inthe United Kingdom and Franceto go to the assistance of Turkey,is attacked, but Turkey Is notassist her alliesar against theThough the Turks are likely tothan submit to any major Sovietthey would not otherwisethe Western Powers in war.
The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty(which expiresermits theKingdom to station limited land andIn thc Suez Canal Zone. Onthe Egyptian Government,ar with the Soviet Union,favoring the Allied cause, wouldto the use of Egyptian armedpossibly In defense of EgyptianThis would not, however, affectuse of bases in Egypt.
e. Iraq and Jordan. Under the United Kingdom treaties with Jordan and Iraq, the parties agree to offer one another mutual assistance. In the case of Iraq, assistance to the United Kingdom is limited to the provision of facilities In Iraq territory.
from treaty obligations, all thcwill probably be disposedthe Western Powers and to maketo them their economic resourcesalthough they may be reluctantIn any active cooperation,this involves the dispatch of forcesown territories.
The present Philippineis committed to alignment with the
United States and to make Philippine bases
available to the United States.
Latin America. The Latin Americanwill support the United States indegrees of effective cooperation under the Bio Treaty. Active military assistance may be available in some cases. Brazil).
Japan. It Is expected that, even after the conclusionapanese Peace Treaty, at least base facilities In that country will continue to be available to the Western Powers.
estern Germany and Austria. The position of the governments of Westernand Austria will depend on theof plans under the North Atlantic Treaty.
reece. In the case of Greece thewill be entirely sympathetic and may
be expected to fall In with Western plans aa far as it Is able to do so.
Neutral Sloloi.
following countries will attempt.at least, to remain neutral, thoughthem may cooperate in actionthe United Nations:
Iran. Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, the Irish Republic, Finland. Yugoslavia, Israel, Afghanistan. Burma. Slam, and Indonesia. Most of these countries would probably resist if attacked, particularly If given support.
So long as theremains in power the Soviet Unionto use force If lt wants to make useterritory. There is at presentof the existence of anorganization of sufficientcarryro-Cominform rising, butdeterioration In the economicthe next year or two, which remainspossibility, could materially affect
In thc eventajor war inEast. Israel may be disposed toWestern Powers and.esult ofor economic pressure, may assist them.
Union,
Soviet citizens In responsible positions from the age ofownwards have been brought up on Marxist-Leninist doctrines to the rigid exclusion of all others. The great majority, therefore, will always be ready to support strong central leadership byleaders In defense of Soviet national
The Soviet people do not want war, but any war in which the Soviet Union became Involved would be presented to them asto their national survival, and few would be able to question the official version of events. The vast majority would acquiesce In the decision of the Kremlin.
In war, thc control exercised over every form of human activity by the police and
propaganda systems of the Soviet Union wouldource of unity and strength, so long as the Soviet campaigns met withIf, however, the assertions of Soviet propaganda were disproved by events, there is little doubt that evidence of Soviet inability to resist Allied strength would comehock to the people generally. So long as policeremained intact, this would not have any widespread result. Even If Allied counter-measures, including the use of atomic bombs, resulted in police control being severely strained or broken, the process ofwould probablylow one. Thepeople have In the past ralliedto expel foreign invaders, and even In the event of large-scale Allied air attack, the majority of the population would fight on as best they could.
13
come Involved ln another war) and the lack of unity of purpose on the part of the Western Allies. These weaknesses are enhanced by the Intellectual and emotional appeals ofCommunism; the social andunrest which Communism exploits; andeneral failure on the part of the rank and file of the Western Nations to appreciate the real conditions of lifeommunist dictatorship.
n Western Europe, the internalthreat is not serious except in France and Italy where the Communist parties have ahold on the labor organizations, and, In Italy, also among tho poorer peasants. The position of other Western European countries will bo materially affected by that of France. In France, although the majority ofare anti-Communist, there is afeeling of defeatism. There is. underpresentonsiderableto resist if war breaks out. or to risk being compromised in the eyes ofoviet occupation which isaccepted as Inevitable. Ifhowever, can be given real confidence in their ability, with the support of their allies, tooviet Invasion, this defeatism Is likely to be dispelled. Defeatism has not gone so far as to affect the attitude of the French Government toward her allies. The Soviet Union is awareeneral-situation and appears In its propaganda to the West to devote more attention to exploiting the desire for peace and attracting those elements of the population most susceptible to peace appeals than directly to expanding the Communist parties in these countries.
Western Germany there Is generalto Communism and theIs unlikely toeriousthreat. Nevertheless. Germanat present low and will deteriorate stillunless Western Germans can bethat either they themselves, orPowers, will be enabled toGermany from attack.
the Middle East, althoughgenerally feared and disliked, theis such that there is fertile ground
for propaganda. Tho Arab Governments would, however, prefer to remain neutral in any conflict between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers. If they were directlytoken resistance might be expected, the strength and duration of which would depend on how the war went for the Allies, If it went badly, tho early emergencero-Soviet body of feeling might be expected. The Arab peoples themselves are largelybut, though Communist ideas have
made little progress, they are generally anti-Western, and no popular resistance to the Soviet Union can be expected. In the non-offlcial intelligentsia there is considerable anti-Western feeling, chiefly on account ot the present policy of the Western Powers toward Israel. In tho eventeneral conflict in which Israel were Involved ln support of the West, there mightisk that anti-Israel feeling would induce the Arabs to come out on tlic other side.
tot auoiixji
APPENDIX B
OPEN
the following discussion, possibleunder Course One (Means ShortResort to General War)
Northern Europe (Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark).
The Immediate Soviet aim In Northern Europe ls to prevent the occupation nnd use of that areaase of operations against the Soviet Union. If the Soviet rulers considerederious threat were developing they wouldisk of global war If necessary to preventevelopment. Thedesideratum would be control of the entire area, thus acquiring not only Itsand resources, but also complete control of the Baltic and free access to the North Atlantic.
With thc exception of Finland, Sovietcapabilities ln Northern Europe are extremely limited. Even in Finland thcappears capable of keeping Internal pressure under control. The only effective means available for accomplishing either of the alms Indicated above Is the overwhelming local preponderance of Soviet military power.
Thc coercive threat inherent in theof overwhelming Soviet power appears sufficient, in large part, to accomplish the immediate Soviet aim. It imposes onecessity to cooperate with thc Soviet Union (so long as Soviet demands do not require national suicide) andain consideration causing Sweden to adherexed policy of neutrality. Although Norway andhave adhered to the North Atlantic Treaty, they would be disinclined to permit developments in their territories which the Soviet Union could regard as an offensive threat.
Conversely, the local employment of Soviet armed force for the subjugation of Northern
) SOVIET UNION
Europe is inhibited by regard .for the broader consequences. Outright Soviet Invasion of Finland would be resisted by thc Finns to the best of their ability. This action, also, might well frustrate the immediate Soviet purpose ln Northern Europe by drivingInto adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty and by stimulating offensive-defensive preparations In Norway, Denmark, andAn attack on Sweden would be resisted and would also stimulate the preparations in Norway and Denmark and would Involve riskeneral war. An attack on Norway or Denmark would directly involve war with all the North Atlantic Treaty States.
G. The Soviet rulers will continue to maneuver toward the subversion of Finland by local Communists supported by the Immanent power of thc Soviet Union, but arc unlikely to resort to local military action in Northern Europe unless convinced that such action Is necessary to prevent the occupation and the use of the areaase for operations against the Soviet Union or that global war Is
Western Europe (France, Benelux, Italy, Porlu-gal).
Soviet nuns In Western
prevent the countries offrom becoming organized Into aof presenting effective militaryto the Soviet Union, either as aor tlireat.
destroy or Impair WesternIn, and association with theand United Kingdom.
foster conditions favorable toof communist strcngth.
of deliberate resort to generalonly means at the disposal of thefor the pursuit of Its alms ln Western
1G
consist of such communist-Inspired activities as mass propaganda and agitation; parliamentary pressure; subversivoof armed forces and government offices; industrial strikes and sabotage; and attempts to stir up Internal violence and civil 6 there hasenerally declining trend In the effectiveness of such measures, correspondingeneralIn-the stability of the governments and In their ability to maintain Internal security, due in large part to external economic aid. Ncvertlieless, despite the substantial effect* of the Economic Recovery Program, Western Europe has not yet achieved economicand, despite thc provisions made under the North Atlantic Treaty and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, the defenses of Western Europe have not yet been translated from paper plans Into actuality. Morale In certain cases Is currentlyow level, the feeling of inability, under presentto resist Soviet military attack being particularly marked. The Soviet-Inspired "peace campaign" has both appealed to and stimulated latent defeatism. Morale isto be rehabilitated without theof real confidenceovietcould be repulsed.
these circumstances, it wouldto conclude that the Sovietgiven up hope of achieving their aimsEurope by continuing theirAs the actual ImplementationEuropean defense plans proceeds,efforts to obstruct it boththrough further propagandamorale, and physically, through strikes.
' sabotage, and civil commotion, may beIt is, nevertheless, estimated that the governments of Western Europe will be able to cope with such efforts and to carry out their defense commitments.
Germany
long-term objective of theIn Germany Is clearly to secure aGermany completely subservient toPending achievement of thisthe Soviet Union will seek toabsolute control over Its own toneand to prevent tho Integration of
Western Germany Into thc North Atlantic Community. It will especially seek tothe establishmentest German armed force that could bolster effectively thc Western military position.
he Soviet Union wil! continue to employ every indirect method available to undermine thc Allied position in Western Oerniany and to Interfere with' thc stability and efficient functioning of the West GermanTo this end, Soviet rulers wil) rely upon lhc West German Communist Party, the entire East German state and Partycertain extreme lightest groups In Western Germany, and the potential of all Eastern Europe for economic pressure on Western Germany. Their tactics will beof the West German Government and police, strikes, agitation, and probablyuse of violence against both local and Allied authorities. They will, immediately, direct their attention toward creatingchaos. buUding up popular pressure for Western troop withdrawal, crystal izing and extending current opposition towardencouraging development ofsentiment, and intensifying theuniversal desire for German unity. To strengthen their propaganda position, the Soviet rulers will make further paperto the East Germans. Includinga separate peace treatyokenof Soviet troops. They will ndt.diminish in any way their actual control over the Eastern zone.
t is regarded as unlikely that the Soviet rulers will achieve their objectives Inthrough the above approach. There are no indications that the West Germans' dislike of cwmmunlsm ln general and Soviet domination In particular is in any wayor likely to diminish. Effectiveof Western Germany wouldthe Soviet rulers either toewin the struggle for Western Germany or risk increasing Western utilization of West German military potential. The importance that Soviet rulers clearly attach tothc latter, as well as certain trends in Soviet policies and activities in East Germany, suggests that the Kremlin ls considering the
use of East German military forces locontrol over Western Germany. While thc Poffzei Bereitshalten is at presentinadequate toonquestthere is evidence that lt is being steadily strengthened. In the near future the Kremlin may consider this forcestrong to be used to uttack thezones, and the possibility of such ancannot therefore be excluded. Therulers would have to recognize, however, that this would Involve great risk of general war.
Berlin
from the aim of securing controlGermany, an Immediate Soviet objectivesecure the withdrawal of WesternBerlin. The importance of this tolies not only in thc impetuspossession of Berlin would be expectedto efforts of the East Germanextend Its rule over all Germany, butthe exaggerated sensitiveness of theto Uie presence of hostile forcesoviet province.
the use of forcefulthere appears little possibilityWestern position In Berlin can be Restitutionull-scalewould unHer present circumstancesembarrassing to Western authorities,appears doubtfulecondbe risked unless the Kremlin wereto maintain it by force ifuse of East German forces for thisor for direct attack on the Westernof Berlinistinct possibility. great risk of -general war wouldhere as In the case of West Germany.
both Berlin and WeslernSoviet rulers must realize that theof their own forces in any sorton tlie Western Forces ofnot be possible without precipitatingconflict.
Austria
Kremlin's policy with respectappears to be to continue theuniu such lime as the Germansettled. It now appears highly unlikely
17
that tho Kremlin will agreeeace treatyithdrawal ot occupying forces. On the other hand, there are no indications that Increased efforts are to be made to extend Soviet control over the whole of Austriaor Independently of GermanIf the German situation should develop favorably for the Soviet rulers,external and internal pressures on Austria could be expected. Yugoslavia
he defection of Yugoslavia from the Cominform, besides isolating Albania,the Soviet Union of an importantposition In Southeast Europe, giving direct access to the Mediterranean, and of an important base for exerting pressure on Italy, Oreece, Trieste and Western Austria. Moreover, the Soviet rulers must realize that thc continued existence of thc Titoakesaster for dissident elements In the communist parties of other countries tothe Kremlin's leadership.
Soviet aim must therefore beabout as soon as possible the fallThe Cominform will continue to tryeconomic collapse and to createpro Cominform communistwithin the country.
policy In Yugoslavia mightgreater success if the economicdeteriorated far enough to lead iddiscontent, but al present there Isthat any alternative communistcan be built up in sufficientevict Tito andro-Corn The only means open tounder present circumstances isof external force. If the Kremlinthat satellite forces, with such Sovietassistance as might be required,Yugoslavia, this possibility mustwith, particularly as such annot necessarilyirectthe Western Powers. However, therulers are unlikely to consider that theforces are powerful enough at presentYugoslavia without direct Soviet Consideration of the shows that the military strength of
tbe satellites Is likely to Increase relative to that of Yugoslavia, but it will remaintor some tunc whether this Increase will be sufficient touccessfulasion without direct Sovietirect Soviet nttack, except in the event of general war, Is unlikely unless the Soviet rulers should see inonsiderably greater threat to the Soviet position than exists at present.
Greece.
The establishment of Soviet influence in* Greece wouldaluable step towards the isolation of Turkey, and the control of Crete and of the Greek islands in tlie Aegean which would be necessary for the effective control of the Straits. It would also enable the Soviet Union to mount air and limited navalagainst Allied sea communications In the Eastern Mediterranean from the outbreakeneral war.
For the present, it appears lhat the Soviet Union Is content to support tho Greekchiefly with propaganda and money. |The communists' objective is to gain control of thc Trade Unions, exploit popularwith the present system ofand ultimately to have the Communist Party legalized and able to participate in the government. They are concentrating, with
i some success, on the reorganization of their ^political activities.
Soviet Union may atlcmpt nt anyresuscitate large-scale guerrilla activityby using the former Greekamong the satellites.analnly-ln Bul-
The Greek Government, however, could cope with such an attempt While the Soviet Union might instigate Bulgarian and Albanian aggression ogainst Greece, probably accompanied by renewal of large-scaleactivity, this Is less likely since it would involve considerable risk of United Nations action. Furthermore, the chances arewhether the Bulgarian and Albanian armed forces without direct Soviet aid could defeat the Greeks now or in the future. The immediate objectives of the Soviet rulers in Greece arc hardly of sufficient priority tothe risk Involved.
the Soviet Union succeed mcontrol of Yugoslavia, theto Greece would be greatlywould then be far cosier lo supportoperations against Greece and stirinside the country. In this eventWestern Powers did not greatlysupport to the Greek Government,domination of Greeceensue
Turkey.
Russia has traditionally regarded theol thc Straits as one of its more Important strategic objectives, and Soviet policy towards Turkey will continue to be directed towards it. Turkey would be of great strategic importanceeneral war.
Communism has little appeal to the Turks who are traditionally fearful of RussianThe Soviet Union could achieve hmlled results in Turkey through continuing the war of nerves which imposes on Turkey the economic burden of continued maintenance of large military forces. The Soviet Union could also exert pressure on the Turkishby raising the question of theGeorgian and Armenian lands" inTurkey, or festering the movement for Kurdish autonomy.
There is. however, no chance of agovernment being established In Turkey without foreign invasion, norurkishto any major Sovietatellite invasion would be unsuccessfulthe Intervention of Soviet forces. Therulers must realizeoviet invasion of Turkey would probably mean general war It is. therefore, likely thai short of decision to resorteneral war, they will limitlo an intensification of propaganda and attempts at sabotage despite theirof thc limitations of this approach. Arab States and Israel
In the Arab States the primary aim of the Soviet rulers is to eliminate Westernand to undermine the strategicof the Western Allies In thc Middle East. To this end, they will attempt to fosterand social discontent ogainst Uie Arab ruling classes; strengthen illegal Communist
19
ommunist sabotageparticularly in oil Held and pipeline areas; instill fear of Soviet armed strength; exploit anti-Israel feeling; extend tlicof the Soviet Union through the Orthodox Church; and exploit dissident minorities such as Armenians and Kurds.
policy toward Israel has appearedmore directed toward embarrassingStales and lhe United Kingdom inEast and promoting politicaltoward any Immediate aggressivein Israel proper. The Soviet rulerswill attempt to orient Israelthe Western Powers, ln particularStates. However, for the presentlimit their efforts to propaganda and of Communist influence in
Israel.
neither Israel nor the Arab StatesSoviet rulers expect the above tacticsCommunist control, althoughsucceed In Influencing politicalpresent they probably do not consideris yet propitious to bring lo beartype of pressures.
Iran
primary concern of the Sovietrespect to Iran Is to prevent thein that countryotential baseagainst the Soviet Union, withreference to the vulnerability ofBaku oil region. The Soviet Union'son that point is reflected in itsemphasis on the Soviet-Iranian Treatywhich contemplates the entry ofin Iran if necessary to forestall aSoviet securityhird powerterritory. An additionalbe the advantage to be derivedcontrol of Iranian oil resourcesreference to their denial toThe bulk of thb oil would not beavailable for use withm thc Sovietunless its transportation by sea wereSoviet domination of Iran woulddirect access to the Indian OceanArab States,onsequent Increaseability of the Soviet Union tointerests ln those areas.
Iran's proximity to the Soviet Union, its remoteness from potential support, and the political and economic conditions prevailing within the country all facilitate Sovietand subversion. The principal factor is Uie immediate presence of overwhelming Soviet military power. Subversiveexist, locally, in Azerbaijan and Kurdish disaffection, and, nationally, in the Soviet-dominated Tudeh Party./Soviet employment of these means has met with successive checks: Soviet withdrawal from northern Iran under United Nations pressure, with theof United Nations support against any future Soviet incursion; Uie Azerbaijan debacle; the outlawing of the Tudeh Partyi and Uie emergence of the strong Razmarawhich If given prompt economic and military aid, may succeed in stabilizing the internal situation. Nevertheless, dangerous subversive potentialities will remain,if there shouldurther deterioration of the economic situation.
A Soviet decision to solve the problem by direct military intervention Is not prevented by any local power of resistance;lausible political justification for directin Iran could probably bewithout much difficulty but Uie Soviets would have to reckon with longstanding UK and recently expressed US interest in Iran, Uie previous UN action, and the KoreanIt could be conceivedocalonly on Uie calculation that it could be accomplished before any reaction could occur and that the United States, the Unitedand the United Nations would shrink from any dangerous counteraction after the fait accompli
The threat of Soviet intervention under1 Treaty is probably sufficient toIranian consent to Uie development of any real threat to Soviet security in Iran;it might induce Iranian oppositionefensive build-up of Western forces in Iran. That being Uie case, Uie Soviet Union, for thc time being, will probably>4ubject the Iranian.Government to alternate intimidaUon and blandishment, while simultaneouslyevery subversive opportunity with Uie
minimum purpose of keeping the country weak and distracted and the maximum object offriendly" government to power In Tehran. Tlie Soviet Union would probably not fnvade Iran unless it were willing toeneral war.
Afghanistan
immediate Soviet interest inls fo prevent the establishment ofhostile influence in thatborders on Soviet Central Asia, asensitiveecondaryinterest Is in the potential utilityosition from whichPakistan and India.
Is no apparent CommunistAfghanistan. Thc Sovieteans of meddling In Afghanprofessed solicitude for theof thc area north of tlie Hindu Kush,akin to thc peoples of Soviet Centralsouthern (Pathan) tribesmen,easily stirred up against theKabul, even without this pretext.
The Soviet Union has shown nointerest in Afghanistan. To do so might well alarm and antagonise Pakistan andThe immediate Soviet objective isserved by the existing Isolation and backwardness of the country. In thisSoviet purposes arc well served by Afghanistan's quarrel with Pakistan overhich antagonizes thecontrolling Afghanistan's communications with the non-Soviet world, createsIn the lack of Western sympathy with Afghanistan's position, andendency to turn to Uie Soviet Union for
The Soviet Union has no reason to bewith the present situation Inand is unlikely toore active policy In thai country under present
Parisian
primary Soviet concern withPakistan must be to prevent the usePakistanase for Allied aerial
est Pakistanomparatively poor field for Communist agitation because of Its Moslem character, the relative absence of industrialization, and sheer difficulty ofsuitable contacts. Sinceoviet embassy at Karachi,some agitation has begun. TheIn East Pakistan In this respect resembles that In India and Communist activity there is controlled from India.
Pakistan's embroilmentseg. thc Kashmir question, andtend to serve Soviet Intereststhe country tense andSoviet Union will endeavor to keepalive, but Is not likely tounless Western mUitary airmay behreat to UieUnion, arc established there.
-India
Immediate Soviet concern withto India must be to exploit Indiantoward residual EuropeanAsia and sympathy for any movementitself as Asian naUonal ism. Inprevent India's alignment with Uieto enlist its unwitting aid In bringingof Asia under Soviet domination.Soviet purpose Is to effectcontrol over India.
and East Pakistan as well,ground for both Industrial and Aside from being peculiarlylo pacifist and nonreslstantIndian intellectuals nre recepUveCommunist InterpretaUon ofIn Asia. There arc present manyelements out of which thein China was produced. Mostexceptions are lack of directthe Soviet Union and the absence ofUberaUon Army. Shouldadvance to Uie frontiers ofsubstitutes for these missingmight eventually be supplied.
ecent developments with respect tohave been somewhat prejudicial to Soviet exploitation of India's attitude, but Indian policy retains considerable ambivalence. With respect to the Internal situation, tlie
21
Government has reacted strongW to Communist violence, but Ls disposed to loftratc nonviolent agitation and propaganda. Itsto control Communist activity haveith some success in industrial centers, but less in rural areas. Ports of Hyderabad, for example, are to all practical purposes under exclusive Communist control. In general, however, the previous Communist program has fallen short of expectations and Uie Party has been weakened by arrests, purges,lic Party is now follow-I ew policy modeled on that of UieCommunist Party.
Soviet Union will presumablyto exploit Indian susceptibilities asmay in the international field, whileto guide and promote CommunistIndiaong-term
is the announced Intention of the Chi-Communist regime to "liberate"military operations to this end areunder way. Tlie issue may.be decided by direct negotiations,token use of military force. Anythat might be undertaken would
In Burma thc general Soviet object is thc spread of Internal violence to preventiableiew eventually to securing Communist domination of the country.
The principal Instruments of Communism are the threat of direct or indirect Chinese Communist intervention in support of thc present activities of Uie Burma Communist Party.
In general, while Burma ls one of thc most disturbed of the Southeast Asian countries, II Is not soield for Communistas some of Its neighbors. There is no nationalist problem; nor isargeminority. On Uie other hand, there is a. certain amount of agrarian discontent, and this will leave thc situation precarious unless^ Uie Government's plans for agrarian reform are successful.
Recently, the Burma Communist Partyevere military and political set-
back, andesult. It Ls unlikely thatsubstantial aid from China, It couldthc stability of the legitimateeven though the latter is faced with many other resistance groups throughout the country.
ith Chinese Communist assistance in the form of materiel and leadershipikelyhc strength of the Burmese Communist Party would be greatly increased, but against this must be placed the innatebetween Chinese and Burmese. fThis antagonism might result in the loss to Uie Communists of left-wing SocialistIncluding thc support of the trade union movement, which has been cooperating with the World Federation of Trade Unions) The sttkes in Burma are probably not great enough vto Justify direct Chinese invasion. On balance, the prospects of Communistin Burma probably seem sufficiently good to lead the Kremlin and Chinese People's Government not to go beyond their present policy there. Communist prospects in Burma would be materially Improved by Uieof Communist control over all of
Siam ,c
n Sam there is no agrarian discontent and little popular sympathy for Communism. The overseas Chinese community is the only considerable element subject to Communist exploitation. The situation In Siam, however, will be decisively Influenced by developments In Indochina and Burma. If cither of those countries were brought under CommunistSiam would probably seek toitself to the new situation.
Malaya
oth thc Chinese People's Government and thc Kremlin will wish to see the removal of UK influence and the subsUtutlon ofParty control in Malaya. TheCommunist Partymall minority group which nevertheless enjoys sufficient support from the local Chinese to prolong^mll-ilary operations. Although thc Soviets and Chinese Communists will aim at securing widespread popular support, it Ls difficult to see how this policy can succeed In view of the
O P t
administrative and military measures nowtaken by the UK authorities.thc Communists can be expected totheir insurrection as long as possible for Its nuisance value and in thc hopehange In the world situation may occur. No other means of pressure is open to theso long as Communist power is not establishedontiguous country.
Indonesia
The. Immediate Soviet aim in Indonesia is the rcestablishment of the influential position, the Communist Party held prior toebellion. At the same time the Kremlin appears to wish toacade of good relationsiew to inducing thc Indonesian Government toolicy of neutrality.
At present the World Federation of Trade Unions is attempting to gain control of theTrade Union and the Communists are seeking to establish themselves asof the Indonesian workers. There has as yet been no sign of pressure by the Chinese People's Government through the smallminority.
The process of rcestablishment ofinfluence is still in its early stages. The effect of the degree of success achievedin Southeast Asia will doubtless bebut the desire toecond abortive attempt at seizing power willinduce Soviet caution.
Indochina
Indochina thc Soviet Union clearlythe exclusion of French influenceuppet regime over theunder Ho Chi Minh. TheIs politically and militarilyHo. Furthermore the Chineseproviding Ho Chi Minh withtraining facilities. French forces areexperiencing serious military reverseshands of revitalized Viet Minh forces.can reasonably argue thatchances arc good, unless militaryfrom external sources and increasedon thc part of the Frenchthe French to.ilitary In view of the Importance of Ho
Chi Mlnh to the Communist plan for South-cast Asia generally, and the fact that he has been recognized by both the Kremlin and the Chinese Peoples' Government, his defeat wouldajor setback. If, therefore, there were signs of the tide turning In French favor, the Chinese Peoples' Government, backed by the Soviet Union, might well decide lo undertake Invasion by Chinese Communist forces. Hut so long as Ho Chi Mlnhhis position, the Soviet rulers and the Chinese Communists are likely to conclude that thc present trend, which tics down large French forces Indefinitely, is more desirable than incurring the political, logistical, racial, and other difficultieshineseInvasion would involve. Hong Kong
of Hong Kong Is Inboth Soviet designs to expel UKfrom Asia and Chinese Communist"liberate" all former Chinese territory.Communists have not so far tried tothe colony tliey must have decidedIs not In their interests to incur the riskretaliation at present. The possibilityattempt, however, exists at any time.the first instance, the Communistsrely on subversion.
The Philippines
In tho Philippines, as In other newlycountries of Southeast Asia, thc Soviet aim Is to prevent thc development of internal stabilityiew to eventualdomination of the country.
Thc principal instrument for achieving this aim ls the Insurgent Hukbalahap, which draws Hi strength from agrarian unrest andreference for guerrilla life acquired by some elements during the Japanesebut which Is definitely led byCommunists. Other elementsto Communist use are found among the overseas Chinese community, the radicalmovement, certain disgruntled veterans, and opportunistic politicians out of office. The Communist program Is facilitatedeneral lack of popular confidence In theor the Integrity of the government.
By thc means Indicated thc Communists
canisturbed internal situation In the Philippines, but are not capable of seizing control of that country in presentChinese Communist or Soviet armed Intervention on their behalf will not be feasible, short of conditions of global warfare. Formosa
Chinese Communists for theirwish to recover Formosa and theof the islandestern base mustSoviet aim. Although the Chinesehave sufficient shipping to liftthe invasion is bound lo beto US air and sea patrols, and. atwithout Soviet naval and airoperation would be unlikely tothc intention lo takecannot be considered to have
Korea
The Soviet aim Is to dominate Korea. The Soviet rulers probably consider control of the peninsula necessary to safeguard their Pacific provinces and their interests InAt the same time they probablythat it is necessary if they are to succeed ln their plan to neutralize and ultimately to gain control of Japan.
To date there is insufficient evidence to indicate that thc USSR intends to commitforces overtly in Korea. However, the commitment of Chinese Communist forces,
iwlth Soviet material aid. Indicates that the USSR considers the Korean situation ofImportance to warrant the risk ofwur. The probability Is that thc Soviet Union considers that the US will noteneral war over Chinese Communistin North Korea and the reaction thereto. The principal risk of general war is through the exercise of Soviet Initiative which the Kremlin continues to hold. CTheIs that the Soviet leaders have not yetecision directly toeneral war over the Korean-Chinese situation. There
ood chance that they will not in thefuture takeecision. At what point they willecision to launch awar is not now determinable by
Japan
The Immediate objective of the SovietIn Japan will be to weaken the position of the US authorities thereiew toIts usease or as an area for the development of an effective indigenousforce.onger view, and morethe Soviet rulers must see that thewould, under' Soviet control, contribute materially to strategic, economic and political domination of the Far East.
The instruments at present available to the Soviet rulers are the Japanese Communist Party, elements of thc Japanese Trade Unions, the peace campaign, ond subversive tactics (including lhc possible formation of ainhere appears no possibility that the Kremlin can hope to achieve its alms even by any combination of these factors. Without taking inlo account occupation forces, the Japanese Government, which Is staunchly anti-Communist, Is sufficiently strong to copo with any internal disorders that thc Communists appear capable of mounting. Moreover, the Japanesels generally both anti-Communist andand subversive movements wouldlittle popular support.
There are accordingly no other methods open to the Soviet rulers save Invasion of Japan.
If at any time the Soviet rulers decided that It was necessary' to go beyond theirtactics. It is unlikely that they could do much tn the way ofoothold insnve by direct attack by their own forces (with or without Chinese CommunistThey would presumably recognize that this would entail Inevitable consequenceeneral conflict
Original document.
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