NIE 20 RESISTANCE OF THAILAND, BURMA, AND MALAYA TO COMMUNIST PRESSURES IN THE

Created: 3/20/1951

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

national intelligence estimate

RESISTANCE OF THAILAND, BURMA, AND MALAYA TO COMMUNIST PRESSURES IN THE EVENTOMMUNIST VICTORY IN INDOCHINA1

NIE-20

The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staffin the preparation of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee have given their concurrence to the estimate. This paper is based onavailable on

RESISTANCE OF THAILAND, BURMA, AND MALAYA TO COMMUNIST PRESSURES IN THE EVENTOMMUNIST VICTORY IN INDOCHINA1

the problem

To assess the will and ability of Thailand, Burma, and Malaya to resist Communist political and military pressures or outright invasion in the eventommunist victory in Indochina

CONCLUSIONS

A Viet Minh victory in Indochinaf accomplished without theof Chinese Communist forces, would result in increased intimidation and subversive activity directed against Thailand and Burma, but it would not necessarily lead to the earlyof Communist orgovernments in these two countries.

A Viet Minh victory in Indochinaf accomplished through Chinese Communist military intervention, would increase the susceptibility of Thailand and Burma to Communist pressures and we believe that, in the absence of effective internal countermeasures and outside support, these two countries would be obliged to seek an accommodation with the Communist powers.

Communist domination of Thailand and Burma, as well as Indochina, would greatly increase British security problems in Malaya. We believe that the British under these circumstances would not be able to maintain even their presentof control in Malayaery considerable increase in their military and economic commitments.

It is most unlikely that the Viet Minh, without Chinese Communistwould attempt to conquer Thailand and Burma

If the Chinese Communists, aftercontrol over Indochina,their military advance into Burma and Thailand, we believe that both those countries would rapidly fall to theunless the UN or the Western Powers interposed their ownhinese Communist invasion of Malaya would be more difficult, but wouldsucceed unless Malaya were greatly reinforced.

It is most improbableegional defense of Southeast Asia could bein time to stop the Chineseif they followed up the conquest of Indochina1ilitary advance into other countries of the area.

E CAST

SECJWIT

DISCUSSION

the event that the Viet Minh shouldin conquering Indochina duringlarge-scale intervention byforces, the prestige of Howould be greatly enhancedAsia. Furthermore, the defeatFrench Union forces despite USintensify the feeling of Insecurity incountries and facilitateof Communism in the area.

if the Viet Minh did notthe intention, either alone or Inwith the Chinese Communists, tofurther military aggression, theof Burma and Thailand wouldoppose Communism internally andalign themselves with theBurma would probablyViet Minh Government and attemptfriendly relations with it. Theof Thailand, although it alsothe Viet Minh Government,to build up its own defensesforces and undoubtedly wouldincreased US aid,

Viet Minh victory, nevertheless,Burma and Thailand to Increasedand Intimidation which. In theeffective Internal countermeasuresmight not be capable of taking)aid, might well lead to theof the present non-CommunistUnder such circumstances,security problem In Malaya wouldmagnified.

participation of Chinesemilitary forcesiet Minhcause far greater repercussionsAsiaictory by the VietIt would be interpreted as aChinese arms ratherictorynationalism. ThroughoutAsia, where there istrongfor the Chinese, it would intensifyChinese Invasion and domination. Inthe general weakness of the countries inhowever, Chinese CommunistIn Indochina wouldwill of Thailand and Burma to resistIncrease the probability that they would accommodate with the Communist powers.

would probably concludefailure of the US-backed Frenchthat the present type of US aidbe sufficient to provide protection.circumstances, the That would beyield to military and political pressurewith Communist offers ofpolitical terms in exchange forgovernment. Initially, thewould probably attempt topressure by calling for full UNmilitary protection. Should It fail tosuch protection, the present Thaiwould probably be superseded byto the Communists.

would not be likely to yield tomilitary threats or politicalBurma itself, however, thereforces potentially capable ofthe government. If thesecure control of Thailand, withaccess to Uie Thai-Burma border,beetter position to reinforceelements. Sufficient outsidefor the dissidents, combined withwould make it unlikely thatretain an anti-Communist government.

n Malaya, the British, with0 regular troopsegular andpolice, have not succeeded In suppressingocal Communist guerrillas. The Malays, although forming the bulk of tbe present police force and generally supporting the British out of fear of the Chinese, would continue to contribute little to the British military effort if opposition were Increased. The aggressive and economically powerful Chinese element has generally failed towith the British in suppressing the guerrillas,onsiderable number of them could be expected to turn against the British if Malaya were seriously threatened byChina. Furthermore, Communist control over Indochina, Thailand, and Burma would facilitate transborder aid to therebels and deprice Malaya of itsrice supply. In these circumstances, the

to the British would becomeunmanageable, and the British would not be able to maintain even theirdegree of control in Malayaery considerable Increase In their military and economic commitment.

We believe that an attempt to conquer Thailand or Burma by the Viet Minh without Chinese Communist participation islthough border incursions of northeast Thailand cannot be excluded.

If the Chinese Communists,ictory in Indochina,ilitary advance into Burma and Thailand and if the UN or the Western Powers did not Interpose their own forces, we believe tluit both these countries would rapidly fall to the Communists because they do not possess the military strength to resist such an invasion. Thailand, perhapsoken resistance, would soonovernment acceptable to the Communists in the hope of retaining atemblance of autonomy. Burma, If directly attacked, would probably fight but would soon beA Chinese Communist invasion of Malaya would be more difficult because of the terrain and the presence of British military

forces, but it would probably succeedalaya were greatly reinforced.

Present or planned outside military aid to Burma and Thailand, although it willstrengthen these countries, will not in the predictable future enable either of them to defend Itself successfullyhinese Communist attack. Military aid towhich has been chieflybeen of limited effectiveness owing to lack of Burmese cooperation, and because it has been largely expended in the Burmese internal conflict. The US aid planned for Thailand, whenwould help Thailand to maintainsecurity, but would not enable it to do more thanelaying actionhinese Communist invasion. The Thai, however, would probably not fight even aaction unless previously assured of support by outside military forces.

In view of the limited capabilities of the countries of Southeast Asia and their wideof interest, it is most improbableegional defense of Southeast Asiae organized In time to stop tho Chineseii they followed up the conquest of Indochina1ilitary advance into other countries of the area.

SECJ*ET

Original document.

---

---