NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
PROBABILITY OF AN INVASION OF YUGOSLAVIA1
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
PROBABILITY OF AN INVASION OF YUGOSLAVIA1
NIE-29
Thc inlelligence organizations of the Departments ot State, the Army, the Navy, thc Air Force, and the Joint StaffIn the preparation of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee have given their concuirence to the estimate. This paper ls based onavailable on
PROBABILITY OF AN INVASION OF YUGOSLAVIA1
THE PROBLEM
To assess the capabilities and intentions of the USSR and its European Satellites with respect to action against Yugoslavia
CONCLUSIONS
Thc ultimate Soviet objectives in Yugoslavia are to eliminate the Titoto replace itegimeto the USSR, and to Integrate Yugoslavia politically, economically, and strategically into the European Satellite structure. Thc USSR has not. however, indicated that it intends to try tothe Tito regime regardless of the cost or within any specific period of time.
It is unlikely that1 the Tito regime could be overthrownoviet-inspired coup or by internal revolt. Therefore, the USSR would have to resort to Satellite or Soviet-Satellite invasion if it intended to overthrow Tito
The continuing military build-up in the neighboring Satellite states (increase tn armed forces, stockpiling,gasoline conservation, stepping-up of war industry,as reversed thebalance of military strengththe Satellites and Yugoslavia and has given the Satellites the capabiUty ofajor invasion of Yugoslavia with little warning.
A major, sustained invasion ofemploying the Satellite armiesSoviet central direction and given full
logistical support by the Soviet Union has the capability of forcing the Yugoslav Army back into the mountainous region along thc Adriatic and of graduallycontrol of the principallines to the major centers of that redoubt. The Yugoslavs would continue to resist, however, and would conduct guerrilla operalions long after theof formal military resistance.
Combined Soviet-Satellite forces could successfully invade Yugoslavia, overcome formal military resistance, and eventually render guerrilla operations ineffective.
Yugoslav capabilities and morale are such that substantial and continuing Western assistance in military supplies and equipment would probably enable Yugoslavia to maintainatellite attack indefinitely, at least in the mountain area. Suchcould extend the period of resistance even in the caseull-scaleattack Any Western materiel sent would have to be adapted to the special requirements of Yugoslav forces.to be effective to Yugoslavia in the initial stages of an invasion, it would have to be delivered well in advance of
Continuine large-scale Satellite rnili-tary preparations indicate that the groundwork is being laidossibleol Yugoslavia. These indications do not. however, provide conclusiveof an intention to attack Yugoslavia since there hasilitary build-up in the other Satellite slates in addition to the ones adjacent to Yugoslavia and since, in the case of Bulgaria and Albania, the military preparations could point to an attack on Greece or Turkey as well as Yugoslavia. Moreover, there is noevidence that militarypointingatellite attack on Yugoslavia are timed for an attackominform propaganda since0 has consistently advancedthat could be used to justify aattack on Yugoslavia, but there has been no recent trend in such propaganda suggesting an attack at an early date.
On the basis of intelligence available we are unable to determine whether the Kremlin hasecision to attack
Yugoslavia. The Kremlin may estimate that1 such an attack by thecould be carried through successfully without incurring effective Westernor precipitating general war. On the other hand, the Kremlin may estimate that the Western Powers would give large-scale support to Yugoslavia, in the event of an attack, thereby making thedifficult and costly andreater risk of general war than the USSR was willing to accept. Finally, themay be fully prepared for theof general war and may launch an attack on Yugoslavia regardless of the risks involved. Although it is impossible to determine which course the Kremlin is likely to adopt, we believe that the extent of Satellite military and propaganda preparations indicates that an attack on Yugoslavia1 should beerious possibility. We believe further that such an attack, if launched, would be made by Satellite forces withSoviet assistance as required.
DISCUSSION
Objectives with Respect to
L Thc ultimate Soviet objectives Inare to eliminate the Tito Government, to replace itegime subservient to the USSR, and to integrate Yugoslavia politically, economically, and strategically into theSatellite structure. Soviet control of Yugoslavia would greatly facilitate Sovietto dominate the Eastern Mediterranean area and wouldangerous salient In the southeast European front of the Soviet bloc. Yugoslavia would offer an approach for Soviet attacks into Greece or Italy; at tho same tunc. Itotential threat to the southern Hank of any Soviet advance into Western Europe. Moreover, the continued survival of the Tito Government as the only
Communist regime not subservient toIs an ideological threat to the Kremlin's control of thc world Communist movement. The USSR has not. however, indicated that it intends to try to eliminate the Tito regimeof the cost or within any specificof time.
Current Strength and Stability of Tito's Regime
lthough the Tito regime Is presently stable, there are elements of potentialin Tito's position. Among theseof potential instability are the
^ajority of the Yugoslavon-Communists' or even Living standards are lower now than
ST-*
(he war. The resentment caused by the national nation of the economy, by the campaign against religion, and by theof police state techniques Is still strong. In the Party hierarchy there is some criticism of the maladministration of the importand of unsatisfactory economicIt is always possible that some of Tito's followers, though seemingly loyal, may be awaiting an opportunity to improve theirat thc expense of their leader.
o. Tito's paradoxical ideological position hampers his freedom of political action. Any considerable retreat by Tito from Communist theory or practice and any conspicuouswith the Western Powers giveto the Kremlin's contention that Titoraitor to Communism. At the same time,etreat might cost Tito the allegiance of some of his more zealous Marxist followers who are indispensable functionaries in his totalitarian regime. On the other hand, if he adheres too faithfully to Communist dogma, he may antagonize the Western Powers and non-Communlst elements within Yugoslavia whose support Is essential If nationalis to be maintained.
espite these elements of potentialTito's regime is presently stable:
Internal security forcesand efficient, and have dealtwith active opposition elements.the Cominform to penetrate andregime by subversive means have thusThere is no evidence of effectiveopposition within the countryare no serious personal rivals to
Yugoslav people seem to preferregime to the rcestablishment offrom Moscow, particularly sinceof some of the more unpopularmeasures. Tito's bold andstand In thc face of mounting Sovietpressure has appealed stronglynational pride. Even thenational minority tensions Inarc relatively quiescent. Theof Yugoslav relations withPowers, and particularly withhas met favorable popular response. In
the event of invasion, the majority ofwould probably support Tito and resist the invaders.
Soviet Capabilities for Overthrowing the Tito Rogime by Measures Short of War
ince the break between Tito and the Kremlin, an economic blockade bas beenby the Soviet orbit countries against Yugoslavia. The Cominform nations have harassed and intimidated Yugoslav diplomats and have virtually suspended diplomaticwith Yugoslavia. Cominformhasontinuous campaign against Tito, and has portrayed himascist agent"illing tool of Weslern imperialistsonspiracy to attack the Soviet orbit. Thc economic pressure on Yugoslaviaerious threat to Tito'suntil the Western Powers began tosupport.
Attempts have been made, and wuTbe continued, to undermine Tito's regime by the infiltration ot subversive agents and saboteurs. The USSR may still attempt lo stage internal uprisings Ln Yugoslavia, linked with guerrilla raids fromorm countries. It may succeed in subverting some elements of Tito's own party who may hope for an opportunity to attain powerominform regime.
Assassination of Tito by Cominform agentsontinuing possibility. Tito's deathany circurostancei wouldajor blow to the regime, but would not automatically cause its collapse. Tito's chief lieutenants are as much committed against theas Tilo himself. They would probably continue lo adhere to the present principles of the regime. Although stresses and strains would eventually develop in the absence of Tito's strong personality and leadership, ihey would not in themselves be likely to causeollapse of the regime
It is unlikely that any of the methods short of war which lhe Kremlin may use willin eliminating the present Yugoslavso long as Western support continues. Past Cominform pressure and the present con-
C
nection with the West appear to haveTito's position with the Yugoslav people. The Kremlin wdl. therefore, have to resort to armed attack to overthrow his regime.
Soviet and Satellite Armed Forcesfor Invasion of Yugoslavia
Soviet forces presently disposed inadjacent to Yugoslavia consist of six lineeach in Austria, Hungary, andare Insufficient by themselvesuccessful Invasion of Yugoslavia. Ad-ditional forces could, however, readily be drawn from the USSR to makeorcefor an invasion.
The armies of Albania. Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria have been steadily enlarged and now totalen,inivisions.he army strength of the individual Satellites has undergone the following changes:
Albania
Bulgaria
Hungary
Rumania
(In addition, the following Internal security forces are militarizedonsiderable degree and are suitable for combat:;ulgarian, Rumanian, and Hungarian army strengths are In excess of peace treatyitheriod of at leastays, total Satellite army strength coulden. organized tnine divisions.ombat brigades, and supporting independent regiments. Additionalwould be required, which might beby the USSR The armed forces of these four Satellites are now estimated to be equipped withanks, and reinforcements might be obtained on short notice from theanks now with Soviet forces In these Satellites. Satellite air forces totalombat air-
craft but their combat effectiveness is low. Satellite naval forces are negligible.
The combat effectiveness of theseforces would be relatively good, provided they operated under Soviet central direction and had the major advantage of extensive and timely Soviet logistical support.
The armies of Czechoslovakia and Poland mightubstantial Satellite reserve in case of need. However, the political and logistical problems Involved In their use against Yugoslavia are so great that thisseems remote.
Yugoslav Miliiary Forces Available for Defenso
he Yugoslav Armyurrent strength ofen. organized Inivisions, and could be expanded lnaysen organized Inivisions. Yugoslaviaurther mobilizationof upillion men within six months, but units beyondivisions could be armed only with light infantry weapons and some field artillery. However, this additionalwould assure an adequate flow of Yugoslav Army weapons are generally serviceable, but heterogeneous. Soviet nnd German World Warypes Quantities are adequate to bring at least existing divisions uptrength in most categories,urplus of small arms. Some ammunition stocks arc believed to be sufficient for several months of war. However. Yugoslav combat effectiveness would rapidly deteriorateay because ofto obtain materiel to replace that lost In combat Yugoslav combat units appear to be short of crew-served antitank weaponsself-propelled guns) and tanks, and are seriously deficient In antiaircraft artillery.
he Yugoslav Air Force received an8O0 aircraftwo-year level of supply from the USSR about four years ago, but this equipment is now of doubtful value for sustained combat operations. Locking Western military assistance, the capabilities of the Yugoslav Air Force will continues air forces In general convert to Jet aircraft, the Yugoslav Air Force
- ir rn tit
become increasingly obsolescent.now assigned to the air force. of whichre
in tactical units.
The Yugoslav Navy Is small and inefficient but Is nevertheless capable of successfullyany Satellite naval operation.
Yugoslav forces arc capable of goodperformance, and would be especiallyIn the defense of the mountainous area of Bosnia. Herzegovina, and Montenegro. Many of the officers and non-commissioned officers had combat experience In World War II and have had fairly good training since then.
lft. In present circumstances, only limitedcan be expected ln Yugoslavcapabilitieshe Yugoslavs are currently attempting to purchase arms and equipment from foreign sources, particularly ammunition and spare parts for Soviet and German equipment now in use. Someis manufactured locally, but production is limited, and it will be some time before new equipment can be produced in adequate
Vulnerability of Yugoslavia to Invasion
of the areas along Yugoslavia'sfrontiers are highly vulnerable tofrom the neighboring SatelliteYugoslavia, includingnorthern Croatia, could be quickly cutthe rest of the countryrivefrom Hungary through Zagreb The country north of the SavaZagreb and the Danube could alsoinvadedumber of pointsHungarian frontier. The Danubianof Belgrade is especially vulnerableattacks from cither Hungary or The Belgrade area would be hardagainst attacks across theor from the south through thevalley. Yugoslav Macedonia mightoff by an atiack from Bulgaria.
industrial centers of Yugoslavia,the army currently depends forare located for thc most part In the low-
land areas that could be overrun soon after hostilities hadonsiderable effort has been made to develop new Industrial installations In less vulnerable areas, as around Sarajevo. The production of these new plants would, as long as they could be kept in operation, partially offset the loss of those In more vulnerable areas. The better agricultural lands are also In the lowland areas and food would, at thc outset,ritical problem. Rail and motor routes from Trieste and Flume could be cut off at an early stage of the operations by an attack from Hungary.
large mountainous area whichBosnia, Herzegovina, andsuitable for the maintenance of aFood and munitions are nowIn thc mountainous regions, butwould probably not suffice forhostilities. Defense of thiswould depend on auch Westerncould be supplied through severalgood ports and airfields along thccoast Transportation facilitiesports are, however, extremelythe road and rail routes fromin turn could be cut off by attackand Albania,
Proboble Outcomeatellite or Soviet-Satollito Invasion of Yugoslavia
combined armies of Bulgaria.Hungary, and Albania, If givenand full logistical support bycouldustained Invasionwhich would force theback into the mountainous regionsHerzegovina, and Montenegro.forces could gradually gainthc principal lines of communicationthese mountainous regions. Thewould continue to resist, however,conduct guerrilla operations longcollapse of formal military resistance.
nder present conditions Jointforces could successfully invadeovercome formal military resistance, and eventually render guerrilla operations
ugoslav capabilities and morale are such that substantial and continuing Westernin military supplies and equipment would probably enable Yugoslavia torganized military resistancealel-attack Indefinitely, at least In therea. Such assistance could extendod of resistance even in the caseull-scale Soviet-Satellite atuck. Such assistance, however, would have lo Include aid in the form of equipment which could be readilyInto Yugoslav units (which are now chiefly equipped with weapons of Soviet,and Yugoslavould have to be delivered several months in advance of an attack, and would have to be on abasis. In particular, the acquisition of certain types of equipment, such as antitank weapons and rocket launchers, couldimprove Yugoslav combat capabilities, but only after Yugoslav personnel had been trained in their use. In the last analysis. Western support would have to becale large enough to neutralize the effect of Soviet logistical support lo the Satellite forces-Likelihood of Satellite orite Invasion of Yugoslaviaincehere have beenof increasing military preparations in thc Satellite states. The strength of their armed forces has been substantially increased. These forces have been largely re-equlpped with Soviet materiel and have engaged inlarge-scale maneuveis. occasionally Ln conjunction with Soviet occupation forces in Hungary and Rumania. Except forthey have substantial numbersanks. Recently, JS heavy tanks and self-propelled guns have appeared with the Hungarian forces. Extensive gasoline and food rationing points to stockpiling operations. Civilian defense measures have been Increased registration for military service. Including the medical profession, has been instituted, and security measures have been tightened. There have been recurrent concentrations of Satellite troops along the Yugoslav border and border incidents have increased- There have been rumors from Comlnform circles of an Impending attack on
Yugoslavia this spring. Comlnformsince0 has consistently alleged that Yugoslavia intends to attack Albania and Bulgaria. For the first time. Tito has begun to admit uneasiness. He is seeking arms from Western European powers and has attempted Increasingly lo lie Yugoslavia lo thc UNof collective security. He has improved his relations with Austria, Italy, and Oreece.
hc foregoing developments suggest that the groundwork ls being laidossibleof Yugoslavia. They do not provide, however, conclusive evidence of an intention to attack Yugoslavia because there have been military build-ups In Satellites other than those adjacent to Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the preparations in Bulgaria and Albania could point to an attack on Greece or Turkey as well as on Yugoslavia. Neither Is there conclusive evidence that preparations for an attack on Yugoslavia are timedinally, although Cominform propaganda since July has consistently advancedlhat could be used to justify an attack on Yugoslavia, there has been no recent trend. In such propaganda suggesting an attack at an early date. Despite the fact that current Indications are Inconclusive, however, they are nevertheless of sufficient magnitudealelUte attack on Yugoslavia1 beerious possibility.
Tho Krernlln may estimate that thoto be gaineduccessfulof Yugoslavia would be greater1 thanater date. The Kremlin mightlhat such an invasion would serve larger Soviet purposes by demoralizing andthe peoples of Western Europe, bythe implementation of NATO plans, and by rendu lag European governmentsto accommodation to the USSR.
The Kremlin may estimate further that there wouldetter chance1 than later lhat an altack on Yugoslavia could be carried through without Incurring effective Western intervention or precipitating general war. The Kremlin might believe:
a. That Yugoslav forces could not maintain successful organized resistance withoutsupplies from the Western Powers, and
that Western military supplies of appropriate types and in sufficient quantity probably would not be forthcoming in time to
b. That Uie present unpreparedness of the Western European Powers and theirfear of general war at this time would prevent effective UN intervention, leaving the US confronted with the dilemma either ofunilaterally or of refraining from Intervention in order to maintain Western unity;
c That the US. in view of its commitmenu in Korea and its obligations to strengthen the defenses of Western Europe, would be unlikely to allocate sufficient forces to the defense of Yugoslavia; and
d. That the American people would not countenance general war with the USSR in defense of Tito.
n the other hand, the Kremlin maythat an attack on Yugoslavia would be difficult and costly and would involve more serious risk of general war than the USSR was prepared lo accepthemay conclude:
ln view of US-UN action inwould be immediate interventionthuserious drainresources of the Soviet orbit andrisk that the conflict might expandgeneral war;
the US would launch anatUck on the USSR. The USSRsupport for this conclusion in thereaction to the Korean invasion, lheand speed of subsequent USmoves to rearm Cermany and Japan,statements by certain US officialsa preventive war. Presidentwarning of0 regarding future
Communist aggression, and Secretary Ache-son's recent speciflc statement with respect to US interest in the preservation ofindependence. The Kremlin might also believe that US military leaders would welcome an occasion to use their atomicbefore thc USSR had further built up its defensive and retaliatory capabilities.
Finally, It is possible that the KremlinIs, or1 will become, fully prepared for the eventuality of general war. Inase, the USSR might launch an attack on Yugoslavia regardless of Its estimate of the risks involved.
On thc basis of evidence available, it is impossible lo determine what course theis likely to adopt. However, thc extent of Satellite miliiary and propagandaindicates lhat an attack on Yugoslavia1 should beerious
If the Kremlin decides to launch an atiack on Yugoslaviae believe that it will probably employ Satellite forces alone, with "unofficial" Sovietatellite attack on Yugoslavia would have the apparentof great flexibility; it would offer scope for increasing or decreasing the scale of Soviet intervention and leave open the possibility ofettlement of that conflict if It threatened to expandeneral war which, at the time, the Kremlin was unwilling to accept
On thc other hand. It Is possible that the Kremlin might decideombinedattack on Yugoslavia, In thethat ll could thus achieve such prompt and decisive results as to confront thePowersail accompit before they could effectively intervene.
Original document.
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